Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack

serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack

like the one that occurred at the Chernobyl plant in 1986. By an incidental role in the commission of a terrorist act; here the. Chernobyl terrorist attack serial numbers are presented here. No registration. The access to our data base is fast and free, enjoy. Russian authorities have cited a number of incidents in eastern to then say that a "terrorist attack was being launched against him".

Ukraine crisis: Is Russia staging 'false flag' incidents?

By Kayleen Devlin, Jake Horton and Olga Robinson
BBC Monitoring & Reality Check

Vladimir PutinImage source, Getty Images

Russian authorities have cited a number of incidents in eastern Ukraine in order to justify military action.

In his speech on Monday, Vladimir Putin said that the Ukrainian authorities "are not interested in a peaceful solution."

"On the contrary, they are trying to set up a blitzkrieg in Donbas," he said.

But the US has warned of Russia faking provocative acts - so-called "false flag" incidents which are staged to appear to come from one side in a conflict - in order to create a pretext for action.

So what has happened in eastern Ukraine and what do we know about it?

Alleged 'sabotage' of separatists

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has tracked thousands of ceasefire violations in recent days.

But there is a growing body of evidence indicating that online rumours have misrepresented some attacks, and that some events may have even been staged.

For example, on Friday, a video circulated on a Telegram channel run by Russia-backed separatists. It claimed to show a clash between an "enemy sabotage group" and pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.

The post said the video showed pro-Ukrainian militants trying to blow up a chlorine tank in the separatist-held area of Donbas.

"The armed formations of Ukraine are purposefully error send load failed 2 to sow fear and panic among the civilian population," the post claimed. "The above facts are direct confirmation of the preparations of the Ukrainian side to unleash hostilities."

The video was then picked up by pro-separatist and Russian news agencies.

But open source investigators on social media pointed out several discrepancies which indicated the video was shot at an earlier date and had been manipulated.

When inspecting the video's metadata - which can be used to see when a file was created or modified - investigators discovered it had a creation date of 8 February - ten days before it was posted.

The video also appears to have audio dubbed over it taken from a YouTube clip posted in 2010 of a military firing range in Finland, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. It looks highly unlikely that this video shows what the separatists claim it shows.

Other stories have created an impression of impending panic in the separatist areas.

Also on Friday, leaders of the two separatist areas called for a mass evacuation of residents, saying Ukraine had intensified hostilities and was planning further attacks.

Denis Pushilin, head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic, published a video announcing the "emergency" evacuation.

At one point in the video Mr Pushilin says "today, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, on 18 February". But a BBC analysis of the metadata showed that rather being recorded in the heat of the moment, this video was also filmed in advance - two days earlier.

'Car bombing' in Donetsk

Russian state media also reported a "powerful explosion" in the centre of the city of Donetsk, near the separatist government headquarters.

Pro-Russian separatists alleged it was a car bombing and Denis Sinenkov, chief of the Donetsk separatist police, claimed the vehicle belonged to him. Russian media reported that nobody was hurt in the incident.

But questions have been raised about whether the attack was staged, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack.

Russian journalist Anton Pustovalov tweeted that the number plate on the destroyed car was taken from a different vehicle - one the head of the separatist police was previously spotted using - in order to then say that a "terrorist attack was being launched against him".

Third. License plate.
A real car with the same license plate is used by the head of the Donetsk military police. It was about him that propaganda began to say that a terrorist attack was being launched against him.
A car with this number was spotted on May 31, 2021 pic.twitter.com/JwlOS22XEv

— Anton Pustovalov (@djxtrees) February serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, 2022
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.View original tweet on Twitter

The BBC is unable to independently verify these claims. The Ukrainian government has denied several of the online rumours.

No, Ukraine did NOT:

❌Attack Donetsk or Luhansk
❌Send saboteurs or APCs over the Russian border
❌Shell Russian territory
❌Shell Russian border crossing
❌Conduct acts of sabotage

Ukraine also does NOT plan any such actions.

Russia, stop your fake-producing factory now.

— Dmytro Kuleba (@DmytroKuleba) February 21, 2022
The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.View original tweet on Twitter

'Ukrainian' vehicle

Questions have also been raised about some of the footage shown on Russian state TV as illustration of alleged Ukrainian acts of aggression.

The Russian military claimed on Monday that its forces had killed five members of a Ukrainian "saboteur group" and destroyed two armoured personnel vehicles following an alleged incursion into Russian territory.

Reporting from the site of the alleged clash, Channel One - one of Russia's most popular state TV channels - showed footage of what it described as one of the destroyed Ukrainian vehicles.

Image source, Channel One Russia/Youtube

But Sam Cranny-Evans, a research analyst at the defence think-tank RUSI, says there is "no compelling evidence to say it's a Ukrainian vehicle".

Both Ukrainians and Russians have produced the BTR-70 vehicles, Mr Cranny-Evans says, and there are different versions of it, but the one shown on Russian TV is similar to the version produced in Russia.

Experts with the Ukrainian military portal Militarnyy also said that the vehicle was the Russian version of BTR-70M, which has been produced at a plant in the Russian city of Arzamas since 2006.

Deadly Donbas car attack 'looks staged'

Footage has emerged from pro-Russian outlets claiming to show a car blown up by a roadside bomb in Donbas. According to one video, inside the charred vehicle are the remains of three dead error 025 function heading differs from prototype.

Local news reports and posts on separatist Telegram channels said the intended target was a separatist military commander.

But a retired bomb disposal expert who has reviewed the footage has cast serious doubts on the allegations.

"There is nothing in those images or videos to support the claims," says Pete Norton, a weapons intelligence specialist.

The key is the location of the car - in footage shot at the scene, there's no evidence that a bomb had been buried in the road or that the vehicle was travelling at speed when it was destroyed.

If, as claimed, the car was destroyed by a roadside device, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, it's much more likely that the car would have carried on moving instead of appearing to stop next to the site of the explosion.

Mr Norton also says graphic up-close images of the bodies inside the cars that surfaced in a YouTube video further undermine the allegations.

One of the skulls shows, he says, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, "clear serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of having undergone a post-mortem cranial autopsy" - it's impossible that such a procedure would happen at the scene of an attack. The suggestion, he says, is that cadavers were used in a staged incident.

The nursing profession: a critical component of the growing need for a nuclear global health workforce

Conflict and Healthvolume 13, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Article number: 9 (2019) Cite this article

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Abstract

Background

Instability in the global geopolitical climate and the continuing spread of nuclear weapons and increase in their lethality has made the exchange serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack nuclear weapons or a terrorist attack upon a nuclear power plant a serious issue that demands appropriate planning for response. In response to this threat, the development of a nuclear global health workforce under the technical expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network has been proposed.

Main body of the abstract

As the largest component of the global healthcare workforce, nurses will play a critical role in both the leadership and health care effectiveness of a response to any public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) resulting from the unprecedented numbers of trauma, thermal burn, and radiation affected patients that will require extensive involvement of the nursing professional community.

Short conclusion

Lives can and will be saved if nurses are present. The clinical care of radiation contaminated patients (e.g. radiation burns, fluid management, infection control), thermal burn patients, and other health system response activities such serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack community screening for radiation exposure, triage, decontamination, administration of medical countermeasures and the provision of supportive emotional and mental health care will be overwhelmingly nurse intensive.

Background

Despite low level awareness on the part of the public, concerns for the use of nuclear warfare against the United States dating back to the Cold War are now steadily increasing [1]. The National Security Strategy states that the American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon [2] and in 2017 the Science and Security Board warned: “World leaders are failing to act with the speed and on the scale required to protect citizens from the extreme danger posed by climate change and nuclear war. The probability of global catastrophe is very high, and the actions needed to reduce the risks of disaster must be taken very soon” [3]. Given the heightened geopolitical tensions between countries in possession of nuclear weapons, the need for a health care workforce with the specific knowledge, skills and abilities to respond to a nuclear PHEIC is of critical importance. The intentional release of radiation will unquestionably create a substantial and potentially devastating burden upon a region’s health care system, and as such, on a region’s healthcare workforce. Plans for U.S. medical response have been described previously [4,5,6], and recognizing that “a nuclear event anywhere is a nuclear event everywhere”, in 2015, Burkle and Dallas proposed a framework for developing a nuclear global health workforce [7]. Nurses constitute the largest sector of the global healthcare workforce (2,955,200 active registered nurses in the U.S. healthcare workforce alone [8], and their capacity and willingness to respond to a radiation/nuclear event will be critical to the success of the health response [9]. The clinical care of radiation contaminated patients (e.g. fluid management, infection control), and other health system response activities such as community screening for radiation exposure, triage, decontamination, administration of medical serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack and the provision of supportive emotional and mental health care will be overwhelmingly nurse intensive [10, 11]. In addition, the mass casualty care required for the extensive thermal burn patients anticipated from any nuclear weapons event will also be very nurse response intensive, and especially so for the strikingly large number that would result from the recent rapid increase in the threat of thermonuclear war. The ubiquitous threat of a nuclear attack is real and the participation of a radiation competent nursing workforce will be imperative for an effective response. This paper presents the potential impact of a nuclear event on individual and population health, and positions nurses will serve as the foundation for a nuclear global workforce.

Main text

Detonation of a nuclear device, especially in crowded urban areas as currently anticipated, will produce unprecedented numbers and kinds of injuries requiring a healthcare response not currently available anywhere in the world. The only experience with urban nuclear detonations, fortunately, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, has been with the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan at the end of World War II., While these weapons (10-15kT) were far greater in destruction and healthcare impact than all conventional weapons previously, in comparison to thermonuclear weapons now proliferating globally these were relatively small. Indeed, after two decades of preparing for a 10kT weapon detonation by DHS, FEMA has announced and presented at a recent meeting of the National Academy of Sciences that they are now focusing on 10-1000kT nuclear detonation response [12, 13].

Healthcare response needs due to nuclear detonation

When a nuclear weapon explodes, it generates a blast wave, intense light and heat, radiation, and a large fireball is created (creating the characteristic mushroom-shaped cloud). Fallout is composed of fission-created radioactive elements which attach to vaporized debris particles from the explosion and then are carried by wind up to many miles from the site of the explosion. Detonation of a nuclear weapon would cause great destruction, death, and injury and have a wide area of impact. Individuals close to the blast site could experience injury or death from the blast wave, moderate to severe thermal burns from heat and mass fires, full or partial blindness from the intense light, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and acute radiation syndrome or ARS (caused by the radiation released at the time of detonation). Individuals farther away from the blast, but in the path of fallout, may experience health effects from fallout on the outside of the body or clothes (external contamination) or on the inside of the body (internal contamination), from contaminated food, air, water sources, or contact with contaminated surfaces. Extensive modeling has been done of a potential detonation of a nuclear weapon in various locations [14, 15] with all studies indicating the daunting task for medical response.

Failure to plan for nuclear events

A nuclear detonation anywhere in the world would have devastating results resulting in a PHEIC and there would be limited time to take critical protection steps. Social disruption, chaos and panic will ensue. In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear event many people will die, however the possibility exists that the great majority of people in most large cities experiencing a nuclear detonation would survive. Despite the fear surrounding such an event, emergency planning and preparation can lessen deaths and serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack and research supports that lives can be saved if a rapidly deployed and robust multidisciplinary response component exists [1]. Public health and the acute health care system will play a key role in responding to the affected population. Yet an overwhelming sense of fatality and doom balanced with societies’ collective denial regarding the potential for serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of nuclear weapons limits health care systems planning for a nuclear attack. A WHO report published in 1984 stated that the immediate and delayed loss of human and animal life would be enormous and “the plight of survivors would be physically and psychologically appalling.” This negative outcome is particularly applicable to the use of thermonuclear weapons (>50kT) in urban areas, though the outcomes for the smaller, Hiroshima-sized weapons is much less in magnitude, especially in the thermal burn casualty category, often described as the “Achilles heel” of nuclear war medical response, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. With the increasing concern tied to the recent spread of thermonuclear weapons to potentially aggressive nations (such as North Korea), this sense of fatality and doom which has helped preclude nuclear war medical response in the past is only likely to be even more of an issue in hampering rationale preparation that is indeed feasible.

Nursing’s role in a nuclear response

A nuclear event will result in an unprecedented mass casualty incident with large scale morbidity and mortality, requiring a massive medical response [16], allocation of scarce resources and the rapid deployment of mobile, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, self-contained, self-sufficient health care facilities [15]. According to the nuclear workforce framework put forth by Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack and Dallas, medical support to triage, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, provision of care to those with the opportunity to survive, palliative serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack for those who will die, and care for those individuals less affected or who have evacuated will be needed [1]. In recognition of the potentially thousands of people exposed, health care facilities (both mobile and fixed) will need to be rapidly established beyond existing emergency departments to meet the massive surge in demand for care. These nuclear health care settings will facilitate initial triage and dose-monitoring, assessment, decontamination, patient transfer, and provide access to definitive care. In order to deliver these services the framework proposes the establishment of 1) nuclear triage centers, 2) nuclear survival centers, 3) nuclear palliative care centers, and 4) health system support centers. Additionally, time-constrained radiation medical countermeasures will need to be rapidly deployed and administered to appropriate populations and mass sheltering may be needed for large numbers of evacuees. In each of these endeavors and across all of these settings, nurses will be needed to establish, sustain operations and provide initial and ongoing patient care (Table 1).

Full size table

Nuclear triage centers/community reception centers

Screening programs will need to be implemented as an immediate primary public health response given the large numbers of people potentially exposed to radioactive fallout, a significant number of whom will have radioactive particles on their clothes and on their person. In addition to providing the much needed screening, this will also divert large numbers of uninjured people away from the primary health delivery facilities, which would otherwise be inundated with these people who are likely to be highly motivated by fear to seek assistance. Crowding with seriously injured patients will already be bad enough, and taking the pressure off these critical facilities is highly important. Nurses will be needed to staff these nuclear triage centers as members of the radiation exposure screening and population monitoring team in conjunction with radiation safety experts and other health care providers. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) advocates establishing Community Reception Centers (CRCs) in the aftermath of a sufficiently large radiologic event- a similar concept to the nuclear triage serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack (NTCs), serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. The purpose of these NTCs/CRCs will be to provide radiologic screening for uninjured or lightly injured people, to provide decontamination when necessary, and to refer those with likely internal contamination on for radiologic assessment and serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack medical countermeasure administration. This referral of verified internally contaminated patients, as well as patients with high estimates of external radiation exposure, will also be an essential function for decision-making of the use of radiation related pharmaceuticals from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Patients (potentially thousands) will present with varying degrees of radiation serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack including acute radiation syndrome (ARS), local radiation injuries, and radiation combined, burn and blast (ocular, ear and lung) serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Nurses will assist with ‘fast biological dosimetry’ initial triage to determine “probability of fatality” [17] or implement the Exposure and Symptom Triage Tool (EAST) for rapid assessment of radiation exposure [18]. Nurses will conduct secondary and serial triage to provide ongoing assessment of severity of injury and other clinical issues. Nurses will interpret triage assessments, implement clinical guidelines [19] and coordinate patient transfers and care as scarce resources (such as the SNS) become available [20].

Point-of-distribution serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack for rapid medical countermeasures deployment

Medical countermeasures, or MCMs, are FDA-regulated products (biologics, drugs, devices) that may be used in the event of a potential public health emergency stemming from a terrorist attack with a biological, chemical, or radiological/nuclear material, or a naturally occurring emerging disease. Recently, the number of MCMs for use following nuclear events has been significantly expanded, due to the increasing threat. Radiation mitigators are drugs administered shortly after radiation exposure that accelerate recovery or repair of radiation injury. Radionuclide eliminators are drugs that decorporate or block absorption of internalized radionuclides and include potassium iodide (KI), Prussian blue (PB), and zinc/calcium diethylenetriamine pentaacetate (Ca- and Zn-DTPA). In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear event specific populations may benefit from rapid access to radiation MCMs in the NTCs/CRCs. Some high dose internally contaminated patients would be selected to receive the radionuclide eliminators that flush the radionuclides out of the body or block absorption, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Other patients with high doses received from internal and/or external radiation might be selected to receive the radiation mitigators, especially those determined to need amelioration of the effects of radiation-induced bone marrow depression (i.e. low white blood cell counts), serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Nurses would be essential in each stage of this process of patient evaluation and decisions on the distribution of limited availability of these highly specialized pharmaceuticals, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. In order to mobilize and distribute these MCMs, nurses will be needed to establish and sustain point-of-distribution clinics (PODs), screen patients and determine eligibility, council patients regarding potential side effects, and to administer the MCMs. Nurses will be needed to care for patients who have adverse medication events and to facilitate medical follow-up.

Nuclear survival centers

Nuclear survival centers will be needed to accommodate the surge of patients serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack higher level clinical care and to help ‘decompress’ the overwhelming burden placed upon existing hospitals and emergency departments. The design may include both fixed and mobile hospital-based facilities to optimize survival opportunities for victims and to mitigate secondary indirect morbidity and mortality [1]. Nurses will be a major personnel necessity in nuclear survival centers to continue the triage process, conducting secondary triage (biodosimetry/bioassay) and to perform serial patient assessments, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Nurses will provide hospital-level unit staffing and staffing of isolation rooms. Acute and chronic care nurses and nurse practitioners, particularly emergency, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, surgery, burn and critical care nurses will be needed for immediate stabilization of patients, render definitive care and to facilitate patient movement through the continuum of care, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. There is already considerable concern over the steady decrease in training for burn treatment nurses in “normal” times. The dramatic surge in thermal burn cases expected with any nuclear weapon use, and the geometrically larger number of thermal burn cases with thermonuclear weapons is likely to be translated serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack a severe staffing shortage in qualified burn nurses that must be addressed. These nurses would provide thermal burn management including initial assessment and hemodynamic stabilization, fluid/electrolyte rescue and management, infection control, debridement, nutrition support and emotional support. Nurse anesthetists, psych/mental health nurses and nurse practitioners, oncology nurses, infection control nurses and occupational health nurses will provide pain control and symptom management, psychosocial support, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and spiritual and culturally sensitive care of patients and their families.

Nuclear palliative care centers

Responses to disasters and large scale humanitarian emergencies rarely include palliative care, the discipline devoted to preventing and relieving suffering rather than to specific diseases, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, organs or technical skills. In fact, a stark and somewhat false dichotomy exists between saving lives and relieving suffering. In the case of a nuclear event, the provision of palliative care will be extremely relevant to health care systems. This will be true for not only the immediate triage category, but also with the expectant group (alive during the healthcare crisis but not expected to survive). Triage decision making with the likelihood that resources such as pharmaceuticals will be far less than the patient population urgently needing them will require distinctive training on the part of the nurses facing these impending nuclear crises. Hospice and palliative nurses focus exclusively on end-of-life care and “help patients achieve the best possible quality of life through serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of suffering, control of symptoms, and restoration of functional capacity, while remaining sensitive to personal, cultural and religious values, believes and practices”.Footnote 1 Palliative nursing care is the “comprehensive management of the physical, psychological, social, spiritual, and existential needs of patients, particularly those with incurable, progressive illness and has an important role in humanitarian crises [21]. Provision of clinical care in nuclear palliative care centers will require 24-h nursing availability, possibly for months, to anticipate and meet the needs of radiation affected patients and families facing terminal illness and bereavement. Pain and symptom management, end-stage burn and acute radiation syndrome care, psychosocial support and patient education and advocacy error code 1013 just a few of the many nursing roles and responsibilities that will be needed in this setting. Primary care nurses and nurse practitioners, Nurse Anesthetists, Psych/mental health nurses, Parish nurses and LPNs/LVNs will be needed to collaborate with physicians, social workers, or chaplains within the context of an interdisciplinary team. Nurses will be needed who understand how to engage community resources for family support and burial services post death, and to work with clergy to help families address loss and grief and bereavement care.

Health system support centers

Health system support centers are settings were populations in unaffected locations and evacuees can seek supplemental medical care and screening for noncommunicable diseases and other health serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. These settings support or restore public health and health care systems and may provide additional bed capacity and additional sources of care. Fixed or mobile facilities will need nurse staffing to provide care and rehabilitation for displaced, evacuated patients and their families. Nurse administrators, hospital and ambulatory clinic nurses, surgical nurses, burn nurses, oncology nurses, rehabilitation nurses and primary care nurses and nurse practitioners will be needed. Public health nurses, psych/mental health nurses and occupational health nurses will conduct population surveillance and monitoring, patient education and advocacy, address ethical and legal considerations in the provision of clinical care, and provide assistance with family reunification and psychosocial support.

Public shelters

Public shelters differ from the clinical settings listed above and will have distinct and complementary operations focused primarily upon non-affected evacuees. Shelters will provide temporary hardcore industrial darkcore terror, security, food service, and ongoing health surveillance to displaced populations [22]. They are not designed for the provision of medical and nursing care beyond first aid and care of minor illness. Ideally, evacuees will have processed through a NTC/CRC prior to arriving at a shelter, however with the panic likely to occur with nuclear weapons detonations of any size this may not be the case and special considerations will serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack to be in place to ensure the health and safety of health care providers and shelter residents. Nurses will be needed to establish and sustain shelter operations including the establishment of a shelter floor plan with detailed procedures for managing potentially contaminated people, securing contamination control zones and decontamination facilities. Baseline radiation levels will need to be ascertained and monitored and decisions made on the degree of decontamination necessary. As most radiation decontamination is likely to be highly effective with simply disrobing and safe disposal of contaminated clothing (as opposed to decontamination requiring unnecessary labor and other resources in an already taxing environment), decision making by properly trained nurses will be essential. Nurses will work with shelter radiation safety officers, local emergency managers and volunteers to accommodate the needs of the residents and to monitor the living, eating and sanitary spaces in the shelter. Shelters have food preparation and food service areas, restrooms, showers and infant care areas. Public health follow-up and monitoring of shelter residents, implementation of infection control measures, care and monitoring of pregnant women exposed to radiation will be done by nurses. Nurses trained in psychological first aid can assist evacuees with the psychological effects of surviving a nuclear event, educate evacuees about radiation risk and help with the transition back to home.

Management of Psychosocial Crisis

The psychological, emotional and behavioral consequences of any nuclear weapon event are certain to be of staggering proportions, rippling through communities both near and far. Depression, anxiety, acute and post-traumatic stress disorder, poor self-reported health status and medically unexplained somatic symptoms characterize the psychological impact of large-scale radiation events [23]. The lifetime prevalence of depression in women 11 years after Chernobyl was double the lifetime prevalence in women in the Ukraine [24]. Fear of developing cancer may be long-lasting and perpetuate negative mental health impacts, leading to self-medication through the increased use of alcohol and pharmaceuticals, and an increase in family disintegration and violent/antisocial behavior. Social decay and civil unrest may occur. Nurses will be needed across diverse clinical settings and all sectors of society to assist individuals, families and communities to heal and move towards restoration of daily life in a ‘new normal’ post nuclear event.

Challenges for workforce development

The detonation of a nuclear device whether in a U.S. city or anywhere in the world will create a PHEIC and a global need for nurses and other health care providers to manage casualties exposed to radiation, sustain the health care systems needed for response, and provide targeted clinical care. However, few nurses have either training or experience in the field of radiation injury [25]. Multiple factors will influence the capacity, capabilities and willingness of nurses to participate in a national or global response to a nuclear event. Nurses’ perception of their personal risk related to radiation exposure, their knowledge, abilities and skills, and their sense of clinical competence may impact the speed and integrity of the response [26]. A lack of clarity regarding nurses’ specific roles and responsibilities in the aftermath of a nuclear event and a lack of awareness or knowledge of clinical guidelines adds complexity to preparedness. Currently, 75 % of U. S Schools of Nursing do not include radiation/nuclear content in their programs of study basically ensuring that the next generation of nurses will be inadequately prepared [26, 27].

Using the proposed framework for a global nuclear workforce a tiered model of professional nursing practice is proposed to directly align to the anticipated roles and responsibilities for nurses in the event of a nuclear event. The Model of nursing practice for nuclear response addresses both clinical and health systems management (administrative) practice, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, from which programs of education and opportunities for training can be targeted to those sectors of the profession who would most benefit.

Model of nursing practice for nuclear event response

  • Tier 1: Any staff/clinic or public health nurse or advanced practice nurse who has completed a program of basic, generalized nursing education and is authorized to practice by the regulatory agency of his/her country. These nurses will need a baseline understanding of radiation concepts, population health effects, basic decontamination and the appropriate use of PPE.

  • Tier 2: Any practicing nurse or advanced practice nurse who has achieved the Tier 1 radiation/nuclear competencies (especially thermal burn treatment) and is designated a disaster responder within an institution, organization or system, or deployed to a satellite clinical setting. These nurses need an advanced knowledge base including clinical care of acute radiation syndrome, management of radiation and thermal burns, radiation triage, and health systems management skills to establish and sustain the fixed or mobile satellite clinical care settings described above.

  • Tier 3: Any nurse or advanced practice nurse who has achieved Level 1 and 2 radiation/nuclear competencies and is prepared to respond as a member of a deployable radiation rapid response team, or to serve as a fixed or mobile ‘base camp’ nuclear subject matter expert nurse advisor. These nurses need advanced knowledge of national/international nuclear response plans, crisis leadership skills and abilities and knowledge of health systems optimization strategies. These nurses will most likely assume clinical supervisory and systems leadership positions.

Conclusions

The participation of a radiation competent nursing workforce will be imperative for an effective response to a PHEIC resulting from a nuclear event. Lives can and will be saved if nurses are present. The clinical care of radiation contaminated patients (e.g. radiation burns, fluid management, infection control), thermal burn patients (which are difficult even with small numbers), and other health system response activities such as community screening for radiation exposure, triage, decontamination, administration of medical countermeasures and the provision of supportive emotional and mental health care will be overwhelmingly nurse intensive. Policymakers, nursing educators, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, public health and health care systems administrators who include the profession of nursing as the foundational element in nuclear response plans will increase the probabilities of survival following these devastating events.

Notes

  1. Journal of Hospice and Palliative Care. Retrieved from https://www.nursesource.org/hospice.html.

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge Dr. Mary Pat Couig, Dr. Roberta Lavin, Clifton Thornton, Mary Casey-Lockyer and Amanda Bettencourt for their review and input into the development of Table 1 describing nurse’s roles and responsibilities following a nuclear event.

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We received no funding for this work.

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  1. National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA

    Tener Goodwin Veenema

  2. Department of International Health, Nursing and Public Health, Johns Hopkins School of Nursing, Centre for Humanitarian Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

    Tener Goodwin Veenema

  3. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University & T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Cambridge, USA

    Frederick M. Burkle Jr

  4. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, USA

    Frederick M. Burkle Jr

  5. Department of Health Policy and Management, Institute for Disaster Management, University of Georgia, College of Public Health, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Athens, USA

    Cham E. Dallas

  6. Department of Emergency Medicine, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine, Medical College of Georgia, Augusta University, Augusta, USA

    Cham E. Dallas

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All authors contributed equally to the writing of this manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Correspondence terrordrome mp3 free download Tener Goodwin Veenema.

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Veenema, T.G., serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Burkle, F.M. & Dallas, C.E. The nursing profession: a critical component of the growing need for a nuclear global health workforce. Confl Health13, 9 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-019-0197-x

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Keywords

  • Nuclear weapons
  • Nuclear war
  • Nurses
  • Global health workforce

Examples of Risk Information Concealment Practice

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Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment. 2015 Aug 20 : 9–245.

Published online 2015 Aug 20. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24301-6_2

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Abstract

The Vajont hydropower station dam and reservoir was located at the foot of Mt. Toc in the Dolomite region of the Italian Alps. In October 1963, a large landslide of 260 million m3 of rock (equivalent of cube with a 650 meter side) filled the reservoir of the dam, initiating a 150–250 m high wave, which overtopped the dam and wiped out several villages in the nearby Piave valley, resulting in the death of at least 1921 people.

Keywords: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack Nuclear Power Plant, RBMK Reactor, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Industrial Sector

Vajont Dam Disaster (Italy, 1963)

The Vajont hydropower station dam and reservoir was located at the foot of Mt. Toc in the Dolomite region of the Italian Alps. In October 1963, a large landslide of 260 million m3 of rock (equivalent of cube with a 650 m side) filled the reservoir of the dam, initiating a 150–250 m high wave, which overtopped the dam and wiped out several villages in the nearby Piave valley, resulting in the death of at least 1921 people.1

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Risk Concealment Before the Disaster

Vajont dam was an important industrial project for post-war Italy. A general plan was proposed for the erection of seven dams in Piave valley, but from the beginning of the Vajont dam development, the project met with fierce resistance from local communities protesting against the forced sale of land to Società Adriatica di Elettricità (SADE) to construct the highest arch dam in the world. SADE, a private electricity company in North-Eastern Italy, had support from Democrazia Cristiana (the Italian Christian democratic political party, which promoted pro-American and pro-capitalist ideology and was in power at the time). Opposition from locals in villages around the Vajont reservoir was suppressed by the police. After this, the Italian Communist Party, the main opponent of Democrazia Cristiana, stayed on the side of local residents and supported their struggle against SADE and the government during the construction of the dam.2

Engineers and geologists focused on the permeability of the Vajont dam foundation, but did not study carefully the geology and the stability of the slopes surrounding the upstream reservoir of the dam, which consisted of soft materials like sand, limestone and clay.3 The geological instability of the surrounding mountains was well known among local residents4: Mt. Toc had many nicknames like “crazy”, “rotten”, “loose” or “walking mountain” among local people due to its propensity for huge unexpected landslides.5,6 The construction of the dam was launched in January 1957 with the goal of completing it by 1959 (construction started without government approval, nor serious geological research of the surrounding mountains). Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, to meet the need of Italian industry for electricity and maximize the profitability of the project, SADE proposed to increase the height of the dam up to 722.5 m, and triple the volume of the reservoir. In June 1957, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, government approval was obtained for construction without a geological study of the consequences of expanding the reservoir.

In March 1959 in the nearby Pontesei dam reservoir (owned by SADE), a landslide serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack 10 million m3 of rock occurred (equivalent of cube with a 220 m side), resulting in the death of one worker, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, killed by a 20-m wave which overtopped the dam and destroyed a nearby bridge. Moreover, clefts were discovered during mountain road constructions around the Vajont reservoir. Protests from local residents against SADE broke out again. In May 1959, l’Unità (the official newspaper of the Italian Communist Party) conjectured that the Pontesei dam accident could recur in the Vajont region: “when there is water in the reservoir, the mountain will fall down and cause a tragedy”.7 (Later SADE filed a lawsuit against the journalist for “disclosure of false, exaggerated and biased information aimed at disturbing public order8 and “defamation and spreading false information9). After the Pontesei dam accident, SADE ordered German and Italian geologists to investigate the geology of mountains around the dam. After several months, they confirmed a potential instability in the southern slope of the reservoir: the possible volume of a landslide could exceed 200 million m3 if the reservoir was filled completely due to undercutting of the foundation by an ancient landslide. They passed on information about a possible rockslide to the architect serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack the chief engineer of the Vajont system, who asked them to moderate some of the report conclusions and suggested testing these hypotheses with another round of studies.10 These more detailed studies stated that the evidence of an ancient landslide was absent, the slope serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack potentially immovable and only a small landslide could occur.11 Apparently, any geological survey demonstrating the dangers of further exploitation of the Vajont system was unacceptable for the engineering team, SADE and the government, which was promoting the Vajont arch dam as the highest in the world and as a historic masterpiece of Italian engineering. Frankly admitting that there were errors in the design could lead to question how safely the government was expanding Italian industry. It could also attract attention to its control over private companies. This could change the political landscape, with the Communists using any blunder for political capital.12 It would also cause losses for SADE and bring their shares down in the market. Nobody among the managerial team wanted to take responsibility for this honest but painful recognition of the dangers.

In February 1960, SADE started filling the reservoir. In the process, small landslides were noticed. On November 4, 1960, when the water level reached 636 m above error svc /system/filesystem/root default level after weeks of heavy rains, a 0.7 million m3 landslide occurred creating a 2-m wave. SADE geologists revealed a direct correlation between the water level in the reservoir and movement in the southern slope of the lake. They proposed to bring down the level of the reservoir to reduce the observed increasing shift of the southern slope. When the smart 199 ultradma crc errors dropped to 600 m, the movement of land mass went down from 3 cm to 1 mm per day. During 1961, the construction of a bypass tunnel kept the level of the reservoir down to around 600 m, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and there were no serious landslides (even during the cold winter of 1961–1962). In 1961, SADE heroes 5 inpageerror a hydraulic study of worst-case scenarios using a simulation model of the reservoir and the dam (1/200 of real size) at Padua University. In July 1962, the results of this research showed that the maximum likely wave from a landslide up to a volume of 40 million m3 would not exceed 25 m, if the minimum sliding duration was 1.5 min13; in reality, the volume of the final rockslide was 260 million m3, the slide lasted only 45 s and the height of the wave generated was 150–250 m. The geologists assumed that keeping the maximum water level of the reservoir below 700 m would prevent a possible landslide wave from overtopping the dam crest. There is no documented evidence that the results of the hydraulic study and the possibility of a 25-m wave were transmitted to the government, local authorities, residents or onsite staff at the dam and hydropower station. Supporting such interpretation is the fact that, right before the disaster, SADE personnel and their families had not left the nearby city of Longarone, which was perceived by local residents as a sign that there was no serious threat. After the disaster, it was revealed that the inspectors of the dam and the commissions responsible for regulation of hydropower industry never received any final reports—in particular they never received the studies by geologists who had identified the fault. Nor did they see any of the results from the model tests or their ensuing recommendations, which emphasized the importance of the water level of the retention dam.14 Moreover, some sources claim that the vice-president of SADE decided not to communicate about the seismic activity registered by the seismographic station at the dam, and even deleted some records about serious tremors in his reports to government officials.15

In 1960, political debates began about the possible advantages for Italy of the nationalization of 1270 electricity companies and the creation of uniform standards for the use of electrical infrastructure. Nationalization could reduce the selling price of electricity for industrial and retail customers. Intensive discussions about nationalization occurred during 1960–1962. To increase their profits before nationalization, senior managers of SADE decided to fill the reservoir up to 700 m by the end of 1962; the velocity of ground movement increased as a response from 1 mm to 1.5 cm per day.16 Finally in December 1962, ENEL (the Italian National Agency for Electric Energy) was established and united all private players, including SADE and all its assets, by July 1963.17 Managers of the private SADE could become managers of the state ENEL after this acquisition. Immediately after nationalization was declared, the level of the reservoir began to go down, and by the spring of 1963, it reached a low of 650 m; ground movement returned to 1–2 mm per day and seismic activity ceased.18 Nobody within the managerial team of ENEL/SADE wanted to reveal the shortcomings of the Vajont system during the process of transfer of assets. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the quality of the dam to government officials and to present the Vajont system as a fully-functioning project, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, the reservoir was filled to the limit of 715 m by autumn 1963; by this time, the total cumulative ground movement surpassed 3 m.19 ENEL/SADE top managers were still confident that they could manage the ground movement by reducing the reservoir level. But from September 1963, in spite of permanent water drainage, the ground movement velocity reached 20 cm per day20,21 and residents of villages located above the reservoir were registering cracks in their houses. Within the ENEL/SADE managerial team, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, the opinion prevailed that, ajna above terror the reservoir had a water level of 700 m, the possible wave from any size of landslide would not be dangerous for the dam and nearby villages. Because of this, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, SADE management did not discuss the results of the hydraulic study of 1961–1962 with external and independent geologists, and ignored the necessity to continue investigations of the dynamics of the southern slope of Mt. Toc. They misjudged the possible volume and speed of potential landsides, and the resulting wave height. This underestimation led to a situation where only a few small villages above the reservoir were evacuated. Neither the serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of villages located below the dam nor staff at the Vajont system were informed by ENEL/SADE executives about the possible threats.

On October 9, 1963 at 10:29 pm, dozens of ENEL/SADE workers were on the crest of the dam. They—and thousands of residents of nearby villages—were completely unprepared for the large landslide or for the wall of water, hundreds of meters serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, which killed them. Meanwhile, the decision makers in the ENEL/SADE managerial team were at a distance from what they knew to be a dangerous area.

After the accident, an investigation commission stated serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack the main cause of the disaster was “bureaucratic inefficiency, muddled withholding serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack alarming information, and buck-passing among top-officials22—not an unforeseen natural event, an act of God, as Democrazia Cristiana and ENEL tried to present it. Four years later, the court found 11 executives of ENEL/SADE and government officials guilty.

Unfortunately, thirty years after the Vajont dam disaster, a quite similar cover up of local geological instability and faulty design at Val Di Stava led to the collapse of another Italian dam in 1985, which resulted in 268 deaths.23

Vajont Dam Disaster: Why Risks Were Concealed
  • Cozy relations between SADE executives and Italian government officials, which allowed the operator of the dam to construct and exploit it in blatant violations of the existing legislation.

  • The political struggle between Democrazia Cristiana and the Italian Communist Party: if SADE and Democrazia Cristiana had disclosed defects in the design of the dam and the reservoir, or had revealed the illegal practice used in obtaining the construction permits, a serious political crisis would have erupted in Italy.

  • The short-term profitability of a private enterprise took priority over the long-term resilience of the Italian electric power industry.

  • Geologists and managers at SADE were unwilling to admit mistakes in the inadequate preliminary study of the geology and of the stability of slopes surrounding the upstream reservoir of the Vajont dam. They were reluctant to incur the massive losses that would follow from the release of information that would lead to much higher construction costs. The goal was to save the dam project and avoid memory allocation error 0xdeadbeef collapse of SADE’s shares in the market.

  • False reassurance/self-suggestion/self-deception among decision makers about the maximum possible volume and speed of the landslide.

  • SADE geologists and managers were afraid of being accused of incompetence. They were also keen not to lose public confidence in the ability of Italian private business to implement complex industrial projects.

Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident (USA, 1979)

The Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is located 15 km from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 140 km from Washington, DC and 240 km from New York. The plant has two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) with a generating capacity of 1700 megawatts (MW). When the largest civil nuclear accident the world had ever seen occurred there at the end of March 1979, Unit 2 (TMI-2) had only been in commercial service for about three months and was operating at 97 % capacity. Unit 1 was shut down for refueling. The reactor core of TMI-2 contained around 100 tons of uranium fuel.24

Brief Technical Summary of the Accident

At 5:00 cybershot system error c 32 01. on March 7, 1979, during regular servicing of the feedwater system on Unit 2, the polisher machines—which remove dissolved minerals from the system—were being repaired when a leakage of water whose causes are not fully understood occurred into the air-controlled system that opens and closes the polisher valves. Eleven hours later, at 4:00 a.m. on March 28, 1979, this problem triggered a stoppage of the secondary feedwater pumps, which were responsible for sending re-heated water to the steam generators to remove heat from the reactor core of Unit 2.25 This in turn provoked the automatic shut down of steam generators, and thus of the entire TMI-2 reactor. “Scramming” (emergency shutdown) of the reactor stopped nuclear fission completely; nevertheless, decaying radioactive materials left from the fission process continued to heat the reactor’s coolant water. Immediately after shutdown, the decay heat power generation was about 160 MW of the thermal power of 2575 MW, corresponding to the 850 MW generating capacity of TMI-2. One hour after the reactor shutdown, decay heat power generation was approximately 33 MW. Ten hours after shutdown, it was about 15 MW. Over time, the decay heat power generation decreased more slowly.26 In spite of the fact that this post-shutdown decay released far less energy than that released during fission, operators of the plant had to continue cooling the reactor for several days to reach a total serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack shutdown.27

Because the secondary feedwater pumps had tripped, heat was not anymore being removed from the reactor. An activation of three auxiliary pumps occurred but the valves have been closed earlier for routine maintenance; the system was unable to pump any water, in violation of a key US Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule. This led to rising pressure within the system, so a relief valve at the top of the pressurizer tank—the so-called pilot-operated relief valve (PORV)—was automatically opened in order to reduce pressure by draining the steam and water from the reactor core into a tank on the floor of Unit 2. The valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it remained stuck open. Instruments in the control room of TMI-2, however, indicated to the plant operators that the valve was closed as the light did not indicate the position of the valve, only the status of the solenoid being powered or not.28 The design of the reactor and the control room design included instruments that could not show how much water was covering the core.29 As a result, the plant staff was unaware that cooling water was pouring out of the stuck-open valve and assumed that, as long as the pressurized water level was high, the core was properly covered with water.30,31 The PORV was open for 2 h and 19 min until operators of the next shift found the leakage of coolant from the reactor and closed the valve. Furthermore, during the first few minutes after the accident, the automatic emergency cooling system was turned off, reducing the emergency cooling water flow into the reactor to 10 times less than the designed level due to fears that the system was overfilled. The combination of these factors led to overheating and severe damage of the nuclear fuel due to the shortage of coolant within the reactor.32 Later investigations found that about half of the core melted during the early stages of the accident.33 The US President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island stated: “We estimate that there were failures in the cladding around 90 percent of the fuel rods. Fuel temperatures may have exceeded 4000 °F in the upper 30 to 40 percent of the core (approximately 30 to 40 tons of fuel). Temperatures in parts of the damaged fuel that were not effectively cooled by steam may have reached the melting point of the uranium oxide fuel, about 5,200 °F”.34 This deterioration of the nuclear fuel induced a powerful upsurge of radioactivity within the containment building of TMI-2, and caused a dangerous hydrogen gas bubble to form within the reactor vessel likely produced by the reaction between the zirconium alloy of the melting fuel rod cladding and the steam. If this hydrogen gas had reacted with oxygen, it could have ignited a blow out, damaging the reactor vessel and leading to severe radioactive contamination. Fortunately, the hydrogen bubble was eliminated in the first few days after the accident.

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The accident happened because of a combination of factors. Firstly, plant operators were ignorant of the risks of water leakage into the polisher valve control system and of the PORVs getting stuck open—even though these incidents had occurred many times before the TMI accident at other American NPPs—because information about both problems had been concealed by suppliers of the nuclear steam system and by other NPP operators. Secondly, nobody was really facing up to the challenge posed by the interaction between human and machine in running a nuclear power plant: appeals from the plant’s staff about poor control room design, and the imperfection of instrumentation, were being ignored; training was inadequate and operating procedures poor; and neither operators nor management had sufficient specialist knowledge about pressurized water reactors, or skill in diagnosing problems.35 A tremendous amount of nationwide public outrage—and panic within the local community—was induced by unconscious misleading statements by the operators and management of TMI-2, and by executives of Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed), the involved utility company. Incorrect statements by representatives of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) were influenced by a mistaken evaluation of conditions at the reactor during the first days after the accident, when operators did not realize that coolant was being lost and the plant was experiencing a meltdown.

Fortunately, there was a containment building sited directly above the reactor, the steam generators and the pressurizer of TMI-2. Thus, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, in spite of the severe core meltdown, the major part of the radioactive material remained within the unit’s containment vessel, with minimal networkerror 400 bad request to the environment.36 The total release of radioactivity to the environment has been established as just 13 to 17 curies of iodine, while 10.6 million curies of iodine were retained in water tanks in the containment building and 4 million curies were in the auxiliary building tanks.37 The total cost of the 14-year cleanup operation on the TMI-2 site was evaluated at US$1 billion in 1993 US$.38 In spite of the contamination of the TMI-2 site, the nearby TMI-1 has worked properly for decades since the accident—in fact in 2009, the NRC approved an extension of the TMI-1 operating license for a further 20 years.39

The event, which was rated as a Level 5 accident out of a maximum Level 7 according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, led to wider consequences. Nearly 150,000 people were evacuated from their homes during the accident,40 which turn out to be unnecessary. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack April 1, 1979 to coordinate evacuation efforts during any such accident that could occur in the future. After the accident, strong public resistance to civil nuclear energy, which was manifested very clearly on May 6, 1979 when 65,000 antinuclear demonstrators gathered in Washington, led to the suspension of the construction of new nuclear power stations within the United States.

At the beginning of 1980, the US President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission both published detailed reports, open for public evaluation, about the TMI-2 accident. However, executives of the Soviet and Japanese civil nuclear industries obviously did not pay serious attention to the findings of these commissions regarding organizational imperfections before and after the accident, as would be revealed later in their corresponding disasters from the fact that they did not implement many of the commissions’ recommendations in their own industries. Unfortunately, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of the organizational mistakes, and the pervasive climate of poor communication about risks that occurred during TMI-2, were repeated before and during the 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima disasters.

Risk Concealment Before the Disaster

Rapid Growth of the American Civil Nuclear Industry at the Expense of Safety Considerations

The American civil nuclear industry originated from the Manhattan Project, a US military nuclear program launched in 1942. In 1946, the first civil reactor was constructed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. By 1955, the first nuclear submarine, based on a pressurized-water reactor design, had taken to the water.41 In parallel with military nuclear development, the Eisenhower administration tested five different types of reactors in order to choose the most effective designs for a national civil nuclear program based on tenders from private companies to “design, construct and operate … atomic power plants with [their] own capital”.42 Following these tests, the Navy’s pressurized-water reactor (PWR) design and the boiling-water reactor (BWR) design were selected—nowadays, 69 of the 104 reactors operating in the United States are PWR and 35 are BWR.43 The 1960s and 1970s serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack boom years for the industry: 91 reactors were ordered in 1969 and 160 by the end of 1972.44 While reactor projects were small in terms of capacity, safety concerns were not adequately emphasized. But when high-capacity reactors were projected in densely serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack areas in order to minimize transmission costs and power losses, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had to pay attention to quality assurance programs, to the redundancy of certain critical equipment, to serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack addition of an emergency core cooling system and to improvements in containment design.45 At the same time, the industry was reluctant to implement additional safety measures because of the desire to reduce production costs in comparison with other fuels.46 According to Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack NRC report “[t]he industry wanted a ‘streamlined’ licensing process to reduce the lengthening lag time between application for permits and licensing, and actual issuance. … In the promotional atmosphere of the AEC, such arguments had appeal”.47 After the 1973 oil crisis, the energy independence of the United States and the development of domestic energy sources assumed greater importance, and the government gave additional support to the civil nuclear industry by promoting “Project Independence”, an ambitious plan to build 1000 nuclear reactors by 2000.48,49 In 1974, the AEC was split into the Energy Research and Development Administration (the promotional side) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the regulatory role); but in spite of this separation of interests, a NRC commissioner stated right after the TMI-2 accident that “I still think it [the NRC] is fundamentally geared to trying to nurture a growing industry”.50The US President’s Commission report concluded that, because of the need to ensure national energy independence, “the NRC is so preoccupied with the licensing of plants that it has not given primary consideration to overall safety issues. … NRC has a history of leaving generic safety problems unresolved for periods of many years”.51 The commission primarily focused on nuclear reactor designs, licensing of new plants and equipment malfunction on existing plants, but paid less attention to systematic safety concerns—the day to day running of plants, serious operator errors, critical areas of operator training, engineering with concern for human factors, utility management, the technical qualifications of staff and the protection of public health and safety.52,53 The President’s Commission report stated: “Two of the most important activities of NRC are its licensing function and its inspection and enforcement activities. We found serious inadequacies in both. In the licensing process, applications are only required to analyze ‘single-failure’ accidents. They are not required to analyze what happens when two systems fail independently of each other, such as the event that took place at TMI. … The accident at TMI-2 was a multiple-failure accident. …insufficient attention has been paid [by the NRC] to the ongoing process of assuring nuclear safety. … NRC is vulnerable to the charge that it is heavily equipment-oriented, rather than people-oriented, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. … [I]nspectors who investigate accidents concentrate on what went wrong with the equipment and not on what operators may have done incorrectly, in the lack of attention to the quality of procedures provided for operators, and in an almost total lack of attention to the interaction between human beings and machines”.54

Lack of Communication About Minor Incidents Within the American Civil Nuclear Industry

The industry had the very serious problem that decision makers had a fragmented perception of the risks, because information about operating experience, including dangerous incidents, was not routinely and reliably exchanged between the NRC, utility companies that operated plants, NPP designers, manufacturers of reactor systems, and contractors and suppliers of critical components. The President’s Commission outlined this problem: “The NRC accumulates vast amounts of information on the operating experience of plants. However, prior to the accident, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, there was no systematic method of evaluating these experiences, and no systematic attempt to look for patterns that could serve as a warning of a basic problem… The major offices within the NRC operate independently with little evidence of exchange of information or experience. For example, the fact that operators could be confused due to reliance on pressurizer level had been raised at various levels within the NRC organization. Yet, the matter ‘fell between the cracks’ and never worked its way out of the system prior to the TMI-2 accident”.55

Moreover, the President’s Commission found out that the mistaken shutdown of the emergency cooling system was not unique to this incident, but a problem well known to representatives of the nuclear steam system suppliers. It had occurred at PWR plants on several occasions, but nobody had transmitted this information to other plants: “The same problem of water leaking into the polisher valve control system had occurred at least twice before at TMI-2… During the 18-month period before the accident, no effective steps were taken to correct these problems… Had Met Ed [the operator of the TMI] corrected the earlier polisher problem, the March 28 sequence of events may never have begun. … A senior engineer of the Babcock & Wilcox Company noted in an earlier accident [on Davis-Besse NPP in 1977], bearing strong similarities to the one at Three Mile Island, that operators had mistakenly turned off the emergency cooling system, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. He pointed out that we were lucky that the circumstances under which this error was committed did not lead to a error loading god of war accident and warned that under other circumstances (like those that would later exist at Three Mile Island), a very serious accident could result, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. He urged, in the strongest terms, that clear instructions be passed on to the operators. This memorandum was written 13 months before the accident at Three Mile Island, but no new instructions resulted from it… Nine times before the TMI accident, open pressurizer relief valves (PORVs) stuck open at B&W plants, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. B&W did not inform its customers of these failures, nor did it highlight them in its own training program so that operators would be aware serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack such a failure causes a canon errore 5100 fix LOCA [loss of coolant accident]”.56

In addition, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, the excessive complexity of control room design, which made it difficult for operators to quickly grasp the condition of a nuclear plant and so make decisions adequately, had been recognized at the design phase but ignored until the TMI case: “Burns and Roe, the TMI-2 architect-engineer, had never systematically evaluated the control room design in the context of a serious accident to see how well it would serve in emergency conditions. Over 100 alarms went off in the early stages of the accident with no way of suppressing the unimportant ones and identifying the important ones. The danger of having too many alarms was recognized by Burns and Roe during the design stage, but the problem was never resolved… The TMI-2 control room operator complained to his superiors about problems with the control room. No corrective action was taken by the utility…”.57

There was a huge problem of risk information transmission between the different players during the development of the nuclear industry, and an inadequate response even to identified risks: “In a number of important cases, [the companies] failed to acquire enough information about safety problems, failed to analyze adequately what information they did acquire, or failed to act on that information. Thus, there was a serious lack of communication about several critical safety matters within and among the companies involved in the building and operation of the TMI-2 plant. … [C]ompanies … have little communication with those responsible for operator training and, therefore, the content of the instructional program does not lead to sufficient understanding of reactor systems… A similar problem existed in the NRC… The information and direction issued by NRC to licensees based on operating experience was, at times, fragmented and misleading… [I]mportant safety issues are frequently raised and may be studied to some degree of depth, but are not carried through to resolution; and the lessons learned from these studies do not reach those individuals and agencies that most need to know about them”.58

Once the plants were operational, it was common practice to focus on eliminating any potential large incidents, whereas fixing minor errors and flaws was generally seen by nuclear executives as less important: “It was natural for the regulators and the industry to ask: ‘What is the worst kind of equipment failure that can occur?’ A preoccupation developed with such large-break accidents as did the attitude that, if they could be controlled, we need not worry about the analysis of ‘less important’ accidents… This was true in the B&W incident described above, it was true about various warnings within NRC that inappropriate operator actions could result in the case of certain small-break accidents… TMI illustrated a situation where NRC emphasis on large breaks did not cover the effects observed in a smaller accident”,59 which can be attributed to the concept of “deterministic design”, which does not incorporate the complexity of the possible cascades that can develop along the multiple branches of the tree of scenarios.

The NRC’s post-accident investigation confirmed the findings of the President’s Commission: “[Similar incidents to the TMI-2 accident] occurred in 1974 at a Westinghouse reactor in Beznau, Switzerland, and in 1977 at Toledo Edison’s Davis Besse plant in Ohio, a Babcock & Wilcox reactor similar in design to the one at Three Mile Island. Both involved the same failed open pressurizer relief valve (PORV), and the same misleading indications to operators that the reactor coolant system was full of water. In both cases, operators diagnosed and solved the problem in a matter of minutes before serious damage could be done. The NRC never learned about the incident at the Beznau reactor until after the TMI-2 accident, because Westinghouse was not required to report to the NRC such occurrences at foreign reactors. Westinghouse concluded that the actions by the Swiss operators proved the validity of an earlier Westinghouse study showing that, in this kind of incident, operators would have enough time to react to a stuck-open valve and correct the situation. A brief account of this earlier study had, in fact, previously been submitted to the NRC. But neither the Beznau incident nor the earlier study had prompted Westinghouse to notify its customers or the NRC that operators might well be misled by their instruments if a valve stuck open. The Davis Besse accident was intensively analyzed by Toledo Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, by Babcock & Wilcox, and by the NRC. Each of these studies identified what should have been perceived to be a significant safety issue. But because no effective system for evaluating operating experience was in effect, none of the results of these studies were ever communicated to [Met Ed] or its operators at the TMI-2 plant, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. … Toledo Edison, at the insistence of an NRC inspector and his supervisor from the agency’s regional office, which is a part of NRC’s Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), eventually adopted new operator precautions. But they were not communicated to B&W or to other utilities, and IE’s regional office did not flag the issue to NRC headquarters”.60

The American nuclear regulator admitted that its inspectors had not given TMI plant managers their conclusions from the experience of erroneous shutdowns of the cooling system at several other NPPs, over a number of years before the TMI accident. In later case studies, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, we will see exactly the same behavior by regulators of The Soviet Ministries of Medium Machine Building, and Energy and Electrification, during the 1970s and 1980s, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. The staff at both Chernobyl NPP and the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydropower station operated complex and dangerous technology without understanding the technical shortcomings of the equipment, or the need to implement special safe operation regimes—even though these had been revealed years if not decades earlier at other plants. In all these cases, the regulators concerned knew the risks, but for different reasons did not pass this knowledge on to operators—and disasters occurred as a pn925 load dll error please update system. The TMI investigation report included this example: “In January 1978, a NRC reviewer in NRR prepared a memo based on … the Davis Besse incident, which noted that, in certain circumstances, operators could be misled by their instruments to serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack off the emergency core cooling system. But the reviewer’s memo was not circulated outside NRR and the issue was not identified as a possible generic safety problem for operating plants; it was simply filed away… In sum, the agency’s fragmented bureaucracy, its preoccupation with hardware and design questions, and the lack of any clear-cut responsibility for identifying significant operating problems and warning operators about them combined to prevent the real message of Davis Besse from getting to Three Mile IslandThe structure of the nuclear industry has not been conducive to the effective sharing and integration of operating data. The utilities that operate the plants have never mobilized an industry-wide effort to concentrate on safety-related operational problems. As for the four principal U.S. manufacturers of reactors (vendors)General Electric, Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, and B&Wwe found a great deal of variation in the extent to which they monitor at their own expense operating problems in the plants they have built, after those plants are tested and turned over to the utilities that have purchased them. And the relationship between the vendor and its utility customer after operation of a plant begins is largely determined by the individual utility’s choice of how much technical assistance it is willing to buy from the vendor on an ongoing, contract basis. Moreover, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, there is no requirement that utilities report failure data to the vendors[A]lthough NRC requirements result in a great deal of material on reactor serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack being generated and sent to the NRC by the utilities, this information has not been systematically reviewed to extract potentially important safety problems or trends… The situation is made more complex because the reporting serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack differ from plant to plant: incidents reportable at some plants do not have to be reported at others. As a result, the NRC is flooded with a mass of undifferentiated data on reactor operations…NRC publishes a computerized listing of [Licensee Event Reports], each described in a few sentences at most, and a periodical called ‘Current Events-Power Reactors’ containing more detailed descriptions of major problems… The lessons learned from malfunctions and mistakes at nuclear plants both here and abroad were never effectively shared within the industry… Coordination among these parties and between them and the NRC, as well as within the NRC, is inadequate”.61 This report was openly published in 1980—but remarkably, Soviet energy industry regulators did not learn the lessons of TMI: no system was established to continuously transmit detailed information about incidents occurring at Soviet nuclear and hydropower plants, so operators remained unaware of the risks. Decades later this lack of communication led to disasters.

In short, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, all the key organizations accountable for the safe operation and regulation of TMI-2 played their part in the accident, but none of them understood the whole picture of the risks involved in running a pressurized-water reactor: no one fully grasped what could develop during a multi-failure hardware malfunction, under the control of staff who had not been trained for such failures.

Challenges of Adequate Risk Transmission After the Disaster

Misreading of Instruments Led to Mistakes by the Operators at TMI-2

There were more than 750 alarms in the control room at TMI-2, and when multi-factor malfunction occurred in the early morning of March 28, 1979, more than 100 of these alarms immediately went off.62 Operators there recalled that the console was “lit up like a Christmas tree”.63 The control room’s alarm printer was overloaded: it could type one line every 4 s, but several alarms per second were occurring during the first few minutes.64 Moreover, there was no system to prioritize alarms, so operators could not trace back the sequence of emergency events in time to make decisions adequately. In addition, the control room and instrumentation were designed for normal, not conditions when an accident occurs.65 The control room was far too large and there was no orderly grouping of instruments by function—in particular, emergency controls and instruments were not sited in a common location.66 For the four TMI-2 operators, it was difficult to run the plant based on information from instruments that were not designed to show, for example, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, how much water covered the core, or which quickly went off scale, as was the case with the radiation-monitoring equipment.67 The infamous PORV alarms were on a panel remote from the central console and facing away from the operators, and the indicator light on the control panel for the PORV was wired to show only what the valve had been “instructed” by the electrical system to do, not the valve’s actual position.68,69 This combination of circumstances misled the operators, who did not realize that the PORV had been open for 2 h and 19 min and that the plant had lost a critical amount of coolant. A year before the accident, a TMI-2 operator had informed Met Ed management about the problem: “The alarm system in the control room is so poorly designed that it contributes little in the analysis of a casualty. The other operators and myself have several suggestions on how to improve our alarm system-perhaps we can discuss them sometime, preferably before the system as it is causes severe problems”.70 The company made several improvements on TMI-1, but nothing had been done on TMI-2 at the time of the accident. Also the operators of the plant—despite having a rigorous background of working on nuclear submarines for the US Navy—had never been trained to understand all the plant parameters, and lacked theoretical knowledge of the operating principles of a pressurized water reactor.71 After the accident, the NRC concluded: “Not all utilities [in the United States had] either as large an engineering staff or executives with appropriate backgrounds to enable them to direct actual plant operations during emergencies… [Nevertheless,] we have concluded that the utility [Met Ed], in terms of technical capability, is as good as the median nuclear utility”.72 Investigators ruled out any deliberate withholding of information: “However, based on the evidence, we could not conclude that the causes of this breakdown in information flow went beyond confusion, poor communications, and a failure by those in the control room, including NRC and B&W employees, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, to comprehend or interpret the available information, a failing shared to some extent by offsite organizations as well. A number of factors other than deliberate attempts to downgrade the seriousness of the situation could have accounted for the failure of the control serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack crew to communicate critical information. The failure to recognize and act on significant data in our view demonstrates a lack of technical competency by site employees to diagnose and cope with an accident. Moreover, the inability of the utility’s management to comprehend the severity of the accident and communicate it to the NRC and the public was a serious failure of the company’s management. [Nevertheless,] there is no serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack to show willful withholding of information by Met Ed from NRC”.73

The NRC investigation also outlined the atmosphere among TMI-2 staff at the time of the accident: “3548o one appears to be theorizing about the cause of the increased radiation levels in the plant. No one postulates an uncovered core. If anyone is thinking such thoughts, he is keeping them to himself… Intellect tells them they don’t really know what is going on; ego tells them none of the rest of these guys do either; on the evidence, both are right… Understanding what is happening to the core itself will not come until much, much later”.74 Another important factor influencing the misreading of the situation by operators runtime error 440 automation error vb6 management at TMI-2 was a prevailing mindset about the impossibility of a meltdown on the plant: “[The] inability to recognize and comprehend the full significance of the information, and certain psychological factors: the difficulty of accepting a completely unexpected situation, the fear of believing that the situation was as bad as the instruments suggested, and a strong desire to focus on getting the reactor stable again rather than dwelling on the severity of the accident”.75 For example, TMI station manager Gary Miller testified that “I don’t believe in my mind I really believed the core had been totally uncovered, or uncovered to a substantial degree at that time”.76 According to the NRC investigation, during the first hours after the accident, Miller sent “Lead Instrumentation Control Engineer Ivan Porter down below the control room to take more instrument readings directly off the wires that lead to the incore thermocouples. Porter has his technicians take four or five initial readings. Several are too low to be believable, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, but at least two are above 2000 °F. The technicians express concern that the core is uncovered … [T]he technicians are taking dozens of additional readings. Many of them are far too high for comfort… Porter shrugs them off and returns upstairs to brief Miller. He tells Miller of the readings, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, but says he does not believe the high ones are accurateafter all, the low ones cannot be right… Apparently there was a lack of skepticism or a lack of willingness to believe the worst”.77,78

Misjudgments of the Status of TMI-2 Resulted in Misleading Information Being Given to External Audiences

These misjudgments of the plant status led the operators and management of TMI-2 to send misleading information to their supervisors at Met Ed and its parent company General Public Utility—who in their turn informed the NRC, the designers of the plant, federal, state and local government representatives and the general public about the unimportance of the accident. For instance, 5 h after the accident, around 20 engineers and managers from Babcock & Wilcox assembled in Lynchburg, Virginia, for a speaker-phone conference with the B&W representative at TMI, but the meeting was “…under the circumstances, a surprisingly placid gathering, marked by a dearth of information from the plant site. ‘B&W’s most prevalent feeling,’ according to one of the people present, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, ‘was we’re just in the dark’”.79 Their reaction—and that of other external audiences—would have been very different if TMI-2 staff had been able, during the first hours after the accident, to recognize the possible consequences of the PORV being open for several hours and the reactor core being uncovered (which raised the temperature within the reactor and damaged the fuel rods), evaluate the real cause of the radioactivity and hydrogen bubble, correctly deduce the possibility of a core meltdown and immediately inform their supervisors. This would have enabled prompt federal response measures to be taken—instead of which, about 4 h after the accident, Met Ed manager of communications services was telling the media that “[t]here was a problem with a feedwater pump. The plant is shut down. We’re working on it. There’s no danger off-site. No danger to the general public”.80

Misinformation About Real Condition of TMI-2 Led to Inadequate Crisis Response

These unwittingly inaccurate reports from TMI just postponed necessary action by external decision makers. It was only on the third day after the start of the accident that the possible meltdown of the reactor and the existence of a hydrogen bubble were officially confessed, in spite of the fact, shown in later investigations, that only 2 h into the accident at least a few of the reactor’s fuel rod claddings had ruptured and zirconium alloy had already reacted with the steam to generate hydrogen. Moreover, there was already severe damage to the reactor core 3-4 h from the start of the accident.81,82,83 The NRC concluded: “In sum, …the evidence failed to establish that Met Ed management or other personnel willfully withheld information from the NRC. There is no question that plant information conveyed from the control room to offsite organizations throughout the day was incomplete, in some instances delayed, and often colored by individual interpretations of plant status… Lack of understanding also affected the public’s perception of the accident because early reports indicated things were well in hand, but later reports indicated they were not. [Only on the third day after the accident started], when the continuing problems were generally recognized, the utility management and staff began effective action to obtain assistance, plan for contingencies, and direct daily plant operations to eliminate the hazards. The recovery effort was massive, involving hundreds of people and many organizations”.84,85 Thus it was only on the third day that General Public Utility executives began to ask for scientific and operational assistance from other utilities, reactor manufacturers, firms of architects and engineers, and national nuclear laboratories. And it was only on the afternoon of the fourth day that 30 people from 10 organizations of the Industry Advisory Group arrived at TMI-2 and started to blueprint solutions to the core-cooling problem.86

In its turn, the President’s commission declared that the NRC was not ready to conduct adequate response measures in such a situation: “[W]e are extremely critical of the role [the Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack played in the response to the accident… During the most critical phase of the accident, the NRC was working under extreme pressure in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The NRC staff was confronted with problems it had never analyzed before and for which it had no immediate solutions”.87 According to the NRC investigation: “They have no time to assess the situation themselves”.88 The inadequate NRC assessment of the plant’s status—based on information from the utility and mistakes serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack estimates of the hydrogen bubble size—led to correspondingly inadequate response measures: “On the first day of the accident, there was an attempt by the utility to minimize its significance, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, in spite of substantial evidence that it was serious. Later that week, NRC was the source of exaggerated stories. Due to misinformation, and in one case (the hydrogen bubble) through the commission of scientific errors, official sources would make statements about radiation already released… Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack response to the emergency was dominated by an atmosphere of almost total confusion. There was lack of communication at all levelsThe fact that too many individuals and organizations were not aware of the dimensions of serious accidents at nuclear power plants accounts for a great deal of the lack of preparedness and the poor quality of the response… Communications were so poor [more than 48 hours from the accident] that the senior management could not and did not develop a clear understanding of conditions at the site. As a result, an evacuation was recommended to the state by the NRC senior staff on the basis of fragmentary and partially erroneous information. … The President asked us to investigate whether the public’s right to information during the emergency was well served. Our conclusion is again in the negative”.89

The situation was aggravated by the fact that many decision makers were informed about the accident not by Met Ed managers or emergency agencies, but by media news representatives. An example of this is Paul Doutrich, at the time the mayor of Harrisburg—the state capital of Pennsylvania situated at about 15 km from TMI. He only found out about the accident when a radio station in Boston called him 5 h and fix 1723 java error after the beginning of the accident—despite the fact that a general emergency had been declared after 3 h and 24 min because of high radiation levels within the containment building: “They asked me what we were doing about the nuclear emergency. My response was, ‘What nuclear emergency?’ They said, ‘Well, at Three Mile Island.’ I said, ‘I know nothing about it’”.90 Around the same time, the NRC notified the White House about the event at Three Mile Island. Seven hours after the accident, Robert Reid—mayor of Middletown, a small city located near TMI—called the Met Ed headquarters in Reading, who assured him that there was no escape of radioactive particles; but 20 s later, when he turned on the radio, he heard that radioactive particles had been released. Around the same time, William Scranton, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Pennsylvania’s Lieutenant Governor, said in a briefing with press representatives that “The Metropolitan Edison Company has informed us that there has been an incident at Three Mile Island, Unit-2. Everything is under control. There is and was no danger to public health and safety… There was a small release of radiation to the environment. All safety equipment functioned properly”.91 The President’s Commission report described this incident: “While some company executives were acknowledging radiation readings off the Island, low-level public relations officials at Met Ed’s headquarters continued … to deny any off-site releases [8 hours after the accident]. It was an error in communications within Met Ed, one of several that would reduce the utility’s credibility with public officials and the press. ‘This was the first contradictory bit of information that we received and it caused some disturbance’… ‘I think they were defensive,’ Scranton told the Commission in his testimony”.92 Another such discrepancy on the third day after the accident showed that top management at Met Ed were still not coordinating the measures they were taking within their own organization: journalists were aware that the radioactivity released during the dumping of wastewater from TMI-2 into the Susquehanna River had been reported at 1200 millirems per hour, but Met Ed’s vice president for power generation was not. During the regular press briefing, the vice president revealed data referring to a radiation level of 300 to 350 millirems per hour. This provoked suspicion that Met Ed was trying to conceal the real radiation reading, but the vice president declared that he had not heard the number 1200 and let drop: “I don’t know why we need to tell you each and every thing that we do specifically”.93 Consequently the NRC concluded that: “The TMI accident was a first of a kind for the nuclear power industry. Neither the utility nor the NRC was prepared to cope with the public’s need for information. As a result, the residents around TMI were unduly confused and alarmed, and the level of anxiety nationwide about the safety of nuclear plants was unnecessarily raised. The information Met Ed and NRC provided to the news media during the course of the TMI accident was often inaccurate, incomplete, overly optimistic, or ultraconservative. Errors in judgment by Met Ed and NRC officials were major contributors to the inadequate public information effort at TMI… At the same time, the NRC failed to coordinate its internal flow of public information, resulting in speculative reports from Washington which conflicted with statements made by NRC to officials in Harrisburg. The NRC made the problem of conflicting reports even worse by refusing to participate in joint press conferences with the utility. The State’s public information effort, which relied almost entirely on information from Met Ed and later the NRC, suffered accordingly. While both the public information performance of Met Ed and the NRC can be faulted in many instances, we found no evidence that officials from either the utility or the regulatory agency willfully provided false information to the press or public”.94 According to a White House representative “many conflicting statements about TMI-2 reported by the news media were increasing public anxiety”.95

The invisibility of radiation also aggravated the perception of the accident by local residents: “Never before have serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack been asked to live with such ambiguity. The TMI accidentan accident we cannot see or taste or smell …is an accident that is invisible. I think the fact that it is invisible creates a sense of uncertainty and fright on the part of people that may well go beyond the reality of the accident itself ”.96 In addition, nationwide public nervousness during the accident was likely intensified by the Hollywood blockbuster “The China Syndrome”. The movie was introduced at cinemas all over the country 12 days before Three Mile Island, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. The plot was about an accident at a fictitious nuclear power plant near Los Angeles. In the film, the investigation that followed revealed massive cover-ups during construction of the plant, and deliberate attempts by the plant’s management to conceal facts from the public. Remarkably, in one scene of the movie, a physicist is trying to evaluate the possible consequences of a total reactor core meltdown, and says that “an area the size of Pennsylvania” would be permanently uninhabitable.97 Many of the 400 reporters who had arrived at TMI were under the influence of this movie, and assessed unintentionally misleading statements by Met Ed and the NRC as deliberate risk concealment. The President’s Commission also mentioned that “[a]nother severe problem was that even personnel representing the major national news media often did not have sufficient scientific and engineering background to understand thoroughly what they heard, and did not have available to them people to explain the information. This problem was most serious in the reporting of the various releases of radiation and the explanation of the severity (or lack of severity) of these releases… We therefore conclude that, while the extent of the coverage was justified, a combination of confusion and weakness in the sources of information and lack of understanding on the part of the media resulted in the public being poorly served… 3548either the utility nor the NRC nor the media were sufficiently prepared to serve the public well”.98

On the fifth day after the accident, when it became clear that the risk of a hydrogen explosion within the reactor vessel had been mitigated, US President Jimmy Carter—formerly a senior officer on a nuclear submarine—visited TMI-2. He tried to convince the public that the reactor was stable, but stated that certain actions may yet have to be taken to bring it to cold shutdown.99 And on the seventh day Dick Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania, announced: “The threat of any immediate catastrophe is over”.100

Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Why Risks Were Concealed
  • The US government and the NRC shared an interest in developing the domestic civil nuclear industry, as part of a larger program to ensure the energy independence of the country after the severe oil crises of 1973 and 1979. This led to a perception among industry executives that increasingthe production of electricity took priority over safety matters.

  • Wishful thinking/self-deception among decision makers, who persuaded themselves that minor accidents did not merit close scrutiny; that the probability of a multi-factor malfunction of hardware was marginal; that the influence of human factors on the operation of a reactor during an emergency was minimal; and that the worst-case scenario—meltdown or decapsulation of a reactor vessel—could never happen.

  • Government and the nuclear industry had weak control over the complex systems involved, and had only a fragmentary perception of the whole picture of risks. Key decision makers were ignorant of other accidents or near-miss cases within the organization or the wider industry, nationally or abroad.

  • There was no system for managing knowledge about risks within the industry (exchange, accumulation, systematization and transmission).

  • There was no industry-wide risk assessment system for timely evaluation of the condition of nuclear power plants. Both operators and management at TMI-2 misjudged the status of the plant, causing samsung spl-c error including corrupted data to give misleading information to other audiences and delaying the measures that needed to be taken to cool the reactor.

Bhopal Pesticide Plant Gas Leak (India, 1984)

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During the night between December 2 and 3, 1984, at the pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanide (MIC) and other gases ami bios error code 38 into the atmosphere. MIC is an intermediate in pesticide production processes and has an extremely toxic impact on human health. Over the days following the accident, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, from 3,000 to 10,000 citizens of Bhopal died, 100,000 were injured with irreversible changes in their health and more than 500,000 were exposed to toxic gases,101 out of a total population of around 850,000 residents. After the disaster, no measures were taken to clean up the site of the plant. Since 1984, contaminated soil and water sources around the plant have continued to affect the environment of Bhopal.102 Thirty years after the disaster, the death toll amounts to more than 15,000 victims of the lingering effects of MIC poisoning.103 In terms of casualty numbers, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, this makes Bhopal the second largest industrial accident in world history; the largest was the breach of the Banqiao and Shimantan Dams in Central China in 1975 due to Typhoon Nina, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, when 26,000 people according to official estimates—or 83,000 according to unofficial data—were killed by the destruction of the dams and ensuing floods; 145,000 perished in the following months from disease and famine.104,105

Risk Concealment Before the Disaster

In 1969, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, an American company, opened a pesticide plant in Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh state, India), serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. In the early years, the plant produced pesticides extracted from US-imported concentrate. However, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, system error 101 Indian government pushed UCC to organize a full-cycle chemical output at the Bhopal plant. They motivated UCC to hire, train and develop local staff for the management of the plant, and allowed it to own 50.9 % of its Indian branch (Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL)) while reserving less than 50 % for Indian businesses and local investors. This was an exception granted to UCC to the norm imposed at that time by the Indian government that it should own more than 50 % of the shares of any foreign investment.106 Such exception made Union Carbide Corporation with headquarters in the United States clearly responsible for all matters concerning the Indian plant. In 1979, UCIL launched production of an insecticide called carbaryl pesticide under the trademark SEVIN, using locally produced methyl isocyanide (MIC). UCC invested reluctantly in MIC production in India because the cost of local production exceeded US costs by a factor of 3 to 4. Due to severe droughts in India in 1977, 1982 and 1984, and the resulting decline in demand for pesticide from local farmers, the Bhopal plant became unprofitable (up to $4 M losses from 1980 to 1984). By 1982, the plant was working at just 50 % of its capacity, and by 1984 just 20 %.107

In spite of the fact that more than 20 Indian engineers were flown to the USA in 1978–1979 at the UCC’s West Virginia MIC plant to learn how to run the MIC process safely, there were at least five major chemical leaks—in which one worker died and close to 50 were injured—at the Bhopal plant between 1981 and 1984.108 Moreover, due to the policy of the Indian government to have 100 % replacement of all positions in industry by Indians, the last American engineer left the Bhopal plant by the end of 1982.109 From that time, the plant was operated only by Indian citizens and employed around 650 people. In 1982, UCC began to put pressure on the management of UCIL to reduce production costs, that resulted in decrease of morale at the plant: “There was widespread belief among employees that the management had taken drastic and imprudent measures to cut costs and that attention to details that ensure safe operation was absent”.110,111 UCIL started to extend the time between full safety checks from every 6 months to every 12 months and, instead of replacing rusted pipes by stainless pipes every 6 months, they replaced them by common steel pipes every 2 years.112 UCIL fired the best trained and most experienced (and therefore most highly paid) engineers and hired lower paid staff with little experience of working with dangerous chemicals and equipment (for instance, the chemical engineer, who was responsible for managing the MIC unit “resigned because he disapproved of falling safety standards” one year before the disaster and an electrical engineer replaced him113); and the length of training courses declined from 6 to 2 months.114 Thirty percent of the staff at the Bhopal plant were fired and, for several years, turnover of staff at the plant exceeded 80 %; by December 1984, only a negligible number of employees remained who had been trained in the United States on the original MIC unit.115,116 In sql server error 7969, the managers of UCIL decided to reduce the number of workers in every shift on the MIC unit: only one manager and six workers were required on a given shift in spite of UCC stating that they should keep three supervisors and twelve workers serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack each shift on the MIC unit.117 Despite these desperate attempts to economize, the SEVIN production plant remained unprofitable, and UCC had plans to sell the plant or disassemble it and ship it to Brazil and Indonesia.118 By the autumn of 1984, plant operators were ordered to produce SEVIN from the remaining stocks of chemicals in anticipation of the possible shutdown of the plant in the near future; the MIC production unit had been halted six weeks prior to the incident. As a result, the plant accumulated a large amount of MIC in its tankers: stocks of this lethal chemical reached 62 tons, of which only 3–4 tons were required daily for production of SEVIN. It was in contravention of common practice in the chemical industry, which is to “always keep only a strict minimum of dangerous materials on site”.119 Due to cost cuts on refrigeration, the MIC mixture began to be stored at the plant at temperatures of nearly 20 °C, while technical requirements for the mixture required it to be stored below 5 °C in order to avoid uncontrolled reactions. At the same time, plant managers had updated the settings of temperature alarm activation, so that operators did not receive early warnings of the temperature rise in the MIC tanks.120 To make matters worse, on 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi, the 3rd Prime Minister of India, was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards—and during the massive social riots that followed, the plant could not safely produce SEVIN from its tremendous stocks of MIC. In November 1984, the Indian government announced nearly two weeks of national mourning and brought in a curfew to stop communal and religious violence in the country. Consequently, workers on the second and third shifts at the Bhopal plant had trouble fulfilling their duties and production of SEVIN from existing MIC stocks was slow.121

For many years, Bhopal was considered an attractive place to get a serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and many poor people from the countryside moved to the city and seized empty land to build slums. The population of Bhopal increased from 300,000 at the end of the 1960s to 900,000 in the mid 1980s.122 Local authorities were reluctant to fight illegal land grabbing and construction and, as a result, shantytowns built up around the plant. During an inspection of the plant in 1979, UCC engineers emphasized that their Indian colleagues should build a complex contingency plan to respond to a possible leak, however small, of hazardous MIC. UCIL managers said that there was a contingency plan but, as the investigation following the 1984 disaster revealed, the city and state governments were not aware of any such plans.123 In spite of the possible threat of MIC to human health, and a series of MIC-related accidents, management at the Bhopal plant never informed the authorities about these risks to the city. However, plant workers complained several times to serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack government of the Madhya Pradesh state about poor safety conditions on the plant, but the resulting inspections did not lead to a halt in production at the plant, because the involved state government representatives had insufficient technical experience of the chemical industry.124

In 1982, UCC again sent American engineers to inspect the plant at Bhopal. They found many shortcomings in the safety system and recommended UCIL to fix them. During the following years, UCIL was sending reassuring reports to UCC about safety measures, but some of these were either temporary or were serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack fully implemented across the plant.125 Meanwhile, risk concealment was also shown to have happened at UCC’s operations back in the U.S. Indeed, 67 leakage events occurred in the West Virginia MIC plant between 1980 and 1984.126 In September serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, UCC engineers reported the following to UCC management in a survey on operational safety and health: “There is a concern that a runaway reaction could occur in serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of the MIC unit storage tanks and that response to such a situation would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tank”—but investigators could not find any proof that this information was transmitted to the Bhopal plant, where the design of the MIC unit was similar to that at the West Virginia plant.127,128

On December 2, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, 1984, the plant and MIC unit were manned by incompetent staff. The safety systems installed were inadequate in the face of the existing amount of dangerous materials (more than 60 tons of MIC). Poor and low-cost maintenance over years had led to the progressive destruction of the integrity of the plant production system. There are two theories129 about the origin of the disaster: the first holds that water poured into MIC tanks serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack to the operation of washing pipes. The second states that there was sabotage among Indian staff for unknown reasons. Either way, a significant amount of water poured into a tank of MIC and ignited a powerful chemical reaction. After hours of unskilled attempts by the operators to control the reaction, approximately 40 tons of Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack were released into the atmosphere of Bhopal.

Risk Concealment After the Disaster

The tremendous number of casualties at Bhopal was caused by a lack of transmission by the plant management of the information concerning the MIC leakage to local authorities and UCC headquarters.

Water was introduced in the E610 Network error 603 tank at 10 p.m. on December 2, 1984 and the reaction started, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. By 0:50 a.m, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. on December 3, the operators understood that they could not control this leakage, and fled the plant. Earlier, at 0:30 a.m., they serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack on a large siren which was heard outside the plant, but soon turned it off. When operational staff left the plant, a low-power siren was turned on, which could only be heard within the plant area.130 Before the disaster, “alarms at the plant sounded so often (the siren went off twenty to thirty times a week for various purposes) that an actual alert could not be distinguished from routine events or practice alerts”.131 None of the plant executives informed local authorities about the accident. Moreover, when the police began to receive hundreds of phone calls from Bhopal residents about a strange gas, bouts of coughing and people lying unconscious on the streets, the plant operators continued to reassure local police that “Everything is OK ” and “We do not know what [is happening]”. The plant manager flatly denied any leakage there: “The gas leak just can’t be from my plant”.132 This all resulted in a situation in which local serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, police tls error tls handshake failed the military stalled the evacuation of local residents. Unbelievably, the authorities had never expected to evacuate people because nobody thought that the plant was a hazardous operation: the management of the plant never revealed the risks of MIC. Moreover, according to the Madhya Pradesh Town and Country Planning Board, the plant was classified in the “general industry” rather than in the “hazardous industry” category.133

The second cause of mass mortality at Bhopal was the fact that medical institutes were unprepared for a large influx of patients. This city of almost a million people had only 5 hospitals, with 1800 hospital beds and 300 doctors, who were never trained to serve patients with chemical poisoning. Before the accident, UCIL did not provide rail co il errors 404 he recommendations about medical treatment appropriate to the list of chemicals in use at the plant, and afterwards they declined to reveal the composition of the leaked gas.134 This led to a complete absence of adequate treatment for the thousands of victims. Moreover, according to a statement by UCC executives in the United States, the first—still contradictory—information about the disaster reached headquarters more than 12 h after the accident.135 By 8 a.m. on December 3, 1984, managers at the plant had been arrested by the local police, and UCC did not have top-level contacts within Bhopal to get reliable information about the accident. In addition, communication between UCC and the Bhopal plant and authorities became complicated by the insufficient capacity of the existing telephone network (a city of nearly a million people had only 10,000 numbers in the telephone network). All together, this led to the absence of detailed information about the accident reaching UCC executives, and consequently to a shortage of clear and strict recommendations about antidotes from UCC’s advanced medical service to hospitals in Bhopal in the first few critical hours after the leak.

In addition, Bhopal also lacked the infrastructure and ground level preparation for an adequate and fast evacuation: there were no channels for the transmission of public information (e.g. networks of loudspeakers); 80 % of the people affected by the accident had an income of less than US$6 per month (half of the Indian subsistence level)136 and could not even afford to have a radio receiver; and only a small number of residents had access to electricity, so most had no stable reception of radio or TV. In October 1982, after major MIC leaks, the labor union published a leaflet about possible threats to people from the plant to Bhopal, but the majority of slum residents could not understand the message and ignored it due to illiteracy. Nevertheless, due to the existence of a series of minor incidents on the plant over the preceding years, word-of-mouth communication has informed the residents of the slums of the potential danger posed by the plant and they understood the necessity to run away from the plant in case of emergency. But nobody had anticipated the magnitude of the potential disaster,137 which occurred in December 1984, when the leaked chemicals covered almost the whole city of Bhopal.

After the accident the Indian government paid only US$800 to relatives of the deceased, and just $100 to the 20,000 victims who developed chronic diseases because of the disaster.138 Moreover, in 1989, out-of-court agreements on compensation between the Indian government and the mother company Union Carbide Corporation stipulated a payment of just US$470 million139; the majority of this serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack did not even reach the victims of the disaster. It took until 2010, that is 26 years after the disaster, for seven UCIL employees to be convicted by Indian courts, each receiving a two-year prison sentence and a fine of about US$2000.140

Bhopal Pesticide Plant Gas Leak: Why Risks Were Concealed
  • The Indian government’s desire to reach national industrial independence, and its negligence to reveal details of deliberate violations of safety rules at the plant. The lack of experience or qualifications of government representatives, which did not allow them to recognize the disastrous state of the plant years before the accident. In addition, without sufficient control by the parent corporation over Union Carbide India Limited, management at the plant could manipulate data about real conditions at the plant without fear to be punished by representatives of Union Carbide Corporation and Indian authorities.

  • The desire of Indian managers to appear in a good light in the eyes of Union Carbide Corporation executives motivated them to play down the existence of massive safety imperfections at the plant.

  • The chronic unprofitability of the Bhopal plant, and reluctance of plant managers to reveal the risks involved to local authorities that would likely oblige them to incur additional expense on safety measures, or to suffer from increased wages to reward employees for hazardous work that would be known as such, or to support the costs for relocating the shantytowns, and so on.

  • The reluctance of Union Carbide Corporation executives to reveal statistics of accidents at the West Virginia MIC plant, and the extreme danger posed by MIC, to their international subdivisions.

  • False reassurance/self-suggestion/self-deception among American and Indian executives about the maximum possible scale of any chemical accident at the plant.

  • The absence of a prompt risk assessment system: nobody among the managers of the plant could evaluate the possible volume of the chemical release or the direction of its movement, nor could they provide recommendations regarding antidotes, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack the residents of Bhopal should respond, and so on.

Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster (USA, 1986)

You don’t concentrate on risks. You concentrate on results.

No risk is too great to prevent the necessary job from getting done

Chuck Yeager

On January 28, 1986 at 11:39 a.m., the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded in the second minute after lift-off from the Kennedy Space Center. This resulted in the deaths of all seven astronauts.

Risk Concealment Before the Disaster

Constant Struggle Within the US Space Shuttle Program to Increase the Launch Frequency and Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack US Government Financing Shortages

The US Space Shuttle program began in 1972. It was based on the idea that a reusable space shuttle system could make regular civil space launches possible, with the goal to achieve 24 flights per year.141 Expenditure would be reduced by reusing the Shuttles and by having more frequent launches through economies of scale, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Over the following 30 years, 135 Shuttle were launched at a total cost of US$192 billion142—or around US$1.5 billion per launch in 2010 prices—and the annual launch rate did not exceed 4.5 flights per year. The Space Shuttle Program has been NASA’s single most expensive activity.143 Compared with unmanned space cargo programs, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, the cost of one kilogram of the Shuttle’s payload exceeded the payload of existing programs by a factor between 2 and 10.144,145,146 High usage rates were critical to the Shuttle’s economy because its huge development costs needed to be recouped within a reasonable amount of time.147 For example, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, in 1976, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, NASA anticipated 49 flights in 1984 and 58 in 1985.148 In contrast, in 1981 there were two launches, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, in 1982 three, in 1983 four, in 1984 five, and in 1985 nine (which is the record in the history of the Shuttle program). In 1985, NASA published a projection of about 24 flights per year by 1990. There were 14 flights scheduled for 1986.149 The Space Shuttle flights were manned, imposing on the engineers of the Shuttle to improve its reliability, at the cost of expansive additional safety systems. As a result, launches were permanently delayed (“Manpower limitations due to high workload created scheduling difficulties and contributed to operational problems150). From the beginning of the program, underestimation of the cost of launches and the irregularity of flights became major managerial problems for NASA executives.

The initial plan implied developing towards self-sufficiency, but during program development, it became clear that NASA would always rely on Congress and government spending. The design of the Shuttle’s solid rocket boosters was primarily based on the U.S. Air Force’s Titan III solid rocket.151 In 1983, Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative—ground-based and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by Soviet strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. On August 28, 1985, a Titan 34D rocket laden with military equipment exploded after take-off from the Vandenberg Air Force Base. This gave NASA additional leverage to convince Congress that the shuttle transportation system could deliver military staff and equipment, including components of the Strategic Defense Initiative program, to orbit in any conditions. Accordingly, NASA requested that military funding for developing the Titan IV program—US$17.6 billion was to be spent for this purpose up to 1999152—should be transferred to NASA. Ultimately, “the nation’s reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate”.153

Because of this, NASA executives could not accept cancellations or serious delays of Shuttle flights due to weather conditions or minor technical problems. Such confidence was based on the statistics of previous flights and the false perception that the probability of Shuttle failure was extremely low. By January 1986, NASA management interpreted the previous 24 successful Shuttle launches as a transition of the space shuttle program from the experimental phase to the operational phase, which meant that the Shuttle’s design was now proven to be adequate for serial launches.

Masterful Encapsulation of the Problem

Richard Feynman, American theoretical physicist, participant in the Manhattan Project to develop an American atomic bomb, Nobel Prize laureate in Physics and member of The Rogers Commission Report, which was created to investigate the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, wrote after the disaster what can be considered as an authoritative last word: “There are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement? Since 1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, we could properly ask ‘What is the cause of management’s fantastic faith in the machinery?An estimate of the reliability of solid rockets was made by the range safety officer, based on the study of all previous rocket flights. Out of a total of nearly 2,900 flights, 121 failed (1 in 25). This includes, however, what may be called early errors, rockets flown for the first few times in which design errors are discovered and fixed. A more reasonable figure for the mature rockets might be 1 in 50. With special care in the selection of parts and in the inspection process, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, a figure of below 1 in 100 might be achieved but 1 in 1000 is probably not attainable with today’s technology. Since there are two rockets on the Shuttle, these rocket failure rates must be doubled to derive the Shuttle failure rates from the Solid Rocket Booster failure rate… Engineers at Rocketdyne, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, the manufacturer, estimate the total probability as 1/10,000. Engineers at Marshal estimate it as 1/300, while NASA management, to whom these engineers report, claims it is 1/100,000. An independent engineer consulting for NASA thought 1 or 2 per 100 to be a reasonable estimate. NASA officials argued that the figure is much lower. They point out that these figures are for unmanned rockets but since the Shuttle is a manned vehicle ‘the probability of mission success is necessarily very close to 1.0.’ It is not very clear what this phrase means. Does it mean it is close to 1 or that it ought to be close to 1? They go on to explain ‘Historically, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack extremely high degree of mission success has given rise to a difference in philosophy between manned space flight programs and unmanned programs; i.e., numerical probability usage versus engineering judgment’. It is true that, if the probability of failure was as low as 1 in 100,000, it would take an inordinate number of tests to determine it. Official management … claims to believe the probability of failure is a thousand times less [the engineers’ estimation of 1 in 100]. One reason for this may be an attempt to assure the government of NASA perfection and success in order to ensure the supply of funds. The other may be that they sincerely believed it to range check error reasons true, demonstrating an almost incredible lack of communication between themselves and their working engineers… The astronauts, like test pilots, should know their risks”.154

Problems of Timely Launching of Space Shuttles in 1985–1986

The 25th launch of the Shuttle (STS-51-L mission, Challenger) had been planned for July 1985. It was postponed until late November to accommodate changes in payloads. The launch was subsequently delayed again and finally was rescheduled to January 22, 1986.155 However, due to problems with weather conditions (bad weather at transoceanic abort landing sites and unacceptable weather at the Kennedy Space Center itself156), the launch was rescheduled for the morning of January 28, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, 1986. However, a major cause of delay to the STS-51-L mission was the delay of the previous mission (STS-61-C, Columbia), which launched only on January 12, 1986, after one month and 7 delays caused by a series of technical problems. During this month, journalists based at the Kennedy Space Center published critical and negative serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack about NASA’s ability to manage technical aspects of the Shuttle and launch schedule (the STS-61-C mission was sarcastically called “Mission Impossible157). For the next mission (STS-51-L, Challenger), more than 500 journalists were accredited to cover the launch from the Kennedy Space Center and Johnson Space Center in Houston. After several delays to the new mission, the media continued to ridicule NASA capabilities to adhere strictly to the schedule. Moreover, the delays meant that the STS-51-L mission could miss opportunities serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack reach the target orbit for the correct deployment of satellites.158

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Outdoor Temperature and O-Rings Problems

Weather forecasts for the night before the Challenger launch and early morning of January 28, 1986 predicted favorable conditions. However, engineers at Morton Thiokol Inc. (MTI), the main supplier of solid rocket boosters to NASA’s Shuttle program and USAF’s Titan rocket family, were alarmed by one detail: extremely cold weather was predicted for Florida, dropping to minus 6.6 °C (20 °F) in the last 11 h before the launch.159 Indeed, previous successful lift-offs all occurred at temperatures above +11.5 °C (53 °F). This low temperature of +11.5 °C (53 °F) was registered during the launch of mission STS-51-C (Discovery) on January 24, 1985. After this mission, the solid rocket boosters were salvaged from the Atlantic Ocean and Roger Boisjoly, one of the senior engineers on the MTI team, found out that the O-rings, which sealed the hot gases inside the combustion chambers of the solid rocket boosters while firing, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, were damaged. The O-rings were among 700 parts included on the “Critical 1” list. Of the 2 million components comprising the Shuttle, a failure of any one of the parts on this list would result in the loss of the spacecraft and/or crew. Boisjoly concluded that the main cause of damage to the O-rings was the low temperature on the day of the launch: +11.5 °C (53 °F). The rings had excellent resistance to high temperatures up to 327 °C (621 °F),160 but lose their flexibility in cold conditions. The manufacturer of the O-rings expected that the product would retain resilience below −3.8 °C (25 °F), but there were no practical tests of O-rings on MTI solid rocket boosters in cold temperature conditions. In view of this and other factors, the recommended temperature range for the entire Shuttle launch was between +0.5 °C (31 °F) and +37.2 °C (99 °F).161 Some erosion of the O-rings was recorded during the 51-B mission (29 April, 1985, Challenger).

After the launches, MTI formally mentioned some problems with the rings in a report to NASA, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, but no action was taken. In July 1985, Boisjoly sent an internal report to MTI executives about his concerns about the need for an immediate redesign of the solid rocket boosters, but received an informal reply from a top MTI manager that “this material is too sensitive to release to anybody. We will keep it a secret”.162 Professor Leveson from MIT stated “schedule and launch pressures in the Shuttle program created a mindset that dismissed all concerns, leading to overconfidence and complacency. This serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of culture can be described as a culture of denial where risk assessment is unrealistic and credible risks and warnings are dismissed without appropriate investigation. Managers begin to listen only to those who provide confirming evidence that supports what they want to hear. Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealing the joints to be touched by hot gases during motor ignition, much less 1001 error reporting be partially burned. However, as tests and then flights confirmed damage to the sealing rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol was to increase the amount of damage considered ‘acceptable’”.163

In fact, the problem of the O-rings was known from 1977,164,165 but “NASA and contractor management first failed to recognize it as a problem, then failed to fix it and finally treated it as an acceptable flight risk. [MTI] did not accept the implication of tests early in the program that the design had a serious and unanticipated flaw. [NASA executives]did not accept the judgment of its engineers that the design was unacceptable and, as the joint problems grew in number and severity, NASA minimized them in management briefings and reports. [MTI also stated that]the condition is not desirable but is acceptable”.166 NASA executives were not informed in detail about the seriousness of the problem with solid rocket boosters during cold weather launches before January 27, 1986.167 On the day before the launch of Challenger, during conference calls with NASA, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Boisjoly tried to convince MTI executives and NASA managers to cancel the flight until the temperature on the launch pad at the Kennedy Space Center reached at least +11.5 °C (53 °F) when all of the solid rocket boosters would be defrosted. He demonstrated that damage had occurred to the material of the O-rings during flights in January and April 1985. Although the STS-61C mission (January 12, 1986, Columbia) was launched at temperatures lower than +5 °C (41 °F), MTI engineers did not provide any information concerning a possible erosion of the O-rings during the conference calls.168 NASA executives exclaimed that they were “appalled at the given recommendations”, that “we can’t launch, we won’t be able to launch until April169 and argued that the evidence was “incomplete”.170 Nevertheless, NASA officials emphasized that they would “not agree to launch against the contractor’s recommendation”.171 After NASA’s comments, MTI managers organized a caucus for intensive discussion about the final video no video lineage error regarding the launch, during which one executive proposed to one of the skeptical managers: “It is time to take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat”.172 Ultimately, MTI executives approved the launch with the following comments: “(1) there is a substantial margin to erode the primary O-ring by a factor of three times the previous worst case, and (2) even if the primary O-ring does not seal, the secondary is in position and will”.173 NASA managers were satisfied with this decision from the contractor. In their turn, they informed their superiors (Levels I and II program officials and the Launch Director for 51-L) that the issue had been resolved and MTI did not have objections for the launch.

The next day, the Shuttle Challenger exploded in the 72nd second after lift-off. Hot gases from the combustion chambers had leaked through a breach, created by tremendous pressure—from 900 to 1200 psi (pounds per square inch) or 62 to 87 bars—on the frosted and stiff O-rings. The temperature at the launch pad during serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack launch was +2.2 °C (36 °F).174,175

Disclosure of Continual Flawed Decision-Making Processes Within the Program

After the disaster, the Roger Commission stated…“that testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers… Organizational response to the technical problem was characterized by poor communication, inadequate information handling, faulty technical decision making, and failure to comply with regulations instituted to assure safety”.176 The Commission found that NASA’s safety system had many faults, including “a lack of problem reporting requirements, inadequate trend analysis, misrepresentation of criticality, and lack of involvement in critical discussions… Problem reporting requirements are not concise and fail to get critical information to the proper levels of management”.177The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit [11.5 °C] and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position… If the decision makers [Levels I and II program officials, or Launch Director for 51-L] had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986”.178

Boisjoly declared during the commission testimony: “I felt personally that management was under a lot of pressure to launch and that they made a very tough decision, but I didn’t agree with it”.179 Twenty years later, Boisjoly stated that “I must emphasize that MTI Management fully supported the original decision to not launch below 53 °F [11.5 °C] prior to the caucus. The caucus constituted the unethical decision-making forum resulting from intense customer intimidation. NASA placed MTI in the position of proving that it was not safe to fly instead of proving that it was safe to fly. Also, note that NASA immediately accepted the new decision to launch because it was consistent with their desires and, please note, that no probing questions were asked”.180 The Commission concluded that “the Thiokol Management reversed its position and recommended the launch of 51-L, at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major customer”.181

Richard Feynman finally found out about the O-ring problem, about which NASA managers had known since 1977: “If all the seals had leaked, it would have been obvious even to NASA that the problem was serious. But only a few of the seals leaked on only some of the flights. So NASA had developed a peculiar kind of attitude: if one of the seals leaks a little and the flight is successful, the problem isn’t so serious… Mr. Weeks said there was a rumor that the history of the seals’ problem was being leaked to the newspapers. That bothered him a little bit, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, because it made NASA look like it was trying to keep things secret… We had our emergency closed meeting to hear from the guy whose story was in the New York Times. His name was Mr. Cook. He was in the budget department of NASA when he was asked to look into a possible seals problem and to estimate the costs needed to serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack it. By talking to the engineers, he found out that the seals had been a big problem for a long time. So he reported that it would cost so-and-so much to fix it – a lot of money. From the point of view of the press and some of the commissioners, Mr. Cook’s story sounded like a big expose, as if NASA was hiding the seals problem from us”.182

The commission summarized major organizational problems related to the accelerated launch schedule, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. We here select a few that are relevant to our discussion183:

  • 1. The capabilities of the system were stretched to the limit to support the flight rate in winter 1985/1986. Projections into the spring and summer of 1986 showed a clear trend; the system, as it existed, would have been unable to deliver crew training software for scheduled flights by the designated dates. The result would have been an unacceptable compression of the time available for the crews to accomplish their required training.

  • 2. Spare parts are in critically short supply. The Shuttle program made a conscious decision to postpone spare parts procurements in favor of budget items of perceived higher priority. Lack of spare parts would likely have limited flight operations in 1986…

  • 3. The scheduled flight rate did not accurately reflect the capabilities and resources

  • 4. Training simulators may be the limiting factor on the flight rate: the two current simulators cannot train crews for more than 1215 flights per year.

  • 5. When flights come in rapid succession, current requirements do not ensure that critical anomalies occurring during one flight are identified and addressed appropriately before the next flight”.

During hearings before the US Congress Committee on Science and Technology, one committee member made the following assessment of NASA’s organizational culture prior to the disaster: “[O]ne difficult question is this whole attitude, this whole new culture that grew up in NASA and perhaps in the Marshall Center, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack culture that has been called arrogance, conceit that they knew it all; they didn’t need to include in the information circle outside experts. They didn’t need to listen to the Rockwell fears, expressed fears of the subzero temperatures. They pressured Morton Thiokol not to bother with a lot of chintzy concerns about safety. They excluded the astronauts themselves from the information circle. They had the feeling that they knew it all and didn’t need any outside information. They didn’t want anything to interfere with the schedule… [B]oth management and technical arrogance brought about by the mindset caused by a period of spectacular successes. We in Congress, as well as NASA and the aerospace industry, must never again be lulled into a sense of overconfidence that could contribute to such a tragedy. While history does not repeat itself, unfortunately people can repeat history”.184

In August 1990, the U.S, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. General Accounting Office mentioned that “NASA and the Air Force provide the majority of the contract dollars for the Thiokol Corporation [renamed Morton Thiokol Inc.]… Based on our interviews with Air Force and NASA officials, our study indicates that Thiokol will remain a viable part of the defense industrial base [Thiokol Corporation was also the manufacturer of the boosters for American ballistic missiles with nuclear warheadsPershing, Peacekeeper/Trident, Poseidon, Minuteman185]… Air Force and NASA officials said that it really is not economically feasible to keep two sources in operation for these items… [Therefore] [p]urchases of Thiokol’s solid rocket motors are planned through 1995 and beyond”.186

Ultimately, the combination of these facts explains the passive position of MTI management when, in July 1985, Boisjoly sent the report about shortcomings in the O-ring design. MTI executives realized that the budget of NASA and the available time were insufficient for serious improvement of the scores of solid rocket boosters that were already ordered—after the accident, it indeed took 32 months to redesign the solid rocket boosters.187 It thus seemed impossible for NASA and MTI to halt the program and confess that there had been flaws in the design of the O-rings during many years before the first launch of the Shuttle in 1981. Moreover, NASA and MTI have been concealing this information from astronauts, the government and the public during two dozen launches, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. NASA was the major client for MTI with more than a billion dollar contract each year, and MTI management wished to maintain its contract. This explains why MTI management made the decision, in compliance with NASA requests, to keep the cost of launches down and to minimize delays, the later being interpreted by the media and politicians as due to technical shortcomings of the whole Shuttle program; NASA was anxious to demonstrate to Congress that the Shuttle could fly in any conditions with military staff and materials.

Because of the disaster, the USAF got resources from Congress to develop its Titan IV program, delivering military staff into space independently from the Shuttle program. After the disaster, MTI admitted guilt and legal liability for the disaster, paid out-of-court compensation to the families of astronauts, thus diverting the blame from NASA management… and received lucrative new contracts from NASA and USAF for the decades to come. After the commission hearing, whistleblower Roger Boisjoly found himself shunned by colleagues and managers of MTI and resigned from the company.188

Richard Feynman summed it up as follows: “Let us make recommendations to ensure that NASA officials deal in a world of reality in understanding technological weaknesses and imperfections well enough to be actively trying to eliminate them. They must live in reality in comparing the costs and utility of the Shuttle to other methods of entering space. And they must be realistic in making contracts, in estimating costs, and the difficulty of the projects. Only realistic flight schedules should be proposed, schedules that have a reasonable chance of being met, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled”.189

Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster: Why Risks Were Concealed
  • Unrealistic projections about the launch schedule and a culture of continuously rushed organization. NASA management’s desire to demonstrate to Congress and the military that the Shuttle program could send any load to space in any weather conditions on a timely basis.

  • Habituation/wishful thinking/false reassurance/self-suggestion/self-deception among NASA and MTI decision-makers about the supposedly minuscule probability of a failure of the Shuttle. This also led to an attitude of arrogance among NASA executives.

  • MTI management’s fear of losing their main client (NASA). General problem of incentives in risk management: if MTI had remained adamant and advised against the flight, how would the “success” of no disaster resulting from the flight cancellation be rewarded?

  • The reluctance of MTI management to confess their own mistakes in the design of solid rocket boosters and in ignoring previous warnings (damage to the O-rings during previous launches).

  • “Success at any price” and “no bad news” culture

  • MTI management’s fear of being accused of incompetence. This question was also connected to national security secrecy because MTI was the supplier of solid rocket boosters for several American ballistic missiles.

Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster (USSR, 1986)

Although the Soviet socialist press blamed serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack and their dangerous and irresponsible working practices during the Bhopal accident, the Soviet nuclear industry and top officials did not implement the evacuation lessons learned from this American-Indian disaster in their own practice—and it was not long before the USSR faced quite a similar event. Previously, Soviet nuclear industry executives had not recognized any parallels between the situation within serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack industry and the American problems revealed during the Three Mile Island accident: insufficient exchange of risk information about incidents and near-miss cases, ignorance of the importance of the human factor in operating a nuclear power plant (NPP), self-deception about the overall reliability of reactors in any situation, and overconfidence about the impossibility of a worst-case scenario actually happening.

On April 26, 1986 at 1:23 a.m., during an experiment with the emergency power supply system at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, a power excursion occurred in the RBMK-1000 Reactor #4 that led the reactor to burn uncontrollably. The plant was located in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which at the time was part of the Soviet Union. It was 700 km away from Moscow, 320 km from Minsk, and 140 km from Kiev. Because the reactor did not have a containment dome, the explosion led to the release into the atmosphere of 7.7 tons of uranium oxide fuel, amounting to 4 % of the total contained in the reactor; 96 % of the fuel, or 185 tons of uranium, stayed in the reactor.190 Huge regions of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine were contaminated,191 and traces of chemical elements from Chernobyl NPP were later found in Northern and Western Europe. The accident resulted in the release of approximately 5200 PBq (1 PBq (Penta Becquerels) = 1015 disintegrations per second)192 of radioactive substances into the atmosphere.193 This was the first accident since the beginning of the nuclear age to be classified as a level 7 event—the maximum level according to the International Nuclear Event Scale. More than 116,000 people were evacuated from the 30 km zone around the NPP.194 Two workers died after the explosion, and 28 firefighters died in the first three months following the accident. Estimates from various sources of the total number of victims of the Chernobyl accident remain contradictory because of political indecisiveness, different scientific approaches and the unavailability of health statistics from Soviet officials. In 2005, the UN report “Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts” contained a statement from an international team of more than 100 scientists that up to about 4000 people could eventually die of radiation from the Chernobyl NPP accident.195

The financial cost of the Chernobyl disaster remains controversial too. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1985 until 1991, cited that the Soviet Union spent 18 billion rubles196 (approximately US$27 billion197) on dealing with the consequences of the disaster. The government budget of the USSR was around 360 billion rubles from 1985–1987,198 and the GNP in that period was around 780–800 billion rubles; so the expenses for the response to Chernobyl were 5 % of the annual Soviet budget, or approximately 2 % of GNP. According to estimates from academician Valery Legasov, a key member of the government investigation committee on the Chernobyl disaster, the total damage caused by the Chernobyl accident was in fact 300 billion rubles in pre-1990 prices, or approximately US$450 billion (of 1990 US$). This amount exceeds the combined profits of all Soviet nuclear power plants for the duration of their existence.199

In a nutshell, the Chernobyl disaster is the combination of (i) a fundamental design mistake on the class of RBMK reactors (leading to instabilities in certain conditions) that were hidden due to a culture of secrecy and arrogance, and (ii) bypassing safety rules due to structural lack of communication between competent agencies as well as amateurship actions of the Chernobyl staff who switched off all alarms during a standard feasibility test.

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Risk Concealment Before the Disaster

Geopolitical Context and the Civil Nuclear Program Race

There was constant competition for innovation between the Soviet Union and the Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, which manifested clearly in the development of nuclear weaponry and in space exploration. At the turn of the 1970s, the competition began in civil nuclear power. By 1972, the USSR was behind the USA and United Kingdom, which had constructed more than 50 reactors between them, while the Soviet Union had only 7.200 The Soviet Union had not tried to develop nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s, because the assumption within the powerful Soviet Planning Commission was that coal from the Donbass—the Donetsk coal basin, located in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic—could provide enough energy for the Western part of the USSR. But double-digit industrial growth and massive construction of civil infrastructure in the runtime error 1004 odbc and 1970s provoked energy shortage within the western part of the Union, and new calculations showed that the Donbass would not have sufficient coal resources for long-term supply. Although the Soviet Union had access to massive coal deposits, these were located serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack the Ural Mountains and would therefore put huge pressure on the railways to transport coal to plants in the western part of the Union. One promising strategy to solve growing energy needs was the intensive development of civil nuclear energy in the heavily populated and highly industrialized western part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, after the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the price of oil increased by a factor 2.5 in serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack months, from US$4.90/barrel [US$22 in 2010 prices] to US$12 [US$53 in 2010 prices].201 Oil exports from the gigantic oil and gas fields recently discovered in Western Siberia became very profitable for the USSR, because production costs there were very low, at only US$0.80 per barrel [US$3.50 in 2010 prices].202 The export of hydrocarbons, principally oil, greatly increased the Soviet budget; so it was logical to focus on raising export revenue by reducing domestic oil and gas consumption for domestic electricity in parallel with large scale development of nuclear power plants for domestic uses. Nuclear power compares very favorably: burning just one ton of natural uranium oxide produces the energy equivalent of 16,000 tons of coal or 80,000 barrels of oil.203

The Politburo (the executive committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) decided to invite the leading developers of the Soviet nuclear weapon (which worked within The Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine Building (Minsredmash)), to work on designing and building a new high-capacity reactor. Academician Anatoly Alexandrov, director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (subordinated to Minsredmash), which had researched the theoretical physics underlying the Soviet nuclear weapon program, was appointed as the scientific director of the new civil reactor project. Academician Alexandrov personally took part in the development of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet, nuclear icebreakers and the civil Water-Water Energetic Reactor (VVER), a successful Soviet variant of the Western pressurized water reactor. Around 80 % of all operating civil nuclear reactors in the world are light water reactors: either pressurized water reactors (PWRs) or boiling water reactors (BWRs).204 An immensely respected scientist, he was president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR from 1975 until 1986.

Strengths and challenges during the development of RBMK reactor

The chief design engineer of the new reactor was Nikolay Dollezhal, another respected member of the Academy and director of the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET), which was responsible for the design of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet, the first Soviet uranium-graphite channel water-cooled reactors and the VVER reactor. Academician Dollezhal recounted the history of the development of the new reactor—the high power channel reactor or RBMK, a water-cooled uranium-graphite channel reactor: “In 1965, the design [of the RBMK] was sent to the Ministry. There were supporters and opponents of the reactor. The opponents considered that only VVERs should be developedIn the construction of [RBMK], we could use cooperative ties between [existing] machinery plants, which were developed during the manufacture of the first industrial reactors [technologically speaking, RBMK reactors were an enlarged version of an existing military reactor developed for production of plutonium; so their construction required minimal restructuring of existing machinery plants, and RBMKs could use cheap natural uranium, while western analogs require more expensive enriched uranium]… It would allow us to cope with the task [of constructing each RBMK] in 56 years. As is known, the Americans construct large shell-type reactors [like PWRs and BWRs, which require sophisticated technological skills to manufacture the reactor vessel, which works under tremendous internal pressure] over 810 years; we [the Soviets] simply did not have the experience [to manufacture large reactors of this type], although we have a shell-type reactor of small capacity at Novovoronezhskay NPP… [The RBMK] did not require anything that would have been too far from the normal, no specialized engineering and manufacturing… Moreover, everything to do with the period [of construction] was important at that time: there was a difficult situation with power supply in the country [Politburo constantly put pressure on the developers in order to accelerate the pace of reactors’ construction]… [Just for information,] the launch of the first VVER-1000 occurred only in 1979, but serial production of [this type of reactors began only in 1985, while in 1973 the first pilot RBMK-1000] was already online. By 1980, there was production of electricity from around ten serial RBMKs… The reactors were economical in terms of the cost of energy produced. Simple enough to run, of course, if [the operators] complied with all the requirements mentioned in the operating instructions”.205 Academician Alexandrov also confirmed that “Soviet scientists were able to solve the problem of increasing the economic efficiency of nuclear power stations”.206 In addition, the construction of the new reactor also implied the possibility of changing nuclear fuel without shutting down the reactor—unlike shell-type reactors, which require a compulsory shutdown—which made the RBMK very cost-effective in comparison with competitive reactor types.

Because the Soviet civil nuclear program originated from the military nuclear program, many approaches for designing and constructing civil reactors came from military experience. In the 1940s, USSR was eager to overtake Americans in the construction of nuclear bombs. In this race, drawing mainly from domestic assets and also from the German specialists they have been able to recruit, the Soviets were significantly constrained by a shortage of resources, both material and human, in comparison with the Americans who had invited the best nuclear physicists from around the world and had suffered no loss on their territory while the Soviets had to reconstruct after the most devastating war in the Union as well as Russian history with casualties mounting to more than 27 million people. Nevertheless, in 1949, the Soviets tested their first nuclear bomb (four years after the Americans). By 1953, the Union overtook the States in the development of thermonuclear weapons, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. In 1954, Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers commissioned in Obninsk the first industrial civil nuclear reactor in the world: an uranium-graphite channel water-cooled reactor, it was a predecessor of the RBMKs. Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack Dollezhal outlined the experience of building this reactor as follows: “In 1951, when designing of the reactor was in full swing … building the world’s first nuclear power plant has already begun by laying the foundation of the plantDuring experiments [i.e. during the simultaneous design and construction of the reactor], more and more new knowledge was revealed that was impossible to ignore. Not often, indeed, but still sometimes, there was the need to reconstruct already designed components and devices [of the reactor]… One thing is beyond doubt: if the construction [of the reactors] had been carried out ‘by the rules’, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, where construction was started [only] after the final completion of the design of the reactor, then the nuclear power plant would have been launched several years later”.207 This approach was continued in the 1970s for the RBMKs: many design solutions for the new reactor were practically tested during operation of the first pilot model, while the construction of the first serial RBMKs was already launched. Minsredmash constructed and launched the first pilot RBMK reactor near Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in 1973, while the foundations of Chernobyl NPP was already laid in 1970. Academician Valery Legasov, an executive at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy during the Chernobyl disaster, recalled: “The first launch of the pilot RBMK reactor at Leningrad NPP already showed [that running an RBMK reactor safely] is quite a difficult task for the plant’s operator. [There was] a problem with the instability of neutron fluxes and the challenges of managing them … It should be said that, of course, a positive coefficient of reactivity in this reactor appeared unexpected [for the developers] … We had to change serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack degree of nuclear fuel enrichment, and carry out a number of other technical measures in order to facilitate the operation of the reactor. Even after these measures, managing the reactor required tremendous attention from a plant’s operator and it was always quite difficult”.208 This shows that knowledge of serious intrinsic problems with the RBMK was present, but raidcall error 426 misinformation and lack of communication nurtured the Chernobyl catastrophe.

RBMK Reactor Design and the SCRAM Effect

There is no single universally accepted version of the cause of the reactor excursion, but the majority of investigators mention two main causes: a combination of imperfections of the RBMK reactor design—especially a phenomenon known as the “positive SCRAM effect”209—and unconscious mistakes by the executives and operators of Chernobyl NPP, who approved and conducted the experiment on Reactor #4. The reactor’s developers blame the staff of the plant and vice versa. The “positive SCRAM effect” first came to light during operation of the first RBMK reactor near Leningrad, in an incident in November 1975. There was a reactor reactivity excursion after SCRAM (emergency shutdown), which overheated a small part of the core, rupturing a channel of the reactor. The investigation commission in 1976 concluded that some elements of the reactor core needed to be redesigned in order to reduce the void coefficient, change some features of the control rods and increase the speed of the SCRAM system.210,211 But these recommendations were only implemented ten years later, after the Chernobyl disaster. The IAEA report after Chernobyl noted: “The slow speed of the emergency protection system (the time for total insertion [of the control rods] into the core from the upper limit position is 18 s) and defects in the design of the rods (i.e. the positive reactivity excursion) resulted in a situation where, for a error the following fields are invalid person of reactor operating modes, the emergency protection system not only did not function, but itself initiated a reactor runaway”.212

From 1976 onwards, Vladimir Volkov, head of the reliability and safety laboratory at the Kurchatov Institute, sent numerous memoranda to his supervisors about calculation errors in the design of the RBMK, and gave suggestions for their improvement, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. He mentioned the positive SCRAM effect, defined as a localized increase of activity in the bottom of the core of a nuclear reactor during emergency shutdown, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. But executives at the Kurchatov Institute and NIKIET did not pay serious attention to his warnings, or those of others.213,214 Academician Valery Legasov concluded: “I did not see in the Soviet Union a single collective body, which more or less competently put together and considered [i.e. made a systematic search of sources of problems and critical shortcomings of existing reactors, which could lead to accidents at nuclear plants, and assessed the probability of each]… [On the contrary] the struggle against [critical shortcomings of the reactors] was conducted as a separate struggle within each particular case: if there was failure of the steam generator at a plantthan it launched a decision-making process about changing the design of steam generators. And, of course, sooner or later, it led to improvements in the situation… [There would be an improvement of that exact shortcoming and things would then] calm down until the next case”.215

The developers of the RBMK assumed that the positive SCRAM effect would only manifest in rare cases, and preferred to take organizational measures to ensure the safe operation of the reactor (clear instructions, staff training, etc.) rather than making technical changes to the reactor design.216 They were confident that the high quality of education and self-discipline of the staff at military-prone Minsredmash would compensate for any technical disadvantages of the RBMK when it became operational. Moreover, due to Western sanctions against the USSR during the Cold War, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Soviet scientists and engineers were not able to use American supercomputers in the 1960s and 1970s to calculate technical solutions for the reactors at the design stage without testing serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack assumptions on prototypes. An IAEA report in 1992 mentioned the following: “There are a number of explanations for the poor quality of the calculation analysis of the safety of the design of [RBMK reactors]. These include the fact that, until recently, Soviet computer techniques were chronically outdated and the standard of computer codes was very low. Three-dimensional non-stationary neutron-thermal-hydraulic models are required in order to calculate the physical parameters of a RBMK reactor under different operating conditions. Such models first became available only shortly before the Chernobyl accident and were not really developed until after the accident… As a result of the misguided selection serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack the core’s physical and design parameters by the designers, the RBMK-1000 reactor was a dynamically unstable system with regard to power and steam quality perturbations. The steam quality, in its turn, was dependent on many parameters characterizing the reactor state”.217

Economic and Political Pressure to Quickly Build Many RBMK Reactors

The Politburo put strong pressure on the RBMK developers to launch serial production of the reactors immediately in order to satisfy domestic electricity needs. So, in parallel with the test operation of the prototype RBMK in Leningrad, full-scale construction was initiated not only at the Chernobyl NPP near Kiev (in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), but at Kursk and Smolensk in the Russian Soviet Socialistic Republic, and at the Ignalina NPP near Vilnius (in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic). The original RBMK design was not fundamentally redeveloped or revised for these serial units, and did not even include the improvements recommended after the 1975 accident at Leningrad NPP.218 Academician Valery Legasov concluded that “[The Soviet Union] built the world’s first nuclear power plant [in Obninsk], but later we slowed down the development of this technology and the review of all safety issues associated with the operation of such plants [until changes in our energy supply strategy for the western part of the USSR, when we] began to hurry. Consequently this haste led to more units being built with limited funding. There was a need from the economy. Keeping the costs down began with [rejection to construct] containment [buildings over reactors, which would have increased the construction costs of Soviet NPPs by 30 % and lengthened the construction period for the plants]… We all began to show concern about the quality of education and training of the personnel responsible for the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants, because the number of units increased dramatically, but the quality of the personnel involved in the process decreased [while developers of the RBMK expected that comprehensive organizational measures could compensate the technical shortcomings of the reactors]… There was a constant need for new buildings, new benches, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, new people for this job, because the number of units [reactors] increased. However this development was still not qualitative, [only] quantitative… [The problems of the Soviet nuclear energy, revealed in the Chernobyl disaster] generally originate from the organizational approach toward development, more rapid development, of new technology”.219 It was common practice for the Politburo to issue deadlines for the construction of nuclear plants according to the date of the next Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with no regard for the availability of equipment for the plant or for the recommended schedule for proper construction. All this resulted in constant rush in the development of the Soviet civil nuclear industry in the 1970s and 1980s, repeating the practice that had prevailed during the nuclear arms race between the USSR and the West in the late 1940s and 1950s.

A Fatal Regulation Mistake

The Politburo issued another pivotal decision: responsibility for all the new RBMK NPPs would be transferred from the predominantly military Minsredmash to the civil Ministry of Energy and Electrification of the USSR. There were several explanations for this decision. The developers of the RBMK reactor—all nationally respected and honored scientists—convinced everybody, especially the senior executives of the Soviet Union, of the absolute safety of the RBMK reactor and the serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of Soviet nuclear technology.220,221,222,223 Their overconfidence persuaded Politburo members and executives at the Ministry of Energy and Electrification that it was safe to hand over the operation of nuclear power plants to personnel who had experience of running thermal power stations, but no education in nuclear science. For instance, the General Director of Chernobyl NPP, who was in place from the digging of the foundations of the plant in 1970, had training and experience as a turbine specialist and had worked on a coal power station before his appointment at Chernobyl. On one occasion before the accident, the director vividly revealed his wishful thinking about the harmlessness of nuclear reactors: “What are you worried about, the nuclear reactor is a samovar [a traditional Russian pot used to heat water for tea]. It is much easier [to operate] than a thermal station, and we have experienced personneland nothing will happen”.224 The background of the deputy of the Ministry of Energy and Electrification and department head, who was responsible for the construction of all nuclear plants in USSR, was in the building of hydropower plants. The head of the Ministry’s unit, who was responsible for the exploitation of all nuclear plants in USSR, was a former executive of the State Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack Commission without any experience in nuclear industry.225

In addition, the plant’s Chief Engineer was an electrician, who had worked previously on thermal power stations and the national electric grid. The Chief Engineer latter played a critical part in developing the plan for the experiment with the emergency power supply system on Reactor #4 that led to the disaster. This experiment was necessary because the emergency operating modes had not been properly tested prior to the RBMK being rolled out across the USSR.226 It involved testing the potential rotational energy of the turbine during emergency shutdown of the reactor, in order to produce emergency electrical power for the water pumps (for a duration around 1 min) until the emergency diesel generators on the plant could be started up to full capacity.227 The experiment was stipulated in the development project for the reactor, but the detailed steps involved were left 49 error imovie the personnel of each plant. In the case of Reactor #4, the plan for the experiment was not submitted to the developers because there was no requirement to obtain their approval for experiments.228 The Chief Engineer of the plant—with no experience of running nuclear plants and little understanding of the risks involved in such a test to be performed on an RBMK229—decided to conduct it as a routine electrotechnical test within a turbine-generator system, during a regular service break of Reactor #4 in April 1986, as part of compulsory measures stipulated by the reactor project.230,231 Obviously, staff at the Ministry of Energy and Electrification was less competent in nuclear matters than the Minsredmash team who had developed the reactor, and did not have advanced knowledge of the physics involved.

Overall, there was a deficit of qualified personnel to run the constantly growing number of nuclear plants in the USSR. After the accident, Academician Alexandrov explained his position regarding the safety of the experiment: “Nobody within our institute (the Kurchatov Institute) knew about the impending experience or participated in its preparation. Academician Dollezhal, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Chief Design Engineer of the reactor, was also unaware of it, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. [Later, after the accident], when I was reading the plan of the experiment, I was shocked. Many actions of this plan led the reactor beyond its design state… Let’s also ask who developed the plan. Executives of the NPP employed for this projectan organization that had no experience with the nuclear power plant [the organization was contractor of the Ministry of Energy and Electrification and specialized only in electric equipment]. Dilettantes can be well intentioned, but they could cause immense catastrophewhich happened at Chernobyl. The director of the station, without summoning even the deputy chief engineer of the plant who had education in physics, signed a contract with [the service contractor] to develop the plan of the experiment, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. The final version of the experiment was sent for consultation and testing by the Hydroproject Institute [the designers of the Chernobyl plant]… Members of the Institute, who had some experience with nuclear power plants, did not approve the plan and refused to endorse it… I often think now what would have happened if the Hydroproject Institute had informed us! However, the staff [of the Institute] could directx device creation error even have imagined that the plant [staff] would dare to conduct the experiment. Minsredmash was not informed about the experiment because Chernobyl NPP had been transferred into the control of the Ministry of Energy… In Minsredmash … were professionals with military-like discipline, who strictly followed the instructions, which in our case are extremely important… There are instructions, which must be followed by any NPP staff. This technical regulation is a guarantee of safety [of the plant]… [Furthermore], the experiment plan violated applicable instructions for operating nuclear power plants in twelve sections! We can say that the design of the reactor has flaws. However, the cause of the accident, after all[was] a poorly prepared experiment, [in] flagrant violation of the instructions for NPP operations… I repeat, there are deficiencies in the reactor. Nowadays, these disadvantages are reduced. [Nevertheless], the problem is not the construction of the reactor. [Imagine] you are driving a car and turning the steering wheel in the wrong directionand an accident takes place! Is it the fault of the engine? Or the designer of the car? Everyone will answer that it is the fault of the unskilled driver”.232 Rdesktop linux internal licensing error 1999, Academician Dollezhal also stated his position: “We left our chairs with Alexandrov [after the Chernobyl accident]. We, of course, are guilty [as developers of the reactor]. I have my version of the accident. First of all, the personnel was terrible; we were sending warnings in all instances but without results; we warned about the negligent regime of operation”.233 Nikolay Fomin, Chief Engineer of Chernobyl nuclear power plant during the disaster, confirmed also his responsibility and that of his staff with respect to the accident: “I was largely blamed. Not everything that has been said about me was fair, as I see it. Nevertheless, one thing I blame myself for: I have always believed that the key to the work of the nuclear industry is technologybut it turned out that the main thing is people. I underestimated their value”.234

Tragic Lack of Communication Between the Main Responsible Agencies

The situation was exacerbated by a total lack of communication about accidents between the military Minsredmash and the civil Ministry of Energy and Electrification, because of the culture of total secrecy235,236,237 that developed within Soviet military nuclear programs during the Cold War. Consequently, neither the developers of the reactor nor Minsredmash officials informed personnel at other Soviet NPPs with RBMK reactors about the accident at the Leningrad NPP in 1975, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, or about technical imperfections of the reactor design.238,239 Moreover, because developers did not eliminate defects revealed during the accident in 1975, the positive SCRAM effect within the RBMK series was observed again at Ignalina NPP, and during the launch of RBMK-1000 Reactor #4 at Chernobyl NPP in 1983.240,241 The Chief Design Engineer for the RBMK reactors discussed the problem with his colleagues by correspondence,242 stating that design changes would be made to correct the problem. But he made no such changes, and the procedural measures he serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack for inclusion in plant operating instructions were not adopted.243 At the Interdepartmental Science and Technology Council on Nuclear Power In December 1984, it was decided to postpone improvements of the RBMK—including the elimination of the positive SCRAM effect—for several years, until a period of planned reconstruction of the existing reactors.244,245 Apparently, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, there was a widespread view that the conditions under which the effect would be important would never occur.246 Personnel at the NPPs across the USSR were informed neither about these discussions within the development team, nor about near-miss cases of positive reactivity on other NPPs.

It important to ask the question: where were the regulators of the Soviet civil nuclear industry? Why did they allow 14 reactors with technical defects to go into operation? After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some supporters of Michael Gorbachev declassified secret shorthand records of Politburo meetings during the Chernobyl disaster. These records clearly show the complexity of the situation regarding the regulation of the developers of the RBMK, and the way serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of the reactor were concealed to the Soviet government and the operators of the NPPs.

May 22, 1986. Mikhail Gorbachev declared: “The Institute (the Kurchatov institute) was the only one [in the country] that was engaged in nuclear matters. It worked and nobody among us [the Politburo] knew what was going on. But it was only after Chernobyl that it was checked, ‘exposed’, and we saw a dangerous monopoly. The Director of the Institute, and President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR [the collective Soviet body of advanced scientists from different fields, which could adequately assess any theoretical conclusions regarding the physics of the RBMK] is comrade academician Alexandrov in one person. He locked all things [regarding any criticism of nuclear matters] on himself… [There was] a 40-year friendly relationship [between the executives of the Kurchatov institute, NIKIET and Minsredmash]and that’s what happened”.247

June 5, 1986. Mikhail Gorbachev pronounced: “[In this crisis situation, we have to eliminate the influence of] narrow departmental interests [when each ministry cares only about their field of responsibility at the expense of others]. Sometimes we hear [from ministers]: ‘I have only my own object’. Everyone has its own object. No, we all have one objectChernobyl!”.248 Such non-coordination led to a situation where the Kurchatov institute, NIKIET, Minsredmash and the Ministry of Energy and Electrification of the USSR did not transmit information about their problems or shortcomings, or critical information about the operation of the reactor to each other, and nobody understood the whole picture of risks associated with the RBMK; later there was similar non-coordination during response measures to the accident and Gorbachev called on ministers to enjoin them to cooperate.

The True Scale and Nature of the Faults Revealed in Meetings of Politburo in July 1986

July 3, 1986. Boris Sherbina (Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers—the Soviet government—and Head of the State Commission for liquidation of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster) said: “Evaluating the operational reliability of the RBMK reactor, a group of professionals working on behalf of the Commission concluded that its characteristics fall short of modern safety requirements… RBMK reactors are potentially dangerous… Apparently, all were under the impression that nuclear power plants were highly safe, as they were aggressively advertised to be… [Therefore] since 1983, the executive board of the Ministry of Energy and Electrification has never discussed the issues related to the safety of nuclear power plants… [Everybody] believed that the issue of civil nuclear safety was solved. A statement to this effect was in a Kurchatov Institute publication”.

Mikhail Gorbachev declared: “Over the last 30 years, we have heard from you [scientists, experts, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and ministers] that everything here [in the nuclear industry] is reliable. In addition you expect that we will look at you as to gods. From this, all went wrong [concerning the regulation of the Soviet nuclear industry]. It occurred because all ministries and research centers were out of control [of the Politburo and the Soviet government]. Finally it ended in failure… It was the responsibility of the staff [of Chernobyl NPP] that the accident took place [because the experiment on Reactor #4 was approved by executives of the plant, while it was not endorsed by the Science Director and the Chief Design Engineer of the reactor; operators chose to deviate from the program of the experiment; several instructions were violated during the experiment, etc.], nevertheless, the scale of the accident [was caused by] reactor physics [and is therefore the responsibility of the developers of the RBMK]… [The Politburo] did not receive information about what was happening in reality… All [nuclear-related] matters were classified and kept away from the reach of the Politburo. No representative of the [Communist] Party was allowed to meddle in this sphere. Moreover, [the Soviet] government had no power to determine which type of nuclear reactor [the country] should develop. Within the entire system [the nuclear energy industry], there was a spirit of servility, fawning, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, persecution of dissidents [as in the case of Vladimir Volkov, the whistle blower from the Kurchatov Institute], window dressing, personal ties and different clans around different executives”.

A representative of the State Committee for supervision of the safe conduct in the nuclear industry of the USSR (Gosatomenergonadzor USSR) said: “Everybody in the industry should be afraid of Gosatomnadzor!249… It is impossible to ensure the complete safety of existing nuclear power units. However, if operators strictly follow standing orders and instructions [they could be operated safely]. With the approval of the reactor design, it was known that it would havepositive voidandpositive temperatureeffects… Nevertheless, [Gosatomenergonadzor] never checked and studied the shortcomings [of the reactor] concerning the ‘physics’ and the degree of danger”. The majority of the staff of Gosatomenergonadzor USSR during the Chernobyl disaster serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack former specialists from Minsredmash; obviously, they did not want to criticize former superiors, and thus the government oversight over the industry was not independent. In addition, academician Valery Legasov stated after the disaster that most of those at the Kurchatov Institute (part of Minsredmash) tried not to ask executives of Minsredmash embarrassing questions because they were receiving bonuses from the ministry. The general opinion was the following: “If I say anything about [the necessity of] the containment [vessels at Soviet NPPs], obviously, I will not receive a premium [from the Ministry]! If I express serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack [against the mainstream within the industry and the opinion of the management], I will not be published and [my] dissertation will be not defended250

… Mikhail Gorbachev [question to representatives of Minsredmash]: “What can you say about the RBMK reactor?

Alexander Meshkov (First Deputy Minister of Minsredmash):It is a proven reactor. However it does not have containment. If [the staff of the NPPs] comply strictly with the instructions, then it is safe”.

Mikhail Gorbachev: “Meshkov continues to assure us that the reactor is safe… So, is it [still] possible to operate them and to construct more? … All that we collected about Chernobyl by this time leads to one conclusionthe reactor should be decommissioned. It is dangerous. And you [to Meshkov] defend esprit de corps”.

Alexander Meshkov: “No, I am advocating nuclear power”.

… Mikhail Gorbachev: “What should be done by the Kurchatov Institute?

Anatoly Alexandrov (Science director dj skinhead-extreme terror RBMK, director of the Kurchatov Institute, president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR): “I’m sure that we will not build RBMK reactors in future. Concerning improvement [of the RBMK series], the costs will not be compensated, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. [Nevertheless], I think that [positive reactivity] of the reactor can be eliminated [on existing reactors]. We have some ideas about possible solutions to this problem. This could be done in one or two years… The existing reactors can be made safe. I put my head on the block… that they can be improved. Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack beg you to release me from the duties of President of the Academy of Sciences and give me a chance to correct my mistake about the shortcomings of this reactor”.

… Mikhail Gorbachev speaks to representatives of Minsredmash: “The reactor is unreliable. The reactor was transferred to the industry and [further] theoretical studies [of physics of the reactor] were suspended. Why was theoretical research not continued? … Academician Alexandrov confirmed it [the unreliability of the reactor]. [Moreover] he missed something. He is [taking his mistakes] seriously, although he bears great responsibility for it [the defects of serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack reactor]. Whereas Meshkov lumps all accusations onto the operators [of Chernobyl NPP]”.

Alexander Meshkov: … serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, we] will not allow one [RBMK] reactor to be built every year [to solve urgent domestic energy needs]. This involves – constant rush. Consequently, it leads to [low] quality of the equipment and [poor] safety measures”.

… Gennady Shasharin (First Deputy Minister of Energy and Electrification): “The ministry believed that Chernobyl NPP was exemplary.251We appointed the best director to the plant … [The main problem was] that we began to interact with nuclear energy on a first-name basis, but it [nuclear energy] requires respect. The staff [of Chernobyl NPP] did not know that the reactor can accelerate. Moreover, we [the Ministry of Energy and Electrification] did not know [about the ‘positive SCRAM effect’]. The staff [of Chernobyl NPP] is responsible for the accident, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Nevertheless, I agree that the scale of the accident was caused by the physics of the reactor… Obviously, the first stages of Smolensk NPP, Kursk NPP and two reactors on Leningrad NPP should be closed. They are not subject for reconstruction… It is possible to get serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack units on these NPPs into shape, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. However, it will take one year. In addition, it will be very expensive”.

Mikhail Gorbachev: “The statement of Shasharin about [immediate] decommissioning of [RBMK] NPPs is not serious”.

… Mikhail Solomentsev (member of Politburo) speaks to Gennady Shasharin: “Did you know that the reactor was unreliable?

Gennady Shasharin: “Yes, I did. But it was not acknowledged on paper. There was a lot of resistance. Alexandrov was against it. The Academy of Sciences too. Minsredmash required [the Ministry of Energy and Electrification] to increase the production of energy in nuclear power plants by 2000

Victor Bryukhanov (Director of Chernobyl NPP): “We did not know that something similar had happened at the Leningrad nuclear power plant in 1975”.

… Mikhail Gorbachev: “The director of the plant … was sure that nothing could happen [with an RBMK reactor] … The Chief Engineer [of Chernobyl NPP] is an electrician. [His] main concern is supplying more electricity

… Anatoly Mayorets (Minister of Energy and Electrification): “This reactor does not … and will never meet safety regulations even under ideal [conditions]. Sooner or later, it [catastrophe] could happen. Alexandrov says that [the RBMK] can be modified. In the meantime, what do we have to do [about electricity production for the Soviet economy]? … It is necessary to bring all matters relating to the nuclear power plants together into one ministry. Moreover, we need to implement paramilitary discipline [within the new ministry]!

Vladimir Dolgikh (Soviet-Russian political figure and head of the Metallurgical Department of the Central Committee Secretariat): “Radical reconstruction of the reactor makes it uneconomical. For many years, we were unaware what might happen. We stubbornly moved towards the accident. It was inevitable as a result of such behavior. A legend was created about the safety of nuclear power”.

Nikolay Ryzhkov (Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers: the equivalent of Prime Minister in Western countries and second in command within the Politburo after Mikhail Gorbachev): “At the dawn of the nuclear industry, everything was conducted strictly and soundly. Gradually, the civil nuclear industry has gone beyond the boundaries [of Minsredmash], but [military] discipline ‘has not fallen off’ … In addition, there was evidence of excessive authority in the hands of [the executives of Minsredmash] and Alexandrov. Things became less exacting and vigilant on all levels. After all, there was no single year without emergency situations at [Soviet nuclear] plants [according to data revealed at this meeting for the period 1981-1985, there were 1042 emergency showdowns among all nuclear reactors in the USSR, including 381 at RBMK reactors; at this time, there were 104 incidents at Chernobyl NPP]. There were no conclusions from the accident at Leningrad NPP. There were shortcomings … and they were obscured, concealed in order to avoid publicity. Principalities took less responsibility. Without serious measures, we are not guaranteed against repetition [of the disaster]”.

Egor Ligachev (Politburo member): “This is the lesson [about what happens when we have] a monopoly in science and production! We need to fully replace the structure of the nuclear industry. The current structure implies irresponsibility. [We are witnesses that] within the Ministry of Energy [and] at the Academy of Sciences, there has been extreme self-confidence”.

Mikhail Gorbachev: “The accident could have been prevented. If there had been proper and timely information [about the features of the RBMK], then [the Politburo] could have taken action and we would have avoided this accident. However, we were faced with an extreme manifestation of irresponsibility”.252,253

HBO’s excellent five-hour mini-series “Chernobyl” ends with the words, “In memory of all who suffered and sacrificed.” It’s a fitting final note for a series that ably pays homage to just those people, from the workers who died in the explosion to those who fought to keep it contained to the scientists who spoke up to make sure it didn't happen again. Brilliantly structured and anchored by great performances from Jared Harris, Emily Watson, Stellan Skarsgard, and more, “Chernobyl” is relentlessly bleak, but it has a remarkable cumulative power. I found each hour more impressive than the one before it, as Johan Renck’s complex, layered vision of an entire nation altered by a nuclear event becomes more and more devastating.

At first, “Chernobyl” feels incredibly episodic. We meet various characters in the sphere of what happened on April 26, 1986 when a safety test went very, very wrong, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. There are the workers directly involved in the test, most of them inexperienced and uninformed about exactly what they’re doing, and led by an abusive jerk who pushes them to make mistakes. There are the local emergency responders, like the firefighters who run serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack to stop the flames, unaware that they’re running to their deaths. And then there are the government officials, some of whom immediately swoop in to devise cover stories to maintain the Russian image around the world, claiming that nothing too horrible really happened even as they know otherwise.

The great Harris, so underrated for years in everything from “The Terror” to “The Crown,” plays Valery Legasov, a key Soviet nuclear physicist who is the first to serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack what has happened at Chernobyl, and what it means is going to happen now. What “Chernobyl” captures most of all is the events that happened after the incident to contain what could have been a much worse international disaster. Legasov windows schannel error 36888 a report of graphite outside the building and knows that the core has exploded, and, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, after much opposition from officials trying to serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack nothing is wrong—including a version of Gorbachev played by David Dencik—is given the freedom to try to contain the disaster. After the meltdown, there were several ticking time bombs related to Chernobyl, including the likelihood of a massive explosion, the containment of the nuclear radiation leaking across Russia, and the fact that it was headed down into the water supply for most of the country.

If you’re wondering how some of these more disastrous fates were avoided, the answer is often human sacrifice. Men were forced into situations so full of radiation that the machines designed to read levels simply broke. Some of the most fascinating parts of “Chernobyl” are almost procedural in the way they detail the hurdles placed in front of Legasov and in his team, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Boris Shcherbina (Stellan Skarsgard) and Ulana Khomyuk (Emily Watson). Skarsgard gives one of his career-best performances as a man who has been a mouthpiece for his government for years, but realizes that party lines won’t get the job done here, and Watson finds a human core in a character who’s really an amalgam of real people who worked not only to contain Chernobyl but to figure out what happened there.

“Chernobyl” is populated by familiar faces on the fringe too, including a small role by future star Jessie Buckley (“Beast”) as the pregnant wife of one of the first responders, and a single episode masterful turn by Barry Keoghan (“The Killing of a Sacred Deer”) as a man assigned to a team that serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack to wander the small towns near Chernobyl to kill the stray dogs that remain after the evacuation. After all, they’re radioactive, and they can’t be allowed to live and travel to other linux error loading operation system. If you think that sounds blindingly depressing, you’re not wrong, but there’s an artful power to Renck and writer Craig Mazin’s approach that keeps “Chernobyl” from becoming a dirge. They add a human element to something that those of us old enough to remember watching news stories on TV have always kind of understood from a distance. Sure, we intellectually knew there were human stories involved, but “Chernobyl” takes very academic, scientific material and makes it understandable and tactile.

It helps that Mazin and Renck have a wonderful cast, particularly Jared Harris, who has played a kind of righteous intellectual before, but never more successfully than he does here. In an underrated career, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, this is one of his best performances, investing Legasov with a deep intellectualism that makes him both the smartest man in the room and the one who knows the real danger of what is happening. Harris finds ways to convey so much in each scene, balancing both Legasov’s commitment to doing what he can and his knowledge that he really can’t do much. As he says at one point, they’re trying to fix something that has never happened before. And you can hear the notes of despair in Harris' voice as he works to solve a problem that not only might not be solvable but has already done so much radioactive damage that it will likely kill everyone involved, including him. 

“Chernobyl” may be a tough sell for HBO viewers accustomed to the more twisting and turning narratives of recent mini-series like “Sharp Objects” and “Big Little Lies.” It’s not as crowd-pleasing as those award-winners, but it’s just as accomplished. It’s incredibly difficult to mine entertainment from something as dry as the physics behind a nuclear meltdown and the governmental mistakes that both led to it that meltdown and tried to cover it up. But the final episode of “Chernobyl,” which intercuts between the hearing about what happened that fateful day and the incident itself, feels like a rewarding end to a remarkable TV journey. You should take it.

Brian Tallerico

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The nursing profession: a critical component of the growing need for a nuclear global health workforce

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Tener Goodwin Veenema

1National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC USA

2Department of International Health, Nursing and Public Health, Johns Hopkins School of Nursing, Centre for Humanitarian Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland USA

Find articles by Tener Goodwin Veenema

Frederick M. Burkle, Jr

3Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University & T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Cambridge, USA

4Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC USA

Find articles by Frederick M. Burkle, Jr

Cham E. Dallas

5Department of Health Policy and Management, Institute for Disaster Management, University of Georgia, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, College of Public Health, Athens, USA

6Department of Emergency Medicine, Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine, Medical College of Georgia, Augusta University, Augusta, USA

Find articles by Cham E. Dallas

Author informationArticle notesCopyright and License informationDisclaimer

1National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC USA

2Department of International Health, Nursing and Public Health, Johns Hopkins School of Nursing, Centre for Humanitarian Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland USA

3Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University & T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Cambridge, USA

4Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC USA

5Department of Health Policy and Management, Institute for Disaster Management, University serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack Georgia, College of Public Health, Athens, USA

6Department of Emergency Medicine, Clinical Professor of Emergency Medicine, Medical College of Georgia, Augusta University, Augusta, USA

Tener Goodwin Veenema, Email: [email protected]

Contributor Information.

corresponding authorCorresponding author.

Received 2018 Oct 31; Accepted 2019 Mar 18.

Copyright © The Author(s). 2019

Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.

Abstract

Background

Instability in the global geopolitical climate and the continuing spread of nuclear weapons and increase in their lethality has made the exchange of nuclear weapons or a terrorist attack upon a nuclear power plant a serious issue that demands appropriate planning for response. In response to this threat, the development of a nuclear global health workforce under the technical expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network has been proposed.

Main body of the abstract

As the largest component of the global healthcare workforce, nurses will play a critical role in both the leadership and health care effectiveness of a response to any public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) resulting from the unprecedented numbers of trauma, thermal burn, and radiation affected patients that will require extensive involvement of the nursing professional community.

Short conclusion

Lives can and will be saved if nurses are present. The clinical care of radiation contaminated patients (e.g. radiation burns, fluid management, infection control), thermal burn patients, and other health system response activities such as community screening for radiation exposure, triage, decontamination, administration of medical countermeasures and run-time error 429 windows 7 provision of supportive emotional and mental health care will be overwhelmingly nurse intensive.

Keywords: Nuclear weapons, Nuclear war, Nurses, Global health workforce

Background

Despite low level awareness on the part of the public, concerns for the use of nuclear warfare against the United States dating back to the Cold War are now steadily increasing [1]. The National Security Strategy states that the American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon [2] and in 2017 the Science and Security Board warned: “World leaders are failing to act with the speed and on the scale required to protect citizens from the extreme danger posed by climate change and nuclear war. The probability of global catastrophe is very high, and the actions needed to reduce the risks of disaster must be taken very soon” [3]. Given the heightened geopolitical tensions between countries in possession of nuclear weapons, the need for a health care workforce with the specific knowledge, skills and abilities to respond to a nuclear PHEIC is of critical importance. The intentional release of radiation will unquestionably create a substantial and potentially devastating burden upon a region’s health care system, and as such, on a region’s healthcare workforce. Plans for U.S. medical response have been described previously [4–6], and recognizing that “a nuclear event anywhere is a nuclear event everywhere”, in 2015, Burkle and Dallas proposed a framework for developing a nuclear global health workforce [7], serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Nurses constitute the largest sector of the global healthcare workforce (2,955,200 active registered nurses in the U.S. healthcare workforce alone [8], and their capacity and willingness to respond to a radiation/nuclear event will be critical to the success of the health response [9]. The clinical care of radiation contaminated patients (e.g. fluid management, infection control), and other health system response activities such as community screening for radiation exposure, triage, decontamination, administration of medical countermeasures and the provision of supportive emotional and mental health care will be overwhelmingly nurse intensive [10, 11]. In addition, the mass casualty care required for the extensive thermal burn patients anticipated from any nuclear weapons event will also be very nurse response intensive, and especially so for the strikingly large number that would result from the recent rapid increase in the threat of thermonuclear war. The ubiquitous threat of error send message nuclear attack is real and the participation of a radiation serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack nursing workforce will be imperative for an effective response. This paper presents the potential impact of a nuclear event on individual and population health, and positions nurses will serve as the foundation for a nuclear global workforce.

Main text

Detonation of a nuclear device, especially in crowded urban areas as currently anticipated, will produce unprecedented numbers and kinds of injuries requiring a healthcare response not currently available anywhere in the world, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. The only experience with urban nuclear detonations, fortunately, has been with the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan at the end of World War II., While these weapons (10-15kT) were far greater in destruction and healthcare impact than all conventional weapons previously, in comparison to thermonuclear weapons now proliferating globally these were relatively small. Indeed, after two decades of preparing for a 10kT weapon detonation by DHS, FEMA has announced and presented at a recent meeting of the National Academy of Sciences that they are now focusing on 10-1000kT nuclear detonation response [12, 13].

Healthcare response needs due to nuclear detonation

When a nuclear weapon explodes, it generates a blast wave, intense light and heat, radiation, and a large fireball is created (creating the characteristic mushroom-shaped cloud), serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Fallout is composed of fission-created radioactive elements which attach to vaporized debris particles from the explosion and then are carried by wind up to many miles from the site of the explosion. Detonation of a nuclear weapon would cause great destruction, death, and injury and have a wide area of impact. Individuals close to the blast site could experience injury or death from the blast wave, moderate to severe thermal burns from heat and mass fires, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, full or partial blindness from the intense light, and acute radiation syndrome or ARS (caused by the radiation released at the time of detonation). Individuals farther away from the blast, but in the path of fallout, may experience health effects from fallout on the outside of the body or clothes (external contamination) or on the inside of the body (internal contamination), from contaminated food, air, water sources, or contact with contaminated surfaces. Extensive modeling has been done of a potential detonation of a nuclear weapon in various locations [14, 15] with all studies indicating the daunting task for medical response.

Failure to plan for nuclear events

A nuclear detonation anywhere in the world would have devastating results resulting in a PHEIC and there would be limited time to take critical protection steps. Social disruption, chaos and panic will ensue. In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear event many people will die, however the possibility exists that the great majority of people in most large cities experiencing a nuclear detonation would survive. Despite the fear surrounding such an event, emergency planning and preparation can lessen deaths and illness and research supports that lives can be saved if a rapidly deployed and robust multidisciplinary response component exists [1]. Public health and the acute health care system will play a key role in responding to the affected population. Yet an overwhelming sense of fatality and doom balanced with societies’ collective denial regarding the potential for use of nuclear weapons limits health care systems planning for a nuclear attack, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. A WHO report published in 1984 stated that the immediate and delayed loss of human and animal life would be enormous and “the plight of survivors would be physically and psychologically appalling.” This negative outcome is particularly applicable to the use of thermonuclear weapons (>50kT) in urban areas, though the outcomes for the smaller, Hiroshima-sized weapons is much less in magnitude, especially in the thermal burn casualty category, often described as the “Achilles heel” of nuclear war medical response. With the increasing concern tied to the recent spread of thermonuclear weapons to potentially aggressive nations (such as North Korea), this sense of fatality and doom which has helped preclude nuclear war medical response in the past is only likely to be even more of an issue in hampering rationale preparation that is indeed feasible.

Nursing’s role in a nuclear response

A nuclear event will result in an unprecedented mass casualty incident with large scale morbidity and mortality, requiring a massive medical response [16], serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, allocation of scarce resources and the rapid deployment of mobile, self-contained, self-sufficient health care facilities [15]. According to the nuclear workforce framework put serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack by Burkle and Dallas, medical support to triage, provision of care to those with the opportunity to survive, palliative care for those who will die, and care for those individuals less affected or who have evacuated will be needed [1]. In recognition of the potentially thousands of people exposed, health care facilities (both mobile and fixed) will need to be rapidly established beyond existing emergency departments to meet the massive surge in demand for care. These nuclear health care settings will facilitate initial triage and dose-monitoring, assessment, decontamination, patient transfer, and provide access to definitive care. In order to deliver these services the framework proposes the establishment of 1) nuclear triage centers, 2) nuclear survival centers, 3) nuclear palliative care centers, and 4) health system support centers. Additionally, time-constrained radiation medical countermeasures will need to be rapidly deployed and administered to appropriate populations and mass sheltering may be needed for large numbers of evacuees. In each of these endeavors and across all of these settings, nurses will be needed to establish, sustain operations and provide initial and ongoing patient care (Table 1).

Table 1

Nursing’s Role in A Nuclear Response

Field-Based Centers Under the Nuclear Global Health Workforcea and U.S. Public Health ResponseNurse Roles & ResponsibilitiesNurse Professionals
Nuclear Triage Centers/Community Reception CentersMedical triage using “fast biological dosimetry”
Initial medical stabilization
Exposure vs Contamination-Decontamination
Thermal vs Radiation Burn Assessment
Peer education and radiation exposure mitigation (principles of working with radioactivity, appropriate use of PPE, etc.)
Surveillance and data collection
Psychosocial support
Health education regarding self-decontamination
Coordination of patient transfers
Interdisciplinary collaborative practice with Radiation safety officers, physicians, EMS and emergency managers
RNs
Occupational health nurses
Nurse Practitioners (psychiatric/mental health NPs, acute care/trauma NPs, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, primary care NPs would all have different, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, but valuable roles to fill in initial triage)
Point-of-Distribution Clinics (PODs) for Rapid Radiation Medical Countermeasures DeploymentEstablish and staff PODs
Screening and assessment
Radiation (protective) medical countermeasure administration
Patient monitoring
Interdisciplinary collaborative practice with State Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Coordinators, Pharmacists, EMS and emergency managers
RNs
School nurses
Public Health nurses
Occupational health nurses
LPNs/LVNs
Nuclear Survival CentersSecondary triage (biodosimetry/bioassay)
Hospital-level unit staffing
Isolation staffing
Pain and symptom management
Burn care- Initial assessment and stabilization, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, fluid/electrolyte management, infection control, debridement, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, nutrition support
Psychosocial support
Spiritual and culturally sensitive care of patients and their families
Family Reunification
Acute and chronic care nurses and Nurse Practitioners (surgical nurses, burn nurses, oncology nurse, emergency and critical care nurses)
Nurse Anesthetists
Psych/Mental Health Nurses and Nurse Practitioners
Infection Control nurses
Occupational health nurses
Nuclear Palliative Care CentersPain and symptom management
End-stage burn/acute radiation syndrome care
Psychosocial support
Spiritual and culturally sensitive care of patients and their families
Patient education and advocacy
Ethical and legal considerations
Interdisciplinary collaborative practice with physicians, pharmacists, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, family counselors and social workers, clergy
Loss and grief, bereavement care
Engagement of community resources for family support post death
Hospice and palliative care nurses and nurse practitioners
Primary care nurses and nurse practitioners
Nurse anesthetists
Psych/mental health nurses and nurse practitioners
Parish nurses
LPNs/LVNs
Health System Support CentersHospital/clinic/mobile facility staffing
Rehabilitation
Care of displaced, evacuated patients and families
Patient education and advocacy
Ethical and legal considerations
Family Reunification
Psychosocial support
Spiritual and culturally sensitive serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack of patients and their families
Nurse Administrators
Hospital and ambulatory clinic nurses
Surgical nurses, burn nurses, oncology nurses
Primary care nurses and nurse practitioners
Rehabilitation Nurses
Public Health nurses
Psych/mental health nurses
Occupational health nurses
Public SheltersTemporary housing
Feeding/Nutrition
Safety/security
Provision of essential supplies
Child/infant care
Infection control
Population surveillance monitoring
Psychosocial support
Family reunification
Manage volunteers
Collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
RNs
Public Health Nurses
LPNs/LVNs

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Nuclear triage centers/community reception centers

Screening programs will need to be implemented as an immediate primary public health response given the large numbers of people potentially exposed to radioactive fallout, a significant number of whom will have radioactive particles on their clothes and on their person. In addition to providing the much needed screening, this will also divert large numbers of uninjured people away from the primary health delivery facilities, which would otherwise be inundated with these people who are likely to be highly motivated by fear to seek assistance. Crowding with seriously injured patients will already be bad enough, and taking the pressure off these critical facilities is highly important, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Nurses will be needed to staff these nuclear triage centers as members of the radiation exposure screening and population monitoring team in conjunction with radiation safety experts and other health care providers. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) advocates establishing Community Reception Centers (CRCs) in the aftermath of a sufficiently large radiologic event- a similar concept to the nuclear triage centers (NTCs). The purpose of these Serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack will be to provide radiologic screening for uninjured or lightly injured people, to provide decontamination when necessary, and to refer those with likely internal contamination on for radiologic assessment and immediate medical countermeasure administration. This referral of verified internally contaminated patients, as well as patients with high estimates of external radiation exposure, will also be an essential function for decision-making of the use of radiation related pharmaceuticals from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Patients (potentially thousands) will present with varying degrees of radiation exposure including acute radiation syndrome (ARS), local radiation injuries, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and radiation combined, burn and blast (ocular, ear and lung) injuries. Nurses will assist with ‘fast biological dosimetry’ initial triage to determine “probability of fatality” [17] or implement the Exposure and Symptom Triage Tool (EAST) for rapid assessment of radiation exposure [18]. Nurses will conduct secondary and serial triage to provide ongoing assessment of severity of injury and other clinical issues. Nurses will interpret triage assessments, implement clinical guidelines [19] and coordinate patient transfers and care as scarce resources (such as the SNS) become available [20].

Point-of-distribution clinics for rapid medical countermeasures deployment

Medical countermeasures, or MCMs, are FDA-regulated products (biologics, drugs, devices) that may be used in the event of a potential public health emergency stemming from a terrorist attack with a biological, chemical, or radiological/nuclear material, or a naturally occurring emerging disease. Recently, the number of MCMs for use following nuclear events has been significantly expanded, due to the increasing threat. Radiation mitigators are drugs administered shortly after radiation exposure that accelerate recovery or repair of radiation injury. Radionuclide eliminators are drugs that decorporate or block absorption of internalized radionuclides and include potassium iodide (KI), Prussian blue (PB), and zinc/calcium diethylenetriamine pentaacetate (Ca- and Zn-DTPA). In the immediate aftermath of a nuclear event specific populations may benefit from rapid access to radiation MCMs in the NTCs/CRCs. Some high dose internally contaminated patients would be selected to receive the radionuclide eliminators that flush the radionuclides out of the body or block absorption. Other patients with high doses received from internal and/or external radiation might be selected to receive the radiation mitigators, especially those determined to need amelioration of the effects of radiation-induced bone marrow depression (i.e. low white blood cell counts). Nurses would be essential in each stage of this process of patient evaluation and decisions on the distribution of limited availability of these highly specialized pharmaceuticals. In order to mobilize and distribute these MCMs, nurses will be needed to establish and sustain point-of-distribution clinics (PODs), screen patients and determine eligibility, council patients regarding potential side effects, and to administer the MCMs. Nurses will be needed to care for patients who have adverse medication events and to facilitate medical follow-up.

Nuclear survival centers

Nuclear survival centers will be needed to accommodate the surge of patients requiring higher level clinical care and to help ‘decompress’ the overwhelming burden placed upon existing hospitals and emergency departments. The design may include both fixed and mobile hospital-based facilities to optimize survival opportunities for victims and to mitigate secondary indirect morbidity and mortality [1]. Nurses will be a major personnel necessity in nuclear survival centers to continue serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack triage process, conducting secondary triage (biodosimetry/bioassay) and to perform serial patient assessments. Nurses will provide hospital-level unit staffing and staffing of isolation rooms. Acute and chronic care nurses and nurse practitioners, particularly emergency, surgery, burn and critical care nurses will be needed for immediate stabilization of patients, render definitive care and to facilitate patient movement through the continuum of care. There is already considerable concern over the steady decrease in training for burn treatment nurses in “normal” times. The dramatic surge in thermal burn cases expected with any nuclear weapon use, and the geometrically larger number of thermal burn cases with thermonuclear weapons is likely to be translated to a severe staffing shortage in qualified burn nurses that must be addressed. These nurses would provide thermal burn management including initial assessment and hemodynamic stabilization, fluid/electrolyte rescue and management, infection control, debridement, nutrition support and emotional support. Nurse anesthetists, psych/mental health nurses and nurse practitioners, oncology nurses, infection control nurses and occupational health nurses will provide pain control and symptom management, psychosocial support, and spiritual and culturally sensitive care of patients and their families.

Nuclear palliative care centers

Responses to disasters and large scale humanitarian emergencies rarely include palliative care, the discipline devoted to preventing and relieving suffering rather than to specific diseases, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, organs or technical skills. In fact, a stark and somewhat false dichotomy exists between saving lives and relieving suffering. In the case of a nuclear event, the provision serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack palliative care will be extremely relevant to health care systems. This will be true for not only the immediate triage category, but also with the expectant group (alive during the healthcare crisis but not expected to survive). Triage decision making with the likelihood that resources such as pharmaceuticals will be far less than the patient population urgently needing them will require distinctive training on the part of the nurses facing these impending nuclear crises. Hospice and palliative nurses focus exclusively on end-of-life care and “help patients achieve the best possible quality of life through relief of suffering, control of symptoms, and restoration of functional capacity, while remaining sensitive to personal, cultural and religious values, believes and practices”.1 Palliative nursing care is the “comprehensive management of the physical, psychological, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, social, spiritual, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, and existential needs of patients, particularly those with incurable, progressive illness and has an important role in humanitarian crises [21]. Provision of clinical care in nuclear palliative care centers will require 24-h nursing availability, possibly for months, to anticipate and meet the needs of radiation affected patients and families facing terminal illness and bereavement, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. Pain and symptom management, end-stage burn and acute radiation syndrome care, psychosocial support and patient education and advocacy createfile + error_path_not_found just a few of the many nursing roles and responsibilities that will be needed in this setting. Primary care nurses and nurse practitioners, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, Nurse Anesthetists, Psych/mental health nurses, Parish nurses and LPNs/LVNs will be needed to collaborate with physicians, social workers, or chaplains within the context of an interdisciplinary team. Nurses will be needed who understand how to engage community resources for family support and burial services post death, and to work with clergy to help families address loss and grief and bereavement care.

Health system support centers

Health system support centers are settings were populations in unaffected locations and evacuees can seek supplemental medical care and screening for noncommunicable diseases and other health issues. These settings support or restore public health and health care systems and may provide additional bed capacity and additional sources of care. Fixed or mobile facilities will need nurse staffing to provide care and rehabilitation for displaced, evacuated patients and their families. Nurse administrators, hospital and ambulatory clinic nurses, surgical nurses, burn nurses, oncology nurses, rehabilitation nurses and primary care nurses and nurse practitioners will be needed. Public health nurses, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, psych/mental health nurses and occupational health nurses will conduct population surveillance and monitoring, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, patient education and advocacy, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack, address ethical and legal considerations in the provision of clinical care, and provide assistance with family reunification and psychosocial support.

Public shelters

Public shelters differ from the clinical settings listed above and will have distinct and complementary operations focused primarily upon non-affected evacuees. Shelters will provide temporary housing, security, food service, and ongoing health surveillance to displaced populations [22]. They are not designed for the provision of medical and nursing care beyond first aid and care of minor illness. Ideally, evacuees will have processed through a NTC/CRC prior to arriving at a shelter, however with the panic likely to occur with nuclear weapons detonations of any size this may not be the case and special considerations will need to be in place to ensure the health and safety of health care providers and shelter residents. Nurses will be needed to establish and sustain shelter operations including the establishment of a shelter floor plan with detailed procedures for managing potentially contaminated people, securing memory allocation error 0xdeadbeef, 0x0 control zones and decontamination facilities. Baseline radiation levels will need to be ascertained and monitored and decisions made on deve home sensor error xerox degree of decontamination necessary. As most radiation decontamination is likely to be highly effective with simply disrobing and internal error 8027 disposal of contaminated clothing (as opposed to decontamination requiring unnecessary labor and other resources in an already taxing environment), decision making by properly trained nurses will be essential. Nurses will work with shelter radiation safety officers, local emergency managers and volunteers to accommodate the needs of the residents and to monitor the living, eating and sanitary spaces in the shelter. Shelters have food preparation and food service areas, restrooms, showers and infant care areas. Public health follow-up and monitoring of shelter residents, implementation of infection control measures, care and monitoring of pregnant women exposed to radiation will be done by nurses. Nurses trained in psychological first aid can assist evacuees with the psychological effects of surviving a nuclear event, educate evacuees about radiation risk and help with the transition back to home.

Management of Psychosocial Crisis

The psychological, emotional and behavioral consequences of any nuclear weapon event are certain to be of staggering proportions, rippling through communities both near and far. Depression, anxiety, acute and post-traumatic stress disorder, poor self-reported health status and medically unexplained somatic symptoms characterize the psychological impact of large-scale radiation events [23]. The lifetime prevalence of depression in women 11 years after Chernobyl was double the lifetime prevalence in women in the Ukraine [24]. Fear of developing cancer may be long-lasting and perpetuate negative mental health impacts, leading to self-medication through the increased use of alcohol and pharmaceuticals, and an increase in family disintegration and violent/antisocial behavior. Social decay and civil unrest may occur. Nurses will be needed across diverse clinical settings and all sectors of society to assist individuals, families serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack communities to heal and move towards restoration of daily life in a ‘new normal’ post nuclear event.

Challenges for workforce development

The detonation of a nuclear device whether in a U.S, serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack. city or anywhere in the world will create a PHEIC and a global need for nurses and other health care providers to manage casualties exposed to radiation, sustain the health care systems needed for response, and provide targeted clinical care. However, few nurses have either training or experience in the field of radiation injury [25]. Multiple factors will influence the capacity, capabilities and willingness of nurses to participate in a national or global response to a nuclear event. Nurses’ perception of their personal risk related to radiation exposure, their knowledge, abilities and skills, and their sense of clinical competence may impact the speed and integrity of the response [26]. A lack of clarity regarding nurses’ specific roles and responsibilities in the aftermath of a nuclear event and a lack of awareness or knowledge of clinical guidelines adds complexity to preparedness. Currently, 75 % of U. S Schools of Nursing do not include radiation/nuclear content in their programs of study basically ensuring that the next generation of nurses will be inadequately prepared [26, 27].

Using the proposed framework for a global nuclear workforce a tiered model of professional nursing practice is proposed to directly align to the anticipated roles and responsibilities for nurses in the event of a nuclear event. The Model of nursing practice for nuclear response addresses both clinical and health systems management (administrative) practice, from which programs of education and opportunities for training can be targeted to those sectors of the profession who would most benefit.

Model of nursing practice for nuclear event response

  • Tier 1: Any staff/clinic or public health nurse or advanced practice nurse who has completed a program of basic, generalized nursing education and is authorized to practice by the regulatory agency of his/her country. These nurses will need a baseline understanding of radiation concepts, population health effects, basic decontamination and the appropriate use of PPE.

  • Tier 2: Any practicing nurse or advanced practice nurse who has achieved the Tier 1 radiation/nuclear competencies (especially thermal burn treatment) and is designated a disaster responder within an institution, organization or system, or deployed to a satellite clinical setting. These nurses need an advanced knowledge base including clinical care of acute radiation syndrome, management of radiation and thermal burns, radiation triage, and health systems management skills to establish and sustain the fixed or mobile satellite clinical care settings described above.

  • Tier 3: Any nurse or advanced practice nurse who has achieved Level 1 and 2 radiation/nuclear competencies and is prepared to respond as a member of a deployable radiation rapid response team, or to serve as a fixed or mobile ‘base camp’ nuclear subject matter serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack nurse advisor. These nurses need advanced knowledge of national/international nuclear response plans, crisis leadership skills and abilities and knowledge of health systems optimization strategies. These nurses will most likely assume clinical supervisory and systems leadership positions.

Conclusions

The participation of a radiation competent nursing workforce will be imperative for an effective response to a PHEIC resulting from a nuclear event. Lives can and will be saved if nurses are present. The clinical care of radiation contaminated patients (e.g. radiation burns, fluid management, infection control), thermal burn patients (which are difficult even with small numbers), and other health system response activities such as community screening for radiation exposure, triage, decontamination, administration of medical countermeasures and the provision of supportive emotional and mental health care will be overwhelmingly nurse intensive. Policymakers, nursing educators, public health and health care systems administrators who include the profession of nursing as the foundational element in nuclear response plans will increase the probabilities of survival following these devastating events.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge Dr. Mary Pat Couig, Dr. Roberta Lavin, Clifton Thornton, Mary Casey-Lockyer and Amanda Bettencourt for their review and input into the development of Table ​1 describing nurse’s roles and responsibilities following a nuclear event.

Funding

We received no funding for this work.

Availability of data and materials

All data related to this study are contained in the manuscript.

Authors’ contributions

All authors contributed equally to the writing serial keygen chernobyl terrorist attack this manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Notes

Ethics approval and consent to participate

This study did not involve human subjects and did not require ethics approval.

Consent for publication

We consent to the publication of this manuscript in Conflict and Health should it be accepted.

Competing interests

Neither I nor my co-authors have a conflict of interest. I certify that the manuscript is intended for publication only in Conflict and Health and that it is not under review, nor have any of its findings been published in any other journal.

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Contributor Information

Tener Goodwin Veenema, Email: [email protected]

Frederick M. Burkle, Jr, Email: [email protected]

Cham E. Dallas, Email: [email protected]

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