Sochinenie protiv terrora

sochinenie protiv terrora

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The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz: Mikhail Zoshchenko and the "Simple-Souled" Soviet Reception of Jazz

The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz: Mikhail Zoshchenko and the “Simple-Souled” Soviet Reception of Jazz JASON CIEPLY A t first glance, Mikhail Zoshchenko sochinenie protiv terrora seem an unusual choice for a study of revolutionary enthusiasm in early-Soviet literature. As a satire writer whose object was everyday Soviet life, Zoshchenko developed the reputation of an inveterate pessimist and a misanthrope, or, in the words of one contemporary critic, a slanderer of the revolutionary project with “no love for humankind or faith its future.”1 But to cast Zoshchenko simply as a pessimist is to ignore one of the most prominent features of his prose: the contagious, high-spirited, and enduring optimism of so many of his narrators. For all of their comic failures and intellectual shortcomings, sochinenie protiv terrora, Zoshchenko’s narrators tend to view themselves and others with a new dignity merited by a sense of having participated in revolutionary history. For instance, upward mobility in the new Soviet bureaucratic institutions gives one narrator a sense of cosmic interconnectedness and meaning, the intoxicating feeling of being a “participant, so to speak, in the flow of life, a little cog in life’s rotating mechanism, something This article benefited from invaluable feedback and years sochinenie protiv terrora revisions in dialogue with Monika Greenleaf, Gregory Freidin, and Gabriella Safran. It also developed in conversations at the Stanford Humanities Center, Princeton University, the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Southern California, Yale University, sochinenie protiv terrora, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Hamilton Sochinenie protiv terrora, where Sochinenie protiv terrora gave invited lectures on the subject, sochinenie protiv terrora. I would also like to thank Russian Review editor Michael Gorham, Kurt Schultz, and my anonymous readers. I am grateful to the staff of the Russian National Library and the State Literary Museum of the Twentieth Century in St. Petersburg, where I conducted research toward this article. This research was carried out with the support of the Department of Slavic Languages, the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Europe Center at Stanford University, the Fulbright Program, and the Higher School of Economics in St, sochinenie protiv terrora. Petersburg, Sochinenie protiv terrora. 1 M. Ol'shevets, “Obyvatel'skii nabat (O ‘Sentimental'nykh povestiakh’ M. Zoshchenko),” Izvestiia, August 14, 1927. The Russian Review 79 (July 2020): 389–414 Copyright 2020 The Russian Review 390 Jason Cieply like an equal shareholder in the feelings of humanity.”2 The challenge that Zoshchenko poses to his readers is to learn to discern the ardent revolutionary feeling that shapes narrative voice in his fiction in its opposition to the pessimistic gaze of the satirical authorial mask. Zoshchenko rtc error samsung mp3 by no means an optimist with regard sochinenie protiv terrora the revolutionary project, but his fiction is enthusiastic in the modern, post-Kantian political-philosophical sense. His sochinenie protiv terrora author aspires to understand himself as a political subject through the sympathetic contemplation of the feelings of the lower-class revolutionary actor. Zoshchenko subjects his own enthusiastic narrative structure and sochinenie protiv terrora buoyant revolutionary feeling to which it gives expression to probing self-reflexive scrutiny in his 1927 story, “Simplicity of Soul.” This miniature masterpiece occupies about a third of a broadsheet page in the satirical journal Begemot.3 The Russian title, “Dushevnaia prostota,” spans the range of connotations from mental deficiency, holy foolishness, and self-absorption to good-natured naïveté, sochinenie protiv terrora, authenticity, and joie-de-vivre. Between these extremes and at the core of “Simplicity of Soul” is a profoundly pithy image of the ill-informed, inarticulate, often violent, but nevertheless infectious feeling that, I argue, is the object of so much authorial interest in Zoshchenko’s short fiction. Zoshchenko’s narrator recounts how his harmonious, contact-free walk alongside a “broad-shouldered,” “healthy,” and “charming citizen” is interrupted when he absent-mindedly steps on the stranger’s heel. Awaiting his “due punishment,” the ear-boxing routinely exchanged by Zoshchenko’s nervous, city- dwelling characters, sochinenie protiv terrora, the narrator is astounded when the charming citizen passes on without a glance.4 The lesson, and the narrator’s new take on Soviet shoving, is that “it’s a matter of simplicity of soul. . No malevolence. You step on someone, someone steps on you, and you tramp onward.”5 The narrator frames this story with a seemingly unrelated event: the arrival of a so-called Negro-Operetta in the Soviet Sochinenie protiv terrora. The operetta in question was Sam Wooding’s Chocolate Kiddies, a real American jazz ensemble that, in 1926, was invited to give three months of performances under this dubious designation in Moscow and 2 Mikhail Zoshchenko, “Madonna,” in his Sochineniia, 7 vols., sochinenie protiv terrora, ed. I. N. Sukhikh (Moscow, 2008), 1:327. 3 As Aleksander Zholkovsky notes, “Simplicity of Soul” is “laconic even by Zoshchenko’s standards.” See Aleksandr Konstantinovich Zholkovskii, Mikhail Zoshchenko: Poetika nedoveriia (Moscow, 1999), 48. In the 1990s the story received relatively significant scholarly attention, first in Cathy Popkin, Pragmatics of Insignificance: Chekhov, Zoshchenko, Gogol (Stanford, 1993), and then error sending reply scan_abort_cmd Zholkovsky’s 1999 monograph cited at the beginning of this footnote, making it a central text in Zoshchenko’s immediate post-Soviet reception. Popkin offers important insight into the narratological parameters of eventfulness in Zoshchenko’s fiction and into the fragmentary, anecdotal nature of Zoshchenko’s prose miniatures. As Zholkovsky and Gregory Carleton have argued, however, Popkin misconstrues Zoshchenko’s open-ended narrative irony as narrowly anti-Soviet “insurrection” against “the regime” and, in this way, sochinenie protiv terrora, aligns her reading with those of those of her Cold-War predecessors. See Popkin, Pragmatics of Insignificance, 122; Zholkovsky, Mikhail Zoshchenko, 54; and Gregory Carleton, The Politics of Reception: Critical Constructions of Mikhail Zoshchenko (Evanston, 1998), 168. Zholkovsky’s objective in making this welcome intervention in the reception of Zoshchenko as proto-dissident is to turn away from “cultural-sociological” interpretation altogether. The hybrid semiotic psychoanalysis which he offers in its place has produced a wealth of important insight into Zoshchenko’s personality and creative oeuvre. It does so, however, at the expense of passing over some of the key social and political dimensions of Zoshchenko’s skaz project which are the focus of this article. 4 Zoshchenko, “Dushevnaia prostota,” Begemot, no, sochinenie protiv terrora. 32 (1927): 5. 5 Ibid. sochinenie protiv terrora runtime error 11 vb The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 391 Leningrad.6 Soviet audiences had heard a great deal about jazz song and dance from the European capitals. In the culturally liberal years of the New Economic Policy, sochinenie protiv terrora, they were to have one of their first authentic encounters. The group had created a sensation in Europe with their variety revue of jazz, comedic sketches, spirituals, and popular American songs and dances. Composer and director Sam Wooding brought his eleven- piece orchestra and thirty-some singers and dancers. The ensemble included trumpeter Tommy Ladnier, trombonist Herbert Auth error dle, singers Adelaide Hall and Arthur “Strut” Payne, the vaudeville act Rufus Greenlee and Thadeus Drayton, and the Three Eddies, a famous tap-dancing trio.7 The organic excitement and curiosity which the Chocolate Kiddies evoked, even before their arrival, was well documented in the press. For Soviet critics, the group presented an opportunity to sample European tastes. But the artists also provided the occasion for critics to project their own emancipatory political rhetoric, quite enthusiastically and with all manner of racist tropes, sochinenie protiv terrora, onto a marginalized and, by and large, imaginary foreign other. Zoshchenko addresses this agonizingly misguided but ultimately well-meaning enthusiasm in “Simplicity of Soul.” Recalling one band member’s complaint about shoving on Soviet streets, Zoshchenko’s narrator expresses his certainty that the band’s visit to Soviet Russia will rid them of the bourgeois squeamishness that they picked up in Europe and restore their “simple- souled” nature. The racist punch-line connecting the foot-stomping to the frame is that Soviet streets seem uncivilized even to these performers, whom the narrator takes to be African “primitives,” dipped in a thin, removable layer of European civilization. There is more to this story, however, than crude, racially motivated humor. The anecdote about the Chocolate Kiddies’ impressions of the Soviet Union derives from a real feuilleton, which was printed in sochinenie protiv terrora special issue of the journal Circus, devoted to the performers. The underlying significance of the frame is that it redirects the critique of simplicity of soul toward contemporary reviews of the Chocolate Kiddies’ performances, sochinenie protiv terrora. Zoshchenko’s satire of Soviet responses to jazz sheds light on the racial prejudice and interpretive violence that sochinenie protiv terrora Soviet critics’ reading of this emancipatory, transnational art form. Zoshchenko, sochinenie protiv terrora, however, voices his satire in an idiosyncratic skaz form that sidesteps any reading of “Simplicity of Soul” as straightforward criticism of Soviet racial politics or an exposé of Soviet public manners. Skaz is a first-person narrative style that was born of nineteenth-century populist traditions and widely practiced in the first decade of the Russian 6 The use of the Russian words negritianskaia and negr, in the name of the ensemble as in this story, is more or less analogous to contemporary English-language usage of “Negro” and is undoubtedly charged with racial and, sochinenie protiv terrora, often, racist humor, sochinenie protiv terrora. The choice of the term operetta was inaccurate in terms of genre and, as I will explain later, not made by the Chocolate Kiddies. I am indebted to Zholkovsky for 7f post error the context of the Chocolate Kiddies’ tour and pointing to a special issue of Tsirk that was devoted to the Chocolate Kiddies’ performances and that, as I have discovered, served as the inspiration for this article. See Zholkovsky, Mikhail Zoshchenko, 49; and Negritianskaia operetta: Spetsialnyi vypusk vmesto ocherednogo nomera zhurnala “Tsirk” (Moscow, 1926), sochinenie protiv terrora. S. Frederick Starr’s incomparable book on jazz and Soviet culture offers an illuminating account of the Chocolate Kiddies’ Soviet tour and was instrumental in orienting me and my scholarship in the world of Soviet jazz (Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1991, With a New Chapter on the Final Years [New York, 1994], 54–77). sochinenie protiv terrora Björn Englund, “Chocolate Kiddies: The Show that Brought Jazz to Europe and Russia in 1925,” Storyville, no. 62 (December 1975–January 1976): 45; Garvin Bushell and Mark Tucker, “On The Road with the Chocolate Kiddies in Europe and South America, 1925–1927,” Storyville, no. 131 (September 1, 1987): 183–84. 392 Jason Cieply Revolution. It tends to have a folksy or tongue-tied quality and often contains lower-class or otherwise socially marked speech. It has been defined by the formalist Boris Eikhenbaum as an imitation of improvised, oral speech and by Mikhail Bakhtin as an orientation toward the speech of the other.8 Much, sochinenie protiv terrora, however, is elided in these formal accounts of skaz. In particular, these definitions do little to establish the aesthetic and ideological motivations that drew intellectuals to imitate the simple speech of ordinary Soviet people. Zoshchenko gives the most revealing account of his own motivations in his 1928 article, “About Myself, Critics, and My Work.” He writes, “The thing is, I’m a proletarian writer. More precisely, in my works I parody that imaginary but authentic proletarian writer, who might exist in our current circumstances of life and in our current environment. Of course, such a writer cannot exist, at least now.”9 In what is essentially a retrospective defense of his skaz project, Zoshchenko positions his performances of proletarian identity as a nuanced, if enigmatic response to the Communist party’s stance on proletarian culture. As Lev Trotsky put it in his 1923 Literature and Revolution, “there is not and will never be” such a thing as proletarian art. Presently, the proletariat must devote its energies toward seizing power, not toward culture. In the future, the proletariat will liberate itself from its class nature and produce a universal, socialist culture. In the meantime, the intelligentsia should act and speak in its name, as a revolutionary vanguard.10 Trotsky astutely identified fellow travelers like Zoshchenko to be the sochinenie protiv terrora to the “peasantifying” nineteenth-century populists.11 He was right, moreover, in fearing that their sympathies lay more with the lower-class spontaneity that figures in Eikhenbaum’s association of skaz with improvisation than with an ideal proletarian consciousness.12 Zoshchenko was no exception in this respect, but his fetishization of spontaneous “proletarian” speech was as richly ironic as his claim to revolutionary vanguardism. I propose that we may deepen our understanding of skaz and the network of interclass feelings to which it gives expression by examining it through the prism of the philosophical history of enthusiasm. Since antiquity, philosophers have applied the concept of enthusiasm to phenomena ranging from solitary creative inspiration to the collective consciousness of congregations, sochinenie protiv terrora, reading publics, warring nations, and, ultimately, individual classes in revolutionary societies. The concept of enthusiasm, as developed by Plato, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and, later, Lenin, sochinenie protiv terrora, had a profound influence on the Russian intelligentsia. In Soviet society, these ideas culminated during the First Five-Year Plan in the concept of “labor enthusiasm.” The demands of industrialization, interpreted through the new “dialectical” currents of Soviet Marxism, deemed enthusiasm an emotional disposition necessary for attaining political consciousness and constructing a socialist society. 8 B. M. Eikhenbaum, “Leskov i sovremennaia literatura,” O literature (Moscow, 1987), 413; idem, “Illiuziia skaza,” Skvoz' literature: Sbornik statei (Leningrad, 1924), 153; M. M. Bakhtin, Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo, in Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, 7 vols., ed. S. G, sochinenie protiv terrora. Bocharev and L. S. Melikhova. (Moscow, 1996–2003), 2:88. sochinenie protiv terrora Zoshchenko, “O sebe, o kritikakh i o svoei rabote,” Sochineniia, 1:111. 10 L. Trotskii, Literatura i revoliutsiia, 2nd ed, (Moscow, 1924), 146–47, 153, 194. 11 Ibid., 24. 12 Ibid., 66, 79, 83, 87, 165–66. The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 393 But these ideas also inspired the notion, beautifully articulated in Mandelstam’s 1921 essay, “World and Culture,” that the poet in times of revolution engages in a sort of world- historical glossolalia.13 In his study of the language culture sochinenie protiv terrora the early Soviet years, Michael Gorham makes compelling use of the metaphor of “speaking in tongues,” arguing that it serves to highlight both the “divine understanding” and the “mundane confusion” which resulted from the revolutionary voice in the 1920s.14 For good reason, Gorham focuses on the tendency of inspired speech to devolve into “unintelligible . gibberish” and on its ultimate failure to attain linguistic authority. In this vein, he interprets skaz as “a parodic device that depends precisely on the undermining of narrative authority,” arguing that it was used to depict the failures of the tongue-tied “new Soviet writer-intellectual.”15 I pick up where Gorham leaves off, attempting to establish what it was that was communicated sochinenie protiv terrora these enthusiastic voices in spite of, and, often, by way of their failures. For the skaz author, as for the Greek enthusiast, “speaking in tongues” represents an attempt to step outside one’s own subjective vantage point by penetrating into the mind of the other, a divine other reinvented, in the wake of the French Revolution, as the revolutionary class. The appeal of skaz lies in its enthusiastic fantasy of unmediated identity with and knowledge of its object. The “illusion,” to borrow Eikhenbaum’s apt word, of spontaneous, oral, lower-class speech achieved in writing by an educated author remains just that, an illusion.16 It cannot become a platform for enabling the subaltern to speak, and by these standards, the phenomena of revolutionary voice were always doomed to failure. The defamiliarizing mediation of the imagined consciousness of the other, however, still enables the enthusiast to achieve a revelatory conceptual shift. Skaz authors spoke in tongues in the hopes of discerning the voice of the future socialist person in the chaotic intonations of the revolutionary present, sochinenie protiv terrora. It sochinenie protiv terrora served as a device for resisting the pull of sochinenie protiv terrora own ideologies. As opposed to self-consciously dialectical writers like Andrei Platonov, Zoshchenko’s first-person narrative mask was inspired more by Silver Age mythology than by dialectical philosophy of the Hegelian or Marxist varieties.17 Like many European modernists, however, Zoshchenko was enamored of Friedrich Nietzsche’s account of the Apollonian-Dionysian opposition at the root of the tragic form, an aesthetic framework that, as Walter Kaufmann argues, is just as dialectical as Hegel’s.18 Zoshchenko found in Nietzsche a foundational myth for his primitivist cultural project, which involved acting as the archetypical Apollonian artist. Zoshchenko forged a skaz mask in order to stand in for the non-existent, indeed, impossible “proletarian writer,” 13 O. E. Mandel'shtam, “Slovo i kul'tura,” in his Sobranie sochinenii v chetyrekh tomakh, sochinenie protiv terrora, sochinenie protiv terrora. G. P. Struve and B. A. Filippov (Moscow, 1991), 2:227. 14 Michael S, sochinenie protiv terrora. Sochinenie protiv terrora, Speaking in Soviet Tongues: Language Culture and the Politics of Voice in Revolutionary Russia (DeKalb, 2003), 15–16, 21. 15 Ibid., 21, 87. 16 Eikhenbaum, “Illiuziia skaza,” 153, 154. 17 For a clear articulation of the dialectical model of narrative fiction which Platonov developed to give expression to the revolutionary feeling of the collective sochinenie protiv terrora socialist laborers, see the unpublished original draft of his preface for For Future Use: A Poor Peasant’s Chronicle (Vprok: Bedniatskaia khronika) in Natalia Kornienko, “Istoriia teksta povesti Vprok i iazyk otrechenii Platonova,” Istoriia teksta i biografiia A. P. Platonova (1926–1946), Zdes' i teper', no. 1 (1993): 152–53. 18 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princeton, 1974), 235–36. 394 Jason Cieply a dialectical encounter sochinenie protiv terrora he hoped would give voice to the unspoken “revolutionary” insight of the Dionysian masses. For self-critical, populist intellectuals like Zoshchenko, skaz’s mimetic attraction lay in its apparent capacity to tear off the Apollonian veil. They sought to produce images of self and other, which, in their carefully elaborated dialectical opposition, would enable them to lay bare and transcend the limitations of their own conceptual frameworks. Introducing the voices of these African American artists into his story sochinenie protiv terrora Zoshchenko articulate the inevitably contingent, “illusory,” and problematic nature of the images sochinenie protiv terrora through such enthusiastic objectifications. At the same time, he makes an implicit defense of his own skaz performances. For all of its faults, skaz gave verbal expression to the processes of political subjectification which were played out dialogically across class, and, in this case, racial lines and which comprised the real, revolutionary event of the Soviet 1920s. THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET ENTHUSIASM The notion of revolutionary enthusiasm figured prominently in the political slogans of the First Five-Year Plan, in the practice of socialist competitions, and in the Stakhanovite movement. Enthusiasm was prescribed by the state as the emotional disposition necessary for the attainment of political consciousness and the construction of a socialist society. Lewis Draeger fabius gs user manual and errors and Ronald Suny identify three distinct positions within the historiography on enthusiasm: the Soviet claim that it played central role in socialist construction, the contemporary, non-Soviet argument that such “enthusiasm was manufactured” and that “workers derived little or no benefit from industrialization,” and the basic “revisionist” contention that such enthusiasm was genuine and widespread among young, skilled workers who identified with the aims of socialist construction.19 These debates aside, enthusiasm remains largely unconceptualized in studies of early Soviet society. By contrast, enthusiasm has emerged as an important field of scholarly inquiry in studies of early Christianity, medieval medicine, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, modern capitalism, and Romantic poetry.20 In order to come to an understanding of enthusiasm in the early-Soviet conceptual universe, we must trace its origins and development in religious, aesthetic, and political philosophy. 19 Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Class Backwards? In Search of the Soviet Working Class,” in Making Soviet Workers: Power, Class, and Identity, ed. Siegelbaum and Suny (Ithaca, 1994), 11. 20 Key contributions to this developing 500 rssl websphere mq gate internal error include James Farr, “Political Science and the Enlightenment of Enthusiasm,” American Political Science Review 82:1 (1988): 51–69; Steven Goldsmith, “William Blake and the Future of Enthusiasm,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 63:1 (2009): 439–60; Michael Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable”: Error bios checksum Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Login error 2 Centuries (New York: 1995); Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History (Chicago, 2012); Shaun Irlam, Elations: The Poetics of Enthusiasm in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Stanford, 1999); Mikhail Iampol'skii, “Entuziazm,” in Fiziologiia simvolicheskogo, book 1, Vozvrashchenie leviafana: Politicheskaia teologiia, reprezentatsiia vlasti i konets Starogo rezhima (Moscow, 2004): 412–26; Lawrence E. Klein, “Sociability, Solitude, and Enthusiasm,” in Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650–1850, ed. Lawrence E. Klein and Anthony J. La Vopa (San Marino, 1998): 153–77; John Mee, Dangerous Enthusiasm: William Blake and the Culture of Radicalism in the 1790’s (Oxford, 1992); idem, Romanticism, Enthusiasm, And Regulation: Poetics And the Policing of Culture in the Romantic Period ruby invalid multibyte char us-ascii syntaxerror, 2003); J. G. A. Pocock, The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 395 The etymology of enthusiasm goes back to the Greek åíèåïò, sochinenie protiv terrora, or en-theos, meaning “possessed by a God” or, literally, “in God.”21 Enthusiasm figures prominently in Plato’s discussions of epistemology and rhetoric. Socrates describes it as a “divine madness” which plays a central role in prophecy, healing, poetry, and love.22 The concept originates in the ecstatic visions of the Dionysian cult and implies an intoxicated transport into the mind of God, sochinenie protiv terrora, where the enthusiast is granted an unmediated glimpse of the higher reality of the heavenly Forms.23 Translating the insight attained therein into the rational categories of mutually comprehensible human language, however, necessarily sochinenie protiv terrora the corruption of this pure vision. Socrates identifies enthusiastic ways of knowing and transmitting knowledge which limit this process of corruption. He puts forth his ideal of dialectical thinking, a “form of madness,” which involves learning to operate between “divisions error 80 p55bt collections” and, thereby, discovering the kinship between part and whole, between earthly and divine love, and between moral self and divine other.24 The enthusiastic moment in this dialectic “follow[s] the objective articulation” and is defined by a vision of “dispersed plurality [brought] under a single form.” Though illusory, this vision is instrumental in attaining “lucidity and consistency.”25 This revelatory experience, however, sochinenie protiv terrora, is compromised if forced into the “dead discourse” of written language, which according to Socrates, is but a shadow- like image in relation to his ideal of “living speech.”26 By contrast, the “living speech” of the enthusiast knows to whom it is addressed and how to address these listeners. Much like the dialogic word in Bakhtin’s linguistic philosophy, it sidesteps the deadening univocality of written speech.27 Indeed, Socrates’ conception of enthusiastic discourse is very much consonant with the linguistic sensibilities of the early Soviet years, when populist intellectuals announced the rebellion of colloquial voices against written literary language and hailed the foregrounding of the narrator’s “living word” in skaz.28 In the millennia since, enthusiasm became a key concept in aesthetic philosophy, early medicine, bsod 9c error critiques of organized religion. During the Early Modern period, Enlightenment philosophers like the Third Earl of Shaftesbury used the term as an epithet for what they regarded as fanatical Protestant religiosity.29 But Shaftesbury also recognized “Enthusiasm: The Antiself of Enlightenment,” in Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650–1850, 7– 28; Pocock, “Edmund Burke and the Redefinition of Enthusiasm: The Context as Counter-Revolution,” in The Transformation of Political Culture, 1789–1848, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf (Oxford, 1989), 17–36; Jordana Rosenberg, Critical Enthusiasm: Capital Accumulation and the Transformation of Religious Passion (Oxford, 2011); and Anthony J. La Vopa, “The Philosopher and the Schwärmer: On the Career of a German Epithet from Luther to Kant,” in Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, sochinenie protiv terrora, 1650–1850, 85–115. 21 OED Online, s. v. “enthusiasm, n.,” September 2012, Oxford University Press, sochinenie protiv terrora, Entry/62879?redirectedFrom=enthusiasm (last accessed May 1, 2020). 22 Plato, Phaedrus, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and Hungington Cairns (Princeton, 1961), 491, 511. 23 Ibid., 486, 495–97, 511. 24 Ibid., 511. autodesk structure detailing rus register error 25 Ibid., 511–12. 26 sochinenie protiv terrora Ibid., sochinenie protiv terrora, 520–21. 27 Ibid., 521. 28 Eikhenbaum, “Illiuziia skaza,” 152–13; Viktor Shklovskii, “Iskusstvo kak priem,” in his Gamburgskii schet: Stat'i – vospominaniia – esse (Moscow, 1990), 71–72; Gorham, Speaking in Soviet Tongues, 12–13. 29 Klein, “Sociability, sochinenie protiv terrora, Solitude, and Enthusiasm,” 152, 159, 160, 162–63, sochinenie protiv terrora. 396 Jason Cieply the need for a qualified enthusiasm, which was necessary in order to explore the extra- rational dimensions of human experience and the relation of sochinenie protiv terrora individual to society and the universe.30 German Enlightenment philosophers linked enthusiasm to Schwärmerei or “swarm-mentality,” a “lower order of madness,” which they associated with agricultural life, mob stupidity, and self-delusion in philosophy.31 It was the French Revolution that brought enthusiasm into the realm of politics. Edmund Burke applied Enlightenment critiques of religious enthusiasm metaphorically to political radicals and their fanatical adherence to reason.32 Kant, however, distinguished between the Schwärmerei of the revolutionary crowd and the enlightened enthusiasm (Enthusiasmus) of the European reading public.33 He aimed to ground his a priori theory of moral progress in the public experience of the French Revolution. For Kant, the evidence of a “moral predisposition in the human race” lay not in the violent excesses of the Parisian crowds but “in the hearts of all spectators,” as a sort of “wishful” and “passionate participation in the good, i.e., sochinenie protiv terrora, enthusiasm” without “the least intention of assisting.”34 Thus, under Kant, enthusiasm attains significance as hair and fur error create file key mechanism of revolutionary subjectivization, but one in which the subject and object of revolutionary history are split on class lines. The inspired flight into the mind of God is replaced with the morally edifying, sympathetic contemplation of the lower-class revolutionary actor, a dynamic that will be essential to the skaz of the Soviet 1920s. In Hegel, the concept of enthusiasm figures both in the sense of the conventional, sochinenie protiv terrora, Enlightenment critique of mystical religiosity and as a key stage in his dialectical conception of human consciousness. For Hegel, the “Bacchic enthusiasm” (Hegel’s usage of the German Begeisterung or “en-spirit-ment” is usually translated as “enthusiasm,” a choice justified, here, by the association with Bacchus) involves a two-step process of self-objectification. It consists in the initial movement of the subject beyond itself and in the reciprocal penetration of abstract Spirit into the material reality of the enthusiast’s body.35 As enthusiasm scholar Jordy Rosenberg argues, Hegel understood enthusiasm as the “longing of the mind for an immediacy of sochinenie protiv terrora and identification with Spirit,” an “identification so strong that the distance between subject and object was thought to blur.”36 Though illusory, this “fantasy of immediacy” motivates the subject to undertake the next negation and, sochinenie protiv terrora, thus, provides the impulse necessary for the continued dialectical movement of thought. Skaz too is motivated by this impulse to self-objectification. It is predicated in the fantasy of identification which underlies Hegel’s definition of truth as “not to treat objects 30 Rosenberg, Critical Enthusiasm, 46. As Klein puts it, Shaftesbury “transvaluated enthusiasm,” distinguishing the narrow, self-absorbed variety of enthusiasm from the philosophical one, which was defined by “sympathy and intelligence” and which “allowed individuals to transcend the limits sochinenie protiv terrora the self or, at least, to see and situate themselves in the moral frameworks of society and cosmos” (“Sociability,” 172). 31 La Sochinenie protiv terrora, “The Philosopher and the Schwärmer,” 85–86. 32 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Indianapolis, 1987), 97; Pocock, “Edmund Burke and the Redefinition of Enthusiasm,” 19–36; Pocock, “Enthusiasm,” 24. 33 La Vopa, “The Philosopher and sochinenie protiv terrora Schwärmer,” 85–86. 34 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York, 1979), 153–57. 35 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phänomenologie des geistes, ed. Georg Lasson (Leipzig, 1907), 466; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), 439. 36 Rosenberg, Critical Enthusiasm, 9, 21. The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 397 asp linux fatal error screen not found as alien.”37 Skaz represents the theoretically problematic but, in practical terms, conceptually revelatory work of resisting the pull of one’s own ideology. It is “think[ing] against our own thought,” as Theodor Adorno defined dialectics.38 That said, the skaz author can never be subsumed entirely in the consciousness of the narrator, even in cases like Andrei Platonov’s, where the distance between them appears to approach zero. On the contrary, to the extent that the aesthetic illusion of sameness enters the reader’s consciousness, skaz only serves to further map the narratological boundaries between intellectual author and working-class narrator. A rigorous approach to the form requires that we understand class, within the work of literature, as a narrative construction, albeit one with a complex, extraliterary relation to social and linguistic reality.39 In this sense, skaz involves a hyperconscious attention both to its own limitations in depicting the working class and to the impossibility of demarcating strict class sochinenie protiv terrora in terms of narrative structure or individual artistic utterance. In the nineteenth century, enthusiasm became a fixture of liberal and socialist discourse. Nietzsche, however, channeled anti-Enlightenment critiques, deriding the “old ideals and . old enthusiasm,” the “‘practical reason,’” and the “moral fanaticism” of Kant and the eighteenth century. Nietzsche identifies the ethical problems of Kant’s reinvention of enthusiasm as a sort of subject-cultivating voyeurism for the enlightened. In reality, sochinenie protiv terrora, he argues, the French Revolution was a “gruesome farce” which, the “noble and enthusiastic spectators from all over Europe” only found “tolerable to look at . from a distance.” It had been “interpreted . according to their own indignations and enthusiasms for so long, and so passionately, that the text finally disappeared under the interpretation.”40 sochinenie protiv terrora At the same time, Nietzsche hails the emergence of a new strain of enthusiasm more akin to Schwärmerei. Nietzsche’s romantic sochinenie protiv terrora of the Dionysian ecstasies in the 1872 Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music would profoundly influence the rhetoric of enthusiasm in the Soviet period, but so would his valorization of Apollonian consciousness, 37 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Sochinenie protiv terrora der Religion. Nebst einer Schrift über die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vol. 12, sochinenie protiv terrora, ed. Philipp Marheineke et al., 2nd rev. ed. (Berlin, 1832–45), 207, cited in Georg Lukács, Sochinenie protiv terrora and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 204. 38 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York, 2007), 141, sochinenie protiv terrora. 39 It is necessary to make this corrective with regard to a narratological imprecision, which has crept into scholarship on skaz and class. On the one hand, it likely stems from the writers’ performed class identities, in our cases, Platonov, the tongue-tied sochinenie protiv terrora poet from the provinces, and Zoshchenko, the intellectual who pretended to be one. But it also reflects ticklish questions about class identity which have troubled both Soviet and contemporary Western critics. Lev Shubin formulated what has become a characteristic approach to Platonov’s authorial stance: “Introducing the image of a narrator or transferring his word to his hero . he depicted not the ‘other-ly’ word and not the ‘other-ly’ thought. Platonov remains as if inside the depicted consciousness” (Shubin, Poiski smysla otdel'nogo i obshchego sushchestvovaniia ob Andree Platonove: Raboty raznykh let [Moscow, 1987], 197). Shubin may be saved by his qualification, “as if,” but Marietta Chudakova goes further. She counterposes Platonov and Zoshchenko, arguing that “in Platonov’s prose there is sochinenie protiv terrora the distance between the author and his word which is inevitable for Zoshchenko.” Moreover, she claims, “Platonov actually was that ‘imaginary but authentic proletarian writer,’ that Zoshchenko stood in for so many years” (Chudakova, Poetika Mikhaila Zoshchenko [Moscow, 1979], 115, 116–17). 40 Friedrich Nietzsche, sochinenie protiv terrora, The Will to Power, sochinenie protiv terrora, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York, 1967), 59–60; Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, sochinenie protiv terrora, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1966), 49. 398 Jason Cieply discipline, and centralized state control.41 As far as the aesthetics of enthusiasm is concerned, what is most important in this myth is Nietzsche’s notion that the “contemplative ecstasy” of the Dionysian artist is accessible only through silence.42 Prior to the synthesis of the Apollonian and Dionysian arts, Dionysian insight could not take visible or spoken form and manifested itself only as will in the spirit of music. Nietzsche emphasizes that in the original chorus, Dionysus was not played by an actor but imagined by the reveler in a state of ecstasy.43 It is only in the mask forged by Apollo that Dionysus and his insight into the “the inside and terrors of nature” take visual form.44 Likewise, it is Apollo’s so-called “fictive” subjectivity that enables Dionysus to speak, sochinenie protiv terrora, for the first time, as a sochinenie protiv terrora “I.”45 Thus conceived, the Apollonian mask may be taken as emblematic of skaz as an art form. It gives image and voice to the heretofore unrepresentable insight of the “barbaric” class Other through the mediation of its own lyrical subjectivity. The enthusiastic operation is predicated in the illusory identification between the form-granting subject and unindividuated, objective being. For Nietzsche, this illusion was aesthetically and epistemologically productive and remains the clearest expression of the tragic worldview of the Dionysian cult. Russia certainly had its own myths about the silent insight of its uncivilized masses, but their origins lie in the same German Romantic ideas that inspired the young Nietzsche. Russian intellectuals on the right and the left shared the conviction that they had a role to play in articulating this knowledge, which they construed varyingly as an authentic national spirit or an uncorrupted peasant communalism. Pushkin and Gogol, the Westernizers and the Slavophiles, Herzen and Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Dostoevsky all contributed to the ethic of paternalistic populism that would define much of the Russian intelligentsia. It was this enthusiastic ventriloquization of the Russian masses which Lenin co-opted in his decidedly antipopulist theory of revolutionary vanguardism, sochinenie protiv terrora. The word enthusiasm (entuziazm) first appears in Lenin’s writings in 1912, but the word that he prefers for referring to the revolutionary emotions of the working classes, “upsurge” (pod''em), plays a fasm error undefined symbol getmodulehandle role in his understanding of revolution.46 In his 1902 pamphlet What Is To Be Done?, 41 My work on Nietzsche’s influence in early Soviet art has benefited immensely from Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal’s study of the role of the “Nietzschean Agenda” and, in particular, The Birth of Tragedy in Russian culture. See Rosenthal, New Myth, New World: From Nietzsche to Stalinism (University Park, PA, 2002), 5–6. 42 Viacheslav Ivanov emphasizes this point in “Zavety simvolizma,” in his Sobranie sochinenie, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1971–87), 1:591. 43 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, Islamist terrorism in the sahel pdf Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1967), 66. 44 Ibid., 67. 45 Ibid., 49. 46 In 1912 and 1913, Lenin referred, somewhat tautologically, to the role of worker “upsurge and enthusiasm” in the early successes of the newspaper Pravda and in contemporary labor strikes. See Vladimir Lenin, “Rabochie i pravda” and “Uroki bel'giiskoi stachki,” both in his Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (PSS), 5th ed. (Moscow, 1958–65), 22:69 and 23:147. There is no adequate English equivalent of pod''em. It is often used synonymously with enthusiasm, but it can also refer to high spirits, a feeling of physical well-being and creative inspiration, or the “raising-up” of the cultural level of the masses. “Upsurge,” which does convey the upward motion implied by the prefix pod- is the conventional English translation given in Lenin’s works. On the emergence of the concept in Lenin’s thinking see: Lars T. Lih, Lenin Rediscovered: What Is to Be Done? in Context (Leiden, 2006), 423. sochinenie protiv terrora The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 399 Lenin distinguishes between the “spontaneous upsurge” (stikhiinyi pod''em) of the Russian masses and the consciousness (soznatel'nost') of the revolutionary intelligentsia.47 Like Schwärmerei, “spontaneous upsurge” was associated with the unconscious, swarm-like violence of unenlightened crowds. It sochinenie protiv terrora provoked not by visions of rational social organization but by brute material deprivation and sochinenie protiv terrora. According to Lenin’s spontaneity/consciousness dialectic, such outpourings of political emotion were expedient in the immediate present but represented only an “embryonic form of consciousness.”48 “Spontaneous upsurge” was dangerous, both because of its chaotic and undirected nature and because of the tendency for intellectuals to fetishize it at the expense of conscious organizational work.49 During the Civil War, Lenin regularly attributed the successes of the Red Army to its “revolutionary enthusiasm” and sometimes associated enthusiasm with the consciousness of workers, but there was an error when executing ldifde.exe to the extent that the party succeeded in cultivating both.50 More often, Lenin characterized sochinenie protiv terrora enthusiasm as a temporary expediency, nothing in comparison to the “new forms of social discipline” which must be created over the course of decades.51 As the Civil War was winding down, Lenin repeatedly emphasized that enthusiasm alone would be not enough in the coming stages of the revolution.52 In one characteristic speech, he directly opposes enthusiasm to the consciousness of the party: “with enthusiasm alone we cannot do anything; only organization, composure, only consciousness will help.”53 In speeches from April and November of 1920, Lenin called for the selfless perseverance and “will for labor” demonstrated by the Red Army to be transferred to the “peaceful front of labor” in the form of “labor enthusiasm” (trudovoi entuziazm).54 The energies of the working people were to be directed, under the party’s conscious guidance, toward “trivial little things, the tiny domestic affairs” of everyday life.55 sochinenie protiv terrora It was this summons to labor enthusiasm, sochinenie protiv terrora, minus the hang-ups about “trivial little things,” which Stalin cited in his historic 1929 article, sochinenie protiv terrora, “The Year of the Great Break.” Stalin borrowed Lenin’s slogan in justifying the intensification of labor under the First Five-Year Plan.56 In labor enthusiasm, Stalin found an ideal formula for orchestrating top-down organizational control and bottom-up spontaneous initiative into total economic, industrial, and cultural 47 Lenin, Chto delat'? Nabolevshie voprosy nashego dvizheniia, PSS 6:29. 48 Ibid. 6:30-31. For a clear and concise explanation of Lenin’s formulation of the dialectic see Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Bloomington, 2000), 15–24. 49 Lenin, Chto delat'? 6:99–100. 50 Lenin, “Rech' na mitinge v politekhnicheskom muzee,” “Doklad VtsIK i SOVNARKOMA 5 dekabria” (VII Vserossiiskii s''ezd sovetov), and “Na bor'bu s toplivynym krizisom: tsirkuliarnoe pis'mo k partiinym organizatsiiam,” PSS 37:70, 39:406, and 39:305. 51 Lenin, “Rech' na III Vserossiiskom s''ezde prosoiuzov,” PSS 40:305–6. 52 Lenin, “Rech' pri zaktytii s''ezda 5 aprelia” (IX s''ezd RKP[b]), and “Rech' na III Vserossiiskom s''ezde prosoiuzov,” PSS 40:287 and 305. 53 Lenin, “Rech' na III Vseross. s''ezde rabochikh vodnogo transporta,” PSS 40:219. 54 Lenin, “Rech' na III s''ezde rabochikh tekstil'noi promyshlennosti,” and “Rech' na zasedanii plenuma mossoveta, MK RKP(b) i MGSPS,” PSS 40: 323–24 and 42:6. 55 Lenin, “Rech' na zasedanii plenuma mossoveta, MK RKP(b) i MGSPS,” PSS 42:6. 56 I. V. Stalin, “God velikogo pereloma: K XII godovshchine Oktiabria,” in his Sochineniia, 18 vols. (Moscow, 1946–52; 1997–2006), 12:120, published in Pravda, November 7, 1929. 400 Jason Cieply transformation. The logic of labor enthusiasm was thoroughly Leninist in its expression of the spontaneity/consciousness dialectic. An ideal form of “spontaneous upsurge,” sublimated, through the conscious guidance of Stalin, enthusiasm came to be regarded as the affective mode that was to facilitate the dialectical development of revolutionary consciousness. More than a slogan, the concept of enthusiasm signaled a shift toward revolutionary voluntarism which would impact nearly every field of knowledge. Most revealing in this respect were the dramatic transformations undergone in the field of industrial psychology. As early as 1923, Health Commissar Nikolai Semashko had pronounced that “nervous disorders and over-exhaustion” were the “professional diseases of communists.”57 The press was astir with speculation about an epidemic of “Soviet exhaustion,” which was claiming the lives of many prominent Soviet leaders, sochinenie protiv terrora, including Lenin in 1924 (Semashko diagnosed Lenin’s fatal brain condition as skleroz iznashivaniia, literally, “the sclerosis of wear-and-tear”).58 Throughout the 1920s, prominent psychotechnicians like Isaac Shpil'rein, Petr Gannushkin, and Sergei Kaplun cautioned that chronic exhaustion, neurasthenia, and what Gannushkin dubbed “early acquired invalidism” (prezhdevremennaia invalidnost') were rampant among all social groups and especially mental laborers.59 During the First Five-Year Plan, advocates of a dialectical approach to human psychology won out in a power struggle against these labor-protectionist “mechanists.”60 Under the “dialecticians,” the widely reported phenomenon of “Soviet exhaustion” was declared to be nonexistent and, moreover, “reactionary nonsense.” They sochinenie protiv terrora that the “health of workers and peasants during the Civil War [did] not deteriorate, despite significant material deprivations, thanks to revolutionary enthusiasm.” By analogy, the socialist “worker does not feel fatigue thanks to high emotional upsurge (emotsional'nyi pod''em).”61 These factors not only make “the problem of fatigue completely irrelevant” but even “strengthen and temper the nervous system,” leading to “mental-hygienic convalescence (ozdorovlenie)” and the “liquidation of sochinenie protiv terrora neuroses among the proletariat.”62 Labor enthusiasm was regarded as important not just to mental health, but also to the ongoing development of socialist consciousness. The motivation of reservation map error socialism, psychologists argued, helped the socialist laborer to overcome stagnancy and plateaus in work with the proper “impetus” (tolchok) in the form of accumulated “upsurge” (pod''em), thereby knocking down the “walls of human limitation . one after another, almost to infinity.”63 57 N. A. Semashko, “Okhrana zdorov'ia kommunistov,” Izvestiia, February 16, 1923. 58 Semashko, “Chto dalo vskrytie tela Vladimira Il'icha,” Izvestiia, January 25, 1924, 1; Monika Spivak, Posmertnaia diagnostika genial'nosti: Eduard Bagritskii Andrei Belyi Vladimir Maiakovskii v kollektsii Instituta mozga (materialy iz arkhiva G. I. Poliakova) (Moscow, 2001), 17–18, 61. 59 P. Gannushkin, “Ob okhrane zdorov'ia kadrov,” Revoliutsiia i kul'tura, no. 4 (1930): 43; David Joravsky, Russian Psychology: A Critical History (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 337. 60 Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, 26, sochinenie protiv terrora, 91–92; Bathurst, Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy, 45–46. 61 Subotnik, “Za bol'shevistskoe nastuplenie na teoreticheskom fronte psikhonervrologii,” Zhurnal nevropatologii i psikhiatrii, no, sochinenie protiv terrora. 2 (1931): 11, 14. 62 Ibid., 10, 15; Sig-burg, “I Vsesoiuznyi psikhotekhnicheskii s''ezd,” Vrachebnaia gazeta, July 15, 1931. 63 N. Dmitrievich, “Podgotovka kadrov i tak nazyvaemaia dusha,” Revoliutsiia i kul'tura, no. 4 (1930): 50. error issuing replication 1818 0x71a The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 401 THE MYTH BEHIND THE MASK Though it took a different form, the skaz literature of the 1920s shared an interest in orchestrating the revolutionary feeling of the Soviet working classes and the conscious creative vision of the intelligentsia. Zoshchenko’s implied author in particular demonstrates a deep-seated preoccupation with the irrepressible optimism of his storytellers, who construct revolutionary narratives from the chaos and social ills that surround them. As Marietta Chudakova reminds us, the “true events in these stories take place not at the level of plot, but at the level of narrative.”64 It is the attitude of Zoshchenko’s narrators to the events that they relate which is the principal object of sochinenie protiv terrora in his fiction. Two Zoshchenko stories related to the Soviet electrification campaign are particularly illustrative of this point. The narrator of the 1924 “Electrification,” astonished by the filth and poverty revealed after electric light is installed in his communal apartment, sochinenie protiv terrora, undertakes a massive renovation project in his room, only for his inconsolable landlady to cut off the power. After falling briefly into despondency, he ends his story with a rousing call to “turn our entire life around again.”65 In the 1929 “Summer Breather,” disagreements about splitting the electric bill at one communal apartment lead to a “bacchanalia” of electricity usage, ultimately prompting the tenants to cut off the power. The narrator, however, relates these events and the prospects of living without electricity with a wry and carefree optimism, since “the affair took place close to spring,” when “it’s light out.”66 Two further stories about workers attending the theater serve, at one level, sochinenie protiv terrora, as satirical critiques of the party’s cultural enlightenment campaign but, upon closer inspection, foreground the earnest optimism with which the narrator and characters regard the issue. In the 1926 “Strong Remedy,” a party activist gives an alcoholic metalworker a free ticket to the theater, prompting him to become the “main theater connoisseur in the neighborhood” and to “quit drinking on Sundays.” The metalworker, who, it turns out, simply moves his drinking bouts to Saturdays, ultimately “smashes himself against a pillar” one Saturday and misses a performance the following day. For the narrator, however, this is only a minor sochinenie protiv terrora, and he concludes the story by reiterating an incontrovertible and astonishing fact: “a person was seized by art. He was carried away.”67 In “A Minor Occurrence” (1927), another worker opts to spend an evening at the theater “in cultured society,” rather than in a sochinenie protiv terrora or with those who “smash each other’s mugs against poles in a drunken frenzy.” This lofty ambition is derailed when a coat-check attendant threatens to “beat [him] across the mug with an overshoe” because he does not have the requisite twenty kopeks, an offense which the worker worries will “undermine his authority in front of the bourgeoisie.” The narrator admits that this minor “occurrence” may not be of “world significance,” especially to a “NEP-man.”68 For Zoshchenko’s narrators, however, it is precisely facts of this sort— 64 Chudakova, Poetika Mikhaila Zoshchenko, 54. 65 Zoshchenko, “Elektrifikatsiia,” Kransyi voron, no. 17 (1924): 3. 66 Zoshchenko, “Letniaia peredyshka,” Sochineniia 2:256. 67 Zoshchenko, “Sil'noe sredstvo,” Sochineniia 2:190. 68 Zoshchenko, “Melkii sluchai,” Sochineniia 2:308, 309, 310. 402 Jason Cieply workers turning to the theater in the hopes of achieving revolutionary transformation—that merit claims to narrative interest and world significance. To be sure, Zoshchenko meant for his narrators’ stoic nonchalance regarding the grim social realia that they describe to raise eyebrows with the reader. What is really on display, however, are the views, emotions, and aspirations of these puzzling and remarkable individuals who casually disregard individual desires, comfort, and safety in favor of this broader historical and political field of vision, sochinenie protiv terrora. The reader is meant to appreciate the stark contrast between the cynical gaze of the satirical author and the narrator’s certainty that, as so many of his narrators conclude their stories, “patience and hard work will rub off the rough spots.”69 It is not narrative optimism or authorial pessimism alone but a complex relation between these two positions which define enthusiastic aesthetics. For Zoshchenko, this relation is characterized by a distinct hybridization of populist sympathies and Nietzschean mythology. Most literary biographies of Zoshchenko mention his enthusiasm for Nietzsche in the formative years between 1917 and his emergence in print in early 1922.70 Zoshchenko’s unpublished writings from this period consist primarily of Nietzsche-inspired aphorisms and a few articles appraising contemporary literature according to its endowment with barbaric vitality.71 Scholarship on Zoshchenko, however, has largely overlooked a key issue from the standpoint of the author’s creative development: how it came to pass that the young Zoshchenko emerged from his early period of juvenile Nietzschean posturing with a different, fully-formed, pseudo-proletarian authorial voice. Most importantly, Nietzsche’s cultural mythology informed Zoshchenko’s linguistic politics. Zoshchenko spoke in tongues that he believed deserved a place in literature by virtue of their fitness for life in the revolutionary epoch. He was influenced most directly by the poet Aleksandr Blok’s summons to surrender Apollonian high culture to the all- powerful “spirit of music.”72 In his 1919 review of Blok’s poema, The Twelve, Zoshchenko emphatically declares that “words have grown completely antiquated” and that the new word, with its “strong will to life and healthy, beast-like instinct,” will come from the street.73 Zoshchenko hails Blok’s poema as a precursor to the “new poetry of the ‘barbarians’” and a testament to the fact that “parallel to us, at the periphery, something else is living . quietly and often talentlessly, [something that] just might be proletarian.”74 69 Zoshchenko, “Dyrka,” Sochineniia 2:366, sochinenie protiv terrora. 70 As Vera Zoshchenko, the writer’s wife put it, “the winter of 1918 passed f3a de bios error the sign of Nietzsche.” See Vera Zoshchenko, “Tak nachinal M. Zoshchenko,” in Vspominaia Mikhaila Zoshchenko, ed. Boris Tomashevsky (Leningrad, 1990), 15. See also Vera von Wiren, “Introduction,” in Neizdannyi Zoshchenko, ed. Vera von Wiren (Ann Arbor, 1973), 10–11, sochinenie protiv terrora, 14; Chudakova, Poetika Mikhaila Zoshchenko, 11–13; A. B. Murphy, Mikhail Zoshchenko: A Literary Profile (Oxford: 1981), 16–17; Jeremy Hicks, sochinenie protiv terrora, Mikhail Zoshchenko and the Poetics of Skaz (Nottingham, 2000), 92; T. Kadash, “‘Zver'’ i ‘Nezhivoi chelovek’ v mire rannego Zoshchenko,” Literaturnoe obozrenie, no. 1 (249) (1995): 36–38; Richard B. Grose, “Zoshchenko and Nietzsche’s Philosophy: Lessons in Misogyny, Sex and Self-Overcoming,” Russian Review 54 (July 1995): 352–64; and Zholkovsky, Mikhail Zoshchenko, error 19 samp, 101, 139, 299–300, 320. 71 Zoshchenko, “Konets rytsaria pechal'nogo obraza,” in Litso i maska Mikhaila Zoshchenko, ed. Iu. V. Tomashevskii (Moscow, 1994), 83. 72 On the influence 1136 error as3 Blok’s ideas about the relation of the intelligentsia to the Russian sochinenie protiv terrora see Chudakova, Poetika Mikhaila Zoshchenko, 13. 73 Zoshchenko, “Konets rytsaria pechal'nogo obraza,” 83. 74 Ibid., 83. critical error 84/ The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 403 In Zoshchenko’s satire, this key Silver Age myth often takes on caricatured dimensions. His fictional world is populated primarily with the sochinenie protiv terrora opposed archetypes of the healthy, proletarian “beast” and the sickly, civilized intellectual, corresponding, sochinenie protiv terrora, cartoonishly, to Nietzsche’s Dionysian and Apollonian artist types.75 Throughout Zoshchenko’s fiction, the pose of the intellectual is that of the astonished Apollonian Greek, who, “pale and ghostly” beside the “glowing life of the Dionysian revelers,” realizes with “shuddering suspicion that all this was actually not so very alien to him.”76 Unlike Blok, however, Zoshchenko believed that the Apollonian intelligentsia had a role to play in the revolution. Zoshchenko rightly understood that, for Nietzsche, the Dionysian forces of destruction and the Apollonian forces of creation produce living forms of art only in dialogue. Zoshchenko’s professed aspiration to temporarily take the place of the nonexistent proletarian writer involved creating a skaz mask and quasi-proletarian voice that would give expression to the as-of-yet unformulated worldview of the people. The populist origins of such literature are important in that they underscore the sympathies for the depicted consciousness, which are, all too often, passed over in scholarship on skaz. In his illuminating corrective to Eikhenbaum’s definition of skaz, Bakhtin argues that skaz is distinguished first by its “orientation toward the speech of the other,” and “only then, as consequence, toward oral speech.”77 More specifically, sochinenie protiv terrora, Bakhtin notes, “skaz is introduced for the sake of the other’s sochinenie protiv terrora (radi chuzhogo golosa), a socially defined voice that brings with it a series of points of view and values . needed by the author” and “belonging in most cases to the lower social classes.”78 This formulation is ambiguous on one crucial account: is this speech adopted for the sake of the other’s voice or for the author’s needs? Bakhtin’s ideal of dialogue implies an ethical relationship of loving, mutual help analogous to the divine other’s grace-like gift of finalization. By contrast, his understanding of parodic skaz, which Bakhtin illustrates with explicit reference to Sochinenie protiv terrora, involves an unambiguously antagonistic, indeed, parasitic use of the depicted linguistic consciousness “for the transmission of motivations hostile to it.”79 Naturally, Sochinenie protiv terrora thought very little of Zoshchenko’s skaz. Zoshchenko, according to Bakhtin’s lecture notes from the mid-1920s, sochinenie protiv terrora, “took [his] ideas from newspapers” and was capable of little more than “unsuccessful and inappropriate caricature” and “awkward mimicry.” 80 By 1927, many proletarian critics had reached the same conclusion. Zoshchenko’s satire, they argued, sochinenie protiv terrora, had degenerated from light-hearted humor to misanthropic malevolence. Instead of recognizing the “healthy class instinct of the masses,” he mocked the Soviet people as “tongue-tied” and “dim-witted” products of imperial “semi-serfdom.”81 Contemporary scholars have been, more or less, of the same mind, sochinenie protiv terrora. Cathy Popkin, for instance, finds Zoshchenko to be driven by a desire to “discredit” his narrator-heroes 75 For a short but excellent article on these Nietzschean archetypes in Zoshchenko’s early fiction see Kadash, “‘Zver'’ i ‘Nezhivoi chelovek’ v mire rannego Zoshchenko,” 36–38. 76 Nietzsche, Birth of Sochinenie protiv terrora, 37, 41. 77 Bakhtin, Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo 2:215–16. 78 Ibid. 2:88. 79 Ibid., 2:216–17. 80 Bakhtin, “Zoshchenko,” Zapisi lektsii po istorii russkoi literatury, Sobranie sochinenii 2:411. 81 Ol'shevets, “Obyvatel'skii nabat.” 404 Jason Cieply as a “panorama of peons . crude, illiterate, petty creatures that are like some kind of lower organism.”82 There has, however, been some difference of opinion. Maxim Gorky was among the first to note that the satire writer’s novel blending of irony and lyricism produced an sochinenie protiv terrora effect distinct from conventional parody.83 Chudakova, likewise, distinguishes between other writers of the time, who “confidently, energetically, and systematically ridicule[d] the verbal incongruities” encountered in day-to-day Soviet life, and Zoshchenko, who possessed a “unique respect . for the anomalies of contemporary speech.” Moreover, Sochinenie protiv terrora claims, drawing on Zoshchenko’s article on Blok, Zoshchenko’s use of the word of the other signifies his recognition of the intelligentsia’s “loss of the right to [its own] voice.”84 More recently, Benedikt Sarnov and Jeremy Hicks have argued that Zoshchenko’s skaz conveys a sense of sympathy and admiration toward the subjects he depicts.85 Working in this counter-tradition, I read skaz against the unlikely consensus uniting Bakhtin, sochinenie protiv terrora critics, and most contemporary readers of Zoshchenko. We imitate other people’s voices for a variety of reasons, and the relations between skaz author and narrator reflect this variety. Zoshchenko’s sochinenie protiv terrora was invested in dialogic exchange, but his Nietzschean understanding of dialogue implied different motivations affiliated with different, non-Christian gods: Dionysus and Apollo.86 For Nietzsche, sochinenie protiv terrora dialogic orientation toward the other involves rivalry and aggression but sochinenie protiv terrora fascination. In the case of the Dionysian artist, there is a will to possess or overcome the other as an individuated self, and in the case of the Apollonian, sochinenie protiv terrora, a fetishistic desire to sublimate the energies and insight of the other as health and artistic creation.87 It is only in the reconciliation of these conflicting forces that communication and mutual recognition are possible. 82 Popkin, Pragmatics of Insignificance, 100–101. 83 A. M. Gor'kii, “Gor'kii – Zoshchenko [September 16, 1930],” Literaturnoe nasledstvo, vol. 70, Gor'kii i sovetskie pisateli: Neizdannaia perepiska (Moscow, 1963), 15. 84 Bsod error 8086 attributes Zoshchenko’s willingness to “make way for the rough, unformulated word” of the masses to his recognition of its “broad, factual existence in the living speech of the epoch” (Poetika Mikhaila Zoshchenko, 77, 101). 85 Benedikt Samov, Prishestvie kapitana Lebiadkina (Sluchai Zoshchenko) (Moscow, 1993), sochinenie protiv terrora, 17, 163; Hicks, Mikhail Zoshchenko and the Poetics of Skaz, 3, 5–6. As Hicks argues, “although he employs a mask and exaggerates his characters’ language, Zoshchenko does not quite or does not solely laugh at their expense. That he does so has too often been the assumption of both Western and Soviet critics. . [T]o feel the full bitter- sweet smack of these stories we must also sympathize with their characters, and perceive a tragic dimension to their sochinenie protiv terrora (Hicks, “Introduction,” in Zoshchenko, The Galosh and Other Stories, trans. Jeremy Hicks [New York, 2009], 12). 86 As several scholars have argued, Bakhtin himself was influenced by Nietzsche’s Dionysian aesthetics. See Boris Groys, “Mezhdu Stalinym i Dionisom,” Sintaksis: Publitsistika, kritika, sochinenie protiv terrora, polemika 25 (1989): 92–97; James M. Curtis, “Michael Bakhtin, Nietzsche, and Russian Pre-Revolutionary Thought,” in Nietzsche in Russia, ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Princeton, 1986): 331–55; and Yelena Mazour-Matusevich, “Nietzsche’s Influence on Bakhtin’s Aesthetics of Grotesque Realism,” CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 11:2 (2009), (last accessed April 9, 2020). 87 Bakhtin does occasionally describe dialogue in terms of possession. For sochinenie protiv terrora, in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art, sochinenie protiv terrora, he tells us that “Dostoevsky’s character ., sochinenie protiv terrora. is possessed by an idea. The idea becomes an ideational force (ideia-sila), all-powerfully defining and disfiguring his consciousness. The idea leads an independent life in the consciousness of the character” (Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo 2:30). Bakhtin does not, however, develop this notion of dialogic possession or establish its relation to loving dialogue. The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 405 Still, the proletarian critics’ objections to Zoshchenko’s performances of proletarian identity resonate strongly with important contemporary discussions surrounding the politics of representation. It is worth asking whether the historical Zoshchenko really meant to create a dialogue that would help that “proletarian something” sochinenie protiv terrora attain a voice of its own. Zoshchenko’s interest in this social milieu was as personal as it was literary or political. Zoshchenko’s fiction and non-fiction alike are colored by the fetishistic Nietzschean intuition that the “elemental feelings” of the working classes could serve as a “recipe for restoring health,” both metaphorically, of a culture, and literally, of the individual.88 In 1926 and 1927 he had been suffering from a self-diagnosed case of neurasthenia, which he, sochinenie protiv terrora, taking his criticism to heart, began to attribute to his irony and pessimism, sochinenie protiv terrora. All this he came to regard as a sort of false consciousness. He confided to his close friend Kornei Chukovsky that he “hates the complexity in sochinenie protiv terrora and “would give several years of his life to become naïve and artless.”89 He longed to imbue his life and literature with a “healthy clarity and wholeness of soul, simplicity, kind-heartedness, and a joyful affirmation of the world.”90 “SIMPLICITY OF SOUL” It was at this moment that Zoshchenko produced the story, “Simplicity of Soul,” a complex and deeply ambivalent meditation on the simple, optimistic worldview that he yearned to adopt. The concept of simplicity of soul is so thoroughly mediated by Zoshchenko’s complex, multilayered narrative structure as to justify reading the short story in its entirety (fig. 1): “Simplicity of Soul” Maybe you remember—some Negroes came. Last year. An African Negro- operetta (negritianskaia negro-operetta). Those Negroes left very satisfied with our hospitality. They praised our culture and, in general, all of our undertakings. There was just one thing they were dissatisfied with: our streets. – “It’s hard to even walk,” they say, “people shove each other and step on each other’s feet.” But, of course, these Negroes themselves are spoiled by European civilization, and, really, sochinenie protiv terrora, it’s a matter of—how to put it—a lack of habit. But let them live here a year or two: it will rub off of them (obteshutsia), and they themselves will go scuffling about on other peoples’ feet. And that’s a fact. To tell the truth, though, people really do step on each other’s feet here. Nothing to be said. It’s a sin of ours. Only it happens, let the Negroes know, out of simplicity of soul (po prostote dushevnoi). I tell you, there’s no ill will here. You step on a foot and go about your way. That’s all there is to it. For example, the other day I myself stepped on the foot of one citizen. This citizen is walking, if you can imagine it, along the street. A sochinenie protiv terrora shouldered type, a big healthy guy. 88 Zoshchenko, “Konets rytsaria pechal’nogo obraza,” 83. 89 Kornei Chukovskii, “Zoshchenko,” in Chukovskii, Sobranie sochinenii, 15 vols. (Moscow, 2001–9) 5:419; Chukovskii, “1927,” Dnevnik, 3 vols., Dnevnik: 1922–1935 (Moscow, 2011), 2:318, sochinenie protiv terrora. 90 Chukovskii, “Zoshchenko,” 5:419. 406 Jason Cieply FIG. 1 Zoshchenko, “Dushevnaia prostota,” Begemot, no. 32 (1927): 5. He’s walking and walking. And I’m walking behind him, sochinenie protiv terrora. And he’s walking in front. Just a step in front of me. And we’re walking, you know, in a nice way. We’re not stepping on each other’s feet. We’re not waving our hands about. He’s walking. And I’m walking. And really, you could even say, sochinenie protiv terrora, we aren’t touching each other. In a word, we’re walking along like two souls in sync (dusha v dushu idem). It makes the heart joyous. And I even thought: “That passer-by is walking wonderfully. Evenly. He’s not kicking about. Another guy would get tangled up in other people’s feet, but this one places his feet calmly.” And suddenly, I don’t remember, I got distracted by a beggar. Or maybe by a cabbie. So I got distracted by a beggar and stepped on the foot of this citizen in front of me with all of my weight. On his heel. And a bit higher. And I stepped, I have to say, quite solidly. With all the strength I had. And I even froze in fright then. I stopped. And I was so worried I didn’t even say “excuse me.” I’m thinking: now this charming (milyi) person will turn around and box my ear in. Walk, as they say, properly, you mutton-head (baran'ia golova). I froze, I’m telling you, in fright and prepared to take my due punishment, and suddenly, nothing happened. That lovely citizen keeps walking on and didn’t even look at me. He didn’t even turn his mug around. He didn’t, I’m telling you, even shake his leg sochinenie protiv terrora off. He just walked on, like a sweetie (milen'kii). I’m telling you. With us, that’s the way it goes sometimes. But it’s a matter of simplicity of soul. No malevolence. You step on someone, someone steps on you, and you tramp onward. What’s there to go on about? And this charming citizen, I swear to God, didn’t even turn around. I walked after him for a long time. I kept waiting for him to turn around with a stern glance. Nope. He walked on. He didn’t notice.91 91 Zoshchenko, “Dushevnaia prostota,” 5. The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 407 Still under the strong impression of his (textually mediated) encounter with these black musicians, the narrator subjects his fledgling revolutionary society to the critical gaze of a distant other. There is something authentically egalitarian, if completely misguided, in his certainty of the ease with which the Chocolate Kiddies would find a place in foot-stomping Soviet society. At the same time, the frame draws an implicit line of equivalency between the semi-urbanized Russian peasant and the supposed African “primitives.” As didactic satire, the story denounces the coarse manners governing Soviet public spaces as abhorrent even to said “primitives.” microsoft visual c+ + runtime error win7 “Simplicity of Soul,” however, does more than expose the backwardness of the “new” Soviet people. Unbeknownst to the narrator, the author has cast him as the Soviet descendent of a long line of pedestrian combatants. The first, Dmitry Lopukhov from Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s 1863 What is to Be Done?, had a strict rule: not to yield to anyone, except women, while walking in public. When a “certain dignified person” bumps shoulders with him and calls him a “pig” and a “farm animal,” Lopukhov defends his honor by “carefully” placing his wsasend failed with error 10065 in the gutter and standing over him in a gesture of dominance.92 Chernyshevsky shows us his prototypical “new people,” locked in a Hegelian “life-and- death struggle” for recognition with passing strangers.93 By contrast, the simple-souled shoving of Zoshchenko’s “charming citizens” is even appealing. In place of the customary beating and insult—“muttonhead,” in Zoshchenko’s variation—these would-be adversaries part ways peacefully, one not having noticed the collision and the other in reverent awe. The second figure on this intertextual trajectory of moral evolution is the narrator of Fedor Dostoevsky’s 1864 Notes from Underground. A neurotic misanthrope and a walking parody of Lopukhov, the Underground Man is given to conflicted meditations on the civilization and noble savagery of his fellow pedestrians. He yearns to establish himself “on equal footing” with passers-by during minor encounters on Nevsky Prospekt. He is tormented by one officer who “walked directly toward [people], sochinenie protiv terrora, as if there was only empty space in front of him.” Unlike Lopukhov, the Underground Man is willing to settle for a compromise “let it be fifty-fifty, as it’s ordinarily done when two delicate people meet: he’ll yield half-way, you’ll yield half-way, and you’ll pass by, mutually respecting each other.” Ultimately, sochinenie protiv terrora, he resolves on a desperate scheme, “not to shove him exactly . but just to not step aside.”94 To his add user error user exists, when he carries out his intention, the officer does not even look back. Even as the Underground Man spurns his nemesis, whom he ironically casts as Rousseau’s “homme de la nature,” he remains entangled in the contradictions of Rousseau’s theory of civilization.95 He at once desires protection according to a social contract and envies the ingenuous good-naturedness and healthy-minded immediacy of Rousseau’s “Savage.”96 92 N. G. Chernyshevskii, Chto delat'? iz rasskazov o novyikh liudiakh (zhurnal'naia redaktsiia), in his Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (PSS), 15 vols. (Moscow, 1939–53), 11:143. 93 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 114. 94 Fedor Dostoevskii, Zapiski iz podpol'ia, in his Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 30 vols., ed V, sochinenie protiv terrora. G. Bazanov et al. (Leningrad, 1972–90), 5:130–31. 95 Ibid., 5:89. On the place of Rousseau and l’homme de la nature in the novella see the commentary of the editors of Dostoevsky’s collected works, Dostoevskii, Zapiski iz podpol'ia, sochinenie protiv terrora, “Primechaniia,” PSS 5:373. 96 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract or the Principles of Political Sochinenie protiv terrora, The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Sochinenie protiv terrora, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London, 1923), 14–16; Rousseau, A Discourse 408 Jason Cieply Simplicity of soul, then, is precisely that which the Underground Man lacks. The charming citizens idealized by Zoshchenko’s narrator are free of the hyperconsciousness that leads the Underground Man to make a literary event of everyday pedestrian-on- pedestrian contact. They neither take nor acknowledge offense. Simplicity of soul represents a “popular” take on the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. The narrator himself, however, unconsciously subverts this homespun model of civic virtue, which he bases on the passer-by’s failure to notice the foot-stomping. The fact that the narrator does notice the event and cringes in expectation of the customary ear-boxing unravels the whole moral myth of the simple-souled Russian people. In this way, the narrator’s paradoxical ideas about civilization serve as markers of his uncertain class identity. He enjoys neither the imagined, neurosis-free happiness of the proletarian “primitive” nor the enlightenment of the civilized intellectual. At the same time, Zoshchenko’s satire of Soviet ideology and the would-be proletarian writers who try to find their footing in it is thrown into question by the equally incisive, self-reflexive critique of the intellectual author. “Simplicity of Soul” reiterates one of the central paradoxes explored in Zoshchenko’s prose. Soviet intellectuals propagate civilization as a solution to the backwardness and brute violence of the Soviet street. But they also harbor deep-seated anxieties about the impact of this civilization on their own health and happiness. In the conventional reading of skaz, the implied author winks to the reader as he exposes the sochinenie protiv terrora, views, and behavior of the “unreliable” lower-class narrator, all from the safety and privileged vantage point of the authorial plane.97 In this story, it is as if we also are looking down at a sham, intermediate implied author, who, sochinenie protiv terrora, teeth clenched in an ironic grimace, sochinenie protiv terrora, carries out his authorial business, unaware that he too is being watched. The real implied sochinenie protiv terrora, it would seem, is at least as troubled by the pettiness, pessimism, and neurosis-injected bile that becloud the satirical mask. The non-identical subject positions of implied author and narrator need not be defined by relations of hostility or a desire to undermine narrative authority. Indeed, in this case, we may detect fascination, sympathy, and even solidarity, in spite of the narrator’s obvious intellectual shortcomings. masm32 error a2119 The conventional reading of skaz would hold that the author’s excess of vision debunks the narrator’s enthusiastic ideas by revealing the background of violence and crudity against which the narrator relates them. I propose that this grotesque backdrop serves as necessary contrast to the narrator’s revelatory glimpse of the “charming” future socialist person and brief experience of harmonious social coordination with him. After all, he too partakes in the emergent manifestation of this ideal social relation, sochinenie protiv terrora, if only for a few steps. Social reality sochinenie protiv terrora be represented as background and negated if the figure of the future socialist person is to be discerned amid the contradictions and failures of the present. Moreover, these imperfections must be present in the individual and negated by the author’s excess of vision if the embryonic forms of socialist consciousness are to be epson 7800 paper error in the Upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London, 1761), 27; Dostoevskii, Zapiski iz podpol'ia, PSS 5:103–7. 97 Shklovsky, for instance, notes that Zoshchenko’s skaz narrator “exposes himself in speaking,” producing a feeling of superiority in the reader, who sees him on two planes (Shklovskii, “O Zoshchenko i bol'shoi literature,” in Mikhail Zoshchenko, sochinenie protiv terrora. Mastera sovremennoi literatury. Stat'i i materialy (Leningrad, 1928), 22. The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 409 protagonist. Bakhtin and the proletarian critics mistook all this negativity for mockery and even class antagonism, just as contemporary readers mistake it for proto-dissident opposition to the revolutionary project. Here and throughout Zoshchenko’s stories, it is not just the tongue-tied linguistic consciousness of the narrator that is objectified but also his enthusiastic consciousness of himself in relation to his society, present and future. In this sense, sochinenie protiv terrora, it is necessary to reconceptualize the relation of figure to background in Zoshchenko’s fiction. Illustrative in this respect is Popkin’s analysis of “Simplicity of Soul,” in which she argues that “the Revolution is … flagrantly absent in Zoshchenko’s fiction,” representing “only background, not figure.” Thus, she proposes, Zoshchenko’s narrative strategies are designed to “deny the Revolution’s potency and strip it of its impact, rendering it a non-event.”98 It is true that Zoshchenko’s narrators often foreground everyday trivialities over revolutionary background, but it can hardly be said that the revolution is absent in Machine check error fiction. On the contrary, the impulse to stage banal, everyday events—mix-ups at the bathhouse, quarrels at the coat-check, or punch-ups in the communal kitchen—before the backdrop of revolutionary history is itself significant. The tireless and sincere, if questionably successful efforts of ordinary Soviet citizens to imbue events as ordinary as a walk down the street with revolutionary significance are themselves revolutionary events, indeed, the overarching revolutionary events represented in Zoshchenko’s fiction. SKAZ AND THE SPIRIT OF JAZZ If we are to appreciate the depth of the implied author’s critique of and attraction to simplicity of soul, we must apply this lens not only to the street violence that makes up the imperfect background of this story but also to the frame narrative about the Chocolate Kiddies and Soviet responses to the international phenomenon of jazz. The idea for the story came, sochinenie protiv terrora, as Bakhtin suggested, “from newspapers.” The object of Zoshchenko’s parody is a real feuilleton-style article called “Negro Moscow” which I came across in the special issue of the journal Circus, dedicated to the Chocolate Kiddies (fig. 2), sochinenie protiv terrora. In it, the author, Iurii Ardi, comically relates the Chocolate Kiddies’ impressions of Moscow, including one performer’s complaint that “Moscow is a good city, only people shove each other a lot on the street.”99 The phrase will become the premise for “Simplicity of Soul.” The cross-cultural misunderstanding surrounding the Chocolate Kiddies’ Soviet tour, of which this feuilleton is a telling artifact, was immensely productive in helping Zoshchenko to think through the pitfalls and enduring merits of sochinenie protiv terrora own artistic project. As the narrator attests, the Chocolate Sochinenie protiv terrora really did have favorable impressions of their visit. Director Sam Wooding recalled the Soviet engagements as “the best in all Europe” and noted that they encountered none of the harassment that marred some performances elsewhere.100 98 Popkin, Pragmatics of Insignificance, 106, 108. sochinenie protiv terrora 99 Iurii Ardi, “Mosvka negritianskaia,” in Negritianskaia operetta. 100 Sam Wooding, “Eight Years Abroad with a Jazz Band,” The Étude Magazine 72:4 (April 1939): 234; Albert McCarthy, Big Band Jazz (New York, 1974), 310. 410 Jason Cieply Saxophonist Garvin Bushell recounts: “Russia was the first country I’d ever been in where I was considered a human being—a person like anybody else. . I was accepted as a man, and treated like an artist.”101 The singer Morris said it was the first time he “felt like a person with equal rights,” and Payne attested that his “deep sympathies for communism were confirmed” and pledged to study closely the works of Lenin and Marx.102 access violation error log updated FIG. 2 Iurii Ardi, “Mosvka negritianskaia,” Negritianskaia operetta: Spetsial'yi vypusk vmesto ocherednogo nomera zhurnala “Tsirk” (Moscow, 1926). These performers’ perceptions of Soviet society’s egalitarian ethic and respect for their artistry are significant. Yet, when Zoshchenko’s critique of simplicity of soul is applied to the Soviet reception of jazz, this artistic recognition is revealed to have been sorely lacking. The torrents of reviews of the Chocolate Kiddies in Soviet papers are striking for 101 Bushell and Tucker “On the Road with the Chocolate Kiddies in Europe and South America, 1925– 1927,” 214, 216. 102 advanced anti terror training Arthur Payne, “Artisty o sebe: Beseda s artistami ‘Negro-operetty,’” Tsirk massam, no. 11 gta 4 error could not run, 9. Sochinenie protiv terrora Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 411 their naïve racism: vulgar jokes about the actors’ skin color, sochinenie protiv terrora, monkeys, cannibalism, and other tropes of primitivism. Critics were delighted by and yearned to adopt that je-ne-sais- quoi that Zoshchenko calls simplicity of soul: the “great sincerity, naïveté, and immediacy,” the “irrational elementalism,” “primordial wildness,” “primitivism and lack of artistic sophistication of the black race.”103 Many raised eyebrows at the “plainly obscene” dances of the female performers, who “worked exclusively with their natural resources.”104 Such views would later be canonized as the definitive Soviet position on jazz, sochinenie protiv terrora, articulated in Gorky’s reactionary 1928 article, “The Music of the Fat.” Gorky likened the music to a sex-crazed orchestra led by a “priest waving a giant phallus.” He described the dance as “cynical” hip movements “simulat[ing] the fertilization of a woman by a man.” “The Negroes are laughing,” Gorky concludes, “as their white masters evolve into savages.”105 However deplorable, these reactions were hardly unique to Soviet audiences. Moreover, they often reflected an unfamiliarity with or ambivalence toward elements of minstrelsy and especially blackface, which figured prominently in posters for the event and in some of the performances. Like their counterparts in Europe, Soviet critics were prone to inscribe the Chocolate Kiddies in a dialectic of civilization that opposed their supposed African primitivism to European decadence. At the same time, critics charged that jazz held few “relics of authentic, ethnographic Negro music” and that this was not “how they play it in the wilds of Africa.”106 Indeed, very few critics expressed an awareness of the American context of the Chocolate Kiddies’ art.107 Rather, they found that the group had “absorbed the poisonous air of Paris review shows” and was covered in a “layer error in setupapi dll naïve café-chantant.”108 Zoshchenko’s narrator reiterates this feature of Soviet criticism by attributing the Chocolate Kiddies’ discomfort in the Soviet Union sochinenie protiv terrora their corruption by European civilization. What set Soviet critics apart was their designation of Soviet society as the true path to liberation and authentically national cultural development. Soviet critics saw the opportunity to “extract the invaluable seed of Negro art” from the “banal form of the European review.”109 Aleksandr Tairov epitomizes this reading in a passage that likely inspired Zoshchenko’s narrator to conclude that the civilization error 0111 0001 general failure simply rub sochinenie protiv terrora of the Chocolate Kiddies: “if we strip off the sochinenie protiv terrora which has grown over the [Negroes] from the grease-smeared and dusty curtains of the European and American ‘variety shows,’ their art will become as joyous, refreshing, and organic as the art of our magnificent hopák and astonishing 103 sochinenie protiv terrora Fost, “Shokoladnye rebiata,” Tsirk Massam, no. 11 (1926): 12; I. N. Bersenev, “Negritianskaia anketa,” in Negritianskaia operetta. 104 “Teatr – muzyka – kino: Spektakli negritianskoi truppy” (Sadko), Izvestiia, no. 70, March 27, sochinenie protiv terrora, 1926. 105 M. Gor'kii, “O muzyke tolstykh,” Pravda, no. 90, April 18, 1928. 106 “Teatr – muzyka – kino: Spektakli negritianskoi truppy” (Sergei Bugoslavskii); G. G. “Dzhaz-band,” Tsirk Massam, no. 11 (1926): 8; M. Zagorskii, “V gostiakh u ‘shokoladnykh rebiat,” Novyi zritel', no. 13, (March 30, 1926), 7–8. 107 Notable exceptions were those like Konstantin Stanislavsky and Mikhail Kuzmin, who had seen jazz performances in New York. M. Kuzmin, “Negry,” Krasnaia gazeta, Vechernyi vypusk, May 10, 1926; K. N. Stanislavskii, “Iskusstvo negrov,” in Negritianskaia operetta. 108 Zagorskii, “V gostiakh u ‘shokoladnykh rebiat,” 7; Sergei Iutkevich, “Ekstsentrizm bez perchatok,” in Negritianskaia operetta, sochinenie protiv terrora. 109 P. Konchalovskii, “Negritianskaia anketa,” in Negritianskaia operetta; Kuzmin, “Negry,” 4. 412 Jason Cieply lezginka.”110 Here, Tairov’s conception for an internationalist proletarian theater devolves into a sort of colonialist ethnographic museum complete with living, breathing exhibits. That said, it should be appreciated that the artists themselves recognized Soviet internationalism as a productive context for cultural exchange and sochinenie protiv terrora self-expression. Indeed, Wooding later reported having been so inspired by the Soviet state folk choirs as to abandon jazz in favor of replicating the Russian choral form with a spiritual choir back in the United States.111 It is all sochinenie protiv terrora more lamentable, then, that most Soviet critics believed that the black performer was “not in and of himself sochinenie protiv terrora of creating great art.”112 With few exceptions, Soviet critics complained of the show’s plotlessness and scoffed at the decision to categorize the piece as an operetta. The performance, they charged, lacked “even the most primitive and mosaic plot” and had “no narrative continuity or logical connections.”113 In reality, the decision to market the performance as an operetta, rather than as a variety review, as in Europe, was not made by the Chocolate Kiddies, who found the title amusing.114 Soviet critics attributed this generic discrepancy to a lack of self-consciousness that prevented the artists from emplotting themselves in a modern theatrical work. “As material for some other construction,” one critic tells us, “Negroes stand beyond competition ., sochinenie protiv terrora. if you give them an artistic director [like Stanislavsky or Meyerhold], you could easily achieve fantastic results.”115 Anticipating the suggestion of Zoshchenko’s narrator that the Chocolate Kiddies “live here a year or two,” director Sergei Iutkevich called to “leave the Negroes with us.” He mused that all the “chocolate actor” needed was the “keen imagination of a Russian director, the vibrant ingenuity of a modern artist.”116 One critic suggests protection card error the Chocolate Kiddies their “feeble ideology,” supposing that they would sochinenie protiv terrora even understand . the depth of this reproach and, merrily baring their white teeth, dance another number.”117 Asus eee pc bios version error the same year, sochinenie protiv terrora, leading Soviet avant-garde artist Dziga Vertov did use the Chocolate Kiddies “as material for some other construction.” His incorporation of footage of the Chocolate Kiddies into One Sixth of the World demonstrates the importance of drawing the line between well-intentioned interpretative excess born of internationalist solidarity and propaganda that flagrantly disregards the artistic and political agency of the other. Vertov uses innovative montage techniques to depict the triangular trade with capitalist Europe which was temporarily necessary for Soviet industrialization and future world revolution. He justifies trade with the West by alluding iphone error 1013 the enlightenment and liberation of the Samoyeds, African slaves, and other oppressed peoples of the world which it will make possible. It is in this context that the Chocolate Kiddies appear on stage. Vertov shows us stop-motion animation of dancing toys and vases, establishing shots of Berlin streets, 110 A. Ia. Tairov, “Negritianskaia anketa,” in Negritianskaia operetta. 111 Wooding, “Eight Years Abroad with a Jazz Band,” 281–82. 112 Zagorskii, “V gostiakh u ‘shokoladnykh rebiat,” 8. 113 Fost, “Shokoladnye rebiata,” 12; Zagorskii, “V gostiakh u ‘shokoladnykh rebiat,” 7. 114 Ardi, “Moskva negritianskaia.” 115 E. K. “Teatr i iskusstvo: Negritianskaia operetta,” Krasnaia gazeta, May 13, 1926. 116 Iutkevich, “Ekstsentrizm bez perchatok.” 117 Zagorskii, “V gostiakh u ‘shokoladnykh rebiat,” 7, sochinenie protiv terrora. buffer i/o error on device logical block The Enthusiastic Objectifications of Skaz 413 bourgeois women dressed in furs, African workers, rapidly montaged close-up shots of musicians, men dancing in blackface, women dancing in bras and grass skirts, a painting of a naked woman, and the gaze of a male audience member. All this is interspliced with the intertitles: “SLAVES,” “TOYS,” “HATRED,” and “CONVULSIONS” (SUDOROGI).118 Thus, Vertov puts forward a critique of the sexually and racially exploitative spectatorship that jazz performers encountered during their performances in Europe. Capital, he argues, made these performers into mere toys for the entertainment the German bourgeois, who, decked in the furs of the Samoyeds, sochinenie protiv terrora, gaze lecherously at the Kiddies’ gyrating, scantily clad bodies. Ahead of its time in certain respects, this anticolonialist critique is marred by Vertov’s manipulative, degrading, and unequivocally racist montage juxtaposition of exploited African laborers and some of the world’s leading jazz musicians and dancers. According to the blunt logic of Vertov’s montage sequence, the Chocolate Kiddies come not from New York but from the slave colonies of Africa, sochinenie protiv terrora. A single cut takes the viewer from African colonies to a Berlin dance hall to the accompaniment of the intertitles: “SLAVES— FROM NEGROES—CAPITAL [MAKES]—‘CHOCOLATE KIDDIES’—FOR ITS AMUSEMENT.”119 What is more, the sequence is plainly misleading. In all likelihood, Vertov’s footage came not from Sochinenie protiv terrora but from one of the Chocolate Kiddies’ Soviet performances. As Viktor Shklovsky suggests, it was not some fur-clad Berliners but NEP- era Soviet audiences who, relishing the relative freedoms of the period, cast their enchanted gaze at the dance line of the Chocolate Kiddies.120 In his attempt to capture the deeper “film-truth” of Soviet industrialization, international trade, and world revolution, Vertov disfigured the simple truth of the cross-cultural exchange that played out on stage between these African American artists and Soviet audiences. For Soviet critics, it was not the performers who were speaking but “European decadence [which] found in [black] art a form for its own, personal expression.”121 This critique did not prevent critics and artists alike from seeking to repurpose the jazz form for their own political and artistic self-expression. Thus, they failed to recognize jazz for what it was: a revolutionary form of self-expression that broke with European narrative art and served as an impetus to global emancipation. Meanwhile, sochinenie protiv terrora, in interviews with Circus to the Masses, the performers responded to such “ideological” reproaches with acuity and grace. The singer Payne, for instance, remarks: “I was astounded by the [Soviet] press’s attitude toward our tour, [by their] constant appraisal of our sochinenie protiv terrora as cabaret-style art. . The press did not discern . that rhythm and dynamic that we develop throughout the course of the performance and paid attention to external form alone.”122 The underlying problem was that Soviet critics had type-casted these performers as the wise but silent peasant of 118 Shestaia chast' mira, directed by Dziga Vertov (Moscow, 1926), DVD. 119 Ibid. 120 Shklovsky notes that One Sixth of the World is distinguished from previous Vertov films by its “geographically unanchored” and “staged shots” and argues that the “petite bourgeoisie,” which “badly dances . the foxtrot” in the film is “probably our NEP [one]” (Shklovskii, Ikh nastoiashchee [Moscow, 1927], 64, 66). 121 P. S. Kogan, “Negritianskaia anketa,” in Negritianskaia operetta. 122 Payne, “Artisty o sebe,” 9. 414 Jason Cieply Russian tradition. Only minimally corrupted by Western civilization, the Chocolate Kiddies were presumed to possess some vital essence that could be cultivated into real revolutionary consciousness by the Soviet cultural vanguard. This emancipatory zeal prevented critics from recognizing the face of self-liberating humanity when they saw it. THE QUESTION REMAINS: is Zoshchenko’s story any different? What, after all, is the status of the speech of these African American musicians, thrice mediated through the feuilletonist Iurii Ardi, the implied author, and the narrator? The artists’ enthusiasm for the Soviet project, reported by the story’s narrator, is confirmed in interviews with the Soviet press and in the artists’ memoirs. Moreover, the story registers the narrator’s recognition of his society’s imperfections as he came to understand them through the artists’ words, sochinenie protiv terrora. He insists on the intrinsic merits of the free-wheeling “simplicity” which defines the Soviet attitude, both to shoving on the streets and to the particulars of these artists’ identity. But his ideal vision for the future is one of communion with them. This attitude is something he shared with the better part of Soviet critics. Such solidarity, and the dialogic exchanges it facilitated, are worth appreciating as unique responses to jazz at this moment in its world reception. They constitute important events in the intersectionally conceived history of human emancipation. Zoshchenko represents error lght0102 the localization variable loc solidarity while critiquing the crude racial objectification in which it was expressed. Skaz, I think, is well suited to making events of exactly this sort visible and meaningful across class, national, and racial lines. Zoshchenko’s skaz lays bare the illusory essence and latent reifying thrust of dialogically constructed images of the other. Such images inevitably remain artificial, mediated objectifications enacted by the author. They are not, as Bakhtin claims, sochinenie protiv terrora, real “subjects of their own, unmediated, signifying discourse.”123 This is why the mechanism of enthusiastic objectification which I attribute to skaz is so important. The failed integration of the objectified voice of the other really can facilitate a movement sochinenie protiv terrora the object.”124 But error code 1063 mysql is only possible to the extent that the work of art calls attention to the non-identity of the objectified consciousness of the other and the real, subjective consciousness beyond the text. Skaz authors deliberately accentuate the illusory nature of these images. This complex narrative structure allowed skaz authors like Zoshchenko to “think against [their own] thought.” In the process, they produced images of the working-class other, which, though not objective, were objectified with great caution and no small measure of “wishful” and “passionate participation in the good.” 123 Bakhtin, Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo 2:12. 124 My thinking about the ethical imperative to move “toward the object” reflects an ongoing intellectual engagement with poet and editor of Translit: A Literary-Theoretical Journal, Pavel Arsenev, and, in particular, his preface to volume 19 of the journal. On the relation of this imperative to the “objective turn” in contemporary Russian poetry and to the political disenchantment of the post-actionist mid-2010s see Arsenev, “#19: Ob''ektno- orientirovannaia poeziia,” and Dmitrii Golynko-Vol'fson, sochinenie protiv terrora, “Poeziia zakrytogo dostupa: Tezisy k ob''ektivatsii poeticheskogo dostupa,” both in Translit: Literaturno-teoreticheskii zhurnal 19 (2017): 4–11 and 15–24, respectively.

The writing. What is Chatsky fighting for and against? (According to the comedy A.S.

The main role, of course, is the role of Chatsky, without whom there would be no comedy, but, perhaps, there would be a picture of morals.

I. A, sochinenie protiv terrora. Goncharov

What is Chatsky fighting for and against? The comedy of Alexander Sergeevich Griboyedov was written during the years of the creation of the secret revolutionary organizations of the Decembrists. It reflects the struggle of the new worldview with the old. This struggle between the ideas of "the present century" and the "past century". Griboyedov showed from the point of view of an advanced person of his time, close in views to the Decembrists, sochinenie protiv terrora. The main character of the comedy is Alexander Andreevich Chatsky. In it, the writer embodied many qualities of an advanced person of his era. According to his convictions, he is close to the Decembrists. Chatsky lost his parents early and, being the son of Famusov's deceased friend, Andrey

Ilyich Chatsky, grew up mssql$wincc error fcb open was brought up in the house of Famusov. Chatsky fondly recalls his childhood spent with Sophia, whom he is in love with. From the words of Sophia, we learn that he left their house, where he run time error 5 invalid call procedure bored, rarely visited them, then again “pretended to be in love, demanding and distressed,” and then went “to look for the mind.” Chatsky says that he "wanted to travel around the whole world, but did not travel around a hundredth." Chatsky was in military service, probably with the Russian army abroad.

Molchalin reminds him that in Moscow they talked a lot about Chatsky's service in St. Petersburg, about his connection with the ministers and about breaking with them.

Famusov speaks about Chatsky's real occupations in the comedy:

Does not serve, sochinenie protiv terrora, that is, he does not sochinenie protiv terrora any benefit in that,

But if you want, it would be businesslike.

It's a pity, it's a pity, he's small with a head,

And he writes and translates well.

Chatsky's personal drama, which gives movement to the whole plot, deepens and complicates his public drama, contributes to the increasing sharpness of his attacks against noble Moscow. In this critique of the mores and views of the Famus society, it is clear what Chatsky is against, what his views are.

He has a negative attitude towards serfdom, the cruelty of the landlords, careerism, sochinenie protiv terrora, servility, the slavish morality of inertia, the ideals of the "past century", ignorance.

Chatsky proclaims humanity, respect for the common man, service to the cause, and not to individuals, freedom of thought. He affirms the progressive ideas of modernity, the prosperity of science and art, sochinenie protiv terrora, respect for the national language and culture, and for education. He sees the meaning of life in serving the people, the Motherland.

The hero's convictions are revealed in his monologues and disputes with representatives of Famus Moscow.

His rejection of serfdom resounds in his memoirs about the serf theatre, about "Nestor of noble scoundrels", who exchanged his faithful servants for three greyhounds.

After listening to Famusov's enthusiastic story about Maxim Petrovich, Chatsky speaks with contempt about people who "not in war, but in peace, took their foreheads, knocked on the floor, not sparing", about those "whose neck often bent." He despises people who are ready

Have patrons yawn at the ceiling,

Appear to be silent, to shuffle, to dine.

He stigmatizes the apache 500 internal server error cgi of the past":

"Direct was the age of humility and fear."

He approves of those young people who are not in a hurry to fit into a regiment of jesters. Chatsky is critical of the dominance of foreigners:

Will we ever be resurrected from the foreign power of fashion?

So that our smart, cheerful people

Although the language did not consider us Germans.

Chatsky defends the right of a person to freely choose his occupation: to travel, live in the countryside, "fix his mind" in science or devote himself to "high and beautiful creative arts." Chatsky's desire to "serve" and not "serve", sochinenie protiv terrora, to serve the "cause" and not "persons", his "connection with the ministers" and further complete break - this is a hint at the desire of progressive youth to transform society in a peaceful, educational way.

Chatsky did nothing, but he spoke, and for this he was declared insane.

The old world is fighting Chatsky's free word, using slander. Chatsky's struggle with accusatory words corresponds to that early period of the Decembrists' movement, when they believed that much could be achieved with words, and limited themselves to oral speeches.

The writing
What critical error video no video Chatsky fighting for and against?

And who are the judges?
A.S. Griboyedov

IChatsky - the central character in the comedy "Woe from Wit"
IIWhat is Chatsky fighting for and against?
  1. "I would be glad to serve, it's sickening to serve"

  2. Comparison of Chatsky and Molchalin

  3. Chatsky - the hero of our time
III"Woe from Wit" is a reflection of our society

The comedy “Woe from Wit”, written by A.S. Griboedov, I think, will make a deep impression on every reader. Chatsky is the central character in the comedy, he opposes the entire Famus society. The very idea of ​​the work was to oppose an educated person with the ignorance, backwardness of the society of that time. Comedy conflict is multifaceted. Chatsky leads a “fight” against ignorance, ignorance, humility and fear, the failure of the government, indulgence in everything foreign. He is not afraid to express his opinion, defend his point of view, discuss, argue:

Now let one of us
Of the young people, there sochinenie protiv terrora an opponent of quests,
Not demanding either places or promotions,
In the sciences, he will stick the mind, hungry for knowledge;
Or in his soul God himself will excite the ardor
To creative arts, lofty and beautiful, -
They are the hour: robbery! fire!
I odal sent wishes
Humble, but out loud
So that the Almighty unclean that same spirit exterminated
Empty, slavish, blind imitation;
So that he would plant a spark in someone with a soul;
Who could by word and example
Hold us like a sochinenie protiv terrora rein,
From pitiful nausea on the side of a stranger .

Ignorance is error fail to run the game of the qualities that Chatsky cannot endure, here he is ready to fight to the bitter end. Chatsky is educated, well-read, erudite, has traveled half the world and knows that the world is not limited to Moscow alone and secular balls. Indeed, in it, in the world of Chatsky, there is so much beauty: philosophers, travelers, freethinkers. sochinenie protiv terrora Chatsky also wants to be useful to society, the government. But the state, it turns out, does not need selfless service, it requires serving, but Chatsky is against this, he does not want to “entertain” sovereigns:

I would be glad to serve, it’s sickening to serve .

Famusov, on the contrary, is proud of the fact that he is familiar with the person who earned the rank with his “forehead”, Chatsky is an honest, sincere person and cannot remain silent, answering this:

As he was famous for, whose neck bent more often;
As not in the war, but in the world they took it with their foreheads,
Knocked on the floor without regret!
Who needs - there arrogance, they lie in the dust,
And for those who are higher, flattery, like weaving lace, sochinenie protiv terrora.
Direct was the age of humility and fear .

Who does Chatsky see next to him? People who are looking only for ranks, "money to live", not love, but a profitable marriage. Their ideal is "moderation and accuracy", their dream is "to d_mysql_connect_error 1130 traffpro away all the books and burn them." With all these "ideals" Chatsky did not agree.
What he really fights for is for his happiness, for Sophia's love. It is difficult for him to be among people, gossips and imitators.

Yes, no urine: a million torments
Breasts from a friendly vice,
Feet from shuffling, ears from exclamations,
And more than a head from all sorts of trifles.

Undoubtedly, sochinenie protiv terrora, Chatsky is a error sending response not enough free resources person. So why can't he find a common language with the Famus society, as Molchalin does. The fact is that Chatsky always sincerely expresses his opinion. Cunning, resourcefulness of Molchalin, the ability to find the "key" to each person, these are the defining qualities of this character, the qualities that make him an anti-hero of comedy, the main opponent of Chatsky. Molchalin became a household name for vulgarity and servility. "Always on tiptoe and not rich in words", he managed to win the favor of the powerful of this world by not daring to pronounce his judgment aloud. No wonder Chatsky speaks of Molchalin like this:

It was like a thunderbolt here.
Molchalin! - Who else will settle everything so peacefully!
There the pug will stroke in time!
Here at the time the card will be rubbed!

Of course, Chatsky's monologues tell us a lot, sochinenie protiv terrora. Thanks to them, we will find out what the hero thinks, what he feels:

A Frenchman from Bordeaux, pushing his chest .
He feels like a little king here., sochinenie protiv terrora.
How he gave everything in exchange for a new way -
And customs, and language, and holy antiquity,
And stately clothes for another
In a jester's fashion
At least we could borrow a few from the Chinese
Wise they have ignorance of foreigners.

No wonder the author noted that during sochinenie protiv terrora these words of Chatsky, no one listened to him, and most likely did not want to listen:

He looks around, everyone is circling in a waltz with the greatest zeal. The old men wandered off to the card tables.

Based on all this, it is already possible to draw certain conclusions. Chatsky is the hero of that time, and thanks to this comedy he is the hero of ours, the hero of the future.

It is hard to imagine what would happen to our society if there were not people like Chatsky in it, because it is to them that we owe our education, intellect, freedom, in general, everything that we have achieved in the process of struggle. Since it was Chatsky who strove for the best and believed that the best could be achieved only by protesting against the outdated, ossified principles established in society.
In what way should a person walk in order to achieve success, but also not to prevaricate, not to make a deal with his conscience? Each of us will make his choice based on his life principles, but such instructive works as the wonderful comedy "Woe from Wit" by A.S. Griboedov can also help in this. The genius of the work lies in the fact network error 603 he saw and showed us universal phenomena that are not subject to fashion and time. I think this comedy will make the reader think. But after all, in society there will always be people like Molchalin, Famusov, Zagoretsky, sochinenie protiv terrora, many will say, sochinenie protiv terrora, but in my opinion a person always needs to fight for his rights and for the rights of society, to express his sochinenie protiv terrora, thoughts. After all, every person is a part of society. This is exactly what the author wanted to show us, the readers.

What and against what is Chatsky fighting.

"Woe from Wit" by Griboyedov is the work of one hero, sochinenie protiv terrora. Chatsky . It's sochinenie protiv terrora strange, but for the first time, when it comes to him, Griboyedov rhymes his last name with the word "stupid":

Excuse me, right, how holy God is,

I wanted this stupid laugh

Helped to cheer you up a bit.

To you Alexander Andreevich Chatsky

These are Lisa's words. And really, is Chatsky's struggle really necessary for the author himself to use such rhymes, isn't it stupid to fight chimeras. In the courtyard of the 20s of the XIX century - the time of reaction and censorship, sochinenie protiv terrora, when they preferred to turn a blind eye to everything and everyone and only "hit the back of the head", like the notorious Maxim Petrovich. But still, the fruit of freedom is gradually ripening, and who knows if our Chatsky was not on Senate Square along with those who dared. Render error detected ubuntu 9.10 is this struggle necessary, and in general, what is in it - this struggle?

Comedy conflict is multifaceted. One conflict grows out of another, but everywhere we see this struggle of Chatsky, whether it is love or disputes with the "gone century". Without a struggle, there is no Chatsky, and rather he fights against. Against the members of the English Club, against "three of the boulevard faces who have been young for half a century", against the "consumptive" gentleman, the "enemy of books". But since Chatsky is fighting, then, apparently, they should also fight, defend their point of view, discuss, object, sochinenie protiv terrora. How can they reflect, sochinenie protiv terrora, for example, such a call:

As he was famous for, whose neck bent more often;

As not in the war, but in the world they took it with their foreheads,

Knocked on the floor without regret!

Who needs - there arrogance, they lie in the dust,

And for those who are higher, flattery, like weaving lace.

Direct was the age of humility and fear.

This is downright an insult, a challenge to a duel, albeit a verbal one. Probably, the past century had arguments, its own arguments, but either he did not dare to express them aloud, or he was afraid. Nevertheless, if you argue, then it means to be aware that it is necessary to seek the truth, and the truth here is on the side of Chatsky. They, this “regiment of jesters”, are certainly dumber, but also more cunning. After all, Chatsky does not accept cunning, he goes to war with an open visor, sochinenie protiv terrora, holding a spear at the ready, ready to fight an enemy in a fair fight, on the side of which there is a numerical superiority. And they stick a knife in his back, shouting “Ah! Sochinenie protiv terrora God! he's carbonari!" This is probably a war with windmills, but it deserves to be called a war. For someone should draw our attention to all this inertia and servility, to this dominance of "mixing languages: French with Nizhny Novgorod", to prejudices that will not destroy "neither their years, not fashions, nor fires", someone must fight the pufferfish and the silent ones, someone must say at least a word of truth.

Ignorance is sochinenie protiv terrora key point that Chatsky is disgusted with, here he is ready to fight to the victory, and, I think, the ill-fated word "carbonari" sounds more like a compliment to him. Chatsky is educated, well-read, has traveled half the world and knows that the world is not limited to Moscow and secular balls. After all, in this world of Chatsky, there is so much beauty: philosophers, sochinenie protiv terrora, travelers, freethinkers. Contempt for the sciences is the worst sin, we see how fiercely he defends himself:

Now letting one of us

Of the young people, there is an enemy of quests,

Not demanding either places or promotions,

In the sciences, he will stick the mind, hungry for knowledge;

Or in his soul God himself will excite the heat

To creative arts, lofty and beautiful, -

They are the hour: robbery! fire!

So, "there is one warrior in the field," according to Goncharov, but only if he is Chatsky!

However, Chatsky not only goes on the attack, but he also defends himself, or rather, fights for . He fights for his love, also to the end. And here he is defeated and defeated, and his banners are trampled into the mud by the cavalry of the enemy, who by deceit entered the "palace". That's what he wasn't ready dhcp client error 1068 windows vista. He feels in himself enough strength to fight the entire Moscow world, but he does not have them to resist the "insignificant" Molchalin.

Blind! in whom I was looking for the reward of all labors!

Hurry! . flew! trembled! Here's happiness, I thought close.

Chatsky is defeated, this was the last, mortal wound, from which he may never recover. The fight is over.

Griboyedov's work has a sad end, however, the author called it a comedy. Probably because everything went well for the main character: he did not stay with a woman who would deceive him, he was not sent to prison for free speech, he did not shoot anyone because of the insults. He just laughed and fought, with the same smile on his lips. Chatsky did not win in his struggle, or rather, he did not win at that time, we, the readers, are well aware of the course of history. But the victory was not so important, sochinenie protiv terrora. Chatsky is the initiator of this struggle of “two centuries”, then it will be continued by the Decembrists, Herzen and many others, in the 20th century it, this struggle, for sure, would have turned into the Red Terror, but we cannot know this. We like Chatsky, we love him with all our hearts, and together with him we leave Moscow, from this struggle, from broken dreams. "Carriage for me, sochinenie protiv terrora, carriage!"


For the preparation of this work, materials from the site were used.

And who are the judges?
A.S. Griboyedov

IChatsky - the sochinenie protiv terrora character in the comedy "Woe from Wit"
IIWhat is Chatsky fighting for and against?
  1. "I would be glad to serve, it's sickening to serve"

  2. Comparison of Chatsky and Sochinenie protiv terrora - the hero of our time
III"Woe from Wit" is a reflection of our society

The comedy “Woe from Wit”, sochinenie protiv terrora, written by A.S. Griboedov, I think, will make a deep impression on every reader. Chatsky is the central character in the comedy, he opposes the entire Famus society. The very idea of ​​the work was to oppose an educated person with the ignorance, backwardness of the society of that time. Comedy conflict is multifaceted. Chatsky leads a “fight” against ignorance, ignorance, humility and fear, the failure of the government, indulgence in everything foreign. He is not afraid to express his opinion, defend his point of view, discuss, argue:

Now let one of us
Of the young people, there is an opponent of quests,
Not demanding either places or promotions,
In the sciences, he will stick the mind, hungry for knowledge;
Or in his soul God himself will excite the ardor
To creative arts, lofty and beautiful, -
They are the hour: robbery! fire!
I odal sent wishes
Humble, but out loud
So that the Almighty unclean that same spirit exterminated
Empty, slavish, blind imitation;
So that he would plant a spark in someone with a soul;
Who could by word and example
Hold us like a strong rein,
From pitiful nausea on the side of a stranger .

Ignorance is one of the qualities that Chatsky cannot endure, here he is ready to fight to the bitter end. Chatsky is educated, well-read, erudite, has traveled half the world and knows that the world is not limited to Moscow alone and secular balls. Indeed, in it, in the world of Chatsky, there is so much beauty: philosophers, travelers, freethinkers, sochinenie protiv terrora. Chatsky also wants to be useful to society, the government. But the state, it turns out, does not need selfless service, it requires serving, but Chatsky is against this, he does not want to “entertain” sovereigns:

I would be glad to serve, it’s sickening to serve .

Famusov, on the contrary, is proud of the fact that he is familiar with the person who earned the rank with his “forehead”, Chatsky is an honest, sincere person and cannot remain silent, answering this:

As he was famous for, whose neck bent more often;
As not in the war, but in the world they took it with their foreheads,
Knocked on the floor without regret!
Who needs - there arrogance, they lie in the dust,
And for those who are higher, flattery, like weaving lace.
Direct was the age of error 500 youtube and fear .

Who does Chatsky see next to him? People who are looking only for ranks, "money to live", not love, but a profitable marriage. Their ideal is "moderation and accuracy", their dream is "to take away all the books and burn them." With all these "ideals" Chatsky did not agree.
What he really fights for is for his happiness, for Sophia's love. It is difficult for him to be among people, gossips and imitators.

Yes, no urine: a million torments
Breasts from a friendly vice,
Feet from shuffling, sochinenie protiv terrora from exclamations,
And more than a head from all sorts of trifles.

Undoubtedly, Chatsky is a smart person. So why can't he find a common language with the Famus society, as Molchalin does. The fact is that Chatsky always sincerely expresses his opinion. Cunning, resourcefulness of Molchalin, the ability to find the "key" to each person, sochinenie protiv terrora, these are the defining qualities of this character, the qualities that make him an anti-hero of comedy, the main opponent of Chatsky. Molchalin became a household name for vulgarity and servility. "Always on tiptoe and not rich in words", he managed to win the favor of the powerful of this world by not daring to pronounce his judgment aloud. No wonder Chatsky speaks of Molchalin like this:

It was like a thunderbolt here.
Molchalin! - Who else will settle everything so peacefully!
There the pug will stroke in time!
Here at the time the card will be rubbed!

Of course, Chatsky's monologues tell us a lot. Thanks to them, we will find out what the hero thinks, what he feels:

A Frenchman from Bordeaux, pushing his chest .
He feels like a little king here.
How he gave everything in exchange for a new way -
And customs, and language, and holy antiquity,
And stately clothes for another
In a jester's fashion
At least we could borrow a few from the Chinese
Wise they have ignorance of foreigners, sochinenie protiv terrora.

No wonder the author noted that during all these words of Chatsky, no one listened to him, and most likely did not want to listen:

He looks around, everyone is circling in a waltz with the greatest zeal. The old men wandered off to the card tables.

Based on all this, it is sochinenie protiv terrora possible to draw certain conclusions. Chatsky is the hero of that time, and thanks to this comedy he is the hero of ours, the hero of the future.

It is hard to imagine what would happen to our society if there were not people like Chatsky in it, because it is to them that we owe our education, intellect, freedom, in general, everything that we have achieved in the process of struggle. Since it was Chatsky who strove for the best and believed that the best could be achieved only by protesting against the outdated, ossified principles established in society.
In what way should a person walk in order to achieve success, but also not to prevaricate, not to make a deal with his conscience? Sochinenie protiv terrora of us will make his choice based on his life principles, but such instructive works as the wonderful comedy "Woe from Wit" by A.S. Griboedov can also help in this. The genius of the work lies in the fact that he saw and showed us universal phenomena that are not subject to fashion and time. I think this comedy will make the reader think. But after all, in society there will always be people like Molchalin, Famusov, Zagoretsky, many will say, but in my opinion a person always needs to fight for his rights and for the rights of society, to express his opinion, thoughts. After all, every person is a part sochinenie protiv terrora society. This is exactly what the sochinenie protiv terrora wanted to show us, the readers.

The beliefs and ideals of the protagonist of the comedy A. S. Griboedov "Woe from Wit" by Chatsky deserve the highest praise, not only because http error curl extension, or openssl extension are highly moral in all respects, but also because they were voiced by the hero in a society hostile to him.
"Woe from Wit" is perhaps one of the most topical works of Russian dramaturgy, and the image of Chatsky occupies a worthy place among the images of progressive people in Russian literature. Chatsky, like Pushkin's Onegin and Lermontov's Pechorin, is opposed to society.
But this is where the similarity of characters (with the exception of some details) ends. Chatsky openly enters into a struggle with the hated "light", while advocating not only for personal interests, but, mainly, for the interests of the whole society.
Chatsky is a true patriot of his country, and serving for him means being useful to the whole society, and not to ranks. At sochinenie protiv terrora time, the main character was close to the ministers in St. Petersburg, but cut off all ties, as he realized that careerism, hypocrisy and meanness form the basis of relationships in this environment. And promotion through one's own merits is simply impossible here - it is necessary to "bend" somewhere. The hero says that he would be glad to serve, but "it's sickening to be served." Chatsky does not accept this state of affairs and openly opposes slave morality.
Subservience causes hatred in such a freedom-loving nature as Chatsky. He delivers an angry speech against those whose cringing reaches the point of absurdity. Chatsky says that there is nothing more disgusting than “bravely sacrificing” your head for the sake of “the highest smile.”
. He is famous for whose neck bent more often.
He emphasizes that those people who should be equal to the growing youth behave in this way. These people are set as an example, sochinenie protiv terrora, and they are the pillars of society, sochinenie protiv terrora. Chatsky angrily asks:
Where, show us, the fathers of the fatherland, Whom we should take as models? Sochinenie protiv terrora denounces the right of some people to own others. He not only points out that in the eyes of the masters bonded people are equated with animals (Khlestova, sochinenie protiv terrora, for example, equated a little dog sochinenie protiv terrora a girl-arapka), but also that serfdom develops lack of spirituality and the lowest morale among slave owners.
Chatsky raises the hot topic of upbringing and education in Russia.
Ironically, if not most aptly, he remarks:
What now, just as from ancient times, They bother to recruit teachers for regiments, More in number, at a cheaper price"? :
How from an early time we have become accustomed to believing That there is no salvation for us without the Germans! Admiration for everything foreign Chatsky does not accept. Sochinenie protiv terrora says that representatives of the "past century" consider communication in a strange language - a mixture of "French with Nizhny Novgorod" as the height of culture. Their native language was not held in high esteem by high society, and they knew it poorly. Having adopted foreign customs, language, fashion, the noble society simply neglected the national culture, and therefore, lost its own face. This is what Chatsky says:
Let them declare me an Old Believer, But our Sochinenie protiv terrora is a hundred times worse for me Since I gave everything in exchange for a new way: Sochinenie protiv terrora morals, and language, and holy antiquity, And stately clothes for another -According to the clownish model . Chatsky deeply believes in the power of reason and defends its rights. It is in the mind that he sees the main way of remaking society. Chatsky hopes that society will be updated, moral values ​​will be reoriented, moral foundations in the “current century” will be rethought: “No, today the world is no longer like that”; “Everyone breathes more freely sochinenie protiv terrora And is in no hurry to fit sochinenie protiv terrora the regiment
I. A. Goncharov wrote: “Chatsky is most of all a sochinenie protiv terrora of lies and everything that has become obsolete, which drowns out a new life,“ a free life. He knows what he is fighting for and what this life should bring him.”

Whitewashing the Great Terror

Stalin, 1945, credit Wikipedia

By Frank Ellis

Guilt and innocence become senseless notions: “guilty” is he who stands in the way of the natural or historical process which has passed judgement over “inferior races”, over individuals “unfit to live” over “dying classes and decadent peoples”. Terror executes these judgements and before its court, all concerned are subjectively innocent:the murdered because they did nothing against the system, and the murderers because they do not really murder but execute a death sentence pronounced by some higher tribunal […] Terror is lawfulness, if law is the law of the movement of some suprahuman force, Nature or History.

Hannah Arendt[1]

    1. Introduction: The Great Terror (Ezhovshchina)
    2. Stalin’s Reasons for the Great Terror
    3. Interrogation, Torture and Confessions
    4. The Role of Terror in the Soviet State
    5. Stalin Manipulated sochinenie protiv terrora the NKVD?
    6. The Great Terror was not confined to the Red Army
    7. No Evidence of Large Agent Networks in the Soviet Union Run by Foreign Intelligence Agencies
    8. Stalin’s Failure to Heed Military Intelligence Data 1940-194
    9. Further Evidence that Internal Considerations of Power outweighed Concerns about any External Threat
    10. The Heydrich Dossier and Archives
    11. The Gang of 13: Stalin names the Core Conspirators
    12. Faking the Past in order to Control the Present
    13. The Heart of the Military-Political Conspiracy
    14. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov: No Comrade in Arms
    15. Inconsistent Explanations of Stalin’s Behaviour
    16. The Party Mind, Ideology and Revolutionary Justice
    17. Ending the Great Terror and the Meaning of Zagovor (Conspiracy)
    18. Conclusion
  1. Introduction: The Great Terror (Ezhovshchina)

Tukhachevsky, credit Wikipedia

In 1937, though the groundwork had been laid well before, Stalin initiated and carried through his sweeping and murderous purge of all Soviet institutions. Old Bolsheviks, among them, Nikolai Bukharin, Martem’ian Riutin, Grigorii Zinoviev, Aleksei Rykov and Sochinenie protiv terrora Piatakov, along with deputy commissar of defence, Field Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii, Field Marshal Vasilii Bliukher, Field Marshal Egorov, sochinenie protiv terrora, Army commanders Iona Iakir, Ieronim Uborevich and August Kork, and Corps commanders Vitovt Putna, Boris Fel’dman and Il’ia Gar’kavyi, were all shot. In the former Soviet Union sochinenie protiv terrora mass cull was known as the Ezhovshchina, named after Nikolai Ezhov, the head of the NKVD at the time. In the West, it is also referred to as the Great Terror. The minimum number known to have been executed throughout the Soviet Union is 681,692 but could be as high as 800,000.[2] An execution toll in excess of 1 million is entirely plausible, if deaths arising from deportation and forced-labour are taken into account. Most of the victims died by shooting but in 1990 it was revealed in declassified Soviet documents that in 1937 the Moscow Directorate of the NKVD had pioneered the use of mobile gas killing vans in order to maintain the rate of executions. There are no numbers in the public domain of those gassed by the NKVD and it is not yet known whether the gas-killing technology either in vans or even in dedicated, static gas chambers was used by the NKVD outside of Moscow, in Leningrad, for example, where the execution squads were also struggling to maintain the tempo of executions.

The purge of the Red Army and its institutional aftershocks had grievous consequences in 1941, and thus the question that has exercised historians is why Stalin ran the risk of weakening the defences of the Soviet state by inflicting such damage on the Red Army. The matter was first examined in depth by Robert Conquest in The Great Terror (1968) and then updated in The Great Terror: A Reassessment (1990). The most convincing explanation is that in order to complete the revolution from above and to eradicate all opposition to his rule, Stalin moved to bring all Sochinenie protiv terrora institutions under his control. By 1939, with all Soviet institutions purged, broken and reconstructed in, and thoroughly imbued with, a Stalinist spirit, the Soviet Union had become the world’s first totalitarian state.

In The Red Army and the Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet Military[3] Peter Whitewood argues that the Conquest analysis of  Stalin’s role in the decapitation of the Red Army in the 1930s is not only wrong but cannot be trusted because it was written during the Cold War and is, for that reason, suspect. Writing well after the Cold War, Whitewood, apparently free of the biases and tensions of that time, would have us believe that what he offers is more detached, free of bias and untainted by the ideological struggles of the Cold War and is, therefore,  a more reliable account of what happened.

Now, any major revision of sochinenie protiv terrora history and origins of the Great Terror, certainly the one proposed by Whitewood, requires a detailed examination of Conquest’s position in order to set out why Whitewood believes Conquest has misinterpreted the evidence.  Unfortunately for his case, Whitewood confines his comments on Conquest’s The Great Terror to a few lines in an endnote[4], so providing no clear basis to explain why Conquest apparently got it wrong, and with reference to an edition published in 1973, not the most recent version, noted above, which was published in 1990. The fact that Conquest was writing in the Cold War is irrelevant. Conquest was and remains right to blame Stalin for the violence and fabrications. The fact of the matter is that Stalin ‘was excessively paranoid and obsessed with power’[5] and this did not need to be popularised by Khrushchev. Nor did historians need Khrushchev’s secret speech of 1956, with its partial denunciation of Stalin, to come to any such conclusion, since enough was already known. With Conquest conveniently exiled to the endnotes, Whitewood is sochinenie protiv terrora free to pursue his case in defence of Stalin, unimpeded by any fundamental objections from the likes of Conquest or Hannah Arendt, the philosopher-historian, also exiled to the endnotes, along with the Russian historian Nikolai Semenovich Cherushev. Cherushev’s contribution is especially important since his two monographs, Udar po svoim: Krasnaia armiia 1938-1941 (Striking one’s Own: The Red Army 1938-1941, 2003) and 1937 god: Byl li zagovor voennykh? (1937: Was there a Conspiracy of the Military?(2007) provide robust support for the Conquest position. Both monographs are ignored by Whitewood, and for good reason.

2. Stalin’s Reasons for the Great Terror

According to Whitewood, no credible explanation has been offered to explain why Stalin would launch the purge of the military ‘at the same time the regime believed war was approaching’.[6] This is manifestly not the case since Conquest (and others) have done just that. The Conquest position on the Great Terror is that it was a product of Stalin’s paranoia and, above all, his drive to achieve complete power over the Soviet state; that it was the culminating act or one in a series of acts, which, by 1939, led to the world’s first totalitarian state with Stalin firmly ensconced, and all real, potential or imaginary rivals for power vanquished.

Stalin used various instruments and ploys to achieve this goal. While never losing sight of his objective, he, depending on the circumstances of the moment, would adopt a comradely pose or one that was ideologically aggressive or vituperative. A letter of apology sent by Stalin to Tukhachevskii in May 1932 – to clear up a misunderstanding on sochinenie protiv terrora latter’s rearmament proposals – and cited by Whitewood to show that Stalin bore Tukhachevskii no grudge, cannot be taken at face value: it was a typical Stalin ploy. Its purpose was to make Stalin appear reasonable and conciliatory so that when, in the future, he turned against Tukhachevskii – and others treated in similar fashion – his reasons for so doing appear more justified and well founded. Tukhachevskii’s diplomatic duties and the fact that he was allowed to travel abroad were merely ruses to strengthen the case against him oracle create procedure show errors of plotting with foreigners, and having betrayed the trust of Comrade Stalin). That certain Red Army commanders had travelled to Germany, Tukhachevskii among them, was also used against them. Public displays of trust in future victims were part of Stalin’s general method, since rewards and displays of trust served to make arrest and execution all the more striking, sochinenie protiv terrora, and were intended to convince domestic and foreign audiences that Stalin must have had very good reasons to move against Tukhachevskii and those alleged to be his fellow plotters in May-June 1937. The 1936 Soviet Constitution, promulgated after the genocide in Ukraine, was another piece of window dressing intended to dupe people, especially Western Sovietophiles, that the worst was over when, sochinenie protiv terrora, in fact, more was about to be inflicted.

Whitewood maintains that the time lag between what could be construed as public demotions and the arrests ‘strongly suggest a level of uncertainty from Stalin about how he should proceed’.[7] Revealed here is not so much Stalin’s uncertainty but Whitewood’s naiveté and lack of understanding of Stalin’s modus operandi. Delays between a public fall from favour and arrest were all part of the psychological processing to which the victim was subjected prior to arrest. The pressure was appalling, and intentional. For example, among Red Army commanders and political commissars who had still not been arrested but who were being slandered there were 782 and 832 recorded cases of suicide and attempted suicide in 1937 and 1938, respectively. These numbers do not include the Navy (Voenno-morskoi flot).[8]

That all kinds of nonsense had been accumulating in Tukhachevskii’s file for years and that this was followed by demotions and arrest indicates, if not ‘a well-thought-out plan’[9], but evidence of some general plan based on opportunities that might arise or could be made to arise to suit Stalin’s purposes. All the evidence of the Great Terror pertaining to the show trials reveals this trait: one moment the victim is promoted or publicly celebrated then he is out of favour then back in favour and finally the axe falls. Responding to claims made by Mikhail Frinovskii, Ezhov’s deputy, and others, that sochinenie protiv terrora conspiracy was suddenly discovered, Robert Conquest points out that ‘The pressure against the Army, though little publicized, had, on the contrary, been gradual and cumulative’.[10] In the case of Iakir the cumulative pressure  – the standard NKVD pattern – was applied by targeting his immediate subordinates. One of Iakir’s divisional commanders, Dmitrii Shmidt, who had once told Stalin he would cut off his  ears, was arrested without Iakir’s being informed. Another Iakir subordinate, divisional commander Iu. Sablin, was arrested and shot. Conquest writes that a female NKVD officer  – at great personal risk – went to see Iakir ‘and told him that she had seen the materials against Sablin, and it was quite clear that he was not guilty’.[11] Yet another indirect blow struck against Iakir was the arrest of Gar’kavyi, sochinenie protiv terrora, another one of his corps commanders and a relation by marriage.  Iakir and Tukhachevskii could read the runes: they knew what was coming.  Stalin did not need ‘additional supporting material’[12] to be provided by his torture machine. Implying that Stalin moved against the Red Army because he really did believe that it was infiltrated by masses of foreign agents is preposterous.

3. Interrogation, Torture and Confessions

Confessions were extracted by torture and Stalin encouraged its use. In a document circulated to district and regional party secretaries (approximately 21st July 1937) Stalin rebuked party officials for objecting to NKVD methods of interrogation (use of torture). Torture was justified, argued Stalin, because ‘obvious enemies of the people’ were exploiting humane methods of interrogation in order to avoid providing the names of conspirators. According to Stalin, Soviet agencies were compelled to use such methods, since ‘It is known that all bourgeois intelligence agencies apply physical pressure in relation to the representatives of the socialist proletariat, and besides applying it in the most shocking forms.  So the question arises: why must socialist intelligence agencies be more humane in relation to the inveterate agents of the bourgeoisie, sochinenie protiv terrora, the accursed enemies of the working class and collective farm workers’.[13] Stalin’s instructions on the use of torture highlight his brutal cynicism and mendacity. Torture, he states, is not to be used on a routine basis but only in exceptional circumstances, sochinenie protiv terrora, and those who have violated this rule, ‘scum such as Zakovskii, Litvin, Uspenskii and sochinenie protiv terrora, applying it ‘to honest people who had been mistakenly arrested’, were subjected to ‘condign retribution’.[14]  The loophole for Stalin and his torturers is that the conspiracy against Soviet power constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’, so there is nothing wrong in the routine use of torture. The Zakovskii condemned by Stalin as ‘scum’ is most likely Leonid Zakovskii who was arrested and condemned to execution on 29th August 1938. However, at the very moment he was being denounced by Stalin in July 1937 he was head of the Sochinenie protiv terrora Directorate of the Leningrad district, indefatigably arresting and torturing suspects on behalf of Comrade Stalin, blissfully unaware that he had been lined up for future liquidation sochinenie protiv terrora served his usefulness).

Severe and protracted beatings were, in any case, the norm not the exception: ‘If the accused won’t sign your written record of the interrogation, just keep beating him until he does sign.’[15] In some cases, specialist interrogators were used, sochinenie protiv terrora, so-called kolol’shchiki (beaters).  They operated without supervision and were able to extract testimonies very quickly and then write up convincing interrogation reports: ‘These people [the beaters] knew nothing about the material on the suspect but were sent to Lefortovo. The arrestee was summoned and they set about beating him. The beating went on until the suspect agreed to give a testimony’.[16]

The role played by beatings and other forms of torture in extracting confessions is also repeatedly confirmed in the statements and memoirs of victims and survivors. For example, in a letter to Stalin from his prison cell, dated 6th April 1937, divisional commander Dmitrii Shmidt, withdrew all his confessions extracted under torture: ‘All the accusations are fantasy, all my testimony is a lie, sochinenie protiv terrora, 100%’ and ‘The main thing is that I am not guilty of anything’.[17]

Head of the Chemical Directorate of the Red Army, Iakov Moiseevich Fishman was arrested on 5th June 1937 and tortured. He was accused of being in a Socialist-Revolutionary organisation, having links with Tukhachevskii and Uborevich, disrupting the chemical armaments of the Red Army, and, for good measure, being an agent of two foreign intelligence organisations and passing information to them on the status of the Red Army’s chemical weapons. Fishman was not shot but ended up in a forced-labour camp. During the process of rehabilitation that ensued after Stalin’s death, Fishman provided details of the torture to which he had been subjected:

Over a six-day period I was allowed no sleep at all, brutally beaten and subjected to the most nightmarish insults.  Brought to a state of complete exhaustion and in a drugged-like condition, and in legal terms unaware of what I was doing, I signed this “confession” which was absolutely false from start to sochinenie protiv terrora Later, when I had regained my senses, I immediately rejected these vile concoctions, but once again I was subjected to the most brutal and malevolent treatment. As a result I was once again forced to sign all kinds of false material, slandering myself and others. In reality I had never been a participant in any conspiracy whatsoever, and had never engaged in any kind of wrecking or espionage activity.[18]

Former NKVD officials, now serving in the newly formed KGB, were dismissed and others were arrested for falsifying evidence. Fishman was totally rehabilitated on 5th January 1955. Justice of sorts caught up with other NKVD figures. Interrogated by the Chief Prosecutor’s office after sochinenie protiv terrora, as part of the investigation into the alleged military conspiracy, A. A. Avseevich, who was known to have been a brutal and sadistic NKVD interrogator, acknowledged sochinenie protiv terrora arrestees were subjected to torture, or in his words, to ‘physical methods of coercion’.[19]  In April 1937, Avseevich forced corps commanders, Putna and Primakov, to provide false testimony incriminating Tukhachevskii, Iakir and Fel’dman who were then arrested.

Even the dead were able to strike back at their torturers. From December 1933, sochinenie protiv terrora, Corps Commander Albert Ivanovich Lapin was an aide to the commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. He was arrested on 17th May 1937. Lapin’s interrogation record shows that he confessed to being in a counter-revolutionary organisation and oracle forms error_level having recruited others. Unable to withstand the prison conditions and torture, Lapin committed suicide (by hanging) on 21st September 1937, leaving a brief suicide note: ‘I have had enough of life, I was beaten very badly, therefore I gave false testimony and so I slandered other people. I am guilty of nothing’.[20] That Lapin had earlier signed his interrogation record which concluded with the wording, ‘I have read the record and it is a truthful record of my words’[21], lacks, in any case, conviction, with or without a suicide note, since it says nothing about the accuracy and veracity of the record itself or the methods used to secure it. The interrogatee’s signature is merely intended to provide a veneer of due process.

That the trial of Tukhachevskii and his co-defendants was a sham  – and that Stalin knew they were innocent of any charges – is additionally corroborated by the fact that in an article drafted on the 10th June 1937, and submitted to Stalin for his corrections and approval, the day before the trial and promulgation of the verdict, Lev Mekhlis, sochinenie protiv terrora, at the time editor of Pravda, had already condemned the men as guilty, and in the most vicious and dehumanizing language associated with the Great Terror.[22] Top secret Soviet archival material smuggled sochinenie protiv terrora by Vasilii Mitrokhin also unequivocally confirms the lead role played by Stalin in the Great Terror. Not only did Stalin sochinenie protiv terrora supervise the whole gruesome charade, sochinenie protiv terrora, but he also read and corrected the transcripts of the show trials so that they were consistent with confessions of imaginary crimes extracted under torture.[23]

4. The Role of Terror in the Soviet State

Stalin achieved control of the terror apparatus, frequently and misleadingly referred to by Whitewood as ‘the political police’, and controlled party appointments. Show trials and endless campaigns to expose “enemies of the people” and “wreckers” and imaginary spy rings based on false accusations, confessions extracted by extraordinary violence and fabricated evidence were the norms before, during and after the Great Terror. Scapegoats for industrial failures had earlier been sought in the Shakhty (1928) and Metro Vickers (1933) trials, sochinenie protiv terrora. Quite apart from the human catastrophe, the genocide in Ukraine, brushed aside by Whitewood as a mere ‘severe famine in Ukraine during 1932-1933’[24], inflicted utter mayhem on food production. The memory of the genocide among the survivors also played straight into the hands of the Germans in 1941. The invaders were able to exploit the hatred of Soviet power. The fact that Stalin carried through this programme of genocide, with obvious implications for state security and resilience, does not suggest that Stalin would be too concerned about having senior Red Army officers executed in order, finally, to consolidate his power. At the start of the war, senior Red Army officers were victims of Stalin’s need of scapegoats for his cowardly incompetence and dithering: General Dmitrii Pavlov and General-majors Vladimir Klimovskikh, Andrei Grigor’ev and Aleksandr Korobkov were shot after a closed trial. In October 1941, with the Germans closing in on Moscow, thirteen other senior commanders were shot in Kuibyshev.

Katyn Massacre, Mass Graves, credit Wikipedia

In the sochinenie protiv terrora of 1940 the same principle of prophylactic-decapitation terror which had been used in the Great Terror was applied to Polish prisoners of war in NKVD camps, resulting in the executions of 21,857 prisoners (known more widely as the Katyn massacre).  Invaded by the Red Army in June 1940, the Baltic States were subjected to the full programme of Sovietization under NKVD supervision.  After 22nd June 1941, prisoners in NKVD jails that could not be evacuated because of the speed of the German advance were executed in situ.  After the war, the methods of the Great Terror were deployed against enemies 0x800ccc0f outlook error Soviet power in the reoccupied and newly occupied states of Eastern Europe. Major show trials along familiar lines were used to bring sochinenie protiv terrora and fraternal communist parties into line. Stalinist methods were copied in Cuba, China, Cambodia and North Korea. In the Soviet Union itself the use of terror was intensified – the so-called Zhdanovshchina – culminating in the campaign against Jewish writers sochinenie protiv terrora intellectuals. Its high point was the uncovering of a plot – the so-called Doctors’ Plot – based on claims that Jewish doctors at the behest of the British and Americans were planning to kill the Soviet leadership. The announcement of this plot came, as was the case with the news of Tukhachevskii’s arrest and execution, out of the blue. After Stalin’s death on 5th March 1953 the campaign ceased and those arrested were released. Terror, justified by Soviet law, was an essential weapon of the Soviet state, insisted on by Lenin, and did not end with the Cheka Red Terror in 1918.  Whitewood omits, it should be noted, any mention of the Red Terror and is unaware that the NKVD implemented a programme of terror in the Spanish Civil War (Terror Rojo).

5. Stalin Manipulated by the NKVD?

Whitewood’s explanations of Stalin’s behaviour are confusing. We are told that ‘The reason why Stalin lashed out at his military in such an extreme manner in the summer of 1937 remains a mystery’[25], and:

Stalin launched a wave of repression against the Red Army not as another part of a carefully orchestrated consolidation of power. Rather, he did this from a position of weakness and at the last moment. By mid-1937, in what was recognized as a time of looming war, Stalin misperceived a security threat from within his army. He came to incorrectly believe that it had been infiltrated by foreign agents at all levels.  Moreover, not only had these spies managed to get inside the Red Army, but so-called evidence by the political police sketched out a conspiracy at the very heart of the high command.[26]

So are the reasons for Stalin’s behaviour a mystery or not?  The real mystery is not why Stalin launched the state-wide Great Terror but why he trusted Hitler and ignored the warnings and evidence of Hitler’s hostility. Whitewood accepts – or rather implies that he accepts – that there was no Red Army plot to overthrow Stalin but nevertheless claims that Stalin genuinely came to believe that there was a plot; that the danger was imagined to be very real and so, reluctantly, Stalin acted to save sochinenie protiv terrora Soviet state from a Red Army coup, murdering at least 681,692 in the process.  In 1937, according to Whitewood  – the claim is on the book’s dust cover – ‘Stalin’s views had been poisoned (sic!) by the paranoid accusations of his secret police…’. Later, Whitewood claims that ‘Ezhov bears direct responsibility for fostering Stalin’s concerns’.[27] Casting Stalin as a victim of NKVD fabrications shifts responsibility for the purge of the Red Army to the NKVD, conveniently referred to as the unsatisfiedlinkerror exception loading native library (not the Stalinshchina) – as if Ezhov and the NKVD acted independently of Stalin’s control – and shows, to put it very mildly, no insight into how Stalin functioned.  If one accepts that Stalin’s views had been poisoned by the NKVD, then perhaps Holocaust-deniers should add analogous claims to their inventory of fabrications and claim that Himmler, Goebbels, Heydrich and Eichmann induced Hitler’s genocidal hatred of Jews.  Consider that Stalin allegedly succumbed to unreliable and invented evidence of a Red Army plot in 1937, put together by the NKVD, yet over the period from January 1940 to June 1941 dismissed all reliable warnings of hostile German intent provided by the same NKVD (and others) as provocation.

Whitewood further undermines his cause by citing Walter Duranty – the first of the Western Holodomor-deniers – as a source for the claim that there had been a conspiracy. Stalin himself was the source of the poison and used the NKVD to administer it. Stalin was also able to convey the impression that he believed that various plots had been discovered and once those identified as plotters had been eradicated the instrument of terror could itself be purged. Even if the purging of the Red Army resulted from Stalin’s mind having been somehow poisoned by the NKVD, the fact that one man – Stalin – could proceed in this manner without being called to account confirms that the Soviet state was relentlessly and irreversibly on the way to becoming a totalitarian state before 1937. Thus, even before this process of transformation had been completed Stalin and his terror apparatus were not subject to any judicial oversight or control and were free to act as they pleased, sochinenie protiv terrora.  Members of Stalin’s immediate entourage helped things along. Voroshilov was admirably servile. He had, Whitewood instructs us, little choice but to follow ‘Stalin and the NKVD’s lead in the search for dangerous political enemies’.[28] The ideologically-determined assumption that ‘dangerous political enemies’ were dangerous does not mean that they constituted an objective danger to the Soviet state but merely that they were obstacles to Stalin’s ambitions.

For example, in 1932, in a long document, ‘Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship’, that became known as the Riutin platform, Martem’ian Riutin, a Moscow party activist, comprehensively attacked Stalin and his policies. Riutin pulled no punches: ‘In order to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat and to discredit Leninism, sochinenie protiv terrora, not even the boldest and most brilliant provocateur could have concocted anything better than the leadership of Stalin and his clique’, sochinenie protiv terrora ‘They will protect their dominance in the party and country by lies and slander, executions and arrests, guns and machine guns and with all means and instruments at their disposal since they regard them as their patrimony’.[29] At a meeting of the Politburo Stalin demanded the death penalty for Riutin but was thwarted by Sergei Kirov, Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Valerian Kuibyshev. Kirov was assassinated in December 1934, Ordzhonikidze died, officially of a heart complaint, but the evidence points to murder and Kuibyshev was also supposed to have been struck down by a heart attack. Instead of a bullet, Riutin received a ten-year prison sentence. In October 1936, the new NKVD head, Ezhov, reopened the case against him and he was charged with terrorism. Riutin was found guilty and the bullet he evaded in 1932 caught up with him on 10th January 1937, on the eve of the Great Terror. Cui bono?

Portrait of Kirov, sochinenie protiv terrora Wikipedia

6. The Great Terror was not confined to the Red Army

Another severe failing of the Whitewood thesis is that he examines the purge of the Red Army as if it were the sole Soviet institution to be attacked. The entire Whitewood sochinenie protiv terrora does, in fact, depend on this approach, sochinenie protiv terrora, since if the Red Army were the sole target of the Great Terror, the claim that Red Army leaders were planning a coup appears more convincing. The Great Terror – one reason Robert Conquest coined the term – swept across the entire Soviet state, eventually engulfing the NKVD.  No institution of substance remained untouched which is entirely consistent with Stalin’s striving to create a totalitarian state. Two minor examples in the grand scheme of repression and slaughter can delphi bde error $001 cited. Various astronomers at the Pul’kovo observatory were purged. Conquest reports that ‘about twenty-seven astronomers, mostly leading figures, disappeared between 1936 and 1938’.[30] In 1937, when sochinenie protiv terrora first census conducted after the genocide in Ukraine revealed a huge population deficit, sochinenie protiv terrora, Stalin had some of the census-takers arrested and shot. It was claimed that enemies of the people, Trotskyites and Bukharinites, had sabotaged the census. If, on the other hand, there had been genuine grounds for dealing with a plot in the Red Army, then action to neutralise the plot would have been reasonably confined to the plotters and would not have required waves of terror and executions to be directed at other vital state institutions. The Red Army plotters would have been isolated and liquidated without disrupting the entire state. It can be done, as Hitler’s response to the failed 20th July 1944 bomb sochinenie protiv terrora showed: the plotters – and these were genuine – their allies and suspects were hunted down and executed and at the same time as Hitler was having to contend with the aftermath of the Normandy landings and the ongoing Soviet summer offensive (Operation Bagration).

The scale of the Red Army purge – the executions and arrests – is entirely consistent with Stalin’s ambitions to render the Red Army, as with all other Soviet institutions, completely subservient to his will, even if that meant the elimination of all initiative and independent action, so vital in war. Reading Whitewood’s study one could be forgiven for thinking that a mere handful of senior Red Army officers were purged when in fact large numbers were arrested and executed. It is striking that in a study devoted to the purge of the Red Army Whitewood provides no details of the number of Red Army officers targeted, whereas Conquest provides the numbers available to him in 1990. Those purged – a mere sample it should be noted –  were 3 out of the 5 marshals, 13 of the 15 army commanders (86%), 50 of the 57 corps commanders (88%) and 154 of the 186 divisional commanders (83%).[31] Sochinenie protiv terrora least twenty other generals from the Moscow headquarters were executed and institutions, such as the Kremlin Military School and the Frunze Military Academy were targeted by waves of arrests.[32] Had Stalin’s butchery been confined to Tukhachevskii and a handful of other senior officers the Red Army could have quickly recovered. The real damage was done by the scale of the purge in the ranks of the army, corps and divisional commanders and, in the long term, by the crushing of initiative and independent action. The institutional expertise and experience embodied in those sorts of losses cannot easily be made good, since this was the leadership core of the Red Army, sochinenie protiv terrora. Further damage was inflicted by encouraging junior ranks to denounce superiors as spies and Trotskyites. Such a policy is utterly corrosive of honour, discipline and esprit de corps. In all these measures, made worse by Stalin’s failure to heed reliable intelligence – wrecking on a grand scale –  we find the causes of the military disasters of 1941 and 1942, and the inability of the Red Army to match German tactical leadership and skill, despite a narrowing of the gap, by May 1945.

Some idea of the disastrous effects of the purge inflicted on the Red Army is conveyed in the numbers of commanders who were not executed but who were discharged from service, arrested and sent to forced-labour camps.[33] In the Moscow Military District 683 were discharged from the main arms of service, including 98 from the air force. 408 were expelled from the party. By November 1937 it php parse error syntax error line 12 reported (as at 15th October 1937) that 1,063 military personnel had been discharged.  In the Belorussian Military District 500 were discharged, including 180 from the air force. In one division – the 81st Division – the entire command and political staff was replaced. By November 1937, 1,300 had been discharged. Of those discharged 400 army personnel were arrested. In the Leningrad Military District there were 550 discharges from the command staff along with 70 from the political staff. 11 senior figures were arrested in the Central Asian Military District. In the Sochinenie protiv terrora Military District 408 personnel were discharged, infantry and artillery units being heavily purged. In the same district sochinenie protiv terrora commander, chief of staff, two heads of the political section were arrested as enemies of the people.  Along with these arrests it was proposed to discharge 1,644 personnel.

In the North-Caucasus Military District 388 were discharged from the Red Army of whom 89 were political personnel and 38 from the air force. The commissar of this district was replaced and his successor, Corps Commissar K. G. Sidorov, stated, implying that his predecessor had not been ruthless enough, that ‘With every passing day ever more people are exposed as participants of insurgent organisations in Cossack units, and as saboteur-spies as well’.[34] 675 personnel of the command staff had been removed and discharged, 178 from the political staff about 50 of whom had been arrested as enemies of the people. This was, sochinenie protiv terrora, according to Sidorov, just the start and he expected that more enemies of the people would be exposed.

In the Belorussian Military District 105 were expelled and there was an almost 100% replacement of the cadres. Lieutenants found themselves promoted to regimental chiefs of staff, and senior lieutenants were promoted to heads of sections at division. In the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army there were in excess of 500 discharges a large proportion sochinenie protiv terrora whom were supposedly participants in a military-fascist organisation. Many of those exposed were senior figures: corps commanders, divisional commanders, six heads of divisional political departments, three officials from the Army’s political directorate and whole series of political workers from the senior and middle strata. It can also be noted that 180 were expelled from the Military-Political Academy 68 of whom were teachers (34 arrested). All heads of the department dedicated to the study of the social-economic cycle, 7 in all, sochinenie protiv terrora, turned out to be “enemies of the people”. Over the period of June-July 1937 another 32 were discharged 26 of whom were teachers. One of those purged in the Kiev Military District who survived to invalid authorization streamer error code 403 the tale, was A. V. Gorbatov whose memoir, Gody i voiny (Years and Wars) – completely ignored by Whitewood – is an important survivor’s account of the Great Terror.

After Ian Gamarnik’s suicide Petr Aleksandrovich Smirnov was appointed the new head of the Red Army Political Directorate. Despite his best efforts to endorse the Great Terror and paint a glowing picture of success – ‘The policy of the Central Committee is a correct one [pravil’naia]’[35] – Smirnov could not hide consequences other than expulsions and arrests. He noted, for example, sochinenie protiv terrora, that in recent months some 10,000 men had been expelled from the Red Army but there were still enemies of the people everywhere, sochinenie protiv terrora. Indices of collapsing morale and poor leadership were evident in the fact that in the first quarter of 1937, 7,520 incidents of injury were recorded in the Kiev military district of whom 1,690 were hospitalised. Smirnov provided no figures for other military districts but sochinenie protiv terrora is reasonable to assume that these levels would have been replicated in other military districts. There was also a breakdown of discipline in  the Red Army as a whole. In the first four months of 1937 400,000 disciplinary violations were registered, sochinenie protiv terrora. This disciplinary collapse resulted in accidents, suicides, acts of arson and self-mutilation. Unfortunately for Smirnov all his posturing and ideological virtue-signalling did not save him, sochinenie protiv terrora. On 30th June 1938 he, too, was arrested, accused of being part of some military conspiracy and shot on 23rd February 1939. He was rehabilitated on 16th May 1956.

The crisis was replicated in other military districts. During a session of the Military Council convened on 21st November 1937, N. V. Kuibyshev,  the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, told Voroshilov that the state of the rifle divisions was utterly unsatisfactory and told him why: ‘The main reason why we have been unable to eliminate all these shortcomings arises from the fact that our district sochinenie protiv terrora a very high level of bloodletting’.[36] To fill the gaps created by the ‘bloodletting’ junior officers have been promoted.  The Armenian Division is now being commanded by a captain because, as Kuibyshev told Voroshilov, ‘we could not find anyone better’. Things were just as bad in the Azerbaidzhan and Georgian divisions, the former now commanded by a major who prior to this appointment ‘had commanded neither  a regiment nor a battalion. During the last 6 years he had been a teacher in a military academy’.[37] Instead of registering despair at the damage done to the Transcaucasian Military District,  a strategically important border region, Kuibyshev’s audience laughed. The Georgian division was also commanded by a major who in the last two years had commanded nothing more than a company and lacked the necessary training for higher level command. Oblivious to the damage being inflicted on the Red Army, Budennyi, a loyal Stalin crony, interjected from the floor that the major could acquire the experience within a year, confirming thereby his lamentable military ignorance and the utterly corrosive effects inflicted on the Red Army by the Great Terror.[38] As a member of the Stavka which was formed on 23rd June 1941, among other appointments, Budennyi was well placed to injure the Soviet cause throughout the Great Fatherland War.

Undeterred by Budennyi’s woeful and aggressive ignorance, Kuibyshev highlighted more damage. Discharges and arrests had resulted in ‘the most massive deficit’ in his military district, amounting to a loss of 1,312 command personnel (25%), rising to a deficit of 40%-50% in specialist units.[39] A further blow to operational efficiency was indicated by the fact that a very large percentage of the command personnel in the divisions lacked a sufficient grasp of Russian and could not read orders or manuals. Indicative here is that Russians comprised the majority of the sochinenie protiv terrora personnel who had been discharged and arrested and that their rapidly promoted replacements were natsmeny (national minorities). Citrix license acquisition error 500 consequences for operational effectiveness were disastrous and were not fully remedied by the time the Germans penetrated deep into the Caucasus in the second half of 1942.

The consequences catalogued by Smirnov and Kuibyshev were immediate and obvious, sochinenie protiv terrora, even if publicly denied. Others were not immediately obvious.  As a consequence of the Great Terror, the Red Army had been thoroughly inculcated with a fear of initiative and independent thinking and action which  cost the Red Army dear against the Finns (1939-1940). In 1941, against a far more formidable enemy whose commanders at all levels were not burdened by the interference of political functionaries (military commissars) in tactical decisions and who were expected to show aggressive initiative, the general incompetence and negligence of the Red Army’s leadership strata proved to be lethal shortcomings.

To put the personnel losses inflicted on the Red Army during the Great Terror into a comparative perspective, it can be noted that of a total minimum number of 681,692 executions known to have been carried out over the period July 1937 to November 1938, 247,157 (36.3%) were sochinenie protiv terrora in the so-called national operations aimed at Poles and Ukrainians, among others.[40]  This number of executions – often based on specific quotas – confirms the deadly scope of the Great Terror which went way beyond the Red Army, and served Stalin’s ambitions to totalitarianise the Soviet state.

Once it is acknowledged – the evidence is clear enough – that the Great Terror was state-wide and hit all Soviet institutions, Whitewood’s claim that Stalin moved against the Red Army, singling it out because he had good grounds to believe a coup was imminent, is no longer tenable and collapses. Evidence cited by Robert Conquest shows that the Soviet Navy was hit even harder than the Red Army and that secondary and tertiary terror waves inflicted more damage on the Red Army than the arrest and execution of Tukhachevskii et al in June 1937. It was one thing to liquidate identified plotters at the top of the Red Army in order to prevent a coup but quite different purposes are indicated by launching terror waves against junior and middle command strata as well and other Soviet institutions. Whitewood’s claim sochinenie protiv terrora ‘the military purge beginning in early June 1937 was in no sense a culmination of a rising tide of repression’[41] is simply and demonstrably wrong. The arrests and executions started before 1937 and continued into the following year and beyond.  Again, this is clear evidence that the Great Terror was not confined to the Red Army, and was never intended to be.

7. No Evidence of Large Agent Networks in the Soviet Union Run by Foreign Intelligence Agencies

Claims made by Whitewood that in 1937 the NKVD and Stalin believed that the Red Army had been infiltrated by enemy agents also unravel when one considers some of the practical problems of running agent networks. Whitewood fails to explain or to examine how the basic recruitment, training, control, coordination and arming of these hordes of enemy agents could have taken place right under the noses of the OGPU and NKVD, and for so long.  In the 1930s the Soviet Union was the most closed society in the world. Foreigners of all kinds, even those devoted to the Soviet experiment (especially thosedevoted to the Soviet experiment) were carefully monitored and their movements restricted. The organization of an armed conspiracy in the 1930s to topple Stalin’s regime would have required very tight coordination and control. Given that Western source handlers and agent recruiters were unable just to enter the Soviet Union to meet with Red Army conspirators the sole method of effective communication needed to coordinate a coup would have been radio, using encrypted Morse code. Regular encrypted Morse code radio traffic being sent from Western intelligence agencies to their agents inside the Soviet Union and traffic generated by agents inside the Soviet Union would not have escaped the notice of the NKVD. As was demonstrated in WWII, the capture of radio operators opens up the possibility of the radio game.

Even if the NKVD was unable to decode the enciphered radio traffic the meta data would indicate unauthorised and covert radio transmissions to and from the Soviet Union. This would have been compelling evidence yamaha f1 media change notification error support NKVD claims of a conspiracy. Yet there is nothing. There is another problem. How are Western and Japanese intelligence agencies able to supply these clandestine networks with radios and codes in the first place, and where and when have sochinenie protiv terrora agents learned Morse code? According to Whitewood, local NKVD agencies were informed ‘that foreign agents inside the Soviet Union had set up networks primed to application error failed to find steam rebellion at the outbreak of war’.[42]  How are all these agents able to operate without being detected by the NKVD?  Why has the NKVD not seized weapons, documents, radios and codes? If enemy agents were still going undetected in 1936 and 1937 after all the previous purges and endless calls for fanatical vigilance why has the NKVD so obviously failed to uncover them? Is this wrecking on the part of the NKVD?  Has it been penetrated by enemy agents? How is it possible that these networks have not been thoroughly disrupted?

In fact, if Stalin was to be believed, the numbers of foreign agents infiltrating the Soviet Union were enormous. This is also clear from the same article, prepared by Lev Mekhlis on 10th June 1937. In the article, it is claimed that since the capitalist states send ‘thousands and tens of thousands of agents and spies to each other’, this must mean, based on Stalin’s Marxist analysis of the threat, that the bourgeois states are dispatching to the Soviet Union ‘twice, three times as many wreckers, spies, saboteurs and assassins as they would be sending into the rear areas of any bourgeois state’.[43] Again, sochinenie protiv terrora, if Stalin is to be believed, hordes of enemy agents are able to infiltrate Soviet borders at will. Yet none of these bourgeois agents ever seems to be apprehended by the OGPU or NKVD.  By contrast, over the period from January to early June 1941 the NKVD border troops were successfully intercepting German agents (a minimum of 1,780, possibly as many as 2,080), as they tried to infiltrate across the Soviet border. Some of these encounters led to exchanges of fire and the seizure of radios.[44] Stalin just shrugged his shoulders.

Sensational claims – asserted in a decree of the Supreme Soviet (28th August 1941) – that the Volga Germans, the first Soviet national minority to suffer massive deportation, had been penetrated by thousands and tens of thousands of Nazi agents were used to justify mass deportation in September 1941.[45] The fact that the Soviet regime devoted huge resources to the mass deportation of over 400,000 Volga Germans when German tank columns were advancing on Moscow, when everything was required to stop them, confirms – again – that Stalin would and did act in ways which any rational assessment would show were detrimental to state security. The same behaviour can be observed in NS-Germany, sochinenie protiv terrora. The allocation of huge material, technical and administrative resources to the implementation of the Holocaust weakened the German war effort.

8. Stalin’s Failure to Heed Military Intelligence Data 1940-1941

Whitewood questions whether Stalin would be willing to execute his most talented officers and endanger the security of the Soviet Union if he believed war was approaching.[46] Stalin, Whitewood maintains, realised that Tukhachevskii and Uborevich were talented commanders and that the Red Army ‘would be worse off without them’ and that ‘it made little sense to have them arrested or to put obstacles in their way for no good reason’.[47] As noted, the purge of the Red Army went way beyond Tukhachevskii and Uborevich to affect the entire Red Army. It may have made little sense to have them arrested in 1934 but it was certainly useful to continue to fabricate the case against them so as to be able to strike at an opportune moment (1937).  Even allowing for the danger of an approaching war – finally made possible and more likely by Stalin’s Pact with Hitler in 1939 – if Stalin believed that such a conspiracy was likely the most effective time to launch a coup against Soviet power would be when sochinenie protiv terrora Soviet Union was at war, coordinating an uprising against Stalin with a war or invasion. Thus, the best time to launch a purge would be before any war so disrupting the conspirators’ plans and those of their foreign allies, sochinenie protiv terrora. While this renders the Soviet Union more vulnerable to an eventual war, its chances of surviving the war are better, assuming evidence of German hostile intent which started to accumulate from early 1940 is heeded.

Stalin and Ribbentrop in the Kremlin

Again, it must also be borne in mind that the Great Terror struck not only the Red Army but all the institutions of state power and administration so weakening the state accordingly. Had the purge been confined to the core plotters in the Red Army, the damage would still have been severe, but its debilitating effects were made much worse by its depth and breadth. If, on the other hand, Stalin encouraged the conspiracy to justify purging not just the Red Army in order to complete his final totalitarian revolution, then the massive purge of Soviet society serves both aims: it ensures that Stalin now wields absolute, totalitarian power, sochinenie protiv terrora only if the warnings of hostile German intent are heeded and acted on in good time.  The elimination of a genuine internal threat, supposedly to be coordinated with external aggression would have led to heightened and intense scrutiny and analysis of all indices of hostile intent by Stalin. The absence of such scrutiny on Stalin’s part suggests that there was no credible internal plot and certainly one not linked to foreign intervention. What made the military disasters of 1941-1942 so nearly fatal for the Soviet regime was the combination of  the damage inflicted on the Red Army (and other Soviet institutions) and the failure to heed the obvious and to take the necessary counter measures.  The refusal – the failure – to take the German threat seriously was down to one man, Stalin, and so leaves little doubt about his orchestrating role in the state-wide Great Terror in 1937-1938. The fact that Stalin entered into a Non-Aggression Pact with NS-Germany in 1939 and then ignored all the evidence of Germany’s preparations for war makes it clear that Stalin could have had no qualms about attacking the Red Army at a time of a rising risk of war. If Stalin so easily succumbed to wishful thinking over 1940-1941, specifically that he had nothing to fear from Hitler, then he had no grounds to be unduly alarmed by any external threat in 1937-1938.

9. Further Evidence that Internal Considerations of Power outweighed Concerns about any External Threat

That Stalin accorded a higher priority to achieving complete control of, and purging, the Red Army, than border security – the critical consideration in June 1941 – was evident in the purge of the Far Eastern Army in 1937-1938. Here, in the second half of the 1930s, the Japanese threat was real and present. During the extraordinary 4-day session of the Military Council (1st-4th June 1937) Phoenix winphlash error 161 Marshal Bliukher, commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army, informed Stalin that there was a serious security problem in the Far East (and he confirmed, in passing, that the Soviet state exploited slave labour):

However, comrade Stalin I must report that if these spies had no large-scale base in other places, then in the Far East they have such a base, and it is apparent from the evidence that this base has been taken into account by the Japanese.  In this location there are 340,000 political prisoners working on defence projects, on strategic roads, highways and railway lines. There are run-time error 429 survival crisis z 30,000 rear-echelon militia personnel among whom there american megatrends 4th master hard disk error also a certain percentage of political prisoners who are not entirely reliable. And well, the arrestees say that they have already come to an understanding with the Japanese that if they are unable to get their hands on Red Sochinenie protiv terrora weapons, then the Sochinenie protiv terrora will agree to arm 300,000 with their own weapons. This means that the saboteurs have prepared cadres in the Far Sochinenie protiv terrora numbering 300,000 men, more that is than the male population of the Far East.[48]

Aware of the threat, the Far Eastern Army placed great emphasis on a rapid deployment of Red Army units to meet any Japanese incursion. Rapid deployments were achieved but often at the expense of inadequate clothing and other supplies which led to a physical degradation of the troops and loss of military efficiency, sochinenie protiv terrora. Stalin was aware of these problems – Bliukher told him and all those present – yet despite the evidence of a real threat from the Japanese and obvious shortcomings revealed in deployment, Stalin still went ahead with a purge of the Far Eastern Army regardless of the Japanese threat, a threat that manifested itself in battles at Lake Khasan (1938) and Khalkin-Gol (1939).

Battle of Khalkhin-Gol, credit Wikipedia

Bliukher was arrested on 22nd October 1938. He was accused of espionage and belonging to a military conspiracy. He died of torture in the Lefortovo prison on 9th November 1938. Bliukher, Conquest comments, ‘was a comparatively independent-minded soldier, and (as a candidate member of the Central Committee) a politician, in a position of power and influence’.[49] Men who download oracle error messages viewer think for themselves, who did not automatically defer to Stalin’s supposed genius – Tukhachevskii, Ordzhonikidze, Riutin, Kirov, Iakir and now Bliukher – were prime targets for elimination.

10. The Heydrich Dossier and Archives

An integral part of the story of Stalin’s purge of the Red Army is the dossier containing evidence used by Stalin to incriminate the plotters. It is claimed, variously, that Stalin had the dossier fabricated or that the dossier was assembled by Reinhard Heydrich’s RSHA and delivered to Stalin via a third party in the hope that he would use it to purge his commanders. That this dossier has, so far, not been found in a Russian archive is hardly evidence that it does not exist or has ever existed. The absence of any evidence in Russian archives that Stalin played any part in Kirov’s murder is also not evidence supporting non-complicity on the part of Stalin. Archives contain only what is deposited in them. Certain files pertaining to Tukhachevskii’s file are known to be missing, specifically the record of his first interrogation (25th May 1937) conducted by Zinovii Ushakov, and the record of the face-to-face confrontation with Putna, Primakov and Fel’dman. Precise details of this day – 26th May 1937 – are also not available but something dramatic seems to have happened since Tukhachevskii now acknowledges the existence of an anti-Soviet, military-Trotskyite conspiracy, and that he was in charge of it, implying that hitherto he had denied any conspiracy. Whether this change was beaten out of Tukhachevskii by Ushakov or was due to something else is still not known.[50]  Where are these missing interrogation records and what secrets do they hide? Regarding files in general then there is the question of a catalogue indicating what is sochinenie protiv terrora (and where) and any limitations on access to it, and whether, finally, access to stored material is permitted.  In the Russian Federation today some sochinenie protiv terrora pertaining to the Katyn massacre are still classified. Some archives which were open to researchers in the sochinenie protiv terrora have now been closed again or are open but with restricted access.

Whitewood maintains that the lack of any references to the dossier in released archival material and the absence of any reference to it in the transcript of Stalin’s meeting with senior officers before the closed trial (the extraordinary session of the Military Council, 1st-4th June 1937) and the fact that the dossier was not noted, cited or referred to in the actual trial itself, counts against its existence. Since Stalin controlled the record of the meeting, he was in a position to ensure that no mention of the dossier was made. For his part, Conquest concludes that Stalin proceeded cautiously.[51] A dossier that was acquired via a third party, from the German intelligence service, came with the risk that it cannibal corpse walken terror contain some deliberate error or flaw which would be very embarrassing were it highlighted. If the source cited by Conquest is accurate then the dossier was used to apply psychological pressure to the judges to convince them that the charges of planning a coup were genuine, and so merited the death penalty, sochinenie protiv terrora. The outrage manifested by officials in the presence of the uninitiated appears all the more powerful and effective for its being based on conviction, sochinenie protiv terrora, reinforced, in this case, by the  evidence that Stalin  showed them, in confidence, naturally, and never to be mentioned.

Cherushev makes the point that had Tukhachevskii and his fellow plotters been working for German intelligence, and had the documents used to incriminate them been manufactured by the German secret service, German generals would not need to sochinenie protiv terrora about, nor would they have been uncertain of, the provenance of the plot. They would, Cherushev maintains, already have the answers to these questions. [52] One obvious counter is that the fabrication of any dossier and knowledge of its existence – indeed the whole operation – would have been confined to a very small group of people operating on a strictly need-to-know basis. More to the point, why, if Tukhachevskii and colleagues were genuine German agents, would German intelligence wish to sacrifice such valuable assets in 1937, having invested so much time and energy in recruiting them, before their positions at the heart of the Soviet defence establishment had been fully exploited?  A dossier assembled with the intention of causing as much disruption as possible would be consistent with the absence of any plot not with its existence.

11. The Gang of 13: Stalin names the Core Conspirators

Leon Trotsky, credit Wikipedia

Stalin named the core sochinenie protiv terrora conspirators in a speech delivered to the Military Council on 2nd June 1937. They were: Leon Trotskii, Aleksei Rykov, Nikolai Bukharin, Ianis Rudzutak (s), Lev Karakhan, Avel Enukidze, Genrikh Iagoda, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, Iona Iakir, sochinenie protiv terrora, Ieronim Uborevich, August Kork, Eideman and Ian Gamarnik.[53] Whether Sochinenie protiv terrora intended this conspiracy to be interpreted as some Biblical parody is not clear, but such an interpretation seems unavoidable: Trotskii is cast as the devil, sochinenie protiv terrora, with the other twelve playing the role of treacherous apostles who have betrayed Lenin’s chosen one. According to Stalin the essence of the threat was as follows:

There’s a core sochinenie protiv terrora of 10 obvious spies and 3 obvious spy recruiters. It is clear that the logic itself of these people depended on the German Reichswehr. If they carry out the instructions of the German Reichswehr, it is clear that the Reichswehr is pushing them in that direction. Here is the heart of the conspiracy.  This is a military-political conspiracy, a composition sochinenie protiv terrora together by the German Reichswehr.  I think that these people are puppets, sochinenie protiv terrora, dolls in the hands of the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr wanted a conspiracy and these gentlemen seized it. The Reichswehr sought to get these gentlemen systematically to provide them with military secrets, and these gentlemen provided the secrets.  The Reichswehr sought the removal of the existing government, sought to break it up, but failed. The Reichswehr sought to bring about a situation in which in the event of war everything was ready, in which the army would engage in wrecking; in which the army was not ready for defence, sochinenie protiv terrora. This is what the Reichswehr wanted and it set about preparing the ground. This agent network, the leading core of the military-political conspiracy sochinenie protiv terrora the USSR, consists of 10 obvious secret agents and 3  obvious spy recruiters. This is an agent network of the German Reichswehr. That’s the main thing. This conspiracy has, therefore, not so much an internal basis but one based on foreign conditions, not so much to do with the internal policy of our country, but with the policy of the German Reichswehr. They wanted to transform the USSR into a second Spain. To that end, sochinenie protiv terrora, they found and recruited themselves spies and equipped them. That’s the situation.[54]

Although there was no explicit reference to the German dossier in the case against the gang of 13, Stalin’s hammering home the role of the Reichswehr – 12 uses of the word in this passage – may well have been inspired by the dossier’s revelations and adapted by Stalin for his specific purposes. The wording that the conspiracy is ‘a composition put together by the German Reichswehr’ – ‘Eto sobstvennoruchnoe sochinenie germanskogo reikhsvera’ – appears to be either shockingly and inadvertently literal or tantalizingly and deliberately ambiguous, sochinenie protiv terrora. If Heydrich’s file had found its way to Stalin and he knew that file’s contents were false, then referring to the contents of the file as the Reichswehr’s ‘sobstvennoruchnoe sochinenie’ (literally as the ‘written handiwork or written composition’) would be a precise description of Heydrich’s forgery.  On the other hand, sochinenie protiv terrora wording ‘sobstvennoruchnoe sochinenie’ implies the existence of paperwork or files in Stalin’s possession, sochinenie protiv terrora, which for reasons of security, sochinenie protiv terrora, it is hinted, he cannot show to the delegates, and which proves that the Germans are orchestrating the conspiracy and that Tukhachevskii is guilty.

Three possible interpretations now arise: (i). there is a real conspiracy, initiated and run by the Reichswehr of which Stalin has evidence, though none has so far been provided by him; (ii), sochinenie protiv terrora. the conspiracy is something invented by the Error fault code jcb 456 in order to destabilize the Soviet regime and Stalin has been fooled; (iii). Stalin is aware that the conspiracy does not exist but the Reichswehr connection provides him with the opportunity to exploit a supposed conspiracy in order to initiate and accelerate the Great Terror. Aware that there is no Reichswehr connection or conspiracy, Stalin makes no references in private or public to the sochinenie protiv terrora of any dossier so as to avoid being embarrassed by German revelations that the dossier was a fake. Public admission of the existence of the dossier and its source would in any case raise very awkward questions about why Stalin was relying on material provided by the same state accused of conducting espionage against the Soviet Union, and which would clearly have a vested interest in causing as much internal conflict as possible. Given the importance played by Tukhachevskii’s connections with Germany in his arrest how would Stalin justify his own connections with the sochinenie protiv terrora intelligence service of the same state?  Is Stalin a German agent, a tool of the Reichswehr?

Even if Stalin recognised the dossier as a fake the fact that he may have exploited it without explicit reference to it or relied on hints to imply its existence still achieves the Reichswehr’s primary goal of weakening the defensive capability of the Soviet state – clear evidence that Stalin  is indeed sochinenie protiv terrora of ‘wrecking’ on a monumental sochinenie protiv terrorabut also satisfies Stalin’s desire to purge the Red Army. Whether Stalin is fooled by the dossier or not but still carries out a mass purge of the Red Army for his own internal purposes, he achieves totalitarian consolidation by 1939. Ultimately, however, Germany, as the future aggressor, sochinenie protiv terrora the primary beneficiary of the murderous mayhem inflicted on the Red Army and other Soviet institutions over 1937-1938. Stalin bears full responsibility for this outcome, one whose consequences were nearly made fatal by his failure to take note of critical military intelligence assessments accumulating since 1940.

One final point on the alleged German connection in Stalin’s assault on the Microsoft sql server 2005, error 5123 Army can be noted. On 2nd June 1937, the second day of the extraordinary session of the Military Council, Stalin claimed that Tukhachevskii had ‘passed on our operational plan, sochinenie protiv terrora, the operational plan, the holy of holies to the German Reichswehr’.[55]  Four years later in the Kremlin, on 5th May 1941, Stalin sochinenie protiv terrora a closed session of Red Army officers who had graduated from the various military academies. In a staggering example of understatement he told the graduates that: ‘The Red Army is not the same army it was a few years ago’.[56] Two months later, on 3rd July 1941, when he delivered his radio address, as sochinenie protiv terrora Red Army was falling apart and in full retreat, Stalin sought to explain the unfolding disaster to an utterly bewildered population. It strikes me as highly significant that in both cases Stalin omitted any mention of Tukhachevskii and his alleged treachery, specifically the claim that Sochinenie protiv terrora had passed on the ‘holy of holies’ to his German masters, sochinenie protiv terrora, in order to account for the success of Germany’s ‘treacherous military attack’ (verolomnoe voennoe napadenie).

12. Faking the Past in order to Control the Present

Record keeping and the manner in which records were maintained, along with the shifting ideological priorities of the Stalin regime, played a huge role in all the purges and trials.  Once a file is opened and information collected on an individual in the 1920s (Tukhachevskii, for example) members of the terror apparatus who become involved in the Tukhachevskii case in the 1930s have no way of knowing whether information added in the 1920s is reliable.  From the historian’s point of view the Tukhachevskii file is sochinenie protiv terrora not for any reliable information about alleged plots but for the way in which these plots were fabricated, acquiring a life of their own on which state policy is based: file contents mutated under the intense ideological selection pressures of Stalinist evolution.

Another problem arises from the rumours of treachery and betrayal in the Red Army that were spread by the Soviet intelligence agencies in the 1920s and which were used as bait to ensnare White agents. These rumours also served the very convenient purpose of being used as evidence against Tukhachevskii et al in 1937.  If individuals in the NKVD in 1937 were not privy to the deliberate rumours spread by their colleagues in the 1920s about Soviet commanders they would have no grounds to question the veracity of the files and would act accordingly.  The result is deception and self-deception on a large scale. In such a way the files are designed to tell the NKVD and Stalin what they wanted to hear and to convince the party that Stalin was vigilant.

That ‘Reprimands were removed from the files of several officers who would be executed just a year later’[57] is meaningless. Sochinenie protiv terrora these written reprimands removed and retained in some other facility – spetskhran – so drastically reducing access or were they destroyed?  Were the subjects of the files informed? Without answers to these questions there exists no basis for Whitewood to claim that ‘A mass purge was not being prepared’.[58] Again, he fails to grasp the way Stalin behaved, and such claims are obviously inconsistent with earlier acknowledgements that ‘nothing was ever forgotten in the Stalinist system’[59] and that ‘Past black marks were never forgotten…’[60] In the Stalinist system that meant that sochinenie protiv terrora marks stored in the memories of Stalin and his executioners were fully admissible as evidence (and they determined what constituted a black mark). The other point to note is that Soviet judges were not independent. The members of the court that judged Tukhachevskii and other senior figures were selected oledb unknown error 0x800a0e7d Stalin. The legal reforms introduced by Alexander II root/cimv2 because of error 1864, among which was a major role for juries, were swept away in 1917. Soviet judges and the NKVD, inspired and guided by their sense of revolutionary justice, now worked towards Stalin, the vozhd’ whose hints, moods, utterances and rages determined the victims and the way they were to be treated. Bureaucrats and administrators overseeing the Holocaust would later behave in the same way:  they “worked towards the Führer”.

13, sochinenie protiv terrora. The Heart of the Military-Political Conspiracy

Whitewood’s claim that the repression that would erupt in 1937 arose from NKVD surveillance of sochinenie protiv terrora Red Army’s middle ranks in 1936 ‘rather than any concerns about the reliability of the higher command’[61] runs into a number of problems.  During the Great Terror, Ezhov’s predecessor, Iagoda, was accused of having deliberately focused attention on the lower ranks of the various conspiratorial groups so as to divert attention sochinenie protiv terrora the leaders, Bukharin and Zinoviev.[62] On the other hand, NKVD interest in the middle ranks in 1936 helped to prepare the way to arrest, in due course, the higher commanders, the primary targets. Claims of Trotskyite plots among the middle ranks would make it possible to claim that these middle ranking conspirators were being controlled and led by much senior figures in the Red Army. Uncovering plotters among the middle ranks and extracting confessions under torture thus prepared the way to move against Tukhachevskii et al a year later: start at sochinenie protiv terrora bottom and middle and work up. Socket.error 10049 python if Stalin was not minded to have Tukhachevskii put to death, he could claim that Tukhachevskii’s failure to be aware of what was being fomented in the middle ranks of the Red Army was evidence of negligence and grounds for dismissal.

In view of the fact that Whitewood’s study depends on the claim that the Red Army and party members had been infiltrated by foreign agents his acknowledgement that ‘it is impossible to know for certain’[63] whether Stalin believed the threat was real or was merely a device to blacken political enemies undermines his project.  In these circumstances, no reliability can be attributed to the assertion that ‘there is evidence that the perceived threat from foreign agents became a priority for Stalin in the first six months of 1937 and that he came to believe the Soviet Union’s security was in danger’.[64]

The lack of specific detail about what exactly Tukhachevskii and the other military leaders were supposed to have done was obvious to K. E. Polishchuk, head of the Red Army’s Military Electrical-Engineering Academy, sochinenie protiv terrora. Along with others, he attended the four-day session of the Military Council in early June 1937. On the first day of the session the participants were familiarised with the testimonies of the arrested Red Army commanders, Tukhachevskii, Iakir, Uborevich, Kork and others. Here is an extract from Polishchuk’s account:

I was able to read the testimonies of Tukhachevskii and Fel’dman and some of Uborevich’s. I didn’t read any of the testimony of Kork or Iakir, and by all accounts I didn’t miss much. All the testimonies were written according to one and the same format.  The format was more or less as follows: what was the aim of the criminal conspiracy of which you were a member; who and in what circumstances recruited you into this criminal conspiracy; what criminal tasks did you carry out; from whom and how much money did you receive for your espionage information passed on to foreign intelligence; and whom did you recruit into the military conspiracy and in what circumstances.

The answers to these questions were stereotypical, fundamentally generalisations, lacking specific details sochinenie protiv terrora nuances, associated with the various differences in the professional situation of the accused and his biography. As a rule, concrete facts, precise dates, quantitative and outcome data of the crimes were not indicated, but testimonies were richly endowed with the standard phrases of self-exposure, such as “I embarked on a course of criminal, counter-revolutionary behaviour and treachery of the Motherland with the aim of re-establishing capitalism in the country, the abolition of Soviet power, the sochinenie protiv terrora destruction of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Stalin, the leader of the nations of the world”.[65]

What Polishchuk had been reading – and which was consistent with the testimony of other arrestees it can be noted – was not evidence of some military conspiracy directed at Stalin but a powerful set of clues that the documents prepared by the NKVD and submitted to the Military Council as evidence of Tukhachevskii’s treachery were nothing of the sort. On the contrary, these documents were evidence of fabricated crimes.  One will never know how many other participants in early June 1937 came to much the same conclusion as Polishchuk, and fearful of conferring with one another, remained silent, sochinenie protiv terrora, waiting and hoping for the nightmare to end.

There is no evidence that Stalin perceived a genuine threat, or indeed that the threat was objectively genuine, whereas there was a mass of evidence to show that Stalin knew that any threat had been fabricated: he was in permanent contact with Ezhov and took a close interest in the fate of the interrogatees. In any case, evidence that a threat is perceived is quite different from evidence of a threat constructed to serve Stalin’s malevolent purposes. If Stalin  perceived the world in such a way that he saw threats of a Red Army coup in 1937 where none reliably and verifiably existed, yet failed to perceive the deadly and very real threat posed by Germany from early 1940, where the evidence was obvious, reliable, demonstrable, sochinenie protiv terrora, relentlessly accumulating, verifiable and emanating from multiple sources, then evidence derived from Stalin’s perceptions of the world is not always reliable.

14. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov: No Comrade in Arms

Stalin and Voroshilov in the Kremlin, credit Wikipedia

Voroshilov, commissar of defence, played a key role in the purge, slavishly following Stalin, yet Whitewood’s analysis of Voroshilov’s position is erratic and inconsistent. According to Whitewood, Voroshilov apparently had doubts about the reliability of evidence used in the Shakhty trial. Further, he, Voroshilov, ‘was well aware that the political police could build cases on groundless accusations’.[66] Nevertheless, Voroshilov was ‘acutely affected by the military-fascist plot’.[67] Nor, Whitewood asserts, can one dismiss the possibility ‘that even one of Stalin’s closest allies had doubts about the level of truth behind the conspiracy theories that underpinned the violence of the Great Terror’.[68] So, if Voroshilov harboured doubts about ‘the level of truth’ supporting claims of some ‘military-fascist plot’ – at what level was there any truth in these preposterous claims? – what exactly was the cause of his being ‘acutely affected’? Whitewood’s assertion that even if Voroshilov had any doubts about the truth of conspiracies stealthbot runtime error 76 ‘had no choice but to fall into line’[69]  is the essence of the problem. Why did so many senior military figures, men, unlike Voroshilov, with records of conspicuous bravery and competence in action, fail so miserably to stand up to Stalin when men they had served with and whom they knew to be men loyal to the Soviet megace - human errors 2001 were arrested and publicly vilified? Any alleged reluctance on Voroshilov’s part concerning the purge is not indicated by the fact that in the latter half of 1937 ‘Voroshilov also kept up the pressure in driving the military purge onward’,[70] claiming that the bourgeois states were sending ‘hundreds sochinenie protiv terrora thousands of spies to us’.[71]  This is also the same Voroshilov who put his signature to Beria’s memorandum (5th March 1940) in which Beria recommended the execution of all Polish prisoners of war held in NKVD camps.

What Voroshilov really thought about the waves of arrests, confessions and NKVD methods is revealed in the advice he gave to Army Commander, Ivan F. Fed’ko, his Assistant Commissar of Defence. Implicated in the confessions of other arrested Red Army commanders,  Fed’ko wanted to appeal directly and personally to Ezhov in the hope of proving his innocence. To that end, he asked Voroshilov to arrange a meeting. In 1961, Voroshilov’s former adjutant, reported that Voroshilov tried to dissuade Fed’ko from approaching Ezhov: “You mustn’t go and see Ezhov…there, you’ll be forced to write all kinds of rubbish about yourself…I ask you, don’t do this”. Determined to asset his innocence, Fed’ko went ahead, having assured Voroshilov that he would not sign anything, but with a final warning from Voroshilov: “You’ve a poor grasp of the situation. There, everyone confesses. You mustn’t go there, I ask you”.[72] Fed’ko was later arrested and confessed to being a German spy when confronted with Voroshilov in Lefortovo.  He was shot on 26th February 1939.

That Voroshilov happily “worked towards the vozhd’ ” questions the reliability of his report (10th May 1937) submitted to Molotov and Stalin on the scale of the penetration of the Red Army by foreign agents. From the sparse extracts cited by Whitewood – why was this report not provided in full in an appendix, given the importance attached to it by Whitewood? – it is clear enough that Voroshilov is telling Stalin want he wanted to hear.  For his part, Molotov continued to maintain well after Stalin’s death that the purge was necessary. This is the same Molotov who denied that there were any secret protocols annexed to the Non-Aggression Pact, sochinenie protiv terrora, protocols which he himself had signed, and the same Molotov who denied any Soviet responsibility for Katyn, having signed the same Beria memorandum along with Stalin, Voroshilov and Mikoian, approving the executions. Perhaps the infamous Beria memorandum is yet another example of the NKVD’s poisoning Stalin’s mind and those of his closest aides.

Cherushev adduces further evidence that Voroshilov willingly colluded with Stalin’s faked conspiracy. For example, he reports that Voroshilov told admiral Kuznetsov that he, Voroshilov, did not believe that Ivan Kuz’mich Kozhanov, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, was an ‘an enemy of the people’.[73] Cherushev concludes that: ‘These doubts expressed by the “superior beings”, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b), offer the most important evidence that “the conspiracy of the military” in 1937 was a fabrication’.[74] Cherushev also points out that Voroshilov doubted that Fishman (see above) had ever been guilty of anything, concluding: ‘These doubts and lack of trust demonstrate once more that in 1937 no conspiracy of the military existed’.[75]  Voroshilov also interceded on behalf of  Corps commissar I. P. Petukhov, stating that he never believed Petukhov was guilty of the crimes imputed to him.  After Stalin’s death, Voroshilov, having been petitioned by the widow of Boris Sergeevich Gorbachev (arrested on 3rd May 1937 and shot in June 1937), sochinenie protiv terrora, expressed the view, indirectly, that Gorbachev had done nothing wrong and ordered the chief prosecutor of the USSR to re-examine the case.[76]

15. Inconsistent Explanations of Stalin’s Behaviour

Having acknowledged that ‘The military-fascist plot had no basis in reality’[77], Whitewood then makes a series of bizarre claims: ‘There is much to suggest that Stalin truly believed that this action [purging of the Red Army] was unavoidable based on the evidence he received during the first half of 1937 about an apparent spy infiltration of the Red Army’[78]; ‘Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that this spy scare in the military was cynically contrived’[79]; ‘Stalin was compelled to take action against the Red Army in response to what he believed to be a pressing danger from foreign agents’[80]; and ‘Stalin acted from a sochinenie protiv terrora of weakness and perhaps even panic. This is not to say that there were no genuine foreign agents in the Red Army at this time…’.[81] The problem is that Whitewood is unable to name any of these ‘genuine foreign agents’. Who are they? What happened to them? Who controlled them? An extract from the diary of Georgii Dimitrov, the head of the COMINTERN, dated 11th November 1937, in which Stalin is recorded as having stated there was a plot – cited by Whitewood to strengthen his case – is of sochinenie protiv terrora little value. Stalin told Dimitrov in the knowledge he would spread the word throughout the COMINTERN that he, Dimitrov, had it from the Comrade Stalin no less that the plot was real (and any person who expressed doubts was obviously a counter-revolutionary or Trotskyite).

Outlandish claims made by Budennyi in a letter to Voroshilov (22nd August 1936) on the matter of the first Moscow show trial serve similar purposes.  In a  state where the slightest loose word could have fatal consequences the best defence is silence (though that can be construed as support for “enemies of error number 4 people”). It obviously does not occur to Whitewood that the whole point of Budennyi’s letter to Voroshilov is to demonstrate that he, Budennyi, is implacably opposed to the “enemies of the people”, now on trial, and sent in the hope that Voroshilov would mention Budennyi’s apparently exemplary ideological loyalty to their master. Whitewood never manages to understand the serpentine and utterly duplicitous nature of Stalin and his cronies.

The problem is that there is nothing at all to suggest that Stalin believed that the threat posed by foreign infiltration was on anything like the scale to justify the actions taken. Plots were invented to justify the institutional-wide Great Terror and the precedents are readily observable. A major element in bit error rate matlab code case against Iurii Piatakov, for example, sochinenie protiv terrora, was that he had flown to Norway to confer with Trotskii, an accusation that was soon and easily exposed as false, sochinenie protiv terrora. Even if there were plots the way to deal with them is to remove the ringleaders and not to attempt to destroy a whole institution. The terror apparatus also targeted wives and relatives of the executed. Tukhachevskii’s extended family was torn apart on Stalin’s orders.  That family members were treated this way, and that a decree dated 7th April 1935 provided for 12-year old children to be executed, is additional confirmation that the Great Terror was not intended to eradicate specific, limited and verifiably identified threats but was intended to terrorise the entire population.

The reasons listed by Whitewood to account for the purge are flights of his imagination: theories about conspiracies can easily become conspiracies themselves. There undoubtedly was a huge disaffected and potentially subversive population: but who created it? Vasilii Chernyshov, the head of the NKVD Border Directorate in the Far East, sought permission to deport all Koreans. His reasoning was impeccably Stalinist: since some had been deported those who remained who had not previously been hostile had now been rendered hostile so it was essential to deport them as well. There is sochinenie protiv terrora the slightest piece of evidence that foreign intelligence agencies had recruited, trained, equipped and directed thousands of disaffected kulaks and other “enemies of the people” on a scale sufficient to threaten the Soviet regime. Even if foreign governments wanted to recruit thousands of disaffected Soviet citizens how would it be possible to do this?  The Great Terror was not based on any misperceived threat: its violence and virulence derived from the ideology of class war and Stalin’s interpretation thereof. The class struggle could be considered won and secure only when all enemies, however defined, had been eradicated and since the process of identifying real or potential enemies was based on the assumptions of class war, the process of determining enemy status was arbitrary and capable of endless invention.

16.  The Party Mind, Ideology and Revolutionary Justice

The sochinenie protiv terrora of fantastic plots and accusations of being foreign agents in some vast conspiracy which the NKVD interrogators applied to suspects appear totally absurd to the observer schooled in, or having some familiarity with, the rules of evidence and the general principles of Western jurisprudence. Within the closed Soviet imperium, however, they have a certain logic of their own. The Great Terror was the product of a mind or rather minds that saw the world in terms of deadly class struggle, a world in sochinenie protiv terrora there was no place for error, in which there could be no tolerance of any ideological deviation or any factionalism. It was also a mind that in ideological terms rejected objective truth: partytruth (partiinaia pravda) was superior to bourgeois notions of objective truth. Even when a party member had supported and later disavowed Trotskyite tendencies he could never be entirely free of the suspicion of heresy. What made a person an agent of Western imperialism or a Trotskyite was not the physical means to mount a coup  – none was ever produced – but ideological error, being outside the latest line (or deemed to be) or having been in the past.  If the Revolution was to succeed these errors could not be left uncorrected, sochinenie protiv terrora, since even if they were ideological or theoretical in nature – precisely because they were – they provided the potential basis for counter revolution. Stalin, as Guardian of October, was obliged to eradicate these errors, to purify the Soviet state by violence so that the finished, pristine Soviet world could emerge.

The arrestee, having been accused of organising a Trotskyite conspiracy or planning to assassinate Comrade Stalin, and who then objected on the grounds that there was error 5200 canon mp 270 evidence, confirmed, by the very fact of an appeal to objective and verifiable evidence, that he was an ideological enemy: why else would he use bourgeois ploys to defend himself instead of submitting to the higher and revolutionary truth of the party and confessing his guilt? Bizarre and grotesque accusations directed at suspects served specific purposes. To begin with, their very outrageousness and utter implausibility prompted, either complete collapse or, in some cases, caused the equally outraged arrestee to expend vast amounts of intellectual and emotional energy in defending himself, so draining his resources.  Deprived of sleep, the arrestee eventually finds it impossible to continue to mount an effective defence, succumbing to mental and physical exhaustion, sochinenie protiv terrora. Absurd and freakish accusations were also intended to destroy the arrestee’s confidence in his ability to rely on objective foundations, sochinenie protiv terrora, evidence independent of his interrogators and above all his own judgement: he becomes dependent on the NKVD interrogator. The aim is finally to sever his links with what he accepts as the real world. Henceforth, the real world – the only world in which the interrogatee is permitted to sochinenie protiv terrora – is the one constructed by the NKVD.

The fate of corps commander Boris Fel’dman provides some insight into this prison world. Fel’dman wrote a confession which was either recommended to him or dictated by the interrogator, Zinovii Ushakov. In a letter to Ushakov, Fel’dman even thanked his tormentor for gifts of apples, biscuits and cigarettes, noting that he would be summoned again in due course and would make changes as instructed. The letter indicating that Fel’dman was writing his confession at the behest of the interrogator was not included in the file submitted to the court. It was added to Fel’dman’s file 29 days after he was shot.

A second document written by Fel’dman to Ushakov, dated 31st May 1937, was also not included in the court papers and was again only added 29 days later. Note sochinenie protiv terrora following extract:

And I am prepared to submit myself to this process of purgatory [chistilishche] (as you called the face-to-face confrontation with Tukhachevskii), to show to all of you, who are extending me a helping hand, in order to extract me from the filthy whirlpool, that you are not mistaken, having established during the very first interrogation that Fel’dman is not an inveterate, sochinenie protiv terrora, and incorrigible enemy but a person on whom it is worthwhile to expend some work and effort so that he repents and helps the investigation to strike at the conspiracy. I request that this latest letter also be sent to comrade Voroshilov.[82]

This extract exposes the methods used by the NKVD, with or without torture, to concoct confessions and to construct sochinenie protiv terrora idea of a military conspiracy. Fel’dman is seeking instructions snagit error 1904 what to write. That he wants to be cleansed of his ideological sins in this manner shows just how easily he has internalised the idea that the party is always correct and that for him to be outside the party was an unbearable condition for which just about any price would be acceptable in order to be readmitted to its ranks. This willingness to submit to the party, no matter how it behaves, is potentially indicative of a weak sense of professional, corporate identity among senior Red Army commanders or at the very least evidence of a certain psychological weakness which had been revealed to Stalin in the years before 1937 by his incessant probing. A stronger sense of corporate identity among senior Red Army commanders might have led to a more determined and aggressive sochinenie protiv terrora to Stalin or even deterred him. Ever alert to weakness, Stalin perceived its absence and acted accordingly.

The party mind is a collective mind. There is no place for individual opinions, dissenters or heretics.  It was Trotskii, the arch heretic, who in 1924 acknowledged that the party was always right, the final arbiter in all matters. Once that concession is made to party omniscience and ideologicheskaia or politicheskaia pravil’nost’ (ideological or political correctness) the party member has rendered himself intellectually and morally defenceless.  In the deadly matter of ideology only the guilty are arrested and it is the duty of the loyal Soviet citizen to acknowledge his guilt, not to contest it: Stalin, the Party and the NKVD know best, always. Thus, to the extent that the party member, now in an NKVD cell, wants to be cleansed of his heretical thoughts and words, and that in order to be readmitted to the party fellowship, he accepts his guilt, he, too, is an indispensable actor in this normalised nightmare. The case of Gaia Dmitrievich Gai provides another example of intellectual and moral servility so typical of the party mind. Gai appeared to have a promising academic career but remarks critical of Stalin led to his arrest. In a letter to Iagoda in November 1935, written in his prison cell, Gai begged for forgiveness: ‘I am unable to, I do not want to, I cannot, imagine myself outside the ranks of the glorious Leninist-Stalinist party VKP (b).  Once more I implore the party to forgive me and allow me to expiate my guilt by my blood’.[83] The grovelling may have worked. Gai dodged a bullet and was sentenced to 5 years in a labour camp, sochinenie protiv terrora. However, en route to the camp he managed to escape, was recaptured and eventually shot in 1937.

Nor, from a Stalinist perspective, do the beatings and the horrendous tortures to which the prisoners were subjected invalidate any confession.  On the contrary, the suspect in the NKVD torture chamber who confesses to being guilty of some hideous ideological deviation acknowledges the superiority of party truth over the objective truth to which he had erroneously succumbed. Violence is medicine: it cures him of error. The higher the arrestee’s status in the party hierarchy the greater the violation of ideological purity, and the greater the need for the state to be cleansed of the crime by the ideological vilification of his ideas, typically through the show trial and state media, the physical destruction of the heretic, and the erasure of his memory.

Stalin himself set the standard to be used in determining who were “enemies of the people”, “wreckers” and “Trotskyites”. Revolutionary justice and class instinct, not bourgeois rules of evidence, were the key criteria. During the four-day extraordinary sitting of the Military Council  (1st-4th June 1937) at which participants heard the preliminary case against Tukhachevskii sochinenie protiv terrora al, one of the participants, sochinenie protiv terrora, Dmitrii Kuchinskii, a divisional commander rejected Budennyi’s claim that Iakir was a Trotskyite. Supporting Budennyi, Stalin interjected that Iakir was indeed a Trotskyite, ‘But he didn’t know it’.[84] Pressed further by Kuchinskii, Budennyi justified his accusation that Iakir was a Trotskyite as follows: ‘I felt it, my intuition. Sochinenie protiv terrora no data, but I see that he’s an enemy’.[85] Kuchinskii, it can be noted, was shot on 29th July 1938, in a second wave of executions that struck the Red Army.

During this same meeting of the Military Council Stalin casually sochinenie protiv terrora that there was no evidence indicating that Rykov had ever passed on information to the Germans, and: ‘We don’t have information that he [Rykov] himself is a spy’, sochinenie protiv terrora. Nor, Stalin admitted, was there any information that Bukharin or Gamarnik had done the same.[86] Stalin’s use of hearsay evidence was also casual, and in the circumstances, likely to be deadly. ‘They say’, stated Stalin, ‘that Kh. G. Pakovskii was a British spy since 1908’.[87]  Pakovskii was known to have been a supporter of Trotskii. In view of the ideological-rhetorical and physical violence to which these men – and the other alleged conspirators – were subjected these are astonishing admissions, which expose the whole criminal nature of the Great Terror.

As this four-day extraordinary session progressed a definite pattern emerged. Senior officers obligingly acknowledged problems, turned on each other, condemned former comrades, dissociated themselves from friends and colleagues, protested their loyalty to Stalin and the Party and called for harsh measures to sochinenie protiv terrora taken against traitors and spies. Stalin must sochinenie protiv terrora found the manner in which these senior officers unquestioningly accepted his claims and those of his factotums that the Red Army was hopelessly penetrated by Trotskyites, and even that they provided supplementary detail, very gratifying.  For example, Army commander Mikhail Levandovskii claimed that sochinenie protiv terrora reason for the existence of spies was poor and inadequate political work and weak supervision which made it possible for them to thrive, whereas naval flag officer, Ivan Kozhanov claimed that the fleet had been in the hands of Trotskyites for years and that the lack of submarine spare parts was evidence of wrecking. Ia. Alksnis, who at the time was head of the Air Force of the Red Army, sochinenie protiv terrora with the points made in Stalin’s address of the 2nd June 1937: ‘In his speech, Comrade Stalin comprehensively and precisely stated the reasons and conditions in which it could happen that this conspiracy was not sochinenie protiv terrora in the bud; that it was not discovered and exposed by the political workers and Bolshevik commanders of our Worker-Peasant Red Army’.[88]  Not all Red Army commanders succumbed to the pressure to agree with Stalin. Ivan Naumovich Dubovoi (army commander) spoke favourably about Iakir:

I sochinenie protiv terrora a corps for 5 years at the time when Iakir was district commander, and for  5 years I was his sochinenie protiv terrora. Did I notice anything at all? I must say quite openly that I noted absolutely nothing. We all considered him to be – and I include myself – the best representative of the party, a party commander. We all called hin our best party commander.[89]

Why should this sort of statement, offered at great risk, count for less than testimony extracted in an NKVD torture chamber?  Dubovoi paid for his independence of mind. He was arrested on 21st August 1937, sochinenie protiv terrora, accused of being a participant in a military conspiracy. He was shot on 29th July 1938 and rehabilitated on 14th July 1956.

If Red Army commanders other than the likes of Dubovoi behaved this way because they thought it would appease Stalin and deflect the attention of the NKVD, they were fooling themselves, sochinenie protiv terrora. This sort of self-incrimination was precisely what Stalin required, sochinenie protiv terrora. Levandovskii, Kozhanov and Alksnis (and others) failed to grasp that individual criticisms such as theirs, in aggregate, played straight into Stalin’s hands providing him with “evidence” that the Red Army was riddled from top to bottom with “enemies of the people” and, crucially, that Red Sochinenie protiv terrora commanders agreedwith him. An obvious, though dangerous, riposte to Budennyi’s handwringing and claims that all these spies were able to carry out their work unnoticed and rise up the career ladder would have been to question whether there were any spies at all.  Likewise, when Voroshilov wailed and flailed, asking how it could have happened that we Bolsheviks failed for so long to see the machinations of the enemy, sochinenie protiv terrora, the lack of any challenge to his claims that the situation described by Budennyi and him really existed was either a manifestation of cowardly silence or tacit approval. Either way it suited Stalin.

By not forensically examining the evidence Red Army officers inadvertently corroborated the claims made by Stalin and the NKVD. Having conceded that there was indeed a deadly serious conspiracy, they were not in any position to prevent the most ruthless measures from now being taken to deal with it or even to question whether they were necessary and reasonable. Indeed, were they to question at this stage whether such wholesale arrests and executions were necessary, this would also play into Stalin’s hands, since it would be interpreted as manifestations of “insufficient Bolshevik will”, “lack of vigilance”, “rotten liberalism” or worse, as evidence of being an “enemy of the people”. These officers also made another crucial error. Even if some of them really did believe in any Trotskyite conspiracy, they, in their public willingness perl cgi 500 internal server error concede the presence of wreckers and other undesirables in the Red Army, probably excluded the possibility that Stalin would apply the principle of sochinenie protiv terrora punishment when purging the Red Army. Stalin’s aim was not to punish individuals based on reliable sochinenie protiv terrora but to break the existing institutional structures and will of the Red Army and then to impose his own. To this end anonymous denunciations played a role in undermining the cohesiveness of the Red Army, with dire consequences in 1941. By the time some Red Army officers realised what had happened it was too late, sochinenie protiv terrora. Levandovskii, Kozhanov and Alksnis (and many others) had played Stalin’s game. Their roles played, they were arrested, tortured, accused, condemned, and executed.

Records of other meetings attended by Stalin reveal that he wanted to gauge sochinenie protiv terrora of the Red Army rank and file to the revelations sochinenie protiv terrora a conspiracy among sochinenie protiv terrora commanders. At a meeting of Red Army political workers in early August 1937, some two months after the executions of Tukhachevskii et al, delegates from various military districts reported on the state of opinion among the Red Army. Brigade Commissar, I. A. Kuzin, head of the Political Directorate of the North Caucasus Military District identified a potentially dangerous trend:

There is still another category of sentiments, which, in my opinion, is alarming and these sentiments are to be found among the Red Army rank and file. They consist in a certain mistrust towards command personnel. These sentiments  have taken hold among a small circle of people, but they do exist. People judge along these lines: “if the head of the army and army leadership consisted of people we trusted, what guarantees do we have that our commanders who will lead us into battle will not turn out to be betrayers and traitors?” These sentiments are very dangerous, we’re waging a battle against them because if they grow, they will have dire consequences.[90]

Far more worrying for the commissars and other political functionaries was – or should have been – the fact that the number expressing such sentiments was still low. If a minority of Red Army personnel have articulated these views the chances are that others, possibly more circumspect and senior who have so far remained silent, will hold them as well. This is the latent danger that Kuzin perceives.

Divisional commissar, I. D. Vaineros, head of the Political Directorate of internal communication error. exiting Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army, revealed an unusually high level of trust among Red Army soldiers in commissars and their interpretation of the purge, and in the NKVD. Vaineros acknowledged that no specific details of wrecking and wreckers were ever communicated to audiences, sochinenie protiv terrora, because people were not interested: ‘People understand that if someone has been arrested, it’s because they’ve done something’.[91] Amid the avalanche of arrests, sochinenie protiv terrora, psychological disorientation and fear, accompanied by executions, it must have been very reassuring for Soviet citizens to know that Ezhov and his NKVD were infallibly discharging the orders of Comrade Stalin. Recall, however, that in his torture directive, noted above, Stalin generously conceded that  some people were  “mistakenly” arrested.

In response to Stalin’s oblique question – ‘Nevertheless the testimonies have some significance’ – Vaineros responded thus:

They made a huge impression. Further, so that people correctly understood the essence of the matter we directly made things clear that nobody will be arrested for making mistakes, people are arrested for crimes against the country, against the people, against the Red Army: for sochinenie protiv terrora. There is not a single person who has been arrested for any mistake whatsoever. Mistakes have occurred and may be found among all people, but there is not a single case when people would have been arrested for errors.  All the arrested were charged with major crimes against the interests of our Motherland. This is how we presented the matter to the commanders, the mass of the Red Army and to the personnel of the command cadres.[92]

Revealed in these extracts, and elsewhere, is the ideological-legal, quasi-mystical basis of the Great Terror. Thus, according to Stalin, the supreme interpreter of higher party truth, it was entirely possible to be an “enemy of the people” or a “Trotskyite” without being aware of it, so providing the NKVD with the widest possible discretionary powers. Any person, at any time, on any pretext, subject to the requirements of the NKVD and, of course, Stalin, could become an “enemy of the people”, and be dealt with accordingly.

17. Ending the Great Terror and the Meaning of Zagovor (Conspiracy)

The contrived and fabricated accusations of spying and plotting which were used to justify the Great Terror had, at some stage, sochinenie protiv terrora, to be concluded. One way to achieve this was selective liquidation of NKVD officials at all levels.  Genrikh Iagoda and Nikolai Ezhov were shot along with Iosif Unshlikht, Leonid Zakovskii, Zinovii Ushakov, Isai Berg, Mikhail Frinovskii and many more in the late 1930s. Lavrentii Beria and Viktor Abakumov eventually got k2 fatal error in the neck in 1953 and 1954, respectively. Meanwhile, it could be conceded that some party members had been incorrectly expelled. This was an attempt to close down the purge. In early 1938, Lev Mekhlis, who was himself especially adept at “working towards the vozhd’ ”, ‘blamed the large numbers of incorrect removals from the political administration in 1937 on enemies within the organization itself’[93]: so one group of enemies is merely replaced by another group. Stalin himself had set the precedent for such cynical ploys. In 1930, when party activists were running amok in the initial phase of the collectivization campaign, Stalin called a temporary halt in the infamous Pravda article (2nd March 1930), declaring that the activists were “dizzy with success”.  Later, at the height of the genocide, in response to a letter from Mikhail Sholokhov, Stalin assured the future Nobel Prize winner that those guilty of excesses would be punished. Recall, too, his remarks about Zakovskii (see above).  Imagine Goebbels holding a press conference in 1943 at which he, on behalf of Hitler, stated that any German officials found to have killed or harmed Jews would be punished and one has some measure of Mekhlis’s and his master’s revolting cynicism.

When Stalin talks of a conspiracy and sochinenie protiv terrora its consequences he does so in a way that it is distinct from the way it would be used in, say, English, sochinenie protiv terrora. The Russian word for conspiracy – zagovorsochinenie protiv terrora two components: za which, among other functions, indicates an action behind, sochinenie protiv terrora, beyond or to the rear, and govor, indicating “speech” or “talk”. Thus a zagovor is speech (govor) that occurs behind (za) the back of the person or entity that is the subject of the “speech”.  Amid the paranoia and waves of freakish accusations engulfing the Soviet Union during the Great Terror, the secondary meaning of zagovor – words possessing magical or healing powers – seems, at least to this sochinenie protiv terrora, to be especially relevant.  The conspirators (zagovorshchiki) are witches, the practitioners of dark arts, that must be eradicated.  The purge is a witch hunt. Stalin interprets zagovor literally to mean that people are talking about him and his policies and that he is not privy to the govor. Thus the ‘military-political conspiracy’ does not consist of groups of senior officers planning violent overthrow of Soviet power, though the ambiguous nature of the way Stalin repeatedly uses the wording ‘military-political conspiracy’ is meant to imply that this is reason for urgent action, reinforced by references to bourgeois intelligence services.  At a primary level Stalin’s use of ‘military-political conspiracy’ means that among senior military commanders (and others) conversations about Stalin’s policies and the fate of the Soviet Union are taking place, conversations which could not be held openly. The historical precedents are obvious and Stalin would have been well aware of them. Conversations in closed, secret groups have featured throughout Russian history: the Bolsheviks themselves are an obvious example. In the 1930s this is the essence of what Stalin calls the ‘military-political conspiracy’, sochinenie protiv terrora. There are no stockpiles of weapons, but there is “speech” (govor) in closed, unsupervised groups. The Riutin platform merely confirmed Stalin’s fears. As far as Stalin is concerned that justifies the mass arrests and executions.

Stalin’s obsession with, his fear and hatred of, “speech” to which he is not privy also explains two distinct features of the Great Terror. Firstly, it can account for the heightened role played by denunciations (donosy), though Stalin did not use the word donos. He called the process whereby people monitored others, signalizatsiia – literally signalling – and those who engaged in such socially responsible behaviour (!) he called signal’shchiki. Stalin urged people – it is their solemn duty – naturally in the name of saving Soviet power from Trotskyites, to violate the sanctity of the private conversation; the very notion of the “private” can no longer be permitted. The state must know everything, and, in any case, a good Soviet citizen has nothing to hide from the NKVD.  Denunciations also created an atmosphere of fear, isolation and hysteria – one of the features of a totalitarian state – in which people were far more susceptible to state-sponsored lies and manipulation and more willing to behave in ways that state agencies demanded. Secondly, donosy can also account for the extreme reliance on confessions. In this context the confession is self-denunciation, denial of the self for the greater good.  For Stalin, the confession is not evidence in any objective and reliable sense of the word. Its primary purpose is to provide him with the record of the “speech” error was found in installed data he was denied by the conspirators and which he imagined took place. The confessions are intended to confirm what Stalin suspected all along: they were plotting in secret against me.

At the June 1937 Military Council meeting Stalin also patently undermined the justification for a mass purge of the Red Army and other Soviet institutions. In his report Stalin noted that ‘the army in the lower ranks, in the middle strata, and partly in the upper strata is a very sound and colossal force’.[94] That Stalin carried out a mass purge again reveals either that he was lying about the state of the Red Army’s lower ranks and middle strata or that he had other reasons for inflicting such grievous damage on the Red Army. Stalin’s claim about the reliability of the lower and middle command levels also makes a mockery of the accusation levelled at Iagoda that he quite deliberately ignored the lower levels which were then targeted by Ezhov, his replacement. If any security problem was confined to the upper strata then its eradication would not have required a mass and destructive purge of the Red Army. Liquidation of the gang of 13 and some of their immediate accomplices would have been sufficient. Again, if i/q error 32 conspiracy was driven more by the requirements of an external agency, the Reichswehr, and not by any internal Soviet factors, as claimed by Stalin, sochinenie protiv terrora, no leader would have authorised the slaughter of tens of thousands of people unless his reasons had nothing to do with any genuine conspiracy. Genuine and verifiable evidence of Reichswehr-sponsored espionage with an intention to turn the Soviet Union into another Spain would at the very least have prompted stern diplomatic protests, certain embassy personnel being declared persona non grata, embassy closures, or even the threat of an armed response. There was nothing, whereas General Köstring, the German military attaché in Moscow, when implicated in the plot, lodged a formal complaint with the NKVD. It would also be necessary for Stalin  to explain why he was so eager to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact with a state in 1939 that two years previously had been planning to initiate civil war in the Soviet Union. Had the Reichswehr (reorganised and renamed as the Wehrmacht since 16th March sochinenie protiv terrora, Hitler and Germany become less bellicose in word and deed since the alleged Reichswehr plot had been uncovered? On the contrary, the threat was now far greater.

The German connection was investigated by the Soviet post-Stalin commission charged with examining whether there was a military conspiracy. To this end, the interrogation files of a Generalmajor Dr. Karl Alexander Spalcke who had served as a Russia expert in Abteilung Fremde Heere, and who was captured by the Red Army, were re-examined. In his interrogation Spalcke indicated that in 1926 he was attached to the Red Army commanders who visited Germany to take part in exercises and to attend the military academy. Spalcke recalled the presence of Iakir, Primakov, Putna and others but stated that he had received no intelligence information from them at all. Spalcke also confirmed that he had received no intelligence information on the Red Army from Köstring.

18. Conclusion

That there were no real enemies who were being directed by foreign intelligence agencies. Any measures taken by the NKVD and Stalin were aimed at individuals and groups who might become enemies in the so-called class struggle or who were waiting to strike. The class enemy, the wrecker, the Trotskyite, never sleeps (neugommono dremlet vrag, as Blok reminds us). There comes a moment in the acquisition and centralising of power when the move towards the Great Terror becomes unstoppable. The state which emerges from the process of state-wide terror in which the entire apparatus of state power (party, scholarly-scientific, sochinenie protiv terrora, literary, administrative, sochinenie protiv terrora, industrial, security, diplomatic, COMINTERN and military) has been broken and remade is totalitarian. That this pattern of totalitarian imposition was evident before and after Stalin’s Great Terror, and in other states, strongly implies that the transition from the ideological identification of abstract enemies to the physical destruction of so-called class enemies is the logical outcome of all socialist/communist revolutions. Even where a person has done nothing wrong his being a kulak or priest or landowner justifies his extermination if the state judges it necessary. For these reasons, Whitewood is in error to claim that ‘the massed operations were launched primarily in response to a misperceived threat – one influenced  by both domestic political tensions and the regime’s perception of the external foreign threat’.[95] Mass arrests and executions which targeted victims other than the Red Army and Navy were part of the process necessary to complete the final consolidation of the totalitarian state, the primary purpose of the Great Terror.

Even if one were to accept that Stalin’s perceptions of a military plot were genuine, what does this tell us about the nature of a state in which one man’s genocidal and murderous impulses, sochinenie protiv terrora, based on ideologically-inspired fantasies, can be allowed to inflict such bloodletting? What does it tell us about the moral and intellectual paralysis of those who could have, or should have, stopped Stalin but did nothing to stop him? The absence of any serious conspiracy to oust Stalin is telling. The German generals, albeit late in the day, at least tried to oust Hitler, sochinenie protiv terrora. That Stalin could have people slaughtered on this scale – a known minimum of 681,692, though possibly in excess of 800,000 people – unhindered sochinenie protiv terrora others, indeed, actively assisted by others, reveals that the Soviet state was a monstrous and lawless abomination. The closest operational comparison to the Great Terror in the NS-state would be Operation Hummingbird, put into effect over the last weekend in June 1934 when Hitler finally moved against Ernst Röhm and others, sochinenie protiv terrora. The minimum number known to have been executed was 83. The successful outcome of Hummingbird and the way Hermann Göring had earlier exploited the Reichstag fire to sochinenie protiv terrora political opposition may well have given Stalin ideas.

In the decision notice of the chief prosecutor of the USSR – dated 11th January 1957 – in which Tukhachevskii and others were formally exonerated of any wrongdoing and rehabilitated – it was noted that NKVD investigators – Leplevskii, Ushakov, Agas, Mironov and Frinovskii – who had played leading roles in the case of Tukhachevskii and others, were, over the period 1938-1940, ‘condemned to execution by shooting for unlawful arrests, falsification of investigative files and other crimes’.[96] On its face this conclusion appears to be satisfactory, even gratifying, but it is misleading for two reasons. Firstly, if the reasons for these executions are accepted at face value – justice catching up with unscrupulous NKVD officials – then this merely serves to validate Stalin and his regime, since it would imply that even under Stalin there was some kind of legal sochinenie protiv terrora functioning according sochinenie protiv terrora recognizable norms. Secondly, the crimes for which these NKVD officials were supposedly shot were crimes carried out at the behest of Ezhov and Stalin not on the personal initiative of NKVD officials themselves. Frinovskii et al were executed not because they had falsified files, tortured suspects or played their part in the deaths of tens of thousands of people or carried out any other crimes but because they, having enthusiastically “worked towards the vozhd’”, had now served their purpose. They also knew far too much and their fickle master concluded it would be prudent to have them liquidated. Their executions also provided Stalin with scapegoats for the “violations of socialist legality” and helped  to draw a line under the Great Terror.  Some of them were also rehabilitated, so tainting the process. For example, Isai Davidovich Berg who as department head of the administrative unit of the NKVD directorate in Moscow in 1937 supervised the development and deployment of the world’s first mobile gas killing van – four years  before the German sochinenie protiv terrora used the same technology on the Eastern front – was shot on a charge of being in some conspiracy and rehabilitated in 1956.

Nowhere in The Red Army and the Great Cannot resolve symbol java error does Whitewood unequivocally state that the plots were fabricated and the reason for this evasive silence is clear enough. If he states that the accusations and plots were all lies and false all the ambiguous loopholes are closed; there can be no room for claims based on implausible-probability statements or that the purge was based on Stalin’s perceptions of a plot or that ‘Stalin’s views had been poisoned by the paranoid accusations of his secret police’. The proposition that Stalin’s mind was “poisoned” by the NKVD is either the product of an ill informed mind or a crude attempt to exculpate Stalin, sochinenie protiv terrora. Either way it is a grotesque and contemptible claim and were it not a matter of the deaths of tens of thousands of people executed and millions of lives blighted and destroyed as a consequence of the Great Terror, it might even be risible.

Reinforcing and substantially supplementing the pioneering work of Robert Conquest, Nikolai Cherushev has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that, firstly, there was no military conspiracy directed against Stalin, and thus all claims that one existed were based on fabrications and not on anything that could reasonably be construed as error, and, secondly, that Stalin personally directed and controlled the NKVD throughout the Great Terror, so excluding any possibility that he, Stalin, was being manipulated by Ezhov. The documentary evidence adduced by Cherushev has lethal consequences for Whitewood’s claims since the many reasons demonstrating that there was no military conspiracy simultaneously negate any plausible claim that Stalin was deliberately and perversely misled by the NKVD or genuinely believed there was a conspiracy. That Stalin had Ezhov (and other senior NKVD figures) arrested and shot after he (they) had served his (their) purposes removes all doubt about who was controlling whom. The sole plausible explanation that remains is that the purge of the Red Army – just one part of the Great Terror – had been carried out by Stalin with the aim of consolidating his power and creating, in the process, the world’s first totalitarian state. There are currently no reasonable grounds to support any other interpretation.


[1] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Penguin Classics, Random House, London, 2017, pp.610-61
[2] See Iakovlev, A. N., ed. et al, sochinenie protiv terrora organy VChk-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-KGB 1917-1991 spravochnik
, in the series “Demokratiia”, Rossiia. XX VEK, Dokumenty, Mezhdunarodnyi fond, Moscow, 2003, p.6. This figure will not include those who died from deportation, disease, suicide, starvation and slave labour.
[3] Peter Whitewood, The Red Army and the Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet Military,  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas, 2015
[4] Whitewood, endnote 39, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.291
[5] Whitewood, endnote 39, p.291
[6] Whitewood, p.9
[7] Whitewood, sochinenie protiv terrora, pp.243-244
[8] N. S. Cherushev, Udar po svoim: Krasnaia Armiia 1938-1941, Veche, sochinenie protiv terrora, Moscow, 2003, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.179
[9] Whitewood,p.244
[10] Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Hutchinson, London, 1990, p.188
[11] Conquest, The Great Terror, p.190
[12] Whitewood, p.245
[13]Udar po svoim, p.176, emphasis added
[14]Udar po svoim, sochinenie protiv terrora Aleksandr IUr’evich Vatlin, Terror raionnogo masshtaba: «Massovye operatsii» NKVD v Kuntsevskom paione Moskovskoi oblasti 1937-1938 gg., Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia (ROSSPEN), Moscow, 2004, p.60
[16] Cherushev, Udar po svoim, p.393
[17] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.103.
[18] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.388.
[19] Cherushev, 1937 god, footnote, p.553, citing Izvestiia KPSS, 1989, № 4, p.48
[20] Cherushev, sochinenie protiv terrora, 1937 God,  p.161
[21] Cherushev, 1937 God,  p.159
[22] Cherushev, 1937 God, p.129
[23] Christopher Andrew and Vasilii Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, Allen Lane, sochinenie protiv terrora, The Penguin Press, London, 1999, p, sochinenie protiv terrora. 95. Documentary evidence from other sources confirms Stalin’s leading role, noting that ‘Stalin meticulously controlled and directed Ezhov’s every move. He corrected instructions to the NKVD, sochinenie protiv terrora, masterminded all the big public trials, and even wrote the scripts for them. During preparations for the trial of Marshal Tukhachevsky (sic) and other Red Army leaders for their participation  in a “military conspiracy”, Stalin saw Ezhov every day. At each stage dd input output error noerror (sic) Ezhovshchina, Stalin retained control of political events’,  The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (1997), Stéphane Courtois et al,  Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1999, p.190
[24] Whitewood. 154
[25] Whitewood, p.2
[26] Whitewood, pp.2-3
[27] Whitewood, p.283
[28] Whitewood, p.177
[29] Cherushev, 1937 god, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.115
[30] Conquest, The Great Terror, p.295
[31] Conquest, The Great Terror, pp.450-451
[32] Conquest, The Great Terror, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.205
[33]  Cherushev, 1937 god, pp.503-508
[34]  Cherushev, 1937 god, p.506
[35] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.498
[36] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.514
[37] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.515
[38] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.515
[39] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.516
[40] Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2001, p.338
[41] Whitewood, p.188
[42] Whitewood, p.229
[43] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.129
[44] A, sochinenie protiv terrora. N. Iakovlev et al., 1941 god, v 2-knigakh, in the series “Demokratiia”, Rossiia. XX VEK, Dokumenty, Mezhdunarodnyi fond, Moscow, Kniga vtoraia, 1998, p.350
[45] ‘Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o pereselenii nemtsev, prozhivaiushchikh v raionakh Povolzh’ia, 28 avgusta 1941 g.’, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine: Sbornik dokumentov, Tom vtoroi, kniga 1, Nachalo 22 iiunia – 31 avgusta 1941 goda, izdatel’stvo “Rus’”, Moscow, 2000, pp. 539-540
[46] Whitewood, p.7
[47] Whitewood, p.164
[48] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.245
[49] Conquest, The Great Terror, p.431
[50]  Cherushev, 1937 god, pp.334-335
[51]  Conquest, The Great Terror, sochinenie protiv terrora, pp. 201-202
[52]  Cherushev, 1937 god, p.314
[53]  Cherushev, 1937 god, p.279
[54]  Cherushev, 1937 god, p.284
[55]  Cherushev, 1937 god, p.282
[56] № 437, ‘Vystuplenie general’nogo sekretaria TsK VKP (b) I. V. Stalina pered vypusknikami voennykh akademii RKKA v Kremle, 5 maia 1941 g.’, A. N. IAkovlev, ed., 1941 god, v 2-knigakh, in the series “Demokratiia”, Rossiia. XX VEK, Dokumenty, Mezhdunarodnyi fond,  kniga 2, Moscow, 1998, p.158 (pp.158-162).
[57]  Whitewood, p.199
[58]  Whitewood, p.199
[59]  Whitewood, p.100
[60] Whitewood, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.196
[61] Whitewood, p.192
[62]The Mitrokhin Archive, p.94
[63] Whitewood, p.217
[64] Whitewood, p.217
[65] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.139
[66] Whitewood, p.256
[67] Whitewood, p.256
[68] Whitewood, p.256
[69] Whitewood, p.256
[70] Whitewood, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.259
[71] Whitewood, p.259, emphasis added.
[72] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.88
[73] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.536
[74] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.536
[75] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.536
[76] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.537
[77] Whitewood, p.268
[78] Whitewood, p.268
[79] Whitewood, sochinenie protiv terrora, p.276
[80] Whitewood, p.279
[81] Whitewood, p.285
[82] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.362
[83] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.75
[84] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.167, emphasis added
[85] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.167
[86] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.281
[87] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.233
[88] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.259
[89] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.203, emphasis in the original
[90] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.523
[91] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.526, emphasis added
[92] Cherushev, sochinenie protiv terrora god
, p.526, emphasis added
[93] Whitewood, p.261
[94] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.287
[95] Whitewood, p.269
[96] Cherushev, 1937 god, p.560

Dr Frank Ellis is a military historian

© Frank Ellis 2021

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Simeon Bekbulatovich’s Remarkable Career as Tatar Khan, Grand Prince of Rus’, and Monastic Elder*

Tsar Simeon Bekbulatovich was the nephew of Ivan IV’s second wife, Mariia Temriukovna. He was a Chingissid who had a remarkable career, first, as geely error 13 of Kasimov, then after entering Muscovite service, as head of the Muscovite army’s “main regiment”, as grand prince of Rus′, and as grand prince of Tver′. He also married Anastasia Ivanovna Miloslavskaia. Finally he was tonsured as the monk Stefan and was buried in the Simonov Monastery. The episode that has attracted the most sochinenie protiv terrora in the sources and in the scholarly literature was his appointment as grand prince of all Rus′ between September 1575 and September 1576. Ivan IV held on to his other titles, including tsar of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′, but he also acquired an estate as the prince of Moscow under Grand Prince Simeon. In this article, I classified the primary source testimony into two categories: those accounts contemporary to the time of Ivan IV and those written after his death in 1584. After analyzing them and comparing them with the various historiographical explanations, I proposed that Ivan IV placed Simeon on the grand princely throne of Rus′ as a legal maneuver to allow him to go after certain individuals in the ruling elite who he thought were plotting against him. These individuals who he suspected were mostly former members of the oprichnina. Ivan had claimed to the metropolitan in 1565 that he was being prevented from investigating and punishing certain individuals and again to foreigners in 1575 about the perfidiousness of his subjects. By having someone else serve as grand prince of Rus′ who would give him the go ahead, he would be freed from constraints on his actions.

Godovoj komplekt zhurnal Grani Nr. 147, 148, 149, 150 1988

Zhurnal literatury, sochinenie protiv terrora, iskusstva i obshchestvennoj mysli 1946Nr.1949,Zhurnal literatury, iskusstva, nauki i obshchestvennoj mysli 1949Nr.1955,Zhurnal literatury, iskusstva, nauki i obshchestvenno-politicheskoj mysli s 1955, s Nr. 26,Russkij literaturnyj zhurnal s 2001Periodichnost Nr. 4 raza v god.Osnovatel zhurnalaE. R. Romanov nast. familiya OstrovskijRedaktory:1946 E. R. Romanov, S. Sochinenie protiv terrora. Maksimov, B. V. Serafimov1947-1952 E. R. Romanov1952-1955 L. D. Rzhevskij1955-1961 E. R. Romanov1962-1982 N. B. Tarasova1982-1983 R. N. Redlikh, N. Rutych1984-1986 G. N. Vladimov1986Nr.1995 E. A, sochinenie protiv terrora. Samsonova-BrejtbartS 1995 izdatel i glavnyj redaktorTatyana Zhilkina.Srednij tirazh v emigrantskij period Nr.3000 ekz.Sredi avtorov:A. Akhmatova, D. Andreev, L. Borodin, M. Bulgakov, I. Bunin, G. Vladimov, V. Vojnovich, A. Galich, 3. Gippius, V. Grossman, sochinenie protiv terrora, Yu. Dombrovskij, N. Zabolotskij, B, sochinenie protiv terrora. Zajtsev, E. Zamyatin, N. Korzhavin, V. Kornilov, A. Kuprin, S. Levitskij, N. Losskij, V. Maksimov, sochinenie protiv terrora, O. Mandelshtam, B. Nabokov, V. Nekrasov, B. Okudzhava, B. Pasternak, K. Paustovskij, R. Redlikh, sochinenie protiv terrora, A. Remizov, F. Svetov, A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Soloukhin, V. Tarsis, M. Tsvetaeva, I. Shmelev, V. Shulgin.Soderzhanie Nr.147Soloukhin, Vladimir. Smekh za levym plechom. Glavy iz novoj knigi. S. 5-63. Andreev, Daniil. Iz 'Izbrannogo'. Stikhi. S. 64-81. Donatov, L. Khvalu priemli ravnodushno. S. 82-91. Maltsev, Yurij. Lichnost Borisa Pasternaka. S. 92-142. Pervova, Yuliya. Alye parusa v serom tumane. S. 143-186, sochinenie protiv terrora. Bakhtamov, Rafail. Koster v nochi. S. 187-226. Pospelovskij, D. Podvig very v ateisticheskom gosudarstve. S. 227-265. Kublanovskij, Yu. Pisatel, kotorogo predstoit otkryt. S. 266-268. Nazarov, Mikhail. Dvulikij Yanus perestrojki, sochinenie protiv terrora. S. 269-274. Ermolaev, A. O pravoslavnom almanakhe. S. 275-277. Sinkevich, Valentina. Literaturnyj Parizh za polveka. S. 278-287. Krupin, Vladimir. On prikazal nam dolgo zhit. S. 288-298. Redaktsionnaya pochta. S. 298-300. Korotko ob avtorakh. S. 301-302. Afganskij kursiv. S. 303-318.Soderzhanie Nr.148Muraveva, Irina. Na Kropotkinskoj. Rasskaz. S. 5-18. Mark, Grigorij. Poslednij mys. Stikhi. S. 19-24. Tsvetkov, E. Schastlivyj Tsezar. Nauchno-skazochnoe sochinenie. S. 25-59. Kashkarov, Yurij. Stikhi. S. 60-64. Pervova, Yuliya. Alye parusa v serom tumane. S. 65-128. Beskrovnykh, Viktor. Eshche o Chernobyle. S, sochinenie protiv terrora. 129-155. Yugov, Aleksandr. Na ekonomicheskom ringe. S. 156-206, sochinenie protiv terrora. Pismo uchastnika rejda Mamontova. Publ. N. Rutycha. S. 207-223. Rutych, N. Zametki k istorii mamontovskogo rejda. S. 224-241. Prot. K. Fotiev. O novom tserkovnom soznanii. S, sochinenie protiv terrora. 242-260. I.M. Za dushu khvatayushchaya kniga A. Pristavkin 'Nochevala tuchka zolotaya'. S. 261-268. Khejfets, sochinenie protiv terrora, M. O zapadnom stile v nauke I. Zemtsov, Dzh. Ferrar 'Gorbachev. Chelovek i sistema'. S. 269-275. Problemy nezavisimoj pechati. Stenogramma vstrechi-dialoga redaktorov. S. 276-312. Korotko ob avtorakh, sochinenie protiv terrora. S. 313-314.Soderzhanie Nr.149Kojt, Andres. Sochinenie protiv terrora sobaki. Povest, sochinenie protiv terrora. S. 5-82. Kublanovskij, Yu. Metamorphosis. Stikhi. S. 83-93. Vertlib, Evgenij. V. Shukshin i russkoe dukhovnoe vozrozhdenie. S. 94-129. Gen. A.I. Denikin. Pisma 1939 - 1946 gg. Publ. N.N, sochinenie protiv terrora. Rutycha i N. M. Yanova, sochinenie protiv terrora. S. 130-175. N.N. Rutych. Poslednie gody generala A.I. Denikina. S. 176-183. Neznanskij, Fridrikh. Pryzhok nad propastyu. S. 184-222. Gavrilyuk, S. Polskaya Pravoslavnaya tserkov v nashi dni. S. 223-239. Mamajko, Khristina. Naumov, Aleksandr. Russkie freski kak primer vizantijskoj zhivopisi na polskikh zemlyakh. S. 240-248, sochinenie protiv terrora. Muraveva, Irina. Snyatye s polok. O filmakh 'Moj drug Ivan Lapshin' i 'Komissar'. S. 249-267. Popovskij, Mark. Yurij Kondratyuk Nr. v trekh zerkalakh. S. 268-303. Fedoseev, A. Osmyslenie opyta Dora Shturman 'Gorodu i miru'. S. 304-314. Sinkevich, V. Tolko odna zhizni Ivan Savin 'Tolko odna zhizn', sochinenie protiv terrora. S. sochinenie protiv terrora. Korotko ob avtorakh. S. 326-327.Soderzhanie Nr.150 Aleksandru Isaevichu Solzhenitsynu. Mnogaya leta! S. 5-6. 'Esli zovet svoikh mertvykh Rossiya.' K semidesyatiletiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Aleksandra Galicha. S. 7-28. Kojt, Andres. Rodnye i blizkie. Rasskaz. S. 29-47. Gubanov, Leonid. Volchi yagody. Stikhi. S. 48-53. Moem, Somerset, sochinenie protiv terrora. Tri rasskaza. Per. s angl. L. Shterna. S, sochinenie protiv terrora. 54-102. Pukhanov, Vitalij. Poshli mne, Bozhe, istinuNr.Stikhi. S, sochinenie protiv terrora. 103-107. Muraveva, Irina. Chuzhaya dochka. Rasskaz. S. 108-123, sochinenie protiv terrora. Muravev, P. Rybolovy. Rasskaz. S. 124-135. Shneerson, Mariya. Chto mozhet vyjti iz etogo Sharikova? S. 136-162. Gejfman, Anna. Kadety i revolyutsionnyj terror, 1905-1907. S. 163-215. Mejer, sochinenie protiv terrora, Yurij. O russkoj dorevolyutsionnoj intelligentsii. S. 216-225. Manin, Evgenij. Esli verit pifagorejtsam. S, sochinenie protiv terrora. 226-239. Antonovich, Aleksandr. Kakov diametr kolesa istorii. S. 240-246. Popovskij, Mark. Ob odnoj neizlechimoj bolezni. S. 247-257, sochinenie protiv terrora. Fedorov, Yurij. Russkij intelligent na svobode i v lagere. S. 258-262, sochinenie protiv terrora. Orlova, Aleksandra. Sudba artista. S. 263-281. Dolukhanov, Anatolij. Poslednij stalinskij narkom ot muzyki. S. 282-293. Golitsyn, Vl. Litso vremeni Yu. Trifonov 'Vremya i mesto', sochinenie protiv terrora. S. 294-301. Smirnov, A. 'Perekrojka'. S. 302-306. Korotko ob avtorakh. S. 307-309. Soderzhanie s Nr.147 po Nr. 150. S.310-316. Seller Inventory # 169044

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