Communis error facit lex

communis error facit lex

property made on the basis of the decision, it may be right to uphold it, even though convicted that it was originally wrong. In such cases the maxim 'communis. superior Court or whether, in such cases, the maxim 'communis error facit jus' I may observe that the maxim de minimis non curat lex has no application. facit injuriam. non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt jura ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. Communis error facit jus.

Communis error facit lex - speaking, opinion

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vile. Nothing is more prejudicial to it than precipitancy, and impatience of delay or attendance on the determination of right reason, which makes us commonly run away with half or a broken judgment : in which respect Aristotle in his Ethicks very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant who goes away posting without his errand. Without this faculty of judgment, though a man were furnished with everything else, he hath no more sufficiency to judge or plead, than the Code or Digest-as one saith—which, compassing within them all the laws and rules of reason, for all that, cannot write one letter." *

Let the student, it is once more entreated, bear in mind, in all his readings, that he is reading not for speculative but practical purposes ; that the period will soon arrive when he must use his acquisitions-often in very arduous circumstances; and that he can appear in public, but as he shall have qualified himself beforehand by private study. If he do not thus reflect, and act—if considerations of this kind do not constantly influence his mind, he may shut up his books. Quickly as he may acquire, firmly as he may retain-it will be all lost upon him ; all his faculties and acquisitions will fail him when the day of trial shall have arrived.

Whatever be the subject of the student's reading-either a Treatise, or a Report--let him imagine himself doing so in preparation for the next day's business. This reflection is calculated, more than anything else, to set an edge upon his attention—to put all his powers on the qui vive—to throw an air of intense and vivid interest over the driest studies. Is he reading an intricate case, full of elaborate and profound argumentation ? Let him, after considering each side of the question, draw upon his own ingenuity-imagining himself to be one of the counsel engaged. Does he differ on any points from the reasoning which lies before him ? Let him note down the grounds of such difference-let him, in short, carefully and calmly weigh each in the balance of his own understanding ; endeavour to put a particular argument in a more striking point of view-in more cogent terms—to develope some latent objection ;-in short, to realize the case, and make it his own. His reasoning powers cannot fail to improve rapidly under this sharp and constant exercise, which transforms a reporter into a learned, and ingenious, and friendly personal opponent. If, instead of this, the student rest satisfied with what he considers a rapid conception of an author's meaning—with a sort of general notion of the scope and drift of a particular argumentation-and make no effort to enter into it as a matter of personal investigation-he will receive but little real practical benefit from the best course of reading that could be devised ; he will become one of those, already

Stu. Leg. Ra., pp. 14, 15. “ Patience and slowness of belief,” says another writer on legal studies, “are the strongest mark of a sound judgment, and are nowhere more necessary than in the study and profession of the law. The seeming agreement which many cases have with each other, in point of circumstance, is too apt to mislead the warm imagination, and make us fancy there is an exact similitude, where, in fact, there is an essential difference between them."-Simps. Reflect.

alluded to, who are ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth."

Thus, then, let the student make a prudent selection of a course of reading, and steadily adhere to it; but in doing so, sedulously and perseveringly labor in the discipline of his mind : keeping in view this contemporaneous exercise-never caring how severely—of his apprehension, his memory, and his judgment: fixing his mind's eye upon a splendid instance of the advantages conferred by early discipline upon a naturally fine intellect-Lord Mansfield ;-of whom it is eloquently said, that “ he apprehended the facts with such clearness, retained every circumstance with such ease, and weighed the ingredients of equity in so just a balance, that one is at a loss whether to admire most the quickness of his apprehension, the strength of his memory, or the soundness of his judgment."

There occurs in an excellent work on legal studies such a vivid picture of the advocate destitute of a “clear and settled judgment," as is calculated to form an instructive finale to this chapter.

“How would that advocate appear, who should stand up in a court of judicature, without having acquired a clear comprehension of the nature of his case, and of its various parts and circumstances : wandering from this to that part of his subject, unable to discern what part to produce and what part to retain; fixing, by chance, upon some weak or disjointed member, and then, with an unmeaning solemnity, dragging it forth as the main support of his cause ; discovering his mistake only by the impatience of his auditors

, and covered with confusion at a sense of his inability to rectify it! Unwilling, however, to terminate his efforts abruptly, he has recourse to his imagination and this serves only to make his weakness the more conspicuous : his uncertainty increases; he continues to heap words upon words, without meaning or end;—now, in all the violence of anger, he declaims upon the injustice—but of what, he cannot tell ;—now, he will argue; but, like a man talking in his sleep, he has no single certain position on which to found his argument;—now, he will denounce—now, remonstrate—now, entreat: till at length his speech became a chaos, and nothing but his silence can restore him, and those whom he addresses, to regularity and the light !”.*

* Raithby's Letters, pp. 224-5 (2d ed.)

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE BOTH THE

STUDY AND PRACTICE OF THE LAW.

Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti: Si non his utere mecum.- -Hor.

No one has the least pretension to the character of a scientific lawyer, whose mind is not imbued with its general principles. It is these alone which facilitate at once the acquisition, and the use of legal knowledge. On this subject we have, however, in the preceding pages, spoken fully and frequently. Our present object is, to point attention to those MAXIMS, in which are embodied, in terse and apposite language, the leading truths and general principles of the law, which have been established and sanctioned by the sagacity and experience of ages, and are perpetually appealed to, in the administration of justice. These maxims are of great value, not merely to the speculative jurist, but the practitioner, In the investigation of legal questions, involving great nicety, and obscure and perplexing details, it continually happens, that a single legal maxim solves the whole difficulty, and enables the lawyer to systematize and arrange conflicting principles, and apparently inextricable involutions of fact. The more of them, therefore, that the student can make his own, the better. Let him, however, bear in mind the caution which we have elsewhere given him as to the premature acquisition, and the incautious use, of or rather reliance upon--general principles.* Merely to learn them off by rote, and imagine himself able to apply them in practice, is a most mischievous, but by no means rare, delusion and absurdity. His principles ought to be the results of laborious examination of particular cases—all with a view to extract from them their regulating principle. Let him look for principle in everything; and he will soon obtain a rapid mastery over details which will utterly confound and bewilder others, and successfully encounter the most subtle and unexpected difficulties in argument. The obligation of our English Law to that of Rome, is, as we have elsewhere shown, abundantly obvious. There are few of our leading maxims which have not been derived from it. † Some of our

judges are pre-eminently happy in applying maxims to the cases brought before them, often thereby in a moment annihilating a long train of sophistical reasoning. Mr. Justice Chambre said, in the case of Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 159, that he had “a very large collection of maxims;" and the student should similarly provide himself. Mr. Preston, in his letter to the author, * points out some of the depositories of these maxims. The reader is also referred to Lord Bacon's · Principal Rules and Maxims of the Common Law;' and to a brief collection of maxims appended to Sir Edward Coke's Second Institute. The author of these pages had long ago meditated an elaborate work upon the maxims of the English law, illustrative of the manner in which they were practically dealt with, in administering Equity, Criminal, and Common Law. He had however abandoned the intention ; and he the less regrets it, as there has very recently (1845) appeared a useful work on the same subject, though not exactly upon the plan which the present writer had proposed to himself. The publication alluded to is entitled “ A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated, by Herbert Broom, Esq., of the Inner Temple," in a moderate sized 8vo volume. It is well arranged, and the author has displayed much judgment in treating his subject, and great industry in collecting cases, illustrative of the maxims which he has selected. The basis of the work which had been contemplated by the author of the present work, was a collection of maxims taken from the Civil Law; and it may be very convenient to the student to present

him with a series compounded out of that collection, and the maxims (upwards of 200) illustrated by Mr. Broom; whose work the student is recommended to procure and peruse in the second year of his pupillage. Most of the following maxims should, indeed, be committed to memory by the student. If he were to copy them into a little book, and carry it about with him, in order that he might perpetually exercise himself in them-not with a view to simply remembering them--but to realizing them by reflection--hc would soon find the advantage which he had derived from them,

Note.—There are a few of the ensuing maxims of the Civil Law, which have not been adopted in the Law of England.

A verbis legis non est recedendum
Accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale.
Accessorios sequitur naturam sui principalis.
Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.

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Ante, pp. 348. One of the works there referred to, is “ Branch's Maxims,” a most useful little collection, the last edition of which was accompanied by a translation, by John Richardson, Esq., of Gray's Inn. The following, taken at random, are samples of this scholarly performance : * Errores scribentis, nocere non debent' [i.e. clerical errors ought not to vitiate '). “ The mistakes of a man writing ought not to harm !” p. 47 (4th ed.) Again, “Omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere debet, non præteritis' (i. e. as Mr. Broom properly translates it, “ A legislative enactment ought to be prospective in its operation, not retrospective'). Every new institution should give a form to future times, not to past!”

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Actio personalis moritur cum personâ.
Actio pænalis in hæredem non datur nisi ex damno locupletior bæres factus sit.
Actor sequitur forum rei.
Actus curiæ neminem gravabit.

Dei nemini facit injuriam.
legis nemini est damnosus.

facit injuriam. non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia. Ad quæstionem facti non respondent judices, ad quæstionem legis non respondent jura

tores. Ædificatum solo, solo cedit. Æquitas sequitur legem. Æstimatio præteriti delicti ex post facto nunquam crescit. Affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio. Aliud est celare aliud tacere. Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur, nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum

verificatione facti tollitur.
Ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra proferentem.
Apices juris non sunt jura.
Argumentum ab inconvenienti plurimum valet in lege.
Assignatus utitur jure auctores.
Benignæ faciendæ sunt interpretationes propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis

valeat quam pereat ; et verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire.
Bona fides non patitur ut idem bis exigatur.
Bona fide possessor facit fructus consumptos suos.
Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem.
Bonus judex secundum æquum et bonum judicat, et æquitatem stricto juri præfert.
Casus omissus habetur pro amisso.
Caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit.
Certum est quod certum reddi potest.
Cessante causâ cessat effectus.

ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
Chirographum apud debitorem repertum præsumitur solutum.
Circuitus est evitandus.
Clausula quæ abrogationem excludit ab initio non valet.

vel dispositio inutilis per præsumptionem vel causam remotam ex post facto non

fulcitur.
Clausulæ inconsuetæ semper inducunt suspicionem.
Cogitationis pænam nemo patitur.
Communis error facit jus.
Conditio illicita habetur pro non adjecta.
Consensus facit matrimonium.

non concubitis, facit nuptias vel matrimonium.

tollit errorem. Constructio legis non facit injuriam. Consuetudo ex certâ causâ rationabili usitata privat communem legem.

loci est observanda.
Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege.
Contra non valentem agere nulla currit præscriptio.
Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu.
Corpus humanum non recipit æstimationem.
Crimina morte extinguuntur.
Cui licet quod majus non debet quod minus est non licere.
Cuicunque aliquis quid concedit concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit
Cuilibet in arte sua credendum.
Cuique licet juri pro se introducto renunciare.
Cujus est commodum, ejus debet esse incommodum.
Cujus est dare ejus est desponere.

solum ejus est usque ad cælum.
Culpa lata dolo æquiparatur.
Culpa tenet suos auctores.
Cursus curiæ est lex curiæ.

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takes upon himself the chance of all consequences, and will be liable in trespass, if it prove bad. In cases similar to the above, however, the maxim as to executio juris is not in truth strictly applicable, because the proceedings actually taken are not sanctioned by the law, and therefore the party taking them, although acting under the color of legal process, is not protected.

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CURSUS CURIÆ EST LEX CURIÆ.

(3 Bulst. 53.) The practice of the Court is the law of the Court. Every court is the guardian of its own records, and master of its own practice: and where a practice has existed it is convenient to adhere to it, because it is the practice, even though no reason can be assigned for it ;) for an inveterate practice in the law generally stands upon principles *that are founded in justice and convenience. Hence, if any necessary proceedings in an action

[*99] be informal, or be not done within the time limited for it, or in the manner prescribed by the practice of the court, it may be set aside for irregularity. Where a defendant, in the Court of Common Pleas, applied on motion to enter satisfaction on the roll, without producing a warrant of attorney from the plaintiff, the Court refused the motion, observing, that the course in that court from time out of mind had been to require the production of a warrant; and that, getting rid of a judgment of the court (by such entry) was so solemn a thing, that the usual course ought to be pursued, for via trita via tuta ;' and the courts of law will not sanction a speculative novelty without the warrant of any principle, precedent, or authority.

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It has been remarked, moreover, that there is a material distinction between those things which are required to be done by the common or statute law of the land, and things required to be done by the rules and practice of the court. Anything required to be done by the law of the land must be noticed by a court of error, but a court of error cannot notice the practice in another court. Moreover, “where, by an act of Parliament, power is given to a single judge to decide a matter, his decision is not absolutely final; but the court adopt the same rule as where he acts in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction; and though the Legislature says that he shall have [*100] power finally to determine a *matter, that does not mean that

the practice of the Court shall be departed from.' In a court of equity, as in a court of law, the maxim, cursus curiæ est lex curiæ, is frequently recognized and applied. The Court will, however, as remarked in several recent cases, adapt its practice and course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not by too strict an adherence to forms and rules established under different circumstances, decline to administer justice and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy.

Lastly, with respect to criminal justice, it was forcibly and truly remarked by a learned judge in a recent case, that even where the course of practice in criminal law has been unfavorable to parties accused, and entirely contrary to the most obvious principles of justice and humanity, as well as those of law, it has been held that such practice constituted the law, and could not be altered without the authority of the Parliament."

CONSENSUS TOLLIT ERROREM.

(2 Inst. 123.) The acquiescence of a party who might take advantage of an error obviates its effect.

In accordance with this rule, if the venue in an action is laid in the wrong place, and this is done per assensum partium, with the

consent of both parties, and so entered of *record, it shall

[*101] stand;' and where, by consent of both plaintiff and defendant, the venue was laid in London, it was held, that no objection could afterwards be taken to the venue, notwithstanding it ought, under a particular act of Parliament, to have been laid in Surrey, for per Curiam-Consensus tollit errorem.?

On the maxim under consideration depends also the important doctrine of waiver, that is, the passing by of a thing; a doctrine which is of very general application both in the science of pleading and in those practical proceedings which are to be observed in the progress of a cause from the first issuing of process to the ultimate signing of judgment and execution.

With reference to pleading, however, the rule, that an error will be cured by the consent or waiver of the opposite party, must be taken with considerable limitation; for, although faults in pleading are in some cases aided by pleading over, yet it frequently happens that a party who has pleaded over, without demurring, may nevertheless afterwards avail himself of an insufficiency in the pleading of his adversary; and the reason is, that, although the effect of a demurrer is to admit the truth of all matters of fact sufficiently pleaded on the other side, yet, by pleading, a party does not admit the sufficiency in law of the facts adversely alleged ;' for, when judgment is to be given, whether the issue be in law or fact, and whether the cause *have proceeded to issue or not, the Court is in general bound to examine the whole record and adjudge according

[*102] to the legal right as it may on the whole appear; so that, if, after pleading over, a demurrer arise at some subsequent stage, the Court will take into consideration retrospectively the sufficiency in law of matters to which an answer in fact has been given ; and hence it follows, that an advantage may often be taken by either party of a legal insufficiency in the pleading on the other side, either by motion in arrest of judgment, or motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, or writ of error, according to the circumstances of the case.5

i Fineux v. Hovendon, Cro. Eliz. 664; Co. Litt. 126, a, and Mr. Hargrave's note (1); 5 Rep. 37; Dyer, 367; Watkins v. Weaver, 10 Johnson, R. (U. S.) 108. See Crow v. Edwards, Hob. 5.

2 Furnival v. Stringer, 1 B. N. C. 68; 27 E. C. L. R. 3 Toml. Law Dict., tit. Waiver.

* Steph. Pl. 5th ed. 157. The subject of waiver, which is of necessity only alluded to very briefly in the text, is treated of at length, Id. 155 et seq. See Brooke v. Brooke, Sid. 184.

5 Steph. Pl., 5th ed. 131, 160.

These remarks are confined, however, to defects in matter of substance ; for, with respect to all objections of mere form, it is laid down as a general principle, that, if a man pleads over, he shall never take advantage of any slip committed in the pleading of the other side, which he could not take advantage of upon a general demurrer.

When applied to the proceedings in an action, waiver may be defined to be the doing something after an irregularity committed, and with a knowledge of such irregularity, where the irregularity might have been corrected before the act was done; and it is essential to distinguish a proceeding which is merely irregular. from one which is completely defective and void. In the latter case the proceeding is a nullity, which cannot be waived by any laches or subsequent proceedings of the opposite party.?

Where, however, an irregularity has been committed, and where [*103]

the opposite party knows of the irregularity, it *is a fixed

rule, observed as well by courts of equity as of common law, that he should come in the first instance to avail himself of it, and not allow the other party to proceed to incur expense.

“It is not reasonable afterwards to allow the party to complain of that irregularity, of which, if he had availed himself in the first instance, all that expense would have been rendered unnecessary;" and, therefore, if a party after such an irregularity has taken place consents to a proceeding which, by insisting on the irregularity, he might have prevented, he waives all exceptions to the irregularity. This is a doctrine long established and well known. Consensus tollit errorem is a maxim of the common law, and the dictate of common sense.“

It may appear in some measure superfluous to add, that the consent which cures error in legal proceedings, may be implied as well as expressed; for instance—where, at the trial of the cause, a proposal was made by the judge in the presence of the counsel on both sides, who made no objection, that the jury should assess the damages contingently, with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for the amount found by the jury, it was held that both parties were

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. bound by the proposal, and that the plaintiff's counsel was not therefore at liberty to move for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, for qui tacet consentire videtur, the silence of counsel implied their consent to the course adopted by the judge.

*COMMUNIS ERROR FACIT Jus.

[*104] (4 Inst. 240 )

Common error sometimes passes current as law. The law so favors the public good, that it will in some cases permit a common error to pass for right ; as an instance of which may be mentioned the case of common recoveries, which were fictitious proceedings introduced by a kind of pia fraus to elude the statute de Donis, and which were at length allowed by the courts to be a bar to an estate tail, so that these recoveries, however clandestinely introduced, became, by long use and acquiescence, a most common assurance of lands, and were looked upon as the legal mode of conveyance whereby tenant in tail might dispose of his lands and tenements."

However, the above maxim, although well known, and therefore here inserted, must be received and applied with very great caution.

“ It has been sometimes said,” observed Lord Ellenborough, “communis error facit jus; but I say, communis opinio is evidence of what the law is not where it is an opinion merely speculative and theoretical, floating in the minds of persons; but where it has been made the groundwork and substratum of practice." So it was remarked by another learned and distinguished judge, that he *hoped never to hear this rule insisted upon, because it would

[*105] be to set up a misconception of the law in destruction of the

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A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated

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+ Supreme Court Of India12

+ Gauhati High Court7

+ Madras High Court7

+ Andhra Pradesh High Court6

+ Calcutta High Court4

+ Jammu and Kashmir High Court4

+ Allahabad High Court3

+ Bombay High Court3

+ Income Tax Appellate Tribunal3

+ Karnataka High Court3

+ Patna High Court3

+ Kerala High Court2

+ Delhi High Court1

+ Gujarat High Court1

+ Madhya Pradesh High Court1

+ Rajasthan High Court1

+ Telangana High Court1

+ Tripura High Court1

+ AAR-GST0

+ Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Appellate Tribunal0

+ Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Of India0

+ Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, GST0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Electricity0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Foreign Exchange0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Forfeited Property0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Forfeited Property10

+ Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property0

+ Appellate Tribunal- Prevention Of Money Laundering Act0

+ Armed Forces Tribunal0

+ Authority For Advance Rulings0

+ Authority for Advance Rulings, GST0

+ Board For Industrial Financial Reconstruction0

+ Board of Revenue0

+ Board of Revenue, Rajasthan0

+ CESTAT0

+ Central Administrative Tribunal0

+ Central Board of Excise & Customs0

+ Central Electricity Regulatory Commission0

+ Central Information Commission0

+ Chhattisgarh High Court0

+ Collector Appeals0

+ Commissioner (Appeals)0

+ Company Law Board0

+ Competition Appellate Tribunal0

+ Competition Commission Of India0

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+ Deputy Collector0

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+ District Court0

+ First Appellate Authority0

+ Himachal Pradesh High Court0

+ Insolvency And Bankruptcy Board Of India0

+ Intellectual Property Appellate Board0

+ Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court0

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+ Manipur High Court0

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+ Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission0

+ National Anti-Profiteering Authority0

+ National Company Law Appellate Tribunal0

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+ National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission0

+ National Green Tribunal0

+ Orissa High Court0

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+ Settlement Commission0

+ Sikkim High Court0

+ State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission0

+ Telecom Disputes Settlement And Appellate Tribunal0

+ Trade Marks Registry0

+ Uttarakhand High Court0

+ Supreme Court Of India11

+ Gauhati High Court7

+ Andhra Pradesh High Court4

+ Jammu and Kashmir High Court4

+ Madras High Court4

+ Allahabad High Court3

+ Bombay High Court3

+ Income Tax Appellate Tribunal3

+ Karnataka High Court3

+ Patna High Court3

+ Kerala High Court2

+ Calcutta High Court1

+ Delhi High Court1

+ Gujarat High Court1

+ Madhya Pradesh High Court1

+ Rajasthan High Court1

+ Telangana High Court1

+ Tripura High Court1

+ AAR-GST0

+ Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Appellate Tribunal0

+ Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Of India0

+ Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, GST0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Electricity0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Foreign Exchange0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Forfeited Property0

+ Appellate Tribunal For Forfeited Property10

+ Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property0

+ Appellate Tribunal- Prevention Of Money Laundering Act0

+ Armed Forces Tribunal0

+ Authority For Advance Rulings0

+ Authority for Advance Rulings, GST0

+ Board For Industrial Financial Reconstruction0

+ Board of Revenue0

+ Board of Revenue, Rajasthan0

+ CESTAT0

+ Central Administrative Tribunal0

+ Central Board of Excise & Customs0

+ Central Electricity Regulatory Commission0

+ Central Information Commission0

+ Chhattisgarh High Court0

+ Collector Appeals0

+ Commissioner (Appeals)0

+ Company Law Board0

+ Competition Appellate Tribunal0

+ Competition Commission Of India0

+ Consumer Disputes Redressal0

+ Copyright Board0

+ Cyber Appellate Tribunal0

+ Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal0

+ Debts Recovery Tribunal0

+ Deputy Collector0

+ District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission0

+ District Court0

+ First Appellate Authority0

+ Himachal Pradesh High Court0

+ Insolvency And Bankruptcy Board Of India0

+ Intellectual Property Appellate Board0

+ Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court0

+ Jharkhand High Court0

+ Manipur High Court0

+ Meghalaya High Court0

+ Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission0

+ National Anti-Profiteering Authority0

+ National Company Law Appellate Tribunal0

+ National Company Law Tribunal0

+ National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission0

+ National Green Tribunal0

+ Orissa High Court0

+ Petroleum And Natural Gas Regulatory Board0

+ Privy Council0

+ Punjab & Haryana High Court0

+ RERA0

+ Railway Claims Tribunal0

+ Right to Information0

+ SEBI0

+ Securities Appellate Tribunal0

+ Settlement Commission0

+ Sikkim High Court0

+ State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission0

+ Telecom Disputes Settlement And Appellate Tribunal0

+ Trade Marks Registry0

+ Uttarakhand High Court0

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