Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation

anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation

Because the Taliban is listed as a terrorist organisation in Canada, Ottawa has told NGOs that any transaction resulting in money flowing to its. Germany will be evaluated by the FATF in. / Its last evaluation was in In preparation, the German government is complet- ing its national risk. Recognizing their threat to a vision of secure, open and prosperous economies, APEC has worked to help secure the Asia-Pacific region from terrorist attack.

Logically remarkable: Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation

Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation
ERROR PRINTER DRIVER
Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation

Kenya 'deregisters' NGOs in anti-terror clampdown

Passengers travelling to Nairobi wait to be searched for weapons in the town of Mandera at the Kenya-Somalia border, 8 December Image source, Reuters

Kenya has deregistered non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including 15 accused of links with terrorism, an official has said.

The government has also frozen their bank accounts and revoked the work permits of foreign employees.

The move follows a heated debate in Kenya over a controversial new security bill aimed at fighting militants.

The al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab group has been increasingly targeting Kenya for error 1004 application defined anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation had been deregistered because of their failure to submit financial records, said Henry Ochido, the deputy head of the government-appointed NGO Co-ordination Board, which oversees their activities.

Fifteen are suspected of money-laundering and financing "terrorism", Mr Ochido told the BBC.

Some of them were linked to the twin bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and neighbouring Tanzania, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, he added.

Mr Ochido declined to name the organisations, saying investigations were ongoing.

The board acted against them to help "safeguard" Kenya's security following information supplied by intelligence agencies, he said.

The decision to target more than organisations is bound to cause an uproar in Kenya, where many fear that the government is using the anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation posed by al-Shabab to curb democratic freedoms, reports the BBC's Wanyama Chebusiri from the capital, Nairobi.

Many of them appear to be aid agencies and charities which failed to provide financial audit returns, AFP news agency reports.

Several of them seem to be Christian organisations, orphanages or groups working in the areas of health and development, it adds.

"The NGOs with accounting issues can only be allowed to operate if they successfully go through a thorough vetting process. Otherwise, they will remain deregistered indefinitely," Fazul Mahamed, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, the executive director of the board, is quoted by Kenya's privately owned Standard newspaper as saying.

International medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) is on a separate list of 12 organisations which has been given 21 days to submit audited financial statements, correspondents say.

MSF said in response that it had complied with all "reporting obligations" and it was in contact with the board "to clear up any misunderstanding".

Last week, Kenya's parliament passed a bill which gave security and intelligence agencies wide-ranging powers, including:

  • the right to detain terror suspects for up to one year
  • to tap communications without court consent
  • and the requirement for journalists to obtain police permission before investigating or publishing stories on domestic terrorism and security issues.

Al-Shabab has killed 64 people in two attacks in the north-eastern Mandera region since last month.

Non-Muslims were singled out and shot dead error 1053 sql server reporting services an attack on quarry workers and bus commuters, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation.

Last year, 67 people were killed when four gunmen took over the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi.

Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta has said the government will not "flinch" in the campaign to defeat the militants.

The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.

Recommendation 8: Non-profit organisations

Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused:
(a) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
(b) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures; and
(c) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations.

INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 8 (NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Non-profit organisations (NPOs) play a vital role in the world economy and in many national economies and social systems. Their efforts complement the activity of the governmental and business sectors in providing essential services, comfort and hope to those in need around the world. The ongoing international campaign against terrorist financing has unfortunately demonstrated, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, however, that terrorists and terrorist organisations exploit the NPO sector to raise and move funds, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, or otherwise support anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation organisations and operations, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. This misuse not only facilitates terrorist activity, but also undermines donor confidence and jeopardises the very integrity of NPOs. Therefore, protecting the NPO sector from terrorist abuse is both a critical component of the global fight against terrorism and a necessary step to preserve the integrity of NPOs.

2. NPOs may be vulnerable to abuse by terrorists for a variety of reasons. NPOs enjoy the public trust, have access to considerable sources of funds, and are often cash-intensive. Furthermore, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, some NPOs have a global presence that provides a framework for national and international operations and financial transactions, often within or near those areas that are most exposed to terrorist activity. Depending on the legal form of the NPO and the country, NPOs may often be subject to little or no governmental oversight (for example, registration, record keeping, reporting and monitoring), or few formalities may be required for their creation (for example, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, there may be no skills or starting capital required, no background checks necessary for employees), anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Terrorist organisations have taken advantage of these characteristics of NPOs to infiltrate the sector and misuse NPO funds and operations to cover for, or support, terrorist activity.

B. OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

3. The objective of Recommendation 8 is to ensure that NPOs are not misused by terrorist organisations: (i) to pose as legitimate entities; (ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (iii) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, but diverted for terrorist purposes. In this Interpretive Note, the approach taken to achieve this objective is based on the following general principles:

(a) Past and ongoing abuse of the NPO sector by terrorists and terrorist organisations requires countries to adopt measures both: (i) to protect the sector against such abuse, and (ii) to identify and take effective action against those NPOs that either are exploited by, or actively support, terrorists or terrorist organisations.

(b) Measures adopted by countries to protect the NPO sector from terrorist abuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities. Rather, such measures should promote transparency and engender greater confidence in the sector, across the donor community and with the general public, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, that charitable funds and services reach intended legitimate beneficiaries. Systems that promote achieving a high degree of transparency, integrity and public confidence in the management and functioning of all NPOs are integral to ensuring the sector cannot be misused for terrorist financing.

(c) Measures adopted by countries to identify and take effective action against NPOs that either are exploited by, or actively support, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation or terrorist organisations should aim to prevent and prosecute, as appropriate, terrorist financing and other forms of terrorist support. Where NPOs suspected of, or implicated in, terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support are identified, the first priority of countries must be to investigate and halt such terrorist financing or support. Actions taken for this purpose should, to the extent reasonably possible, avoid any negative impact on innocent and legitimate beneficiaries of charitable activity. However, this interest cannot excuse the need to undertake immediate and effective actions to advance the immediate interest of halting terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation by NPOs.

(d) Developing cooperative relationships among the public, private and NPO sector is critical to raising awareness and fostering capabilities to combat terrorist abuse within the sector. Countries should encourage the development of academic research on, and information-sharing in, the NPO sector to address terrorist financing related issues.

(e) A targeted approach in dealing with the terrorist threat to the NPO sector is essential given the diversity within individual national sectors, the differing degrees to which parts of each sector may be vulnerable to misuse by terrorists, the need to ensure that legitimate charitable activity continues to flourish, and the limited resources and authorities available to combat terrorist financing in each country.

(f) Flexibility in developing a national response to terrorist financing in the NPO sector is also essential, in order to allow it anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation evolve over time as it faces the changing nature of the terrorist financing threat.

C. MEASURES

4. Countries should undertake domestic reviews of their NPO sector, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, or have the capacity to obtain timely information on its activities, size and other relevant features. In undertaking these assessments, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation should use all available sources of information in order to identify features and types of NPOs, which, by virtue of their activities or characteristics, are at risk of being misused for terrorist financing. Countries should also periodically reassess the sector by reviewing new information on the sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.

5. There is a diverse range of approaches in identifying, preventing and combating terrorist misuse of NPOs. An effective approach, however, is one that involves all four of the following elements: (a) outreach to the sector, (b) supervision or monitoring, (c) effective investigation and information gathering and (d) effective mechanisms for international cooperation, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. The following measures represent specific actions that countries should take with respect to each of these elements, in order to protect their NPO sector from terrorist financing abuse.

(a) Outreach to the NPO sector concerning terrorist financing issues

(i) Countries should have clear policies to promote transparency, integrity and public confidence in the administration and management of all NPOs.

(ii) Countries should encourage or undertake outreach programmes to raise awareness in the NPO sector about the vulnerabilities of NPOs to terrorist abuse and terrorist financing risks, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, and the measures that NPOs can take to protect themselves against such abuse.

(iii) Countries should work with the NPO sector to develop and refine best practices to address terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities and thus protect the sector from terrorist abuse.

(iv) Countries should encourage NPOs to conduct transactions via regulated financial channels, wherever feasible, keeping in mind the varying capacities of financial sectors in different countries and in different areas of urgent charitable and humanitarian concerns.

(b) Supervision or monitoring of the NPO sector
Countries should take steps to promote effective supervision or monitoring of their NPO sector. In practice, countries should be able to demonstrate that the following standards apply to NPOs which account for (1) a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector; and (2) a substantial share of the sector’s international activities.

(i) NPOs should maintain information on: (1) the purpose and objectives of their stated activities; and (2) the identity of the person(s) who own, control or direct their activities, including senior officers, board members and trustees. This information should be publicly available either directly from the NPO or through appropriate authorities.

(ii) NPOs should issue annual financial statements that provide detailed breakdowns of incomes and expenditures.

(iii) NPOs should be licensed or registered, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. This information should be available to competent authorities.

(iv) NPOs should have appropriate controls in place to ensure that all funds are fully accounted for, and are spent in a manner that is consistent with the purpose and objectives of the NPO’s stated activities.

(v) NPOs should follow a “know your beneficiaries and associate NPOs” rule, which means that the NPO should make best efforts to confirm the identity, credentials and good standing of their beneficiaries and associate NPOs. NPOs should also undertake best efforts to document the identity of their significant donors and to respect donor confidentiality.
(vi) NPOs should maintain, for a period of at least five years, records of domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organisation, and should make these available to competent authorities upon appropriate authority. This also applies to information mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above.

(vii) Appropriate authorities should monitor the compliance of NPOs with the requirements of this Recommendation. Appropriate authorities should be able to apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations by NPOs or persons acting on behalf of these NPOs.

(c) Effective information gathering and investigation

(i) Countries should ensure effective cooperation, coordination and anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation sharing to the extent possible among all levels of appropriate authorities or organisations that hold relevant information on NPOs.

(ii) Countries should have investigative expertise and capability to examine those NPOs suspected of either being exploited by, or actively supporting, terrorist activity or terrorist organisations.

(iii) Countries should ensure that full access to information on the administration and management of a particular NPO (including financial and programmatic information) may be obtained during the course of an investigation.

(iv) Countries should establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that, when there is suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that a particular NPO: (1) is a front for fundraising by a terrorist organisation; (2) is being exploited as a conduit for terrorist financing, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (3) is concealing or obscuring the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, but redirected for the benefit of terrorists or terrorist organisations, this information is promptly shared with relevant competent authorities, in order to take preventive or investigative action.

(d) Effective capacity to respond to international requests for information about an NPO of concern consistent with Recommendations on international cooperation, countries should identify appropriate points of contact and procedures to respond to international requests for information regarding particular NPOs suspected of terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support.

D. RESOURCES FOR SUPERVISION, MONITORING, AND INVESTIGATION

6. Countries should provide their appropriate authorities responsible for supervision, monitoring and investigation of their NPO sector with adequate financial, human and technical resources.

Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation

Appropriate authorities refers to competent authorities, including accrediting institutions, and self-regulatory organisations.

Associate NPOs includes foreign branches of international NPOs.

Beneficiaries refers to those natural persons, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, or groups of natural persons who receive charitable, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, humanitarian or other types of assistance through the services of the NPO.

Non-profit organisation or NPO refers to a legal person or arrangement or organisation that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of “good works”.

APEC's Work in Counter-Terrorism

Recognizing the threat that terrorism posed to APEC's vision of secure, open and prosperous economies, APEC leaders pledged in to help secure the region's people and its economic, trade, investment and financial systems from terrorist attack or abuse and trade-based money laundering. Member economies expressed their commitment to undertake individual and joint actions to counter terrorism in two principle statements—the  APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism and the  Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth.

Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF)

As a result, an APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) was established in May in order to monitor progress and build capacity in counter-terrorism, with a view to:

  • Coordinate the implementation of Leaders' Statements and commitments on fighting terrorism and enhancing human security
  • Assist members to identify and assess counter-terrorism needs
  • Coordinate capacity building and technical assistance programs
  • Cooperate with relevant international and regional organizations
  • Facilitate cooperation between APEC fora on counter-terrorism issues

In NovemberAPEC Ministers welcomed the APEC Consolidated Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy, which focused APEC’s work on secure supply chains, secure travel, secure finance and secure infrastructure, and structured work around three fundamental pillars of security, efficiency and resilience. 

Recognizing that the threat of terrorism had a long-lasting effect and in light of the CTTF’s valuable and constructive role in helping to protect the economic systems anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation the region from disruption, APEC Senior Officials upgraded the task force to a working group in July

Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG)

The Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) was then established as a SOM Sub-Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH) sub-forum in and its first mandate for was established in accordance with its strategic plan. The CTWG aimed to assist member economies to build capacity to protect supply chains, travel and financial systems, and infrastructure against terrorist attacks, disruption, and misuse, as well as to respond to, and recover from, such disruptions without anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation the flow of legitimate trade and travel.

The CTWG also sought to align its work run time error 91 excel find relevant agencies and international organizations, such as the UN and its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and stressed the need for implementation, where applicable, of UN counter-terrorism measures and the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.

Inthe SOM Steering Committee on ECOTECH adopted the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group Strategic Planwhich guided the work of the CTWG according to the following focus areas

 

  1. Continue to implement, review and assess the APEC Consolidated Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy as recognized in successive Leaders Declarations, Ministerial Joint Statements, and Ministers Responsible for Trade Statements;

     

  2. Increase cooperation with other APEC sub-fora on cross-cutting, counter-terrorism related issues;

     

  3. Increase cooperation among APEC member economies to understand and take appropriate actions to address:  (i) the impact of evolving terrorist threats including by ISIL, Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, as well as foreign terrorist fighters; and (ii) the impact of radicalization to violence and violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism on their economies, including increasing risk to soft targets, in order to promote the security and resilience of businesses and communities;

     

  4. Increase member economy capacity to disrupt the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) within the region anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation interrupting the movement of bona-fide international travelers between economies, and promote exchange of information between special and law enforcement agencies of APEC Economies regarding actions/movements of terrorist organizations and individuals;

     

  5. Increase cooperation and technical assistance among APEC member economies in their efforts to implement the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) programs to secure and facilitate legitimate travel within the region;

     

  6. Improve member economy capacity to prevent and counter terrorist financing, including by ISIL and foreign terrorist fighters, without impacting on the free anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation of legitimate trade in accordance with international law and standards;

     

  7. Improve member economy capacity to ensure the resilience, and security against misuse, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, attack, and disruption, of critical infrastructure, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, which supports and enables economic activity across the APEC region;

     

  8. Strengthen counter-terrorism related cooperation with the private sector and with relevant multilateral organizations; and

     

  9. Foster whole-of-government approaches within APEC economies, as well as enhance cooperation and coordination among economies and relevant APEC sub-fora.

 

The CTWG’s term ended in after many contributions and accomplishments to the APEC region, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Relevant APEC fora will undertake the continuation of work in counter-terrorism activity areas. Now, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, member economies are considering specific aspects of counter-terrorism work in secure supply chains, secure travel, secure finance and secure infrastructure, in line with the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group Strategic Plan and the APEC Consolidated Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy.

Accomplishments

The CTWG’s implemented capacity building projects to support the Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy across anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation economies, based on the three fundamental pillars: security, efficiency and resilience; particularly in four cross- cutting work streams: secure supply chains; secure travel; secure finance and secure infrastructure. Member economies discussed and shared information on new terrorist challenges in the APEC region, including evolving terrorist threats, cross-border travel of foreign terrorist fighters and growing risk of terrorist financing.

 

Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) conferences

In Los Cabos, MexicoAPEC Leaders agreed that terrorism represented a severe threat to the region, and decided that a new Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative would be introduced as a matter of urgency. Since then, XI STAR conferences were held from to

Discussions at the STAR Conference focused on policies and procedures to enhance security and efficiency in the APEC region's seaports, airports and other access points, including port and airport security; shipping container security; coastal patrol; capacity building; financial assistance, and private sector initiatives. The STAR initiative also fostered coordination between public and private entities to counteract terrorist threats through the supply chain. All 21 APEC member economies participated in the STAR with participants coming from private sector companies and international organizations.

Counter-Terrorism Action Plans

APEC's Counter Terrorism Action Plans (CTAPs) were developed based on the  APEC Leaders' Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth and incorporated relevant security-related elements of subsequent annual Leaders' and Ministers' statements. Each CTAP provided a checklist of counter-terrorism measures undertaken by an APEC member economy to achieve the key elements of the STAR initiative. These included securing cargo, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, protecting people in transit, protecting ships engaged in international voyages and international aviation; combating threats to security; measures to halt the financing of terrorism; and, promoting cyber-security. CTAPs provided an opportunity for member economies to take stock of their efforts to respond to Leaders and Ministers' directions anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation to highlight capacity-building needs to implement these commitments.

Projects

 

APEC Follow-On Bus Anti-Terrorism Workshop - Expanding and Sharing Best Practices ()

The 9th STAR Conference : Transportation Security in APEC Region - Challenges and Opportunities ()

Secure Finance Workshop on Countering the Financing of Terrorism with New Payment Systems ()

APEC CTWG Secure Infrastructure Workshop on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience ()

APEC CTWG Secure Travel Workshop on Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighter Travel ()

APEC Workshop on Strengthening Tourism Business Resilience against the impact of Terrorist Attack ()

APEC Major Events Security Framework Capacity Building ()

APEC CTWG Secure Travel Follow-On Workshop on Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighter Travel ()

10th STAR Conference: Secure Supply Chain in the APEC Region - Challenges and Opportunities ()

APEC Major Events Security Planning Workshop for Viet Nam ()

Halting Terrorist Financing: APEC Workshop on Targeted Financial Sanctions Regime ()

APEC CTWG Workshop on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context ()

Workshop on Aviation Security ()

The 11th Secure Trade in APEC Region Conference (STAR XI) ()

 

Publications

 

Strengthening Tourism Business Resilience against the Impact of Terrorist Attack, September

3rd APEC Air Cargo Security Workshop, Summary Report and Proceedings, May

Seminar Outcome Report: APEC Seminar SeriesDecember

Report on the APEC Trade Recovery Programme, Pilot Exercise, April

APEC Training Symposium Optimize the Use of Audit and Investigation to Strengthen Aviation Security in APEC Economies, May

Indonesia's Report on the APEC Seminar on Securing Remittance and Cross Border Payment from Terrorist Use, December

Singapore's Report on the APEC Symposium on Total Supply Chain Security, July

Effective Public-Private Partnerships to Counter Terror and Secure Trade, Final Report, September

APEC Trade Recovery Programme, July

Countering terrorism

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO will continue to fight this threat with determination and in full solidarity. NATO’s work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

 

  • NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the United States.
  • NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement.
  • NATO’s counter-terrorism work spans across the Alliance’s three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
  • A comprehensive action plan defines and determines NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism.
  • A Terrorism Intelligence Cell has been established at NATO Headquarters.
  • NATO advises and assists Iraqi security forces and institutions through NATO Mission Iraq and is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
  • NATO supports the development of new capabilities and technologies to tackle the terrorist threat and to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.
  • NATO cooperates with partners and international organisations to leverage the full potential of each stakeholder engaged in the global counter-terrorism effort.
  • The Alliance’s Strategic Concept recognises terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity.
  • Awareness

    In support of national authorities, NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic analysis and assessment.

    Intelligence reporting at NATO is based on contributions from Allies’ intelligence services, both internal and external, civilian and military. The way NATO handles sensitive information has gradually evolved based on successive summit decisions and continuing reform of intelligence structures since Sincethe Joint Intelligence and Security Division at NATO benefits from increased sharing of anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation between member services and the Alliance, and produces strategic analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.

    Intelligence-sharing between NATO and partner countries’ agencies continues through the Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and an intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. An intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters improves how NATO shares intelligence, including on foreign fighters. NATO faces a range of threats arising from instability in the region to the south of the Alliance. NATO increases its understanding of these challenges and improves its ability to respond to them through the ‘Hub for the South’ based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. The Hub collects and analyses information, assesses potential threats and engages with partner countries and organisations.

    Recognising the many different roles that men and women may play in terrorist groups, NATO is also seeking to integrate a gender perspective in all its counter-terrorism efforts, including training and education for Allies and partners, as well as policy and programme development. Likewise, the Alliance seeks to address all pillars of the human security agenda (including protection of civilians, preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence, countering trafficking in human beings, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, protection of children in armed conflict, cultural property protection) in its counter-terrorism work.  

    Beyond the everyday consultations within the Alliance, experts from a range of backgrounds are invited to brief Allies on specific areas of counter-terrorism, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Likewise, discussions with international organisations – including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the International Criminal Police Organization anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) – enhance Allies’ knowledge of international counter-terrorism efforts worldwide and help NATO refine the contribution that it makes to the global approach.

  • Capabilities

    The Alliance strives to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Capability development and work anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation innovative technologies are part of NATO’s core business, and methods that address asymmetric threats, including terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are of particular relevance. Much of this work is conducted through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, which aims to protect troops, civilians and critical infrastructure against attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. NATO’s Centres of Excellence are important contributors to many projects, providing expertise across a range of topics including military engineering for route clearance, countering IEDs, explosives disposal, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, cultural familiarisation, network analysis and modelling.

    NATO policies and practical frameworks in areas such as C-UAS, biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation also drive capability development in areas relevant to counter-terrorism. 

    Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

    The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW) was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and approved by NATO Leaders at the Istanbul Summit in Its initial focus was primarily centred on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks, but the programme has since widened its scope to support comprehensive capability development. It now includes exercises, trials, development of prototypes and concepts, doctrine, policy, equipment, training and lessons learned, and interoperability demonstrations. The key aim of the DAT POW is to prevent non-conventional attacks, such as attacks with IEDs and UAS, and mitigate other challenges, such as attacks on critical infrastructure.

    The DAT POW is based on the principle of common funding, whereby member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. Under the DAT POW, individual NATO countries, with support and contributions from other member countries and NATO bodies, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, lead projects to develop advanced technologies or counter-measures that meet the most urgent security needs in the face of terrorism and other asymmetric threats.

    Most projects under the programme focus on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term and that respond to the military needs of the Alliance – although the DAT POW also bridges the gap between long-term military requirements and urgent operational needs. The programme uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, covering a wide range of areas, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, including countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, biometrics, technical exploitation and countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED). The DAT POW is also an integral contributor to NATO activities in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, such as data and autonomous vehicles exploitation.

    Protection of harbours and ports

    The safe and uninterrupted functioning of harbours and ports is critical to the global economy and it is essential for maritime assets to be made as secure ie runtime error windows 7 possible. The DAT POW has supported several projects to develop technologies that enhance maritime protection. These have included sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid-reaction capabilities, underwater magnetic barriers and unmanned anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation vehicles. In andunder the leadership of France, the DAT POW supported "Cut Away", anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation multinational harbour exploration and clearance exercise. Additionally, under the lead of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) located in La Spezia, Italy, the DAT POW is assessing the use of underwater autonomous systems to detect maritime IEDs and of virtual reality for situational awareness.

    Countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

    NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems to state and non-state actors, including terrorists, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Ideally, terrorists will be prevented from acquiring and using such weapons, but should prevention fail, NATO is committed to defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Allied forces, territory and populations, and to supporting recovery efforts.

    The Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents. The NATO-certified Centre of Excellence (COE) on Joint CBRN Defence in anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation Czech Republic further enhances NATO’s capabilities. The DAT POW has also supported the Joint CBRN Defence COE in establishing and enhancing the NATO CBRN Reachback Capability, ensuring that CBRN expertise is available to the NATO Command Structure and Allied forces in theatres of operations.

    The DAT POW also covers projects on the detection, identification and monitoring of CBRN substances, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management and CBRN medical counter-measures. Furthermore, the DAT POW facilitates training and exercises, including those conducted with live agents.

    Explosive ordnance disposal and consequence management

    Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians are experts in the safe detection, removal and destruction of dangerous weapons like landmines and other explosive remnants of war. The DAT POW anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation improve NATO's EOD capabilities by training teams how to manage the consequences of an explosion. The programme also supports EOD demonstrations and trials, war on terror crack by the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence in Trencin, Slovakia. With DAT POW support, the demining community has also tested integrated exoskeletons that technicians can wear to protect themselves while anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation this dangerous work. The strong community of interest includes experts from partner countries, such as the Irish Defence Forces' Ordnance School.

    Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED)

    NATO must remain prepared to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical system error 79 04 plotter, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority. Several NATO bodies are leading the Alliance’s efforts on countering IEDs, including the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Various technologies to defeat IEDs have been explored, in particular stand-off detection. The DAT POW supports the anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation Northern Challenge exercise, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, led by Iceland, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, which tests counter-IED and IED disposal abilities. The biennial Thor's Hammer electronic counter-measures trial series and the radio-controlled IED database are two innovative approaches regularly supported by the DAT POW, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation are now also being leveraged to assist with countering unmanned aircraft systems. 

    Countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)

    Terrorists have sought to use and manipulate various technologies in their operations, including easily available off-the-shelf technology. Drones, in particular, have been identified as a threat. Therefore, in Februaryanti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. A new programme of work to help coordinate approaches and identify additional steps to address this threat was agreed in and is currently being implemented. 

    The DAT POW supports comprehensive capability development in the field of C-UAS through tests, evaluation, exercises, concept development and technical standardization. Inthe DAT POW supported an innovation challenge for the development of artificial intelligence / machine learning techniques to track, classify and identify drones as they fly within a anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation area. At the NATO Summit in Madrid, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, a technology display for Heads of State and Government covered some of the latest challenges related to C-UAS and exploitation capabilities. 

    Through the DAT POW, NATO is also consulting with stakeholders from industry, the military and academia to explore how new technologies can be leveraged in the fight against terrorism.

    Biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation

    NATO is also addressing the use of information obtained on missions and operations. InAllies agreed a biometric data policy, consistent with applicable national and international law and subject to national requirements and restrictions. The policy enables biometric data collection to support NATO operations, based upon a mandate from the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s top political decision-making body. Furthermore, NATO's Strategic Commands have recognised that developing and improving this capability is a military requirement. The policy is particularly relevant to force protection and the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. United Nations Security Council Resolution highlights the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and “urges Member States to expeditiously exchange information, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms and in accordance with domestic and international law, concerning the identity of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”. A prototype of the NATO Automated Biometric Information System (NABIS) was deployed for testing and operational experimentation by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Building on this, military requirements are under development to deploy NABIS in KFOR in the long term.

    In Octoberthe NATO Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation Evidence Policy was approved. It aims to facilitate the sharing of information obtained on NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. While the primary purpose of deployed military is to fulfil their operational objectives, troops often collect information or material on the battlefield, some of which may also be useful to support legal proceedings, including the prosecution of returning foreign terrorist fighters. In this regard, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, the policy also supports Allies in fulfilling their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution in holding foreign fighters accountable. Cooperation with other international organisations, including the United Nations, INTERPOL and the European Union, is an important aspect of NATO’s work on battlefield evidence to ensure complementarity and added value. Since JulyNATO also has a Battlefield Evidence Programme of Work in place to guide the implementation of the Policy. Moreover, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence is providing a series of hands-on battlefield evidence training courses to law enforcement and military from partner countries in the region to the south of the Alliance.

    Also in Octobera Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation was agreed. Technical exploitation collects material that has been in the possession of terrorists and other adversaries – such as weapons, computers and cell phones – and uses scientific tools and analysis to support the identification of actors, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, their capabilities and intentions. It enables NATO forces to derive important information and intelligence from material and materiel collected on the battlefield to support military objectives, protect our forces or support law enforcement outcomes such as battlefield evidence, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. In Junethe first NATO Martial Vision Technical Exploitation Experiment took place in Burgos, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, Spain to test and assess relevant technical exploitation doctrine.

    Operations and missions

    As part of the Alliance’s degree approach to deterrence and defence, NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts extend through a variety of operations and missions, both within NATO territory anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation beyond the Alliance’s borders.

    SinceNATO has been a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. As a member of the Coalition, NATO has been playing a key role in the fight against international terrorism, including through its former operational engagement in Afghanistan, through intelligence-sharing and through its work with partners with a view to projecting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Leaders agreed to provide direct support to the Global Coalition through the provision of NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft. The first patrols of NATO AWACS aircraft, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, operating from Konya Airfield in Türkiye, started in October

    In Februaryfollowing a request by the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition, the Alliance decided to launch NATO Mission Iraq, a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission. Its aim is to strengthen Iraqi security forces and institutions so that they are better able to prevent the return of Daesh/ISIS, to fight terrorism and to stabilise the country. In Februaryanti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, upon request from Iraq, Allied Defence Ministers agreed to expand the scope of NATO Mission Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. NATO operates in full respect of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and coordinates and consults closely with other international partners like the Global Coalition, the United Nations and the European Union.

    NATO also takes part in counter-terrorism in the high seas. NATO’s operation Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime security operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, including countering terrorism at error no 1064 sql if required. Currently, Sea Guardian operates in the Mediterranean Sea. It succeeded Operation Active Endeavour, which was launched in under Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty as part of NATO’s immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist error load driver code 39 vista to deter, detect and, if necessary, disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Active Endeavour was terminated in October

    Many other operations have had relevance to international counter-terrorism efforts, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. For example, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, which began in and came to an end in - helped the government to expand its authority and implement security to prevent the country from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. Following the end of ISAF, NATO launched the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. In Aprilthe Allies decided to start the withdrawal of RSM forces by 1 May and the mission was terminated in early September

    Crisis management

    NATO’s long-standing work on civil preparedness, critical infrastructure protection and crisis management provides a resource that may serve both Allies and partners upon request, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. This field can relate directly to counter-terrorism, building resilience and ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for response to and recovery from terrorist acts.

    Protecting populations and critical infrastructure

    National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their populations and critical infrastructure against the consequences anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation terrorist attacks, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents and natural disasters. NATO can assist countries by developing non-binding advice and minimum standards and acting as a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned to improve preparedness and national resilience. NATO has developed guidelines for enhancing civil-military cooperation in response to a CBRN incident and organises international courses for trainers of first responders to CBRN incidents. NATO guidance can also advise national authorities on warning the general public and alerting emergency responders. NATO can call on an extensive network of civil experts, from government and industry, to help respond to requests for assistance. Its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) coordinates responses to national requests for assistance following natural and human-made disasters including terrorist acts involving CBRN substances.

     

  • Engagement

    As the global counter-terrorism effort requires a holistic approach, Allies have resolved to strengthen outreach to and cooperation with partner countries and international actors.

    With partners

    Increasingly, partners are taking advantage of partnership mechanisms for dialogue and practical cooperation relevant to counter-terrorism, including defence capacity building.

    For instance, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) package for Jordan was reviewed in and now comprises 15 initiatives, including some that are specifically aimed at supporting Jordan in its counter-terrorism efforts, such as strategic communications, the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the development of a curriculum for Jordan’s counter-terrorism education and training. Counter-terrorism is also a high priority for partners such as Mauritania and Tunisia, for whom Allies agreed new DCB packages at the June Madrid Summit. In Madrid, Allies also agreed to offer tailored support measures to enhance the resilience of vulnerable partners against security challenges and malign foreign influence. To that end, NATO will scale up counter-terrorism engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Interested partners are encouraged to include a section on counter-terrorism in their individual cooperation agreements with NATO. Dialogue with partners about the specific threats that they face helps the Alliance to better understand the needs of its partners and tailor its counter-terrorism support accordingly.

    Allies place particular emphasis on shared awareness, capacity-building, civil preparedness and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively. Countering improvised explosive devices, the promotion of a whole-of-government approach and military border security are among NATO’s areas of work with partners.

    As a result of multinational collaboration through the Partnership for Peace Consortium, NATO launched its first standardized curriculum on counter-terrorism in Juneaiming to support interested Allies and partners in enhancing their capacities to develop national skills and improve counter-terrorism strategies. The curriculum also serves as a reference document to support partner countries in addressing their education and training requirements relevant for fighting terrorism, under the framework of NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). Inthe Alliance began using this standardized curriculum to deliver online courses to participants of the Odesa Military Academy and the National Defence University in Kyiv, Ukraine.

    Counter-terrorism is one of the key priorities of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The SPS Programme enhances cooperation and dialogue between scientists and experts from Allies and partners, contributing to a better understanding of the terrorist threat, the development of detection and response measures, and fostering a network of experts.

    Activities coordinated by the SPS Programme include workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects that contribute to identifying methods for the protection ig4dev32.dll error maya critical infrastructure, supplies and personnel; human factors in defence against terrorism; technologies to detect explosive devices and illicit activities; and risk management, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, best practices, and use anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation new technologies in response to terrorism. The SPS Programme is flexible and able to respond to evolving priorities. For example, sincethe SPS Programme has overseen DEXTER (short for Detection of Explosives and firearms to counter TERrorism). This flagship initiative is composed of a number of projects all working together to develop an integrated system of sensors and data fusion technologies capable of detecting explosives and concealed weapons in real time to help secure mass transport infrastructures, such as airports, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, metro and railway stations. DEXTER was successfully tested in a live demonstration at a metro station in Rome, Italy in May Eleven governmental and research institutions from four NATO Allies (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and four partner countries (Finland, the Republic of Korea, Serbia and Ukraine) have participated in DEXTER.

    With international actors

    NATO cooperates in particular with the UN, the EU and the OSCE to ensure that views and information are shared and that appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with relevant UN resolutions provide common frameworks for efforts to combat terrorism.

    NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its component organisations, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. NATO’s Centres of Excellence and education and training opportunities are often relevant to UN counter-terrorism priorities, as is the specific area of explosives management. More broadly, NATO works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN Committee. In MarchNATO and the UN launched a joint project to improve CBRN resilience in Jordan.

    NATO and the European Union are committed to combatting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They exchange information regularly on counter-terrorism projects and on related activities such as work on the protection of civilian populations against CBRN attacks. Relations and regular staff talks with the European External Action Service’s counter-terrorism section, with the Council of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator’s office and other parts of the EU help ensure mutual understanding and complementarity.

    NATO maintains close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action against Terrorism Unit. Other areas of joint interest between NATO and the OSCE include gender and terrorism, border security, a whole-of-government approach to counter-terrorism, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, as well as countering terrorist financing.

    NATO is also working with other regional organisations to address the terrorism threat. In AprilNATO and the African Union (AU) held their first joint counter-terrorism training in Algiers and in DecemberNATO hosted the first counter-terrorism dialogue with the AU. Since then, the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism has been briefing Allies regularly and further practical cooperation is under development.

    The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon in the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to efforts to enhance aviation security. NATO contributed to improved civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the US Federal Aviation Administration, other major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

    Education

    NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It draws on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; mobile training courses run out of Allied Joint Force Commands at Naples, Italy and Brunssum, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, the Netherlands; and the Centres of Excellence (COEs), which support the NATO Command Structure. There are almost 30 COEs accredited by NATO, several of which have links to the fight against terrorism. The Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Türkiye serves both as a location for meetings and as a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The COE-DAT reaches out to over 50 countries and 40 organisations.

    InNATO delivered the first in-person counter-terrorism course through a Mobile Education and Training Team at the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Regional Centre in Kuwait, with 24 participants from NATO partner countries in the Gulf.

     

  • Milestones in NATO’s work on counter-terrorism

    The Alliance's Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO's security.

    11 September

    Four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched by the terrorist group al-Qaeda on targets in the United States.

    12 September

    Less than 24 hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO Allies and partner countries condemn the attacks in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and offer their support to anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation United States, pledging to "undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism". Later that day, the Allies decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defence clause, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, for the first time in NATO's history, if it is determined that the attack had been directed from abroad against the United States.

    September

    Declarations of solidarity and support are given by Russia and Ukraine.

    2 October

    The North Atlantic Council is briefed by a high-level US official on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks. The Council determines that the attacks would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

    4 October

    NATO agrees on eight measures to support the United States:

    • to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
    • to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
    • to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
    • to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
    • to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
    • to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
    • that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
    • that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

    Mid-October

    NATO archlinux grub2 error 15 its first-ever operation against terrorism: Operation Eagle Assist. At the request of the United States, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft are sent to help patrol the skies over the United States. The operation runs through to mid-Mayduring which time crewmembers from 13 NATO countries fly over sorties, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. It is the first time that NATO military assets have been deployed in support anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation an Article 5 operation.

    26 October

    NATO launches its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States: Operation Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces are sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking.

    May

    At their Reykjavik meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers decide that the Alliance will operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism. This landmark declaration effectively ends the debate on what constitutes NATO's area of operations and paves the way for the Alliance's future engagement with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

    November

    At the Prague Summit, NATO Leaders express their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists. To this end, they adopt a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprises:

    • a Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation Concept for Defence against Terrorism;
    • a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
    • five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives;
    • protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;
    • missile defence: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;
    • cyber defence;
    • cooperation with other international organisations; and
    • improved intelligence-sharing.

    In addition, they decide to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment to better prepare NATO's military forces to face anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation challenges, including terrorism.

    10 March

    Operation Active Endeavour is expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar. The remit is extended to the whole of the Mediterranean a year later.

    11 August

    NATO takes lead of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists.

    NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in Novemberanti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, recognises that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. It commits Allies to enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced threat analysis, more consultations with NATO's partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities.

    May

    At the Chicago Summit, NATO Leaders endorse new policy guidelines for Alliance work on counter-terrorism, which focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is subsumed into the overall NATO approach. The NATO Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism, which reflects the policy guidelines, becomes a public document in

    Responsibility for security gradually transitions from ISAF to the Afghan security forces in a phased approach. The Afghan forces assume full security responsibility, and ISAF is brought to a close by the end of

    1 January

    NATO’s Resolute Support Mission is launched to provide further training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions in order to help the Afghan National Unity Government to prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorism.

    July

    At the Warsaw Summit, Allied Leaders decide to provide support through NATO to the fight against ISIS. NATO AWACS aircraft will provide information to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS. NATO will begin training and capacity-building in Iraq, while continuing to train hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Allies will enhance ongoing cooperation with Jordan in areas such as cyber defence and countering roadside bombs.

    Allies also undertake to promote information-sharing through the optimised use of multilateral platforms and to continue to seek to enhance cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.

    October

    Operation Active Endeavour is terminated and succeeded by Sea Guardian, a broader maritime operation in the Mediterranean, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if so decided by the North Atlantic Council.  

    5 February

    NATO launches a new training programme in Iraq, teaching Iraqi security forces to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This is particularly relevant for territory newly liberated from ISIS occupation.

    16 February

    Defence ministers agree to create a new regional ‘Hub for the South’, based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples. It will be a focal point for increasing both the Alliance’s understanding of the challenges stemming anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation the region, and its ability to respond to them.

    31 March

    Foreign ministers decide to step up their efforts inside Iraq, including with military medicine courses to train new paramedics, and with training to help maintain tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. 

    25 May  

    At their meeting in Brussels, Allies agree an action plan to do more in the international fight against terrorism with: more AWACS flight time, more information-sharing and air-to-air refuelling; NATO’s membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; the establishment of a new terrorism intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters and the appointment of a coordinator to oversee NATO’s efforts in the fight against terrorism.

    December

    At their meeting, foreign ministers underline the continuing need to provide support to NATO’s southern partners in building counter-terrorism capabilities and institutions.  They reaffirm their full commitment to Allied efforts in training and assistance, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, building Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s security capacity, which is an important part of NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. Ministers also note that NATO’s role within the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS will evolve as the Coalition moves from combat anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation to stabilisation efforts.

    NATO and the European Union agree to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including by strengthening the exchange of information, coordinating their counter-terrorism support for partner countries and working to improve national resilience to terrorist attacks.

    15 February

    At their meeting, defence ministers agree to start planning for a NATO non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission in Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

    11 July

    At the Brussels Summit, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, Allies decide to establish a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission in Iraq anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation increase their assistance to the Afghan security forces, providing more trainers and extending financial support. They will continue to contribute to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and will also increase their support to partners to further develop their capacities to tackle terrorism. 

    December

    Foreign ministers agree an updated action plan on enhancing NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. It consolidates NATO’s counter-terrorism activities related to awareness, preparedness, capability development and engagement with partners.

    14 February

    Defence ministers endorse a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems and a set of guidelines on civil-military cooperation in case of a potential CBRN terrorist attack.

    4 December

    At their meeting on the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Allied Leaders note an updated action plan to enhance NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. They also take stock of NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism, including the Alliance’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which continue to play a key role in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist groups.

    February

    Defence ministers agree in principle to enhance NATO Mission Iraq by taking on some of the Global Coalition’s training activities.

    12 June

    NATO launches its first standardized Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum.

    October

    NATO agrees a Battlefield Evidence Policy to facilitate the sharing of information obtained in NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. At the same time, a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation is approved.

    July

    NATO agrees a Programme of Work on Battlefield Evidence to guide the implementation of the Policy.

    September

    Following the completion of the withdrawal of all Resolute Support Mission (RSM) forces from Afghanistan the previous month, RSM is terminated in early September. NATO Allies went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States to ensure that the country would not again become a safe haven for international terrorists to attack NATO member countries. Over the last two decades, there have been no terrorist attacks on Allied soil from Afghanistan. Any future Afghan government must ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.

    November/December

    At their meeting in Riga, NATO Foreign Ministers agree an updated action plan to enhance the Alliance’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation. The plan consolidates and guides all of NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts, covering awareness, capabilities and engagement. It also includes new areas such as terrorist misuse anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation technology, human security and countering terrorist financing.

    29 June

    At the NATO Summit in Madrid, Allied Leaders adopt the Alliance’s Strategic Concept – a key document that defines the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that Anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation will carry out to address them. The Strategic Concept identifies terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity. It states that NATO will continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Alliance will enhance cooperation with the international community to tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and will also enhance support to NATO’s partners, anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation, helping build their capacity to counter terrorism. 

Counterterrorism

The Netherlands is working to combat terrorism in a variety of ways. For example, it monitors potential terrorists, promptly identifies individuals who may be becoming radicalised and provides at-risk people and buildings with additional security.

Security of potential targets

The Dutch government takes security measures to protect people and organisations that could become the target of attacks. This reduces the chances of a terrorist attack.

And if an attack does happen, the Netherlands is prepared to minimise the impact.

Recognising radicalisation

Terrorists go through a radicalisation process before turning to violence. Teachers and youth workers try to recognise this and report their suspicions to the police and criminal justice authorities, if necessary. In this way, it is possible to stop radicalisation in time and prevent it from leading to terrorism.

Punishing terrorists

Terrorist offences are crimes carried out with the intent to cause terror. Terrorist intent is a circumstance that makes the punishment more severe. So the sentence for an offence carried out with terrorist intent will be harsher  than for the basic offence alone. This applies not only to people who carry out attacks but also to those who intend to carry out an attack. For example, planning an attack or completing a terrorist training programme are also criminal offences.

General counterterrorism measures

The Dutch government has taken a series of measures to combat terrorism. For example:

  • Websites that use hate speech or anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation for violence or discrimination are taken down.
  • The Counterterrorism Alert System warns the government and key sectors (such as drinking water companies and the energy sector) about terrorist threats.
  • The Royal Netherlands Air Force monitors Dutch airspace around the clock.
  • Special units from the armed forces and the police collaborate in the Special Intervention Service (DSI). This service arrests and detains those suspected of terrorist offences. In the most extreme cases it eliminates them.
  • The police monitor people who may pose a terrorist threat.
  • The government has taken measures to combat terrorist financing.
  • The intelligence and security services have increased their capabilities. The new Intelligence and Security Services Act (WIV) helps keep the Netherlands and Dutch military personnel abroad safe.
  • The national terrorism list is used to keep a record of individuals and anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation involved in terrorist activities. The assets of these individuals and organisations are frozen.

Working with international partners to share information on terrorism

The Netherlands wants to improve international cooperation and information sharing in order to combat terrorism. The Netherlands also intends to make funds available to establish a Passenger Information Unit for the Netherlands (Pi-NL) The unit will analyse information provided by airlines, such as reservation data,  and work together with similar units in other countries. The information can be used to combat serious crime and terrorism.

Types of terrorism

Jihadism is currently the main source of terrorism. However, there are other forms of terrorism. For example, the government is also alert to terrorist threats posed by left-wing and right-wing extremists and by animal rights activists.

anti-terrorist non-governmental organisation

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Countering terrorism

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion, and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO will continue to fight this threat with determination and in full solidarity. NATO’s work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

 

  • NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the United States.
  • NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement.
  • NATO’s counter-terrorism work spans across the Alliance’s three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
  • A comprehensive action plan defines and determines NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism.
  • A Terrorism Intelligence Cell has been established at NATO Headquarters.
  • NATO advises and assists Iraqi security forces and institutions through NATO Mission Iraq and is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
  • NATO supports the development of new capabilities and technologies to tackle the terrorist threat and to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.
  • NATO cooperates with partners and international organisations to leverage the full potential of each stakeholder engaged in the global counter-terrorism effort.
  • The Alliance’s Strategic Concept recognises terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity.
  • Awareness

    In support of national authorities, NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic analysis and assessment.

    Intelligence reporting at NATO is based on contributions from Allies’ intelligence services, both internal and external, civilian and military. The way NATO handles sensitive information has gradually evolved based on successive summit decisions and continuing reform of intelligence structures since Since , the Joint Intelligence and Security Division at NATO benefits from increased sharing of intelligence between member services and the Alliance, and produces strategic analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.

    Intelligence-sharing between NATO and partner countries’ agencies continues through the Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and an intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. An intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters improves how NATO shares intelligence, including on foreign fighters. NATO faces a range of threats arising from instability in the region to the south of the Alliance. NATO increases its understanding of these challenges and improves its ability to respond to them through the ‘Hub for the South’ based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. The Hub collects and analyses information, assesses potential threats and engages with partner countries and organisations.

    Recognising the many different roles that men and women may play in terrorist groups, NATO is also seeking to integrate a gender perspective in all its counter-terrorism efforts, including training and education for Allies and partners, as well as policy and programme development. Likewise, the Alliance seeks to address all pillars of the human security agenda (including protection of civilians, preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence, countering trafficking in human beings, protection of children in armed conflict, cultural property protection) in its counter-terrorism work.  

    Beyond the everyday consultations within the Alliance, experts from a range of backgrounds are invited to brief Allies on specific areas of counter-terrorism. Likewise, discussions with international organisations – including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) – enhance Allies’ knowledge of international counter-terrorism efforts worldwide and help NATO refine the contribution that it makes to the global approach.

  • Capabilities

    The Alliance strives to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats. Capability development and work on innovative technologies are part of NATO’s core business, and methods that address asymmetric threats, including terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are of particular relevance. Much of this work is conducted through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which aims to protect troops, civilians and critical infrastructure against attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). NATO’s Centres of Excellence are important contributors to many projects, providing expertise across a range of topics including military engineering for route clearance, countering IEDs, explosives disposal, cultural familiarisation, network analysis and modelling.

    NATO policies and practical frameworks in areas such as C-UAS, biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation also drive capability development in areas relevant to counter-terrorism. 

    Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

    The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW) was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and approved by NATO Leaders at the Istanbul Summit in Its initial focus was primarily centred on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks, but the programme has since widened its scope to support comprehensive capability development. It now includes exercises, trials, development of prototypes and concepts, doctrine, policy, equipment, training and lessons learned, and interoperability demonstrations. The key aim of the DAT POW is to prevent non-conventional attacks, such as attacks with IEDs and UAS, and mitigate other challenges, such as attacks on critical infrastructure.

    The DAT POW is based on the principle of common funding, whereby member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. Under the DAT POW, individual NATO countries, with support and contributions from other member countries and NATO bodies, lead projects to develop advanced technologies or counter-measures that meet the most urgent security needs in the face of terrorism and other asymmetric threats.

    Most projects under the programme focus on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term and that respond to the military needs of the Alliance – although the DAT POW also bridges the gap between long-term military requirements and urgent operational needs. The programme uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats, covering a wide range of areas, including countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), biometrics, technical exploitation and countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED). The DAT POW is also an integral contributor to NATO activities in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as data and autonomous vehicles exploitation.

    Protection of harbours and ports

    The safe and uninterrupted functioning of harbours and ports is critical to the global economy and it is essential for maritime assets to be made as secure as possible. The DAT POW has supported several projects to develop technologies that enhance maritime protection. These have included sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid-reaction capabilities, underwater magnetic barriers and unmanned underwater vehicles. In and , under the leadership of France, the DAT POW supported "Cut Away", a multinational harbour exploration and clearance exercise. Additionally, under the lead of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) located in La Spezia, Italy, the DAT POW is assessing the use of underwater autonomous systems to detect maritime IEDs and of virtual reality for situational awareness.

    Countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

    NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems to state and non-state actors, including terrorists. Ideally, terrorists will be prevented from acquiring and using such weapons, but should prevention fail, NATO is committed to defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Allied forces, territory and populations, and to supporting recovery efforts.

    The NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents. The NATO-certified Centre of Excellence (COE) on Joint CBRN Defence in the Czech Republic further enhances NATO’s capabilities. The DAT POW has also supported the Joint CBRN Defence COE in establishing and enhancing the NATO CBRN Reachback Capability, ensuring that CBRN expertise is available to the NATO Command Structure and Allied forces in theatres of operations.

    The DAT POW also covers projects on the detection, identification and monitoring of CBRN substances, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management and CBRN medical counter-measures. Furthermore, the DAT POW facilitates training and exercises, including those conducted with live agents.

    Explosive ordnance disposal and consequence management

    Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians are experts in the safe detection, removal and destruction of dangerous weapons like landmines and other explosive remnants of war. The DAT POW helps improve NATO's EOD capabilities by training teams how to manage the consequences of an explosion. The programme also supports EOD demonstrations and trials, led by the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence in Trencin, Slovakia. With DAT POW support, the demining community has also tested integrated exoskeletons that technicians can wear to protect themselves while undertaking this dangerous work. The strong community of interest includes experts from partner countries, such as the Irish Defence Forces' Ordnance School.

    Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED)

    NATO must remain prepared to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority. Several NATO bodies are leading the Alliance’s efforts on countering IEDs, including the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain. Various technologies to defeat IEDs have been explored, in particular stand-off detection. The DAT POW supports the annual Northern Challenge exercise, led by Iceland, which tests counter-IED and IED disposal abilities. The biennial Thor's Hammer electronic counter-measures trial series and the radio-controlled IED database are two innovative approaches regularly supported by the DAT POW, which are now also being leveraged to assist with countering unmanned aircraft systems. 

    Countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)

    Terrorists have sought to use and manipulate various technologies in their operations, including easily available off-the-shelf technology. Drones, in particular, have been identified as a threat. Therefore, in February , NATO Defence Ministers agreed a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems. A new programme of work to help coordinate approaches and identify additional steps to address this threat was agreed in and is currently being implemented. 

    The DAT POW supports comprehensive capability development in the field of C-UAS through tests, evaluation, exercises, concept development and technical standardization. In , the DAT POW supported an innovation challenge for the development of artificial intelligence / machine learning techniques to track, classify and identify drones as they fly within a defined area. At the NATO Summit in Madrid, a technology display for Heads of State and Government covered some of the latest challenges related to C-UAS and exploitation capabilities. 

    Through the DAT POW, NATO is also consulting with stakeholders from industry, the military and academia to explore how new technologies can be leveraged in the fight against terrorism.

    Biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation

    NATO is also addressing the use of information obtained on missions and operations. In , Allies agreed a biometric data policy, consistent with applicable national and international law and subject to national requirements and restrictions. The policy enables biometric data collection to support NATO operations, based upon a mandate from the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s top political decision-making body. Furthermore, NATO's Strategic Commands have recognised that developing and improving this capability is a military requirement. The policy is particularly relevant to force protection and the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. United Nations Security Council Resolution highlights the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and “urges Member States to expeditiously exchange information, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms and in accordance with domestic and international law, concerning the identity of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”. A prototype of the NATO Automated Biometric Information System (NABIS) was deployed for testing and operational experimentation by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Building on this, military requirements are under development to deploy NABIS in KFOR in the long term.

    In October , the NATO Battlefield Evidence Policy was approved. It aims to facilitate the sharing of information obtained on NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. While the primary purpose of deployed military is to fulfil their operational objectives, troops often collect information or material on the battlefield, some of which may also be useful to support legal proceedings, including the prosecution of returning foreign terrorist fighters. In this regard, the policy also supports Allies in fulfilling their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution in holding foreign fighters accountable. Cooperation with other international organisations, including the United Nations, INTERPOL and the European Union, is an important aspect of NATO’s work on battlefield evidence to ensure complementarity and added value. Since July , NATO also has a Battlefield Evidence Programme of Work in place to guide the implementation of the Policy. Moreover, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence is providing a series of hands-on battlefield evidence training courses to law enforcement and military from partner countries in the region to the south of the Alliance.

    Also in October , a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation was agreed. Technical exploitation collects material that has been in the possession of terrorists and other adversaries – such as weapons, computers and cell phones – and uses scientific tools and analysis to support the identification of actors, their capabilities and intentions. It enables NATO forces to derive important information and intelligence from material and materiel collected on the battlefield to support military objectives, protect our forces or support law enforcement outcomes such as battlefield evidence. In June , the first NATO Martial Vision Technical Exploitation Experiment took place in Burgos, Spain to test and assess relevant technical exploitation doctrine.

    Operations and missions

    As part of the Alliance’s degree approach to deterrence and defence, NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts extend through a variety of operations and missions, both within NATO territory and beyond the Alliance’s borders.

    Since , NATO has been a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. As a member of the Coalition, NATO has been playing a key role in the fight against international terrorism, including through its former operational engagement in Afghanistan, through intelligence-sharing and through its work with partners with a view to projecting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Leaders agreed to provide direct support to the Global Coalition through the provision of NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft. The first patrols of NATO AWACS aircraft, operating from Konya Airfield in Türkiye, started in October

    In February , following a request by the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition, the Alliance decided to launch NATO Mission Iraq, a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission. Its aim is to strengthen Iraqi security forces and institutions so that they are better able to prevent the return of Daesh/ISIS, to fight terrorism and to stabilise the country. In February , upon request from Iraq, Allied Defence Ministers agreed to expand the scope of NATO Mission Iraq. NATO operates in full respect of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and coordinates and consults closely with other international partners like the Global Coalition, the United Nations and the European Union.

    NATO also takes part in counter-terrorism in the high seas. NATO’s operation Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime security operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, including countering terrorism at sea if required. Currently, Sea Guardian operates in the Mediterranean Sea. It succeeded Operation Active Endeavour, which was launched in under Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty as part of NATO’s immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks to deter, detect and, if necessary, disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Active Endeavour was terminated in October

    Many other operations have had relevance to international counter-terrorism efforts. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, which began in and came to an end in - helped the government to expand its authority and implement security to prevent the country from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. Following the end of ISAF, NATO launched the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. In April , the Allies decided to start the withdrawal of RSM forces by 1 May and the mission was terminated in early September

    Crisis management

    NATO’s long-standing work on civil preparedness, critical infrastructure protection and crisis management provides a resource that may serve both Allies and partners upon request. This field can relate directly to counter-terrorism, building resilience and ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for response to and recovery from terrorist acts.

    Protecting populations and critical infrastructure

    National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their populations and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents and natural disasters. NATO can assist countries by developing non-binding advice and minimum standards and acting as a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned to improve preparedness and national resilience. NATO has developed guidelines for enhancing civil-military cooperation in response to a CBRN incident and organises international courses for trainers of first responders to CBRN incidents. NATO guidance can also advise national authorities on warning the general public and alerting emergency responders. NATO can call on an extensive network of civil experts, from government and industry, to help respond to requests for assistance. Its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) coordinates responses to national requests for assistance following natural and human-made disasters including terrorist acts involving CBRN substances.

     

  • Engagement

    As the global counter-terrorism effort requires a holistic approach, Allies have resolved to strengthen outreach to and cooperation with partner countries and international actors.

    With partners

    Increasingly, partners are taking advantage of partnership mechanisms for dialogue and practical cooperation relevant to counter-terrorism, including defence capacity building.

    For instance, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) package for Jordan was reviewed in and now comprises 15 initiatives, including some that are specifically aimed at supporting Jordan in its counter-terrorism efforts, such as strategic communications, the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the development of a curriculum for Jordan’s counter-terrorism education and training. Counter-terrorism is also a high priority for partners such as Mauritania and Tunisia, for whom Allies agreed new DCB packages at the June Madrid Summit. In Madrid, Allies also agreed to offer tailored support measures to enhance the resilience of vulnerable partners against security challenges and malign foreign influence. To that end, NATO will scale up counter-terrorism engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Interested partners are encouraged to include a section on counter-terrorism in their individual cooperation agreements with NATO. Dialogue with partners about the specific threats that they face helps the Alliance to better understand the needs of its partners and tailor its counter-terrorism support accordingly.

    Allies place particular emphasis on shared awareness, capacity-building, civil preparedness and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively. Countering improvised explosive devices, the promotion of a whole-of-government approach and military border security are among NATO’s areas of work with partners.

    As a result of multinational collaboration through the Partnership for Peace Consortium, NATO launched its first standardized curriculum on counter-terrorism in June , aiming to support interested Allies and partners in enhancing their capacities to develop national skills and improve counter-terrorism strategies. The curriculum also serves as a reference document to support partner countries in addressing their education and training requirements relevant for fighting terrorism, under the framework of NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). In , the Alliance began using this standardized curriculum to deliver online courses to participants of the Odesa Military Academy and the National Defence University in Kyiv, Ukraine.

    Counter-terrorism is one of the key priorities of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The SPS Programme enhances cooperation and dialogue between scientists and experts from Allies and partners, contributing to a better understanding of the terrorist threat, the development of detection and response measures, and fostering a network of experts.

    Activities coordinated by the SPS Programme include workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects that contribute to identifying methods for the protection of critical infrastructure, supplies and personnel; human factors in defence against terrorism; technologies to detect explosive devices and illicit activities; and risk management, best practices, and use of new technologies in response to terrorism. The SPS Programme is flexible and able to respond to evolving priorities. For example, since , the SPS Programme has overseen DEXTER (short for Detection of Explosives and firearms to counter TERrorism). This flagship initiative is composed of a number of projects all working together to develop an integrated system of sensors and data fusion technologies capable of detecting explosives and concealed weapons in real time to help secure mass transport infrastructures, such as airports, metro and railway stations. DEXTER was successfully tested in a live demonstration at a metro station in Rome, Italy in May Eleven governmental and research institutions from four NATO Allies (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and four partner countries (Finland, the Republic of Korea, Serbia and Ukraine) have participated in DEXTER.

    With international actors

    NATO cooperates in particular with the UN, the EU and the OSCE to ensure that views and information are shared and that appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with relevant UN resolutions provide common frameworks for efforts to combat terrorism.

    NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its component organisations, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. NATO’s Centres of Excellence and education and training opportunities are often relevant to UN counter-terrorism priorities, as is the specific area of explosives management. More broadly, NATO works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN Committee. In March , NATO and the UN launched a joint project to improve CBRN resilience in Jordan.

    NATO and the European Union are committed to combatting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They exchange information regularly on counter-terrorism projects and on related activities such as work on the protection of civilian populations against CBRN attacks. Relations and regular staff talks with the European External Action Service’s counter-terrorism section, with the Council of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator’s office and other parts of the EU help ensure mutual understanding and complementarity.

    NATO maintains close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action against Terrorism Unit. Other areas of joint interest between NATO and the OSCE include gender and terrorism, border security, a whole-of-government approach to counter-terrorism, as well as countering terrorist financing.

    NATO is also working with other regional organisations to address the terrorism threat. In April , NATO and the African Union (AU) held their first joint counter-terrorism training in Algiers and in December , NATO hosted the first counter-terrorism dialogue with the AU. Since then, the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism has been briefing Allies regularly and further practical cooperation is under development.

    The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon in the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to efforts to enhance aviation security. NATO contributed to improved civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the US Federal Aviation Administration, other major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

    Education

    NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It draws on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; mobile training courses run out of Allied Joint Force Commands at Naples, Italy and Brunssum, the Netherlands; and the Centres of Excellence (COEs), which support the NATO Command Structure. There are almost 30 COEs accredited by NATO, several of which have links to the fight against terrorism. The Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Türkiye serves both as a location for meetings and as a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The COE-DAT reaches out to over 50 countries and 40 organisations.

    In , NATO delivered the first in-person counter-terrorism course through a Mobile Education and Training Team at the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Regional Centre in Kuwait, with 24 participants from NATO partner countries in the Gulf.

     

  • Milestones in NATO’s work on counter-terrorism

    The Alliance's Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO's security.

    11 September

    Four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched by the terrorist group al-Qaeda on targets in the United States.

    12 September

    Less than 24 hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO Allies and partner countries condemn the attacks in a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and offer their support to the United States, pledging to "undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism". Later that day, the Allies decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective defence clause, for the first time in NATO's history, if it is determined that the attack had been directed from abroad against the United States.

    September

    Declarations of solidarity and support are given by Russia and Ukraine.

    2 October

    The North Atlantic Council is briefed by a high-level US official on the results of investigations into the 9/11 attacks. The Council determines that the attacks would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

    4 October

    NATO agrees on eight measures to support the United States:

    • to enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
    • to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;
    • to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
    • to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism;
    • to provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
    • to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures;
    • that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
    • that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.

    Mid-October

    NATO launches its first-ever operation against terrorism: Operation Eagle Assist. At the request of the United States, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft are sent to help patrol the skies over the United States. The operation runs through to mid-May , during which time crewmembers from 13 NATO countries fly over sorties. It is the first time that NATO military assets have been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.

    26 October

    NATO launches its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States: Operation Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces are sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking.

    May

    At their Reykjavik meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers decide that the Alliance will operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism. This landmark declaration effectively ends the debate on what constitutes NATO's area of operations and paves the way for the Alliance's future engagement with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

    November

    At the Prague Summit, NATO Leaders express their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists. To this end, they adopt a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprises:

    • a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism;
    • a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T);
    • five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives;
    • protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;
    • missile defence: Allies are examining options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance populations, territory and forces in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence;
    • cyber defence;
    • cooperation with other international organisations; and
    • improved intelligence-sharing.

    In addition, they decide to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment to better prepare NATO's military forces to face new challenges, including terrorism.

    10 March

    Operation Active Endeavour is expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar. The remit is extended to the whole of the Mediterranean a year later.

    11 August

    NATO takes lead of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists.

    NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November , recognises that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. It commits Allies to enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced threat analysis, more consultations with NATO's partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities.

    May

    At the Chicago Summit, NATO Leaders endorse new policy guidelines for Alliance work on counter-terrorism, which focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is subsumed into the overall NATO approach. The NATO Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism, which reflects the policy guidelines, becomes a public document in

    Responsibility for security gradually transitions from ISAF to the Afghan security forces in a phased approach. The Afghan forces assume full security responsibility, and ISAF is brought to a close by the end of

    1 January

    NATO’s Resolute Support Mission is launched to provide further training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions in order to help the Afghan National Unity Government to prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorism.

    July

    At the Warsaw Summit, Allied Leaders decide to provide support through NATO to the fight against ISIS. NATO AWACS aircraft will provide information to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS. NATO will begin training and capacity-building in Iraq, while continuing to train hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan. Allies will enhance ongoing cooperation with Jordan in areas such as cyber defence and countering roadside bombs.

    Allies also undertake to promote information-sharing through the optimised use of multilateral platforms and to continue to seek to enhance cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.

    October

    Operation Active Endeavour is terminated and succeeded by Sea Guardian, a broader maritime operation in the Mediterranean. Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if so decided by the North Atlantic Council.  

    5 February

    NATO launches a new training programme in Iraq, teaching Iraqi security forces to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This is particularly relevant for territory newly liberated from ISIS occupation.

    16 February

    Defence ministers agree to create a new regional ‘Hub for the South’, based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples. It will be a focal point for increasing both the Alliance’s understanding of the challenges stemming from the region, and its ability to respond to them.

    31 March

    Foreign ministers decide to step up their efforts inside Iraq, including with military medicine courses to train new paramedics, and with training to help maintain tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. 

    25 May  

    At their meeting in Brussels, Allies agree an action plan to do more in the international fight against terrorism with: more AWACS flight time, more information-sharing and air-to-air refuelling; NATO’s membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; the establishment of a new terrorism intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters and the appointment of a coordinator to oversee NATO’s efforts in the fight against terrorism.

    December

    At their meeting, foreign ministers underline the continuing need to provide support to NATO’s southern partners in building counter-terrorism capabilities and institutions.  They reaffirm their full commitment to Allied efforts in training and assistance, building Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s security capacity, which is an important part of NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. Ministers also note that NATO’s role within the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS will evolve as the Coalition moves from combat operations to stabilisation efforts.

    NATO and the European Union agree to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including by strengthening the exchange of information, coordinating their counter-terrorism support for partner countries and working to improve national resilience to terrorist attacks.

    15 February

    At their meeting, defence ministers agree to start planning for a NATO non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission in Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

    11 July

    At the Brussels Summit, Allies decide to establish a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission in Iraq and increase their assistance to the Afghan security forces, providing more trainers and extending financial support. They will continue to contribute to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and will also increase their support to partners to further develop their capacities to tackle terrorism. 

    December

    Foreign ministers agree an updated action plan on enhancing NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. It consolidates NATO’s counter-terrorism activities related to awareness, preparedness, capability development and engagement with partners.

    14 February

    Defence ministers endorse a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems and a set of guidelines on civil-military cooperation in case of a potential CBRN terrorist attack.

    4 December

    At their meeting on the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Allied Leaders note an updated action plan to enhance NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. They also take stock of NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism, including the Alliance’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which continue to play a key role in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist groups.

    February

    Defence ministers agree in principle to enhance NATO Mission Iraq by taking on some of the Global Coalition’s training activities.

    12 June

    NATO launches its first standardized Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum.

    October

    NATO agrees a Battlefield Evidence Policy to facilitate the sharing of information obtained in NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. At the same time, a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation is approved.

    July

    NATO agrees a Programme of Work on Battlefield Evidence to guide the implementation of the Policy.

    September

    Following the completion of the withdrawal of all Resolute Support Mission (RSM) forces from Afghanistan the previous month, RSM is terminated in early September. NATO Allies went into Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States to ensure that the country would not again become a safe haven for international terrorists to attack NATO member countries. Over the last two decades, there have been no terrorist attacks on Allied soil from Afghanistan. Any future Afghan government must ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.

    November/December

    At their meeting in Riga, NATO Foreign Ministers agree an updated action plan to enhance the Alliance’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. The plan consolidates and guides all of NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts, covering awareness, capabilities and engagement. It also includes new areas such as terrorist misuse of technology, human security and countering terrorist financing.

    29 June

    At the NATO Summit in Madrid, Allied Leaders adopt the Alliance’s Strategic Concept – a key document that defines the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO will carry out to address them. The Strategic Concept identifies terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity. It states that NATO will continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Alliance will enhance cooperation with the international community to tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and will also enhance support to NATO’s partners, helping build their capacity to counter terrorism. 

Counterterrorism

The Netherlands is working to combat terrorism in a variety of ways. For example, it monitors potential terrorists, promptly identifies individuals who may be becoming radicalised and provides at-risk people and buildings with additional security.

Security of potential targets

The Dutch government takes security measures to protect people and organisations that could become the target of attacks. This reduces the chances of a terrorist attack.

And if an attack does happen, the Netherlands is prepared to minimise the impact.

Recognising radicalisation

Terrorists go through a radicalisation process before turning to violence. Teachers and youth workers try to recognise this and report their suspicions to the police and criminal justice authorities, if necessary. In this way, it is possible to stop radicalisation in time and prevent it from leading to terrorism.

Punishing terrorists

Terrorist offences are crimes carried out with the intent to cause terror. Terrorist intent is a circumstance that makes the punishment more severe. So the sentence for an offence carried out with terrorist intent will be harsher  than for the basic offence alone. This applies not only to people who carry out attacks but also to those who intend to carry out an attack. For example, planning an attack or completing a terrorist training programme are also criminal offences.

General counterterrorism measures

The Dutch government has taken a series of measures to combat terrorism. For example:

  • Websites that use hate speech or call for violence or discrimination are taken down.
  • The Counterterrorism Alert System warns the government and key sectors (such as drinking water companies and the energy sector) about terrorist threats.
  • The Royal Netherlands Air Force monitors Dutch airspace around the clock.
  • Special units from the armed forces and the police collaborate in the Special Intervention Service (DSI). This service arrests and detains those suspected of terrorist offences. In the most extreme cases it eliminates them.
  • The police monitor people who may pose a terrorist threat.
  • The government has taken measures to combat terrorist financing.
  • The intelligence and security services have increased their capabilities. The new Intelligence and Security Services Act (WIV) helps keep the Netherlands and Dutch military personnel abroad safe.
  • The national terrorism list is used to keep a record of individuals and organisations involved in terrorist activities. The assets of these individuals and organisations are frozen.

Working with international partners to share information on terrorism

The Netherlands wants to improve international cooperation and information sharing in order to combat terrorism. The Netherlands also intends to make funds available to establish a Passenger Information Unit for the Netherlands (Pi-NL) The unit will analyse information provided by airlines, such as reservation data,  and work together with similar units in other countries. The information can be used to combat serious crime and terrorism.

Types of terrorism

Jihadism is currently the main source of terrorism. However, there are other forms of terrorism. For example, the government is also alert to terrorist threats posed by left-wing and right-wing extremists and by animal rights activists.

The measures to fight terrorism in Italy

International cooperation as the linchpin in the fight against terrorism

Starting from September 11, , the international community has launched initiatives to prevent and counter the threat of terrorism by using, depending on the circumstance, military or law enforcement instruments or, in the perspective of prevention, addressing the social and economic conditions liable to favour the spread of extremist propaganda or the recruitment of terrorists.

The European Union underscores the need for an integrated approach in which every component (investigations, intelligence activities, the political and diplomatic dimension, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, the struggle against financing systems, transport safety, the strategy to fight recruitment and radicalisation) plays an essential and synergic role.

An indispensable principle for the European Union – but also acknowledged in relevant acts of the United Nations, such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in September and renewed every two years – is that the struggle against terrorism must unfold in the respect for international law, human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as for the rule of law.

The response of Italy – Complying at legislative and institutional level

At present, Italy has a legislation in line with the highest international standards in fighting terrorism and violent extremism. Our legal system has gradually abandoned the regulatory framework set up to tackle the threat of terrorism in the s with a view to adjusting to the different challenges posed by the terrorist threats of the subsequent decades, combining repressive measures with the attempt to prevent the phenomenon.

In , with the adoption of Law Decree No. 7 of 18 February labelled “Urgent measures to counter terrorism, also international (…)”, later enacted by Law No. 43 of 17 April , our Country implemented the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. of September , which is especially aimed at addressing the phenomenon of the so-called “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF).

With Law No. 43 Italian legislators further reinforced the mechanisms to fight international terrorism, with a special focus on the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalist extremism, only a few months after the terrorist attacks in Paris on 7 January

The Law arose from the need to be able to rely on the most effective legal instruments in combating the phenomenon of FTF and, among these, the so-called “lone wolves”, meaning thereby people, often also second or third-generation immigrants, who autonomously convert to the cause of the “Jihad” and act on their own account. This is a different kind of terrorist than the traditional profile describing him as a member of a criminal organization, also international, as was written in Art. bis and following articles of the Criminal Code (Associations, also international, for the purposes of terrorism).

The counter-terrorism measures identified in Law 43/ envisage new incrimination provisions or broadening the scope of existing provisions (incriminating the recruit and not only the recruiter, self-training, organizing transfers abroad to finance terrorist activities) and the adoption of individual prevention measures now comprehensively regulated by the anti-Mafia Code (Legislative Decree No. /). In this last respect, on the one hand, the Law aims to ban anyone (Italian or foreign) suspected of sympathising with the fundamentalist cause from leaving the Country in order to go fight with the Islamic militias (and then return to our Country with a load of experiences acquired on the battlefield) and, on the other hand, expel from the Country any non-EU citizen suspected of having links with terrorism or who has eventually merely manifested the will to fight in conflicts abroad.

The administrative expulsion of the foreigner for reasons of public order and security provided for under Legislative Decree No. /98, is to be promoted by the Minister of the Interior (or by the Prefect upon a mandate from the Minister) and is accompanied by an order motivating the reasons of the danger of the expelled individual for the “security of the State”, as in the case of subjects involved in espionage or terrorist activities. It is a flexible terrorist risk prevention instrument to be used against those citizens who, legally present on the national territory, represent a danger for the State even if they have not committed offences listed in the categories mentioned above.

Law 43 for the first time also assigns a coordinating role in the investigation of terrorism to the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor’s Office, now renamed “National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office”.

Italian legislators came back to the issue of combating terrorism in with the adoption of Law No. of 28 July of It adjusts Italian legislation to a number of international commitments on this issue, also making several amendments to the Criminal Code, adding thereto new cases for incrimination such as: a) offences of financing behaviours leading to acts of terrorism; b) the theft of confiscated goods or money; c) acts of nuclear terrorism; and also a new case providing for the mandatory confiscation in connection with all the offences committed for the purpose of terrorism.

On 19 June of last year, the Italian Official Journal published Legislative Decree No. 90 of 25 May to fall in line with Directive (EU) / preventing the use of the financial system for the purpose of laundering proceeds from criminal activities and financing terrorism, amending Directives /60/EC and /70/EC and implementing Regulation (EU) No. / Law No. / had incorporated in our legal order the Financial Security Committee (CSF) at the Ministry of Economy and Finance with the task of coordinating competent Agencies and Police Forces in fighting terrorism and supervising the activities connected to the implementation of international sanctions. The functions of the CSF were subsequently extended to include money laundering activities.

Law No. /, which was approved in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 , adopted urgent measures to prevent and combat offences committed for the purposes of committing an act of international terrorism. Among these was the law that punished anyone “promoting, establishing, organising, managing or financing” associations whose aim was to commit acts of violence for the purposes of terrorism or subverting the democratic order.

Within this legislative framework, Legislative Decree No of , which was passed to implement European Council Directive /60/EC, among other things established the Financial Information Unit (UIF) at the Bank of Italy, which replaced the Italian Exchange Bureau (Ufficio Italiano Cambi) in its duty to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism financing. The people considered in the money-laundering law are under the obligation to adopt measures to freeze and report suspicious operations (the duties to report absorbed by Legislative Decree /)

With respect to the compensation payable to the victims of terrorist acts, Law No. of 3 August provides for several benefits, including of an economic nature.

Principal areas of multilateral cooperation against terrorism

The United Nations

By virtue of its universal nature, the United Nations Organization constitutes the principal forum of multilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

On 8 September , the General Assembly adopted by consensus an important document, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which sets out four pillars:1) address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 2) prevent and combat terrorism; 3) build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; 4) ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.

The Strategy is reviewed every two years in order to have it take into consideration the changes in international scenarios.

In an important reform was performed to rationalise and to better coordinate the United Nations prevention and counter-terrorism activities.

With the adoption of Resolution 71/ on 15 June , the General Assembly established the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) directed by the Under-Secretary General of the United Nations.

The UNOCT has five main functions: 1) provide leadership on the General Assembly counter-terrorism mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General from across the United Nations system; 2) enhance coordination and coherence across the 38 Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force entities to ensure the balanced implementation of the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy; 3) strengthen the delivery of United Nations counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance to Member States; 4) improve visibility, advocacy and resource mobilization for United Nations counter-terrorism efforts; and 5) ensure that due priority is given to counterterrorism across the United Nations system and that the important work on preventing violent extremism is firmly rooted in the Strategy.

The Global Coalition against Daesh

Following the fall of Mosul in June , the United States promoted the creation of a coalition to counter the self-proclaimed Islamic State (Daesh). From the beginning the Coalition, albeit concentrating on the military emergency, adopted a multidimensional approach structured along five lines of actions: military operations; preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across borders; tackling Daesh’s financing and economic infrastructure; supporting stabilisation of areas liberated from Daesh; and countering the group’s propaganda. The Coalition presently comprises 75 members, including four international organizations (European Union, NATO, Arab League and INTERPOL).

In these past few years, Italy has been actively engaged in all the Coalition’s areas of intervention. In particular, our Country has deployed the second-largest military contingent in Iraq after the one of the United States, for the purpose of training military units (including Kurdish Peshmerga) and the Iraqi police. These last two have been trained by a multinational Task Force led by Italy’s Carabinieri. Italian troops are engaged in protecting the Mosul Dam construction site. Aircraft assets deployed in Kuwait have performed intelligence, surveillance and search and rescue operations. Moreover Italy, together with the United States and Saudi Arabia, co-chairs the Counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFG) which promotes active cooperation and tangible measures by Member States to eliminate the sources of income of Daesh and its members and to block their access to the international financial system.

The G7

The G7 has systematically tackled terrorism-related issues, which were especially addressed under the G7 Italian presidency in

The G7 Leaders that met at the Taormina Summit on  May adopted a Declaration on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism that confirms the Group’s commitment in this respect, which placed a special focus on combating the terrorist groups’ abuse of the Internet; managing the return flows and relocation of FTFs; combating terrorism financing; developing technical instruments to reinforce borders; overcoming the deep causes that often underly the phenomenon.

It meets at the Rome-Lyon Group level, which is the result of the merger decided at the Kananaskis Summit between the Lyon Group – which dealt with combating organised crime – and of the Group of Rome (established under the Italian Presidency and thus called to acknowledge appreciation for the Italian Presidency’s commitment) which were set up following the 9/11 attacks in with a specific mandate to combat terrorism.

It is a forum in which to exchange information, examine and promote concertation and cooperation initiatives to combat terrorism and organised crime, that meets twice a year to develop proposals to submit to political approval, as well as best practices and guidelines for the adoption of operational measures by specialised multilateral organizations.

The European Union

The European Council Conclusions on the European Union’s external action to combat terrorism approved by the Council on 19 June describe the broad scope of activities performed by the European Union in preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism.

The principles underpinning the EU’s action are still those laid down in the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy of , which takes into account, in a coordinated approach, the internal (intra-EU) and external (extra-EU) aspects of the phenomenon, on the basis of 4 pillars (prevent, protect, pursue, respond).

The EU’s external action is high-profile: EU institutions have developed targeted dialogue processes on security and counter-terrorism with the MENA Region Countries and with the principal International and Regional Organizations (League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the G5 Sahel). The EU participates in the Global Coalition against Daesh (playing a role in the Working Groups on FTF, stabilisation, strategic communication and terrorism financing) and co-chairs the Global Counter Terrorism Forum dedicated to capacity building in Eastern Africa.

As for its geographical priorities, the European Union has followed with special attention the start of the transition process in Syria and the stabilisation process in Iraq – as the self-acclaimed Islamic State recorded a succession of defeats – which raise the issue of the return to Europe of FTFs from the theatres of war in Syria and Iraq. The European Union fosters a broad-scope approach that not only envisages repressive interventions but also providing support for the social reinsertion of these individuals.

The EU also performs capacity building actions in several partner Countries, generally putting the emphasis on building the local community’s capacity of being resilient in fighting terrorism and violent extremism and in training officials to combat terrorism in the priority Countries of the aforesaid regions.

The EU fosters the introduction of technical instruments to more adequately control European borders such as the “EES” (Entry Exit System); track the entry and movements in the Schengen area through the “PNR” (Passenger Name Record), including of those who do not require visas through the “ETIAS” (European Travel Information and Authorization System).

As for top priority issues, note should be taken of the European Commission’s commitment in the aviation safety sector, with particular attention on cargo, thanks to the adoption of the UNSCR In the civil aviation sector, in the Commission launched a 6-million-euro programme aimed at supporting the initiatives of Member States to assure safety standards in the sector.

In May , the European Commission and 4 Internet service providers (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft) developed a code of conduct to combat the use of the Internet by terrorist groups. The aforesaid companies have committed to remove the disputed contents 24 hours after receiving a valid report. The “EU-Internet Forum”, which aims at improving public-private sector interactions, meets on an annual basis.

Among the initiatives to combat radicalisation, in the EU set up the “RAN” (Radicalisation Awareness Network), which aims to enable local players to share good practices on what has proven to be effective in combating radicalisation.

NATO

Fighting terrorism is nothing new for the Alliance. Following the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, for the first time, it applied Art. 5 of the Treaty of Washington on the Members’ self-defence; also the Alliance’s Strategic Concept envisages responding to a terrorist threat.

The Alliance has gradually reinforced its role in this respect, especially in the seven areas of action: 1) intelligence and analysis; 2) preparedness and responsiveness; 3) developing capacities; 4) capacity building and partnerships; 5) operations; 6) governance within NATO and 7) strategic communication.

The NATO has formally joined the Global Coalition against Daesh, to which the Alliance already contributed mainly through the exchange of intelligence and monitoring activities with AWACS aircraft.

From Italy’s perspective, the Alliance’s efforts to combat terrorism must be part of a broader attention for emerging and asymmetric security challenges coming from all strategically relevant directions (including the South), with a truly all-inclusive scope.

Trends in international cooperation in fighting terrorism

At present, the very topical issue of managing the flow of foreign fighters returning to the territories of origin or directed elsewhere is relevant from the security, political, legal and social point of view.

The phenomenon, to which Italy dedicated special attention during its Chairmanship of the OSCE, also includes the sensitive issue of the families of returning fighters and their children and highlights the opportunity to actively integrate schools, medical facilities and, where possible, local communities in the strategy to avoid the further spread of radicalisation and pave the road for their social reinsertion.

Generally speaking, the opportunity of further developing international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism is widely supported, especially through the exchange of information that might be useful to prosecute, in the full respect for human rights, the people suspected of terrorism and prevent new attacks.

International cooperation will also continue to develop from the point of view of combating the abuse of the Internet by terrorist groups and terrorism financing, two contexts in which a concerted response by the entire international community is imperative. In respect of international cooperation against terrorism financing, the FATF – Financial Action Task Force has developed 9 Special Recommendations against terrorism financing (which add on to the pre-existing 40 Recommendations against money laundering). In the past few years, the FATF cooperation model has been extended to similar regional organisations with a view to universally applying the FATF-developed standards and harmonising national legislations in this respect.

The FATF’s new operational programme to combat terrorism financing, which was adopted in February , focuses on the currently continually evolving risks of terrorism financing in order to assure that the effective implementation of the Group’s global standards may contribute to preserve the security of the financial system.

APEC's Work in Counter-Terrorism

Recognizing the threat that terrorism posed to APEC's vision of secure, open and prosperous economies, APEC leaders pledged in to help secure the region's people and its economic, trade, investment and financial systems from terrorist attack or abuse and trade-based money laundering. Member economies expressed their commitment to undertake individual and joint actions to counter terrorism in two principle statements—the  APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism and the  Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth.

Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF)

As a result, an APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) was established in May in order to monitor progress and build capacity in counter-terrorism, with a view to:

  • Coordinate the implementation of Leaders' Statements and commitments on fighting terrorism and enhancing human security
  • Assist members to identify and assess counter-terrorism needs
  • Coordinate capacity building and technical assistance programs
  • Cooperate with relevant international and regional organizations
  • Facilitate cooperation between APEC fora on counter-terrorism issues

In November , APEC Ministers welcomed the APEC Consolidated Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy, which focused APEC’s work on secure supply chains, secure travel, secure finance and secure infrastructure, and structured work around three fundamental pillars of security, efficiency and resilience. 

Recognizing that the threat of terrorism had a long-lasting effect and in light of the CTTF’s valuable and constructive role in helping to protect the economic systems in the region from disruption, APEC Senior Officials upgraded the task force to a working group in July

Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG)

The Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) was then established as a SOM Sub-Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH) sub-forum in and its first mandate for was established in accordance with its strategic plan. The CTWG aimed to assist member economies to build capacity to protect supply chains, travel and financial systems, and infrastructure against terrorist attacks, disruption, and misuse, as well as to respond to, and recover from, such disruptions without compromising the flow of legitimate trade and travel.

The CTWG also sought to align its work with relevant agencies and international organizations, such as the UN and its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and stressed the need for implementation, where applicable, of UN counter-terrorism measures and the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.

In , the SOM Steering Committee on ECOTECH adopted the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group Strategic Plan , which guided the work of the CTWG according to the following focus areas

 

  1. Continue to implement, review and assess the APEC Consolidated Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy as recognized in successive Leaders Declarations, Ministerial Joint Statements, and Ministers Responsible for Trade Statements;

     

  2. Increase cooperation with other APEC sub-fora on cross-cutting, counter-terrorism related issues;

     

  3. Increase cooperation among APEC member economies to understand and take appropriate actions to address:  (i) the impact of evolving terrorist threats including by ISIL, Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, as well as foreign terrorist fighters; and (ii) the impact of radicalization to violence and violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism on their economies, including increasing risk to soft targets, in order to promote the security and resilience of businesses and communities;

     

  4. Increase member economy capacity to disrupt the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) within the region without interrupting the movement of bona-fide international travelers between economies, and promote exchange of information between special and law enforcement agencies of APEC Economies regarding actions/movements of terrorist organizations and individuals;

     

  5. Increase cooperation and technical assistance among APEC member economies in their efforts to implement the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) programs to secure and facilitate legitimate travel within the region;

     

  6. Improve member economy capacity to prevent and counter terrorist financing, including by ISIL and foreign terrorist fighters, without impacting on the free flow of legitimate trade in accordance with international law and standards;

     

  7. Improve member economy capacity to ensure the resilience, and security against misuse, attack, and disruption, of critical infrastructure, which supports and enables economic activity across the APEC region;

     

  8. Strengthen counter-terrorism related cooperation with the private sector and with relevant multilateral organizations; and

     

  9. Foster whole-of-government approaches within APEC economies, as well as enhance cooperation and coordination among economies and relevant APEC sub-fora.

 

The CTWG’s term ended in after many contributions and accomplishments to the APEC region. Relevant APEC fora will undertake the continuation of work in counter-terrorism activity areas. Now, member economies are considering specific aspects of counter-terrorism work in secure supply chains, secure travel, secure finance and secure infrastructure, in line with the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group Strategic Plan and the APEC Consolidated Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy.

Accomplishments

The CTWG’s implemented capacity building projects to support the Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy across member economies, based on the three fundamental pillars: security, efficiency and resilience; particularly in four cross- cutting work streams: secure supply chains; secure travel; secure finance and secure infrastructure. Member economies discussed and shared information on new terrorist challenges in the APEC region, including evolving terrorist threats, cross-border travel of foreign terrorist fighters and growing risk of terrorist financing.

 

Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) conferences

In Los Cabos, Mexico , APEC Leaders agreed that terrorism represented a severe threat to the region, and decided that a new Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative would be introduced as a matter of urgency. Since then, XI STAR conferences were held from to

Discussions at the STAR Conference focused on policies and procedures to enhance security and efficiency in the APEC region's seaports, airports and other access points, including port and airport security; shipping container security; coastal patrol; capacity building; financial assistance, and private sector initiatives. The STAR initiative also fostered coordination between public and private entities to counteract terrorist threats through the supply chain. All 21 APEC member economies participated in the STAR with participants coming from private sector companies and international organizations.

Counter-Terrorism Action Plans

APEC's Counter Terrorism Action Plans (CTAPs) were developed based on the  APEC Leaders' Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth and incorporated relevant security-related elements of subsequent annual Leaders' and Ministers' statements. Each CTAP provided a checklist of counter-terrorism measures undertaken by an APEC member economy to achieve the key elements of the STAR initiative. These included securing cargo, protecting people in transit, protecting ships engaged in international voyages and international aviation; combating threats to security; measures to halt the financing of terrorism; and, promoting cyber-security. CTAPs provided an opportunity for member economies to take stock of their efforts to respond to Leaders and Ministers' directions and to highlight capacity-building needs to implement these commitments.

Projects

 

APEC Follow-On Bus Anti-Terrorism Workshop - Expanding and Sharing Best Practices ()

The 9th STAR Conference : Transportation Security in APEC Region - Challenges and Opportunities ()

Secure Finance Workshop on Countering the Financing of Terrorism with New Payment Systems ()

APEC CTWG Secure Infrastructure Workshop on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience ()

APEC CTWG Secure Travel Workshop on Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighter Travel ()

APEC Workshop on Strengthening Tourism Business Resilience against the impact of Terrorist Attack ()

APEC Major Events Security Framework Capacity Building ()

APEC CTWG Secure Travel Follow-On Workshop on Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighter Travel ()

10th STAR Conference: Secure Supply Chain in the APEC Region - Challenges and Opportunities ()

APEC Major Events Security Planning Workshop for Viet Nam ()

Halting Terrorist Financing: APEC Workshop on Targeted Financial Sanctions Regime ()

APEC CTWG Workshop on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context ()

Workshop on Aviation Security ()

The 11th Secure Trade in APEC Region Conference (STAR XI) ()

 

Publications

 

Strengthening Tourism Business Resilience against the Impact of Terrorist Attack, September

3rd APEC Air Cargo Security Workshop, Summary Report and Proceedings, May

Seminar Outcome Report: APEC Seminar Series , December

Report on the APEC Trade Recovery Programme, Pilot Exercise, April

APEC Training Symposium Optimize the Use of Audit and Investigation to Strengthen Aviation Security in APEC Economies, May

Indonesia's Report on the APEC Seminar on Securing Remittance and Cross Border Payment from Terrorist Use, December

Singapore's Report on the APEC Symposium on Total Supply Chain Security, July

Effective Public-Private Partnerships to Counter Terror and Secure Trade, Final Report, September

APEC Trade Recovery Programme, July

Recommendation 8: Non-profit organisations

Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused:
(a) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
(b) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures; and
(c) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations.

INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 8 (NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Non-profit organisations (NPOs) play a vital role in the world economy and in many national economies and social systems. Their efforts complement the activity of the governmental and business sectors in providing essential services, comfort and hope to those in need around the world. The ongoing international campaign against terrorist financing has unfortunately demonstrated, however, that terrorists and terrorist organisations exploit the NPO sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organisations and operations. This misuse not only facilitates terrorist activity, but also undermines donor confidence and jeopardises the very integrity of NPOs. Therefore, protecting the NPO sector from terrorist abuse is both a critical component of the global fight against terrorism and a necessary step to preserve the integrity of NPOs.

2. NPOs may be vulnerable to abuse by terrorists for a variety of reasons. NPOs enjoy the public trust, have access to considerable sources of funds, and are often cash-intensive. Furthermore, some NPOs have a global presence that provides a framework for national and international operations and financial transactions, often within or near those areas that are most exposed to terrorist activity. Depending on the legal form of the NPO and the country, NPOs may often be subject to little or no governmental oversight (for example, registration, record keeping, reporting and monitoring), or few formalities may be required for their creation (for example, there may be no skills or starting capital required, no background checks necessary for employees). Terrorist organisations have taken advantage of these characteristics of NPOs to infiltrate the sector and misuse NPO funds and operations to cover for, or support, terrorist activity.

B. OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

3. The objective of Recommendation 8 is to ensure that NPOs are not misused by terrorist organisations: (i) to pose as legitimate entities; (ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (iii) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, but diverted for terrorist purposes. In this Interpretive Note, the approach taken to achieve this objective is based on the following general principles:

(a) Past and ongoing abuse of the NPO sector by terrorists and terrorist organisations requires countries to adopt measures both: (i) to protect the sector against such abuse, and (ii) to identify and take effective action against those NPOs that either are exploited by, or actively support, terrorists or terrorist organisations.

(b) Measures adopted by countries to protect the NPO sector from terrorist abuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities. Rather, such measures should promote transparency and engender greater confidence in the sector, across the donor community and with the general public, that charitable funds and services reach intended legitimate beneficiaries. Systems that promote achieving a high degree of transparency, integrity and public confidence in the management and functioning of all NPOs are integral to ensuring the sector cannot be misused for terrorist financing.

(c) Measures adopted by countries to identify and take effective action against NPOs that either are exploited by, or actively support, terrorists or terrorist organisations should aim to prevent and prosecute, as appropriate, terrorist financing and other forms of terrorist support. Where NPOs suspected of, or implicated in, terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support are identified, the first priority of countries must be to investigate and halt such terrorist financing or support. Actions taken for this purpose should, to the extent reasonably possible, avoid any negative impact on innocent and legitimate beneficiaries of charitable activity. However, this interest cannot excuse the need to undertake immediate and effective actions to advance the immediate interest of halting terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support provided by NPOs.

(d) Developing cooperative relationships among the public, private and NPO sector is critical to raising awareness and fostering capabilities to combat terrorist abuse within the sector. Countries should encourage the development of academic research on, and information-sharing in, the NPO sector to address terrorist financing related issues.

(e) A targeted approach in dealing with the terrorist threat to the NPO sector is essential given the diversity within individual national sectors, the differing degrees to which parts of each sector may be vulnerable to misuse by terrorists, the need to ensure that legitimate charitable activity continues to flourish, and the limited resources and authorities available to combat terrorist financing in each country.

(f) Flexibility in developing a national response to terrorist financing in the NPO sector is also essential, in order to allow it to evolve over time as it faces the changing nature of the terrorist financing threat.

C. MEASURES

4. Countries should undertake domestic reviews of their NPO sector, or have the capacity to obtain timely information on its activities, size and other relevant features. In undertaking these assessments, countries should use all available sources of information in order to identify features and types of NPOs, which, by virtue of their activities or characteristics, are at risk of being misused for terrorist financing. Countries should also periodically reassess the sector by reviewing new information on the sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.

5. There is a diverse range of approaches in identifying, preventing and combating terrorist misuse of NPOs. An effective approach, however, is one that involves all four of the following elements: (a) outreach to the sector, (b) supervision or monitoring, (c) effective investigation and information gathering and (d) effective mechanisms for international cooperation. The following measures represent specific actions that countries should take with respect to each of these elements, in order to protect their NPO sector from terrorist financing abuse.

(a) Outreach to the NPO sector concerning terrorist financing issues

(i) Countries should have clear policies to promote transparency, integrity and public confidence in the administration and management of all NPOs.

(ii) Countries should encourage or undertake outreach programmes to raise awareness in the NPO sector about the vulnerabilities of NPOs to terrorist abuse and terrorist financing risks, and the measures that NPOs can take to protect themselves against such abuse.

(iii) Countries should work with the NPO sector to develop and refine best practices to address terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities and thus protect the sector from terrorist abuse.

(iv) Countries should encourage NPOs to conduct transactions via regulated financial channels, wherever feasible, keeping in mind the varying capacities of financial sectors in different countries and in different areas of urgent charitable and humanitarian concerns.

(b) Supervision or monitoring of the NPO sector
Countries should take steps to promote effective supervision or monitoring of their NPO sector. In practice, countries should be able to demonstrate that the following standards apply to NPOs which account for (1) a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector; and (2) a substantial share of the sector’s international activities.

(i) NPOs should maintain information on: (1) the purpose and objectives of their stated activities; and (2) the identity of the person(s) who own, control or direct their activities, including senior officers, board members and trustees. This information should be publicly available either directly from the NPO or through appropriate authorities.

(ii) NPOs should issue annual financial statements that provide detailed breakdowns of incomes and expenditures.

(iii) NPOs should be licensed or registered. This information should be available to competent authorities.

(iv) NPOs should have appropriate controls in place to ensure that all funds are fully accounted for, and are spent in a manner that is consistent with the purpose and objectives of the NPO’s stated activities.

(v) NPOs should follow a “know your beneficiaries and associate NPOs” rule, which means that the NPO should make best efforts to confirm the identity, credentials and good standing of their beneficiaries and associate NPOs. NPOs should also undertake best efforts to document the identity of their significant donors and to respect donor confidentiality.
(vi) NPOs should maintain, for a period of at least five years, records of domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organisation, and should make these available to competent authorities upon appropriate authority. This also applies to information mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above.

(vii) Appropriate authorities should monitor the compliance of NPOs with the requirements of this Recommendation. Appropriate authorities should be able to apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations by NPOs or persons acting on behalf of these NPOs.

(c) Effective information gathering and investigation

(i) Countries should ensure effective cooperation, coordination and information- sharing to the extent possible among all levels of appropriate authorities or organisations that hold relevant information on NPOs.

(ii) Countries should have investigative expertise and capability to examine those NPOs suspected of either being exploited by, or actively supporting, terrorist activity or terrorist organisations.

(iii) Countries should ensure that full access to information on the administration and management of a particular NPO (including financial and programmatic information) may be obtained during the course of an investigation.

(iv) Countries should establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that, when there is suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that a particular NPO: (1) is a front for fundraising by a terrorist organisation; (2) is being exploited as a conduit for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (3) is concealing or obscuring the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, but redirected for the benefit of terrorists or terrorist organisations, this information is promptly shared with relevant competent authorities, in order to take preventive or investigative action.

(d) Effective capacity to respond to international requests for information about an NPO of concern consistent with Recommendations on international cooperation, countries should identify appropriate points of contact and procedures to respond to international requests for information regarding particular NPOs suspected of terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support.

D. RESOURCES FOR SUPERVISION, MONITORING, AND INVESTIGATION

6. Countries should provide their appropriate authorities responsible for supervision, monitoring and investigation of their NPO sector with adequate financial, human and technical resources.

Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation

Appropriate authorities refers to competent authorities, including accrediting institutions, and self-regulatory organisations.

Associate NPOs includes foreign branches of international NPOs.

Beneficiaries refers to those natural persons, or groups of natural persons who receive charitable, humanitarian or other types of assistance through the services of the NPO.

Non-profit organisation or NPO refers to a legal person or arrangement or organisation that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of “good works”.

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