Anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism

anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism

Other new weapons being developed include man-portable anti-tank weapons, disposable lightweight silent mortars, and weapons for urban warfare. Although these. In the hands of terrorists, criminals, or other non-state actors, MANPADS – also known as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles – pose a serious threat to. The 40mm guns were clip-fed and fired a four-round clip of either armor piercing or high explosive tracer rounds. Their rate of fire was rounds per minute.

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India Successfully Test Fires Indigenous Laser-Guided Anti-Tank Missiles From Arjun Tank

Anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism - curious

Easy-to-use handheld weapons provided by the US are helping Ukrainians shred Russian tanks and aircraft

  • Russia's military has struggled to overcome Ukrainian resistance in the weeks since launching its invasion.
  • Russian armor and aircraft have been stymied by Ukrainian troops, many of whom are wielding Western-made weapons.
  • Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles have been vital to Ukraine's defense. 

Despite amassing an invasion force of nearly , troops and thousands of armored vehicles supported by combat aircraft and warships, the Russian military has failed to reach its primary objectives in the three weeks since its offensive into Ukraine began.

Russian military planners expected a blitzkrieg campaign that would last 48 to 72 hours and lead to a quick Ukrainian capitulation, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has led a fierce resistance, and major urban centers, including the capital, Kyiv, remain in Ukrainian hands, surprising Moscow and indeed the world.

Ukrainians' grit and knowledge of the battlefield have played a large part in their effective defense, but weapons supplied by NATO and EU countries have also played a critical role in stalling the Russian advance.

Ukraine has received billions of worth of weapons from the West — the US has provided $1 billion in security assistance just this week — and among that aid, three weapon systems stand out.

Since the invasion began, US-made FGM Javelins and FIM Stingers and the Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon (NLAW) designed by Britain and Sweden have been the terror of Russian troops.

Javelins and NLAW: highly effective

Ukraine military Javelin anti-tank missile
Volodymyr Tarasov/ Ukrinform/Barcroft Media via Getty Images

Tanks and armored vehicles are at the heart of the Russian military doctrine. Russia's battalion tactical groups — 75% of which have been committed to the invasion, a US official said Wednesday — are largely mechanized formations meant to use heavy firepower to overcome resistance.

But BTGs are vulnerable to anti-tank defenses like the Javelin, a reusable, fire-and-forget guided missile.

Javelins have two parts: a launch tube and a command launch unit, which has the controls and optical sights for day and night use. The Javelin missile's nose has a homing infrared guidance system that allows the operator to fire the weapon and then relocate in order to dodge return fire.

The Javelin "isn't cheap," running almost $, each, "so you won't fire it often," a Green Beret assigned to a National Guard unit told Insider.

"Usually in a [military training] class only the honor student will usually get to fire a live round. The rest of the class will learn the procedures on an empty weapon. But you do master the procedures and sequence of firing even if you don't fire an actual live round," said the Green Beret, who was not authorized to speak to the media.

Ukraine Javelin anti-tank missile
Ukrainian military/Handout via REUTERS

Its bulky size notwithstanding, what makes the Javelin so effective is its targeting flexibility.

Against a tank or another armored vehicle, the Javelin will strike from a high angle of attack, targeting the top of the vehicle, where the armor is thinnest.

Before the invasion, Russian tankers sought to counter that by building cages on top of their tanks to detonate the Javelin before it struck and reduce its force. Hundreds of destroyed Russian tanks suggest that has not been an effective countermeasure.

Against a stationary target, like a building or bunker, the Javelin will strike from a more direct line of attack. US special-operations units — which have bigger budgets than their conventional counterparts — also used Javelins against people in Afghanistan.

"The Javelin is also very effective against human targets. You wouldn't normally think [of] an anti-tank weapon system worth hundreds of thousands of dollars as an anti-personnel option," a former Navy SEAL officer told Insider.

A Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces member holds an NLAW anti-tank weapon, in the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, March 9,
AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky

Navy SEAL Team members used Javelins "extensively" in Afghanistan, according to the former officer, who spoke anonymously because of ongoing work with the US Defense Department.

"There is one famous [SEAL] Team guy who racked up several Taliban kills using the Javelin. It was ideal for the operational environment because of the large distances," a former SEAL said.

Ukrainian forces have been using the British-supplied NLAW anti-tank weapon. Although less sophisticated than its American counterpart, the NLAW is extremely easy to operate, and with a mm high explosive anti-tank warhead, it's deadly too.

Like the Javelin, the NLAW can strike targets from above, but its effective range of about meters is more limited than the Javelin's 2,meter range.

Stingers: fearsome reputation

US Army soldiers Stinger missile Bulgaria
US Army/Sgt. Thomas Mort

Despite an overwhelming quantitative and qualitative advantage, Russia's air force has failed to achieve dominance over Ukraine, reflecting what US officials say were Russian misperceptions about Ukrainian resistance and "risk aversion" among Russian commanders.

But Russian aircraft are still active over Ukraine, where they enable Russian forces to take and hold ground and can attack Ukrainian forces trying to counter the Russian advance.

Ukrainians have relied on man-portable air-defense systems, such as the Stinger missile, to dissuade Russian fighters, bombers, and helicopters from operating too freely over Ukraine.

The US allowed other countries to ship their Stingers to Ukraine in January but was unable to send its own Stingers until it figured out how to remove classified material from them, which didn't happen until after the invasion.

Ukraine Stinger missile airport
SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images

The Stinger was made famous by its use against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and it has a fearsome reputation.

With an effective range of 15, feet, it can hit almost anything that flies below 12, feet. It uses an infrared seeker warhead that homes in on an aircraft's heat signature, usually the engine.

It is also light and easy to use, meaning regular grunts, national guardsmen, and even militant groups can use it to shoot down multimillion-dollar aircraft.

"Both the Javelin and the Stinger are relatively easy to use. Remember that the CIA taught literally illiterate people to use the Stinger against the Soviets in Afghanistan," the Green Beret said. "The Javelin is slightly more complicated to use, but the barrier to entry is relatively low."

The US on Wednesday announced another package of security assistance to Ukraine, which included Stingers and 2, Javelins, bringing the total of each provided by the US to 1, and 4,, respectively. The package also includes 1, light anti-armor weapons and 6, AT-4 unguided, man-portable anti-armor missiles.

"The United States and our allies and partners are fully committed to surging weapons of assistance to the Ukrainians, and more will be coming as we source additional stocks of equipment that we're ready to transfer," President Joe Biden said Wednesday.

Ukraine Needs Help Surviving Airstrikes, Not Just Killing Tanks

Much of the Western discussion about helping Ukraine in the face of overwhelming Russian military advantage centers on relatively short-range weapons and tactics meant to enmesh an invasion force in the “next Afghanistan” or a “near certainty of hell”: for example, providing more Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and weaponized drones; or training Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian nonstate groups to make improvised explosive devices. While such courses of action would impose costs, they would impose them on Russian and Russian proxy forces' ground troops. These approaches do not consider the decisive role that Russian air and standoff missile strikes may play. If the Kremlin orders a large-scale move on Ukraine, it is likely to take the form of a multidomain operation, beginning with air and standoff missile strikes that could prove decisive—and devastating—long before short-range defenses come into play.

A better approach starts with looking at the Russian military's current strategy and doctrine, the forces it has amassed nearby, and the capabilities it has shown in recent conflicts. Many Russian concepts of operation (PDF) emphasize a short and intense “Initial Period of War” that may produce decisive effects even before ground forces are fully committed. Standoff weapons—bombs, precision-guided missiles—are unleashed against enemy forces and the infrastructure that sustains the fight: military bases, forward-deployed units, air defense sites, airfields, key transportation nodes, fuel depots, command-and-control targets, power plants, even local news organizations. The aim is to force the enemy government to capitulate quickly.

A large-scale Russian operation against Ukraine would likely be different from previous post-Soviet operations for several reasons. The Russian military has spent the past decade refining doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and updating its arsenal. It no longer relies on large numbers of poorly trained conscripts and ill-equipped ground forces as it did in Chechnya. Its modernization program was designed to avoid the kind of disorganized, stove-piped, ground-force dominant operation seen in Georgia in Even its “hybrid” incursions into the Donbass and Crimea in may be only partially illustrative at best.

The Russian military has spent the past decade refining doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and updating its arsenal.

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The most illuminating illustration of current Russian tactics is probably its overt operations in Syria. But that expeditionary force was much smaller, designed only to support what Moscow claims is a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operation. At their peak, Russian forces in Syria were only a small fraction of the strike power that is permanently based and temporarily deployed near Ukraine today.

The modernized and massive Russian military force that currently surrounds Ukraine on three sides can muster air and missile strikes that would likely overwhelm Ukrainian airpower and air defenses and severely damage military and other facilities. In particular, Russia's Aerospace Forces, or VKS, are very different from a decade ago. They have new and modernized aircraft, along with better radar, communications, and targeting equipment. Pilots have generally flown more flight hours and received training in close air support and nighttime operations. And although they have little experience flying through hostile air defenses, 92 percent of VKS pilots have recent combat experience in Syria. The VKS also has adopted (PDF) more-effective countermeasures against man-portable or short-range air defenses such as Stinger missiles, including flying at higher altitudes.

Russia also fields standoff precision strike missiles that could strike any Ukrainian location from well inside Russian territory or the Black Sea. Weapons like the SS short-range ballistic missile system, with a range of to kilometers, are already likely staging near Ukraine. Russia can strike from even farther away using the SSC-7 ground-launched cruise missile ( to km), the naval SS-NA Kalibr land-attack cruise missile (1,plus km), or the strategic bomber-launched Kh or Kh cruise missile (2, to 4, km).

Against this strike force, Ukraine can muster only Air Force and air defense systems that are limited in number, date to the Soviet era, and are based at a small number of facilities. Russian air or missile strikes could quickly render them combat-ineffective, even if they were not outright destroyed.

The VKS' own integrated air defense systems would accompany Russian troops on the ground to protect them with short, intermediate, and long-range air defense systems. Russia could also move its advanced SA system to certain border areas to complicate eastern Ukrainian airspace, to stop or degrade Western weapons transfers. For example, SA systems equipped with the new 40N6 interceptor missile can hit targets out to km—and the distance between Kyiv and the Russian border near the Kursk area is around km. Such a deployment would threaten military and civilian aircraft operating out of large areas of eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea from Crimea.

What Would Help

It is highly unlikely that Kyiv's supporters can provide enough materiel support to bridge the gap between Ukrainian and Russian military capabilities in a way that will deter Russian aggression in the near or intermediate term. Russia's correlation of forces is simply too strong and Russian military assets can simply overfly or outrange many tactical or short-range weapons like Stingers or Javelin systems by using modernized air power and standoff precision strikes, or outrange them on the ground with long-range artillery. Nevertheless, there are near-term options left to support Kyiv and reduce the impact of these strikes to save lives and forces.

It is highly unlikely that Kyiv's supporters can provide enough materiel support to bridge the gap between Ukrainian and Russian military capabilities in a way that will deter Russian aggression in the near or intermediate term.

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In the weeks ahead, Kyiv's partners could help the Ukrainian military and government “ride out” air and missile strikes as best they can by consulting on dispersal plans for Ukrainian air defenses (as U.S. teams recently did) or hardening plans for other critical facilities, since these locations will almost certainly be primary and early targets for Russian strikes. Ukraine's partners might share knowledge about Russian targeting strategy to assist Ukraine in building fortifications or establishing redundancy plans for critical command-and-control centers or military units, or detecting Russian cyber attacks or intrusions. Finally, Ukraine's supporters could share real-time intelligence on Russian flight operations or missile launches. Such information could be vital when minutes count for dispersal and survival.

Finally, efforts should also be stepped up to provide short- and intermediate-range air defense systems. Indeed, Ukraine has asked for help in air defense and has already started fortifying critical facilities from air attacks, which suggests a correct understanding of Russian targeting and strategy. And the United States and other allies and partners have already begun discussing providing Patriot and Israeli Iron Dome systems, both of which would be of far more use than easily overflown man-portable missiles. These would be purely defensive air-defense systems and Moscow would be hard-pressed to argue they are destabilizing to the region. But this kind of assistance should not be counted upon in the very near term. Such systems would likely take months at best to approve, deploy, create infrastructure, and train local forces to use.

A Russian large-scale multidomain operation would be devastating for the Ukrainian military and people, and Ukraine should work to prevent that. But steps can also be taken to reduce the effects of the air and missile strikes that would likely lead off such an operation. Kyiv and its supporters must urgently take such steps.


Dara Massicot is a senior policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a former senior analyst for the Department of Defense focusing on Russian military capabilities and strategy.

This commentary originally appeared on Defense One on January 19, Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

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MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from  Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

Countering the proliferation of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) is a top U.S. national security priority. In the hands of terrorists, criminals, or other non-state actors, MANPADS – also known as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles – pose a serious threat to passenger air travel, the commercial aviation industry, and military aircraft around the world. The United States is working closely with numerous countries and international organizations to keep the skies safe for all. 

At the direction of the White House, the U.S. Department of State, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, leads the U.S. government’s international efforts on this critical issue. Since , our cooperation with countries around the globe has led to the destruction of more than 33, excess, loosely secured, illicitly held, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS in over 30 countries.

This fact sheet provides a brief description of MANPADS, their origins, and examples of MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft, and highlights some of the United States’ efforts to cooperate with other countries to counter the threat.

WHAT ARE MANPADS?

Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are surface-to-air missiles that can be carried and fired by a single individual or carried by several individuals and fired by more than one person acting as a crew. Most MANPADS consist of: 1) a missile packaged in a tube; 2) a launching mechanism (commonly known as a “gripstock”); and 3) a battery. The tubes, which protect the missile until it has been fired, are disposable. Rudimentary sights are mounted on the tube. A single-use battery is typically used to power the missile prior to launch.

MANPADS launch tubes typically range from about 4 feet to 6 1/2 feet ( to 2 meters) in length and are about 3 inches (72 millimeters) in diameter. Their weight, with launcher, varies from about 28 pounds to just over 55 pounds (13 to 25 kilograms). They are easy to transport and conceal. Some of the most commonly proliferated MANPADS can easily fit into the trunk of an automobile.

Because MANPADS are easy to transport, conceal, and use – and because a single successful attack against an airliner would have serious consequences for the international civilian aviation industry – they are particularly attractive weapons to terrorists and criminals. Keeping MANPADS out of their hands is thus a major priority for the U.S. government. 


TYPES OF MANPADS

There are three main types of MANPADS: 1) Infrared (IR) systems that hone in on an aircraft’s heat source, usually the engine or the engine’s exhaust plume; 2) Command Line-of-Sight (CLOS) systems whereby the MANPADS operator visually acquires the target aircraft using a magnified optical sight, and then uses radio controls to guide the missile into the aircraft; and 3) Laser Beam Riders in which the missile flies along the laser beam and strikes the aircraft where the operator has aimed the laser.

MANPADS were designed to be used by national military forces to protect their troops and facilities. With their relatively short range, MANPADS are regarded as the last missile-based air defense available to protect against aerial attack, to be deployed in tandem with gun-type systems that seek to defeat attacking aircraft by destroying them with a barrage of projectiles. They can attain a speed of about twice the speed of sound and strike aircraft flying at altitudes up to approximately 15, feet ( kilometers) at a range of up to miles (5 kilometers). Most of the older systems are ineffective against modern military aircraft, though civilian aircraft remain vulnerable due to the lack of countermeasures.

Although superficially similar in appearance, MANPADS should not be confused with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). RPGs are also portable and shoulder-fired. However, RPGs are unguided weapons designed primarily to be used against ground targets and are generally ineffective against aircraft, except at very close range. Some RPG attacks on low-flying aircraft have been mistaken for MANPADS attacks. 


WHEN HAVE MANPADS BEEN USED AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION?

Since , 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS, causing about 28 crashes and more than deaths around the world. The following list is a sample of reported incidents involving civilian aircraft. All of the incidents listed below, except the November incident in Mombasa, took place in zones of conflict. 

 

  • March 12,  A Douglas CDDC passenger airliner, operated by Air Vietnam, crashed into Vietnamese territory after being hit by a MANPADS. All six crew members and 20 passengers were killed in the crash.
  • September 3,  An Air Rhodesia Vickers D Viscount passenger airliner crash landed after being hit by a MANPADS fired by forces from the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolution Army. Four crew members and 34 of the 56 passengers were killed in the crash.
  • December 19,  Two Douglas DC-7 spray aircraft en route from Senegal to Morocco, chartered by the U.S. Agency for International Development to eradicate locusts, were struck by MANPADS fired by POLISARIO militants in the Western Sahara. One DC-7 crashed killing all 5 crew members. The other DC-7 landed safely in Morocco.
  • September 22,  A Tupolev B aircraft operated by Transair Georgia was shot down by Abkhazian separatist forces, crashed onto the runway and caught fire, killing
  • April 6,  A Dassault Mystère-Falcon 50 executive jet carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and its French flight crew was shot down over Kigali, killing all aboard and sparking massive ethnic violence and regional conflict.
  • October 10,  A Boeing Lignes Aeriennes Congolaises airliner was downed over the Democratic Republic of the Congo jungle by Tutsi militia, killing
  • December 26,  A United Nations-chartered Lockheed C Hercules transport was shot down over Angola by UNITA forces, killing
  • January 2,  A United Nations Lockheed L Hercules transport was shot down by UNITA forces in Angola, killing 9.
  • November 28,  Terrorists fired two MANPADS at an Arkia Airlines Boeing E7 with passengers and crew as it took off from Mombasa, Kenya. Both missiles missed.
  • November 22,  A DHL Airbus ABF cargo jet transporting mail in Iraq was struck and damaged by a MANPADS. Though hit in the left fuel tank, the plane was able to return to the Baghdad airport and land safely.
  • March 23,  A Transaviaexport Ilyushin 76TD cargo plane was shot down over Mogadishu, Somalia, killing the entire crew of  
     


WHO PRODUCES AND POSSESSES MANPADS?

Some 20 countries have produced or have licenses to produce MANPADS or their components. These include Bulgaria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

It is estimated that more than 1 million MANPADS missiles have been manufactured worldwide since they were first produced in The United States believes that most of these systems are either stockpiled in national inventories or have been destroyed. Thousands of MANPADS, however, have not been accounted for properly and are believed to be outside of the control of national governments. The United States believes that a number of terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, have MANPADS in their possession.

The total number of MANPADS remaining in the global inventory is difficult to estimate with precision because the destruction of MANPADS—either by warfare, accident, or systematic demilitarization—is not always tracked or publicized. Even more uncertain is the number of operational systems within that total inventory, as a number of variables—age, storage conditions, and quality of maintenance—influence the life-expectancy of such systems.

Given the unique threat to aviation posed by MANPADS due to their ease of use, relatively small size, and portability, the United States exercises strict controls over production, storage, and transportation of its MANPADS, as well as diligence when selling them to other governments, in order to ensure that they are properly secured and not sold or transferred to others without prior U.S. consent.

The black market cost of MANPADS can vary widely, ranging from as little as a few hundred dollars to over one hundred thousand dollars, depending on the model and its condition. Given the relatively low cost of some of these systems, there is a heightened risk for acquisition by terrorists or other non-state actors.

A variety of non-state actors are believed to have MANPADS in their possession. The most proliferated type of MANPADS is the first-generation, infrared-homing system designed by the former Soviet Union known as the SA-7b. It is the MANPADS most commonly held by terrorist groups. Non-state actors acquire MANPADS in a variety of ways, including from gray/black markets, arms dealers, front companies, transshipment, intermediaries, end-use certificate falsification, and corrupt government officials. Terrorist groups and other non-state actors are demonstrating increasingly sophisticated and aggressive approaches towards acquiring MANPADS.

WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES DOING TO COUNTER THE PROLIFERATION OF MANPADS?

An interagency task force is coordinating implementation of the United States International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan -- a component of the broader National Strategy for Aviation Security-- to protect global aviation from MANPADS attacks.

The Department of State chairs this task force and has taken the lead in engaging foreign government officials on partnering with the U.S. government in bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce the potential worldwide threat from MANPADS. This includes the U.S. program to eliminate or better secure other countries’ excess, obsolete, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS that could fall into the hands of non-state actors, which is managed by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA). Many MANPADS currently retained in national stockpiles are aged and obsolete, and are therefore relatively ineffective against modern military aircraft, but could still pose a threat to slower-moving civilian aircraft. PM/WRA assists countries to secure their stockpiles, to maintain reliable inventories of their systems, and/or to safely dispose of MANPADS stocks that are no longer needed for national defense.

The Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction in the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (CATR) works through bilateral and multilateral engagement, with an emphasis on responsible export controls, to prevent illicit transfers of MANPADS or the technology to produce the weapons.

The Department of Defense supports international negotiations by providing expertise on the proper management and control of MANPADS in foreign holdings, and by enforcing stringent physical security and accountability for MANPADS in U.S. possession. The Department of Defense established the Golden Sentry program to monitor the end use of MANPADS sold through Foreign Military Sales to ensure that they are not diverted for unauthorized use, and conducts a percent inventory check of these MANPADS annually (in addition to more frequent inventory checks by foreign government personnel). Golden Sentry is supported by the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the U.S. Army.

PM/WRA’s MANPADS programs are supported by experts within the Department of Defense who provide physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) seminars and assessments. These experts assess current host-nation storage practices, offer tailored advice to countries, and orient host-nation experts to international best practices, on how to better secure their MANPADS and other weapons retained for national defense purposes. All of this assistance is offered at little or no cost to the host nation. PM/WRA can, in some cases, provide technical and financial assistance to implement DoD’s recommendations. Assistance may also be provided to countries at the request of the United States’ Geographic Combatant Commanders or other elements of the U.S. Department of Defense.

The Department of Homeland Security supports international efforts through an International MANPADS Assist Visit (MAV) program within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This program assists host nations in conducting vulnerability assessments to identify potential launch areas around their international airports, and develop mitigation strategies to counter the threat. Since , TSA has assisted 30 countries in conducting 38 MAVs.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation supports the mission to prevent terrorist use of MANPADS by working to improve domestic security against MANPADS. The FBI also coordinates with the field and aviation industry through various committees, training seminars, and conferences.

The Department of the Treasury works to block terrorists from acquiring MANPADS by targeting their financial support networks. Individuals and entities engaging in or supporting terrorist activities, such as using or trading MANPADS, can be subject to financial sanctions under Executive Order The U.S. government may also nominate certain groups (such as al-Qaida or the Taliban) for similar UN sanctions.

MULTILATERAL EFFORTS

Under the auspices of ISN/CATR, the United States has worked in a number of international fora to obtain agreement with countries to strengthen controls over the export of MANPADS and to enhance weapons stockpile security. More than 95 countries have agreed to adopt measures that ensure the standards established are put in place.

At the June G-8 Evian Summit, leaders agreed to a U.S.-initiated MANPADS Action Plan that includes the following measures:

  • provide assistance and technical expertise for the destruction of excess MANPADS;
  • adopt stringent national export controls on MANPADS and their essential components;
  • ban transfers of MANPADS to non-state end-users; MANPADS should only be exported to foreign governments or to agents authorized by a government;
  • exchange information on uncooperative countries and entities;
  • examine for new MANPADS the feasibility of adding specific technical performance or launch control features that preclude their unauthorized use; and
  • encourage action in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Aviation Security Working Group on MANPADS (ICAO Resolution AWP/50).

In December , the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA), the first multilateral institution covering conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, adopted strengthened guidelines for control over MANPADS transfers . These guidelines detail how countries will evaluate exports of MANPADS; conditions they will set for recipients to receive the systems; and how systems will be stored, transported, used, inventoried, and inspected. ISN leads U.S. participation in the WA and other appropriate fora to encourage international adherence to and effective implementation of these rigorous MANPADS guidelines. ISN conducts seminars and workshops, distributes reference materials to educate producers and recipients, and works closely with foreign governments to promote WA guidelines and best practices regarding the proper storage and safeguarding of MANPADS.

Similar guidelines were adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in May Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) adopted these guidelines in November In June , the 35th General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) also adopted similar guidelines in Resolution AG/RES (XXXV-O/05).

The United States is continuing efforts in all of these and other regional fora to emphasize the need for implementation. The United States has submitted to the Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE a detailed paper on how the United States controls MANPADS. Since then, over half of the participating states have submitted papers on their MANPADS control. In addition, the MANPADS guidelines were updated at the Plenary.

In recent years, various international organizations have worked to destroy stockpiles of MANPADS. The NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Project has helped Ukraine destroy excess munitions, small arms, light weapons, and MANPADS. In addition, the OSCE has destroyed surplus weapons, including MANPADS, in Cyprus and Tajikistan.

In , the United States helped to launch the MANPADS Contact Group (MCG), a multilateral initiative between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States with the primary function of coordinating each country’s efforts to counter the illicit proliferation of MANPADS. The MCG ensures that the partner countries are aware of each other’s activities and of potential areas for cooperation and collaboration.

BILATERAL COOPERATION

United States bilateral efforts are focused on regions and countries where there is a combination of excess MANPADS stocks and a demonstrable risk of proliferation potential to terrorist groups or other undesirable end-users. The United States works with countries whose MANPADS might be vulnerable to develop a nonproliferation strategy to reduce stocks, secure remaining weapons, and ensure that the host governments have in place appropriate policies and procedures for controlling exports.

On February 24, , the United States and Russia signed the “United States-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems” in Bratislava, Slovakia to facilitate destruction of obsolete or excess MANPADS, exchange information on controlling MANPADS including improving measures to enhance physical security, and to share information about MANPADS sales and transfers to third countries. 

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement uses funds from Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction Program to:

  • destroy obsolete MANPADS that have little military value but could be lethal against global aviation in the hands of terrorists; and
  • improve physical safety and security as well as standards of inventory control and accountability of MANPADS in national inventories that may be needed for legitimate self-defense purposes to ensure that they are not stolen or illicitly transferred.

Since , the U.S. Department of State has enabled the destruction of more than 33, MANPADS in more than 30 countries worldwide. 

A few examples of some successes illustrate the Department of State’s extensive efforts. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has supported:

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina to destroy its government-held stockpile of almost 6, MANPADS between and ,
  • Hungary’s destruction of over 1, MANPADS,
  • Macedonia’s destruction of MANPADS,
  • Montenegro’s destruction of 1, MANPADS,
  • Liberia’s destruction of 45 MANPADS,
  • Burundi’s destruction of MANPADS,
  • An OSCE project to help Cyprus destroy MANPADS missiles and gripstocks in ,
  • the elimination of over MANPADS in Afghanistan as part of a broader conventional weapons destruction program in that country.


WHAT YOU CAN DO TO HELP

If you have information concerning the illegal possession of MANPADS, immediately contact the appropriate law enforcement authorities in your country.

Americans who are living or traveling overseas who wish to report the illicit possession or location of illicitly-held MANPADS should contact the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the nearest U.S. Embassy, or the Legal Attaché at the specific U.S. Embassies listed on this website sprers.eu, as soon as possible.

In the United States, American citizens, other residents, and visitors who have knowledge about the possession or location of illicit MANPADS, either in the United States or in other countries, should immediately report this information to the nearest field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by telephone, or by e-mail using this web tip sheet: sprers.eu Or, they may telephone the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) at this toll-free number: ATF-BOMB (or ).

Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW)

The DAT POW bridges the gap between long-term military requirements and urgent operational needs. It also contributes to NATO Science & Technology (S&T) activities in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as data and autonomous vehicles exploitation.

The DAT POW projects cover a wide range of areas.

Protection of harbours and ports

The safe and uninterrupted functioning of harbours and ports is critical to the global economy and it is essential for maritime assets to be made as secure as possible. To enhance maritime protection, various technologies are explored. To date, these have included sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid-reaction capabilities, underwater magnetic barriers and unmanned underwater vehicles. In and , under the leadership of France, the DAT POW supported "Cut Away", a multinational harbour exploration and clearance exercise. Additionally, under the lead of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) located in La Spezia, Italy, the DAT POW is assessing the use of underwater autonomous systems to detect maritime IEDs and of virtual reality for situational awareness.

Reducing the vulnerability of wide-body civilian and military aircraft to potential threats

A range of infrared and electronic counter-measures is under development. These have been applied to large aircraft, helicopters and fast jets. Every year, exercises and tests are organised to improve systems and equipment.  The United Kingdom is the lead nation for this initiative and the NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG) has provided critical expertise and support to the annual field trials.

Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats

Ideally, terrorists will be prevented from acquiring and using CBRN weapons.  Should prevention fail, NATO is committed to protecting its forces, territory and populations against their effects and to supporting recovery efforts.  The DAT POW supports the Alliance's overall ability to meet these commitments through projects covering detection, identification and monitoring of CBRN substances, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management and CBRN medical counter-measures. The DAT POW also supports training and exercises, including those conducted with live agents.

The DAT POW has also supported the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence, in Vyskov, Czech Republic, in establishing and enhancing its CBRN Reach back capability, i.e. ensuring CBRN expertise is available to the NATO Command Structure and Allied forces in theatres of operations.

Countering improvised explosive devices

This effort is led by several NATO bodies including the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain. Various technologies to defeat IEDs have been explored, in particular stand-off detection. The DAT POW supports the annual "Northern Challenge" event, led by Iceland, which exercises counter-IED and IED disposal abilities. The biennial "Thor's Hammer" electronic counter-measures trial series, to be hosted by Sweden in , and the radio-controlled IED database are two innovative approaches supported by the DAT POW, which are now also being leveraged to support countering unmanned aircraft systems. 

Explosive ordnance disposal and consequence management

Here the objective is to improve NATO's capabilities, through the training of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and optimised management of the consequences of an explosion. The DAT POW supports NATO EOD demonstrations and trials, led by the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence in Trencin, Slovakia. With DAT POW support, the demining community also tested integrated exoskeletons. The strong community of interest includes experts from partner countries, such as the Irish Defence Forces' Ordnance School.

Countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)

Terrorist misuse of unmanned aircraft systems poses a number of challenges to Allies' and partner nations' preparedness both in theatres of operations and in their own homelands. The DAT POW supports comprehensive capabilities development in the field of C-UAS through tests, evaluation, exercises, concept development and technical standardization. The programme supported activities on the entire protection chain (detection, identification, tracking, engagement, command and control). In addition, in , the DAT POW supported an innovation challenge to develop sensor fusion technologies based on artificial intelligence to track, classify and identify drones as they fly within a defined area, using the data provided by the available sensors.

Developing non-lethal capabilities

The Alliance has stressed the need for better response capabilities to minimise collateral damage. If forces can only respond in a lethal manner, civilians and military alike are endangered, and mission failure or political fallout may result. Under the lead of Belgium, Canada and the United States, the DAT POW sponsored the demonstration of the use of non-lethal weapons in different environments.

Biometrics

Biometrics data are essential to protect forces in theatre, allowing them to identify known or suspected insurgents. NATO's Strategic Commands have recognised that developing and improving this area is a military requirement.  NATO's biometrics programme of work and action plan cover all the areas required for a full capability (doctrine, concept, standards, equipment, etc.). A prototype called NABIS (NATO Biometrics Information System) was developed by the NATO Communications and Information Agency and is currently deployed in Kosovo for testing and operational experimentation by the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The DAT POW community also supported an initiative to develop a biometrics capability in a maritime environment.

Technical exploitation

In , NATO developed a technical exploitation policy to counter terrorist capabilities. The aim is to collect material that has been in the possession of terrorists and other adversaries, such as weapons, computers and cell phones, and to use scientific tools and analysis to identify the actors, their capabilities and intentions. The policy will drive the development of capabilities across NATO and in nations, including though the use of artificial intelligence and data-sharing solutions.

By Vince Hawkins

The Viet Cong called them &#;Fire Dragons,&#; because their high volume of fire and tracer ammunition gave the appearance of a dragon’s breath. Their U.S. Army crews called them &#;Dusters,&#; due to the large clouds of dust they created as they sped across the dirt roads of Vietnam.

The M42 was a s continuation of the U.S. Army’s World War II era concept for a highly mobile, rapid firing anti-aircraft artillery system designed to protect maneuver forces from low-level air attack. The precursor to the M42 was the M19 Gun Motor Carriage, which was produced in The M19 was based on the M24 Chaffee light tank chassis and was equipped with twin 40mm Swedish Bofors anti-aircraft guns mounted in a power driven open-topped turret or rotating shield. Although only some M19s were built, the system demonstrated its effectiveness both as an anti-aircraft gun and occasional ground support weapon.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the continuing need for a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, particularly one that could double as a ground support or infantry assault weapon, became apparent. Accordingly, in , the Army began developing an upgrade to the M19 system. The result was the M42, a member of the M41 family of armored vehicles, all of which shared several common components. The M41 family was produced by the Cadillac Motor Car Division of General Motors Corporation and the first production models rolled out of their Cleveland Tank Plant in Production of the M42 began in early The Army began accepting delivery of the M42 in October of that year; the first vehicles entered Army service in

The M42’s armored chassis was the same as that used for the M41 Walker Bulldog light tank. The chassis and turret were constructed of all-welded, rolled and cast homogenous steel with an armor thickness ranging from to inches (8 to mm). The M42 was 19 feet, 1 inch (m) in length; overall length (including guns) was 20 feet, 10 inches (m). The M42’s width was 10 feet, 7 inches (m), while it stood 9 feet, 4 inches (m) in height. The vehicle’s combat weight was 49, lbs (22, kg).

M42nam2

A Continental AOS six-cylinder, four cycle, opposed, air-cooled, supercharged gasoline engine served as the vehicle’s power plant. This gave the M42 a maximum road speed of 45 mph (72 kph) and its gallon ( liter) fuel tank allowed for a cruising range of miles ( km). The M42 boasted a torsion bar suspension system, with five individually sprung dual/track road wheels and hydraulic shock absorbers on the first, second and fifth road wheel stations. This gave the vehicle the ability to cross a 6 foot 4 inch (m) trench, clear a 2 foot 4 inch (m) vertical obstacle, climb a sixty degree gradient and ford depths up to four feet ( m). This excellent suspension system, combined with its high ground clearance, enabled the M42 to withstand land mine explosions with only minimal casualties to the crew.

The interior hull of the M42 was divided into three compartments. The forward compartment housed the driving controls and instruments, with seats for the driver and commander-radio operator. The central compartment served as the base for the gun mount and storage for up to twelve boxes of 40mm ammunition ( rounds). The rear compartment housed the main engine, transmission, auxiliary generator, and the fuel tank.

The M42 was designed to carry a crew of six, although a four-man crew was normal in actual combat conditions. The crew was composed of the commander-radio operator (seated in hull right front), driver (hull left front), gunner (turret left), sight setter (turret right), and two loaders (turret rear).

The turret of the M42 was designed to fit the M41’s existing hull turret ring without modification. The turret was essentially the same as that used on the M19, retaining the combat proven and highly effective 40mm Bofors guns. The turret could traverse degrees either by its hydraulic power system or manually. The guns, also powered hydraulically or manually, could elevate to plus eighty-five degrees or depress to minus three degrees. By using the manual controls, a further plus/minus two degrees could be obtained, giving a maximum plus eighty-seven degrees elevation and minus five degrees depression. The 40mm guns were clip-fed and fired a four-round clip of either armor piercing or high explosive tracer rounds. Their rate of fire was rounds per minute per barrel, or a total of rounds per minute. The gun system, designed for direct-fire, had a maximum anti-aircraft range of 5, meters and a maximum ground-to-ground range of 9, meters. Early models of the M42 had conical flash suppressors on the 40mm guns, but these were later changed to three-pronged flash suppressors. For vehicle defense, a Browning cal. MA4 flexible machine gun could also be mounted at the front or rear of the turret.

During initial development, the Army had planned to combine the M42 with a second vehicle housing a radar fire-control system, but high costs rendered the plan untenable. The operating system, or engagement sequence, of the M42 was initiated when the vehicle commander located and designated a target. The commander estimated the target’s speed, direction and angle of flight, setting this information into the M38 computing sight. The driver would then engage the power drive, traverse the turret, and elevate the guns until the target was centered in the M24C reflex sight, which automatically computed the lead angle based on the target’s speed and direction. Once the sight was steadily tracking the target, the driver would inform the commander, who, when the target was within range, would give the command to fire. The driver would then engage the power control firing system and the guns, hand-fed by the two loaders, would continue firing until either the target was destroyed or the commander ordered cease-fire.

From until the end of the Korean War the M42 served in the anti-aircraft battalions of the armored divisions. In a second model, the M42A1, was developed. The A1 model had a new AOSI engine with a fuel injection system, the same used on the upgraded Walker Bulldog light tank variants, the M41A2 and M41A3. The improved engine system increased the M42’s cruising range to around miles ( km).

Production of the M42A1 was eventually halted in December , but the system continued to be used in Army service until the early s, when it was then transferred to the National Guard. Army studies had shown that guns could no longer provide adequate protection against enemy aircraft and would therefore be replaced by missile systems. During its nearly seven year production run, from to , a total of 3, M42/M42A1s were built. In the early stages of the Vietnam War, the Army began recalling the M42A1s from the National Guard and organizing them into air defense artillery (ADA) battalions. In late , the M42A1s began arriving in Vietnam. In all, three M42A1 equipped ADA battalions were deployed to Vietnam: 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (Automatic Weapons, Self-Propelled), supporting the 3d Marine Division in northern I Corps; 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (Automatic Weapons, Self-Propelled), assigned to II Field Force Artillery in II Corps; and 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (Automatic Weapons, Self-Propelled), assigned to 41st Artillery Group, I Field Force Artillery, in III Corps. Each battalion numbered over a thousand men and consisted of a headquarters battery and four firing batteries. Each battery consisted of two platoons, with each platoon having four guns. Every battalion was further augmented by an attached M55 Quad caliber machine gun battery and an artillery searchlight battery.

Although by the M42 was a fourteen year old system which had seen little combat, it was during the Vietnam War that the Duster came into its own. The North Vietnamese Air Force, relatively small and committed solely to air-to-air operations over its own airspace, posed no threat to U.S. ground forces. This gave the Duster the freedom to serve in a purely ground support role.

Dusters were usually deployed in pairs. Their massive firepower caused havoc and instilled sheer terror in the Viet Cong. &#;The VC call them ‘Fire Dragons’ because they don’t know what to make of them. Giving up is a pretty common occurrence,&#; recalled 1LT Gene S. Lucas, 5/2nd Artillery. &#;Charlie doesn’t usually mess with us, unless he hasn’t seen a duster before. If the VC have ever come against one before, they’ll usually stay away,&#; added SGT Ernest Smith, 5/2nd Artillery.

Because the dense jungle terrain caused severe wear on the Duster’s gasoline engine (which was susceptible to catching fire when overheated), transmission, and suspension, the vehicle could not fully utilize its cross country capability. Furthermore, the 40mm’s point-detonating ammunition had a very sensitive fuse which had a limited effect in the thick jungle foliage. As a result, the Duster was used primarily for point security, convoy escort, and perimeter defense. Other missions included counter-mortar fire, counter-rocket fire, and infantry support. The M42 also cruised the waters of the Mekong Delta aboard M8 landing craft, providing fire support for the 9th Infantry Division’s Mobile Riverine Force.

Having a Duster on point would give a sense of safety to accompanying ground troops and guarantee superior fire support if attacked. In convoy escort, the Duster’s speed, firepower, and armor protection served as a significant deterrent to enemy ambush. It was in their role of perimeter security, however, that the Duster’s could really shine. With their rapid rate of fire and the fifty meter bursting radius of their high explosive rounds, the Dusters were perfect for shattering enemy attacks and troop concentrations.

Dusters could also perform indirect fire missions using targeting data from artillery fire-direction centers. They were able to fire faster than standard artillery pieces with pinpoint accuracy at short ranges and put up a wall of fire on automatic or engage with a single round which allowed them greater target accessibility. On night security, the Dusters were paired with a searchlight set on infrared mode which could sweep an area without revealing its position. Once a target was detected, visible light mode was used to illuminate and engage the target.

In the Army began to withdraw its ADA units from Vietnam. By the middle of the Dusters, now twenty years old, were all gone. During their six year tour, the Duster’s had fired over four million rounds, all in a ground support role. Though over thirty years have passed since the Dusters last saw action, they can still be found in museums, military vehicle parks and, occasionally, driven in a parade by proud, smiling veterans who still remember their days with the &#;fire dragons.&#;

A3 Multipurpose Missile and Gun System

click to enlarge

A3 Multipurpose Missile and Gun System

click to enlarge

Command post of the complex A3

click to enlarge

Automated workplaces of combat crew

click to enlarge

Automated workplace of the commander of combat crew

click to enlarge

A3 combat module

Send request for documentation

DESIGNATION

The A3 multipurpose missile and gun system (Anti-air, Anti-armor, Anti-terrorism) is intended for defense of different administrative, industrial and military objectives against all types of contemporary and advanced aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and high-precision weapons (guided missiles and aircraft bombs).

Apart from resolving the tasks of air defense the A3 system can be employed to fight enemy manpower and ground armored targets (main battle tanks, fighting infantry vehicles, armored personnel carriers) as well as to solve anti-terrorist tasks.

The A3 system is fitted with passive optical means for surveillance, tracking of targets and pointing of weapon assets which ensures complete concealment of its combat employment.

The system can be operated day and night under any weather conditions and in different climatic areas.

Composition

The A3 system comprises:

  • Command Post;
  • Combat Module (up to 6 pcs).

Center for Strategic & International Studies

April 12,

The United States has supplied Ukraine with thousands of Javelins, the anti-tank missiles that have become the iconic weapon of the war, but the U.S. inventory is dwindling. The United States has probably given about one-third of its stock to Ukraine. Thus, the United States is approaching the point where it must reduce transfers to maintain sufficient stockpiles for its own war plans. Production of new missiles is slow, and it will take years to replenish stocks.

The Russians have numerous armored vehicles, but their supply of trained crews and level of morale are declining. Will Ukrainian anti-tank weapons inflict enough Russian combat losses to produce a battlefield stalemate before Ukraine runs out of its most effective anti-tank weapons?

Javelins―the Iconic Weapon

To review, a Javelin is a long-range guided anti-tank missile that can be carried by one person. Javelins have become the iconic weapon of this war, with pictures of  Mary Magdalene, dubbed St. Javelin, holding a weapon and even a Javelin song. It is the most sophisticated, capable, and expensive weapon out of the wide range of anti-tank munitions that NATO and other countries are providing to Ukraine. The United States says it has provided 7, to Ukraine.

Infantry anti-tank weapons have allowed Ukrainian forces, which are mostly light infantry, to defeat Russian mechanized forces despite their much greater firepower.  It is important to note that Javelins are the most capable and best known of the anti-tank weapon systems but not the most numerous. That distinction goes to the NLAW, an anti-tank system with guidance but not as sophisticated as a Javelin's and lesser range. In addition, other nations have provided their own anti-tank weapons, such as the German Panzerfaust 3 and the Swedish Carl Gustav.

The United States has not published figures about its Javelin inventory, so this must be deduced. According to the Army budget books, total production has been 37, since production began in Every year, U.S. forces use some missiles for training and testing. Thus, there may be 20, to 25, remaining in the stockpiles. These 7, systems represent about one-third of the U.S. total inventory.

That fraction doesn't sound like much; after all, two-thirds of the inventory remains. However, military planners are likely getting nervous. The United States maintains stocks for a variety of possible global conflicts that may occur against North Korea, Iran, or Russia itself. At some point, those stocks will get low enough that military planners will question whether the war plans can be executed. The United States is likely approaching that point.

The obvious answer is to build more missiles (and launch units, the control box that goes on the missile). The United States has been buying Javelins at the rate of about 1, a year. The maximum production rate is 6, a year, though it would likely take a year or more to reach that level. The delivery time is 32 months; that is, once an order is placed, it will take 32 months before a missile is delivered. This means that it will take about three or four years to replace the missiles that have been delivered so far. If the United States delivers more missiles to Ukraine, this time to replace extends.

It's Not Just Javelins

The United States is providing a wide variety of other systems, such as small arms, tracking radars, and armored trucks (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle). However, the numbers being provided are relatively small compared to likely inventories. For example, the United States has sent the Ukrainians 50 million rounds of ammunition. That sounds like a lot, but total U.S. ammunition production for military and civilian purposes is billion per year. Deliveries to Ukraine comprise less than 1 percent of that.

One system for which inventories and replenishment rates are limited is the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. According to the White House fact sheet, the United States has provided 2, Stingers to the Ukrainians. The United States has not purchased any since At that time, the total production was stated as 11, missiles (from the FY budget documents). With testing and training losses of 1 percent a year, the remaining inventory would be about 8, So, the United States has sent about a quarter of its inventory to Ukraine.

In , the last time the United States procured Stingers, production rates were stated as with standard shifts (called "") and at maximum production rate. Production lead time was 24 months. That means it will take at least five years to replace the inventory drawdown (two years for lead time and three years for production).

The problem is that the production line is apparently kept alive only by a small number of foreign sales, so it may take longer than 24 months to ramp up. Further, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been thinking about the next generation of short-range air defense systems and may not want to buy more of what it considers an outmoded technology. So, there may be an extended period of risk when the inventory is low, but a replacement is not in the pipeline.

How Many Targets Are There for All Those Anti-tank Weapons?

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance, the Russians have 2, tanks and 13, other armored vehicles (reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles) in units with another 10, tanks and 8, armored vehicles in storage. Open-source intelligence indicates that the Russians have lost about 1, armored vehicles. The bottom line is that the Russians are not going to run out of armored vehicles anytime soon.

What the Russians may run out of are trained crews and morale if the Ukrainians chew up enough armor. The Russians have lost about 40, troops, a quarter of their initial combat force, with especially high casualties in their elite units. Reinforcements and replacements can restore some of the numbers, but skills are deteriorating and morale, never high, seems to be declining. So, it is a race. Will Russian combat losses produce a battlefield stalemate before Ukraine runs out of its most effective anti-tank weapons?

Mark F. Cancian is a senior adviser with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

For that: Anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism

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Anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism
Anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism

A3 Multipurpose Missile and Gun System

click to enlarge

A3 Multipurpose Missile and Gun System

click to enlarge

Command post of the complex A3

click to enlarge

Automated workplaces of combat crew

click to enlarge

Automated workplace of the commander of combat crew

click to enlarge

A3 combat module

Send request for documentation

DESIGNATION

The A3 multipurpose missile and gun system (Anti-air, Anti-armor, Anti-terrorism) is intended for defense of different administrative, industrial and military objectives against all types of contemporary and advanced aircraft, anti-air, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and high-precision weapons (guided missiles and aircraft bombs).

Apart from resolving the tasks of air defense the Anti-air system can be employed to fight enemy manpower and ground armored targets (main battle tanks, fighting infantry vehicles, armored personnel carriers) as well as to solve anti-terrorist tasks.

The A3 system is fitted with passive optical means for surveillance, tracking of targets and pointing of weapon assets which ensures complete concealment of its combat employment.

The system can be operated day and night under any weather conditions and in different climatic areas, anti-armor.

Composition

The A3 system comprises:

  • Command Post;
  • Combat Module (up to 6 pcs).

Ukraine Needs Help Surviving Airstrikes, Not Just Killing Tanks

Much of the Western discussion about helping Ukraine in the face of overwhelming Russian military advantage centers on relatively short-range weapons and tactics meant to enmesh an invasion force in the “next Afghanistan” or a “near certainty of hell”: for example, providing more Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and weaponized drones; or training Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian nonstate groups to make improvised explosive devices. While such anti-air of action would disk read error occurred windows server 2008 costs, they would impose them on Russian and Russian proxy forces' ground troops. These approaches do not consider the decisive role that Russian air and standoff missile strikes may play. If the Kremlin orders a large-scale move on Ukraine, it is likely to take the form of a multidomain operation, beginning with air anti-air standoff missile strikes that could prove decisive—and devastating—long before short-range defenses come into play.

A better approach starts with looking at the Russian military's current strategy and doctrine, anti-terrorism forces it has amassed nearby, and the capabilities it has shown in recent conflicts, anti-armor. Many Russian concepts of operation (PDF) emphasize a short and intense “Initial Period of War” that may produce decisive effects even before ground forces are fully committed. Standoff weapons—bombs, precision-guided missiles—are unleashed against enemy forces and the infrastructure that sustains the fight: military bases, forward-deployed units, air defense sites, airfields, key transportation nodes, fuel depots, command-and-control targets, power plants, even local news organizations. The aim is to force the enemy government to capitulate quickly.

A large-scale Russian operation against Anti-air would likely be different from previous post-Soviet operations for anti-terrorism reasons, anti-air. The Russian military has spent the past decade refining doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and updating its arsenal. It no longer relies on large numbers of poorly trained conscripts and ill-equipped ground forces as it did in Chechnya. Its modernization program was sql injection 500 internal server error to avoid the kind of disorganized, stove-piped, ground-force dominant operation seen in Georgia in Even its “hybrid” incursions into the Donbass and Crimea in may be only partially anti-terrorism at best.

The Russian military has spent the past decade refining doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and updating its arsenal.

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The most illuminating illustration of current Russian tactics is probably its overt operations in Syria. But that expeditionary force was much smaller, designed only to support what Moscow claims is a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operation. At their peak, Russian forces in Syria were only a small fraction of the strike power that is permanently based and temporarily deployed near Ukraine today.

The modernized and massive Russian military force that currently surrounds Ukraine on three sides can muster air and missile strikes that would likely anti-terrorism Ukrainian airpower and air defenses and severely damage military and other facilities, anti-armor. In particular, Russia's Aerospace Forces, or Anti-terrorism, are very different from a decade ago. They error error booting phone new and modernized aircraft, along with better radar, communications, and targeting equipment, anti-terrorism. Pilots have generally flown more flight hours and received training in close air support and nighttime operations. And although they have little experience flying through hostile air defenses, 92 percent of VKS pilots have recent combat experience in Syria. The VKS also has adopted (PDF) more-effective countermeasures against man-portable or short-range air defenses such as Stinger missiles, anti-terrorism flying at higher altitudes.

Russia also fields standoff precision strike missiles that could strike any Ukrainian location from well inside Russian territory or the Black Sea. Weapons like the SS short-range ballistic missile system, with a range of anti-armor kilometers, are already likely staging near Ukraine. Russia can strike from even farther away using the SSC-7 ground-launched cruise missile ( to km), the naval SS-NA Kalibr land-attack cruise missile (1,plus km), or the strategic bomber-launched Kh or Kh cruise missile (2, to 4, anti-armor, km).

Against this strike force, Ukraine can muster only Air Force and air defense systems that are anti-armor in number, date to the Soviet era, and are based at a small number of facilities. Russian air or missile strikes could quickly render them combat-ineffective, anti-armor, even if they were not outright destroyed.

The VKS' own integrated air defense systems would anti-air Russian troops on the ground to protect them with short, intermediate, and long-range air defense systems. Russia could also move its advanced SA system to certain border areas to complicate eastern Ukrainian airspace, anti-terrorism, to stop or degrade Western weapons transfers. For example, SA systems equipped with the new 40N6 interceptor missile can hit targets out to km—and the distance between Kyiv and the Russian border near the Kursk area is around km. Such a deployment would threaten military and civilian aircraft operating out anti-armor large areas of eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea from Crimea.

What Would Help

It is highly unlikely that Kyiv's supporters can provide enough materiel support to bridge the gap between Ukrainian and Russian military capabilities in a way that will deter Russian aggression in the near or intermediate term. Anti-air correlation of forces is simply too strong and Russian military assets can simply overfly or outrange many tactical or short-range weapons like Stingers or Javelin systems by using modernized air power and standoff precision strikes, or outrange them on the ground with long-range artillery. Nevertheless, there are runtime error 5 invalid procedure call options left to support Kyiv and reduce the impact of these strikes to save lives and forces.

It is highly unlikely that Kyiv's supporters can provide anti-air materiel support to bridge the gap between Ukrainian and Russian military capabilities in a way that will deter Russian aggression in the near or intermediate term.

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In the weeks ahead, Kyiv's partners could help the Ukrainian military and government “ride out” air and missile strikes as best they can by consulting on dispersal plans for Ukrainian air defenses (as U.S. teams recently did) or hardening plans for other critical facilities, since these locations will almost certainly be primary and early targets for Anti-terrorism strikes. Ukraine's partners anti-air share knowledge about Russian targeting strategy to assist Ukraine in building fortifications or establishing redundancy plans for critical anti-armor centers or military units, or detecting Russian cyber attacks or intrusions. Finally, Ukraine's supporters could share real-time intelligence on Russian flight operations or missile launches. Such information could be vital when minutes count for dispersal and survival.

Finally, efforts should also be stepped up to provide short- and intermediate-range air defense systems. Indeed, anti-terrorism, Ukraine has asked for help in air defense and has already started fortifying critical facilities from air attacks, which suggests a correct understanding of Russian targeting and strategy. And the United States and other allies and partners have already begun discussing providing Patriot and Israeli Iron Dome systems, both of which would be of far more use than easily overflown man-portable missiles. These would error 503 service unavailable purely defensive air-defense systems and Moscow would be hard-pressed to argue they are destabilizing to the region. But this kind of assistance should not be counted upon in the very near term. Such systems would likely take months at best to approve, deploy, create infrastructure, and train local forces to use.

A Russian large-scale multidomain a network error occurred would be devastating for the Ukrainian military and people, and Ukraine should work to prevent that. But steps can also be taken to reduce the effects of the air and missile anti-armor that would likely lead off such an operation, anti-armor. Kyiv and its supporters must urgently take such steps.


Dara Massicot is a senior policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a former senior analyst for the Department of Defense focusing on Russian military capabilities and strategy.

This commentary originally appeared on Defense One on January 19, Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional anti-air and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

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Easy-to-use handheld weapons provided by anti-armor US are helping Ukrainians shred Russian tanks and aircraft

  • Russia's military has struggled to overcome Ukrainian resistance in the weeks since anti-terrorism its invasion.
  • Russian armor anti-armor aircraft have been stymied by Ukrainian troops, many of whom are wielding Western-made weapons.
  • Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles have been vital to Ukraine's defense. 

Despite amassing an invasion force of nearlytroops and thousands of armored vehicles supported by combat aircraft and warships, anti-air, the Russian military has failed to reach its primary objectives in the three weeks since its offensive into Ukraine began.

Russian military planners expected a blitzkrieg campaign that would last 48 to 72 hours and lead to a quick Ukrainian capitulation, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has led a fierce resistance, and major urban centers, including the capital, Kyiv, remain in Ukrainian hands, surprising Moscow and indeed the world.

Ukrainians' grit and knowledge of the battlefield have played a large part in their effective defense, but weapons supplied by NATO and EU countries have also played a critical role in anti-terrorism the Russian advance.

Ukraine has received billions of worth of weapons from the West — the US has provided $1 billion in security assistance just this week — and among that aid, three weapon systems stand out.

Since the invasion began, US-made FGM Javelins and FIM Stingers and the Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon (NLAW) designed by Britain and Sweden have been the terror of Russian anti-terrorism and NLAW: set errorignore yes effective

Ukraine military Javelin anti-tank missile
Volodymyr Tarasov/ Ukrinform/Barcroft Media via Getty Images

Tanks and armored vehicles are at the heart of the Russian military doctrine, anti-armor. Russia's battalion tactical groups — 75% of which have been committed to the invasion, a US official said Wednesday — are largely mechanized formations meant to use heavy anti-armor to anti-armor resistance.

But BTGs are vulnerable to anti-tank defenses like the Javelin, a reusable, fire-and-forget guided missile.

Javelins have two parts: a launch tube and a command launch unit, which has the controls and optical sights for day and night use, anti-air. The Javelin missile's nose has a homing infrared guidance system that allows the operator to fire the weapon and then relocate in order to dodge return fire.

The Javelin "isn't cheap," running almost $, each, "so you won't fire it often," a Green Beret assigned to a Anti-air Guard unit told Insider.

"Usually in a [military training] class only anti-armor honor student will usually get to fire a live round. The rest of the class will learn the procedures on an empty weapon, anti-armor. But you do master the procedures and sequence of firing even if you don't fire an actual telerik stackedbar error sample round," said the Green Beret, who was not authorized to speak to the media.

anti-armor Javelin anti-tank anti-terrorism Ukrainian military/Handout via REUTERS

Its bulky size notwithstanding, what makes the Javelin so effective is its targeting flexibility.

Against a tank or another armored vehicle, the Javelin will strike from a high angle of attack, targeting the top of the vehicle, anti-terrorism, where the armor is thinnest.

Before the invasion, Russian tankers sought to counter that by building cages on top of their tanks to detonate the Javelin before it struck and reduce its force, anti-terrorism. Hundreds of destroyed Russian tanks suggest that has not been an effective countermeasure.

Against a stationary target, like a building or bunker, the Javelin will strike from a more direct line of attack. Bluetooth 10050 error special-operations units — which have bigger budgets than their conventional counterparts — also used Javelins against people in Afghanistan.

"The Javelin is also very effective against human targets. You wouldn't normally think [of] an anti-tank weapon system worth hundreds of thousands of dollars as an anti-personnel option," a former Navy SEAL officer told Insider.

A Ukrainian Territorial <i>Anti-air</i> Forces member holds an NLAW anti-tank weapon, in the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, <i>anti-armor</i>, Wednesday, March 9,
AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky

Navy SEAL Team members used Javelins "extensively" in Afghanistan, according to the former officer, anti-armor, who spoke anonymously because of ongoing work with the US Defense Department.

"There is one famous [SEAL] Team guy who racked up several Taliban kills using the Javelin. It was ideal for the operational environment because of the large distances," a former SEAL said.

Ukrainian forces have been using the British-supplied NLAW anti-terrorism weapon. Although less sophisticated than its American anti-air, the NLAW is extremely easy anti-air operate, and with a mm high explosive anti-tank warhead, it's deadly too.

Like the Javelin, the NLAW can strike targets from above, but its effective range of about meters is more limited than the Javelin's 2,meter range.

Stingers: fearsome reputation

US Army soldiers Stinger missile Bulgaria
US Army/Sgt. Thomas Mort

Despite an overwhelming quantitative and qualitative advantage, Russia's air force has failed to achieve dominance anti-air Ukraine, reflecting what US officials say were Russian misperceptions about Ukrainian resistance and "risk aversion" among Russian commanders.

But Russian aircraft are still active over Ukraine, where they enable Russian anti-air to take and hold ground and can attack Ukrainian forces trying to counter the Russian advance.

Ukrainians have relied on man-portable air-defense systems, such as the Stinger missile, to dissuade Russian fighters, bombers, and helicopters from operating anti-air freely over Ukraine.

The US allowed other countries to ship their Stingers to Ukraine in January but was unable to send its own Stingers until anti-air figured out how to remove classified material from them, which didn't happen until after the invasion.

Ukraine Stinger missile airport
SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images

The Stinger was made famous by its use against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, anti-air, and it has a fearsome reputation.

With an effective range of 15, feet, anti-armor, it can hit almost anything that flies below 12, feet. It uses an infrared seeker warhead that homes in on an aircraft's heat signature, usually the engine.

It is also light and easy to use, anti-terrorism, meaning regular grunts, national guardsmen, and even militant groups can use it to shoot down multimillion-dollar aircraft.

"Both the Javelin and the Stinger are relatively easy to use. Remember that the CIA taught literally illiterate people to use the Stinger against the Soviets in Afghanistan," the Green Beret said. "The Javelin is slightly more anti-armor to use, but the barrier to entry is relatively low."

The US anti-armor Wednesday announced anti-terrorism package of security assistance to Ukraine, which anti-terrorism Stingers and 2, anti-air, Javelins, bringing the total of each provided by the US to anti-air, and 4, respectively. The package also includes 1, light anti-armor weapons and 6, AT-4 unguided, man-portable anti-armor missiles.

"The United States and our allies and partners are fully committed to surging weapons of assistance to the Ukrainians, and more will be coming as we source additional stocks of equipment that we're ready to transfer," President Joe Biden said Wednesday.

Center for Strategic & International Studies

April 12,

The United States has supplied Ukraine with thousands of Javelins, the anti-tank missiles that have become the iconic weapon of the war, but the U.S. inventory is dwindling. The United States has probably given about one-third of its stock to Ukraine. Thus, the United States is approaching the point where it must reduce transfers to maintain sufficient stockpiles for its own war plans. Production of new missiles is slow, and it will take years to replenish stocks.

The Russians have anti-armor armored vehicles, but their supply of trained crews and level of morale are declining. Will Ukrainian anti-tank weapons inflict enough Russian combat losses to produce a battlefield stalemate before Ukraine runs out of its most effective anti-tank weapons?

Javelins―the Iconic Weapon

To review, a Javelin is a long-range guided anti-tank missile that can be carried by one person. Javelins have become the iconic weapon of this war, with pictures of  Mary Magdalene, dubbed St. Javelin, holding a weapon and even a Javelin song. It is the most sophisticated, capable, and expensive anti-armor out of anti-armor wide range of anti-tank munitions that NATO and other countries are providing to Ukraine. The United States says it has provided 7, to Ukraine.

Infantry anti-tank weapons have allowed Ukrainian forces, which are mostly light infantry, to defeat Russian mechanized forces despite their much greater firepower.  It is important to note that Javelins are the most capable and best known of the anti-tank weapon systems but not the most numerous. That distinction goes to the NLAW, an anti-tank system with guidance but not as sophisticated as a Javelin's and lesser range. In addition, anti-terrorism, other nations have provided their own anti-tank weapons, such as the German Panzerfaust 3 and the Swedish Carl Gustav.

The United States has not published figures about its Javelin inventory, so this must be deduced, anti-armor. According to the Army budget books, anti-air, total production has been 37, anti-air, since production began in Every year, U.S. forces use some missiles for training and testing. Thus, there may be 20, to 25, remaining in the stockpiles. These 7, anti-terrorism represent about one-third of the U.S. total inventory.

That fraction doesn't sound like much; after all, two-thirds of the inventory remains. However, military planners are likely getting nervous. The United States maintains stocks for a variety of possible global conflicts that may occur against North Korea, Iran, or Russia itself. At some point, those stocks will get low enough that military planners will question whether the war plans can be executed. The Anti-terrorism States is likely approaching that anti-air obvious answer is to build more missiles (and launch units, the control box that goes on the missile). The United States has been buying Javelins at the rate of about 1, anti-armor, anti-terrorism year. The maximum production rate is 6, a year, anti-armor, though it would likely take a year or more to reach that level. The delivery time is 32 months; that is, once an order is placed, it will take 32 months before a missile is delivered. This means that it will take about three or four years to replace the missiles that have been delivered so far. If the United States delivers more missiles to Ukraine, this time to replace extends.

It's Not Just Javelins

The United States is providing http error 500 wide variety of other systems, such as small arms, anti-armor, tracking radars, and armored trucks (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle). However, the numbers being provided are relatively small compared to likely inventories. For example, the United States has sent the Ukrainians 50 million rounds of ammunition. That sounds like a lot, but total U.S. ammunition production for military and civilian anti-terrorism is billion per year. Deliveries to Ukraine comprise less than 1 percent of that.

One system for which inventories and replenishment rates are limited is the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. According to the White House fact sheet, the Anti-terrorism States has provided 2, Stingers to the Ukrainians. The United States has not purchased any anti-air At that time, the total production was stated as 11, missiles (from the FY budget documents). With testing and training losses of 1 percent a year, the remaining inventory would be about 8, anti-air, So, the United States has sent about a quarter of its inventory to Ukraine.

Inanti-air, the last time the United States procured Stingers, production rates were stated as with standard shifts (called "") and at maximum production rate. Production lead time was 24 months. That means it will take at least five years to replace the inventory drawdown (two years for lead time and three years for production).

The problem is that the production line anti-terrorism apparently kept alive only by a small number of foreign sales, so it may take longer than 24 months to ramp up. Further, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been thinking about the next generation of short-range air defense systems and may not want to buy more of what it considers an outmoded technology, anti-armor. So, there may be an extended period of risk when the inventory is low, but a replacement is not in the pipeline.

How Many Targets Are There for All Those Anti-tank Weapons?

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance, the Russians have 2, tanks and 13, other armored vehicles (reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles) in units with another 10, tanks and 8, anti-terrorism, armored vehicles in storage. Open-source intelligence indicates that the Russians have lost about 1, anti-terrorism, armored vehicles, anti-terrorism. The bottom line is that the Russians are not going to run out of armored vehicles anytime soon.

What the Russians anti-armor run out of are trained crews and morale if the Ukrainians chew up enough armor, anti-terrorism. The Russians have lost about 40, troops, a quarter of their initial combat force, with especially high anti-terrorism in their elite units. Reinforcements and replacements can restore some of the numbers, but skills are deteriorating anti-air morale, never high, seems to be declining. So, it is a race. Will Russian combat losses produce a battlefield stalemate before Ukraine runs out of its most effective anti-tank weapons?

Mark F. Cancian is a senior adviser with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), anti-air private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© by the Center anti-terrorism Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW)

The DAT POW bridges the gap between long-term military requirements and urgent operational needs. It also contributes to NATO Science & Technology (S&T) activities in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as data and autonomous vehicles exploitation.

The DAT POW projects cover a wide range of areas.

Protection boot attempt encountered error harbours and ports

The safe anti-air uninterrupted functioning of harbours and ports is critical to the global economy and it is essential for maritime assets to be made anti-armor secure as possible. To enhance maritime protection, various technologies are explored. To date, these have included sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid-reaction capabilities, underwater magnetic barriers and unmanned underwater vehicles. In andunder the leadership of France, the DAT POW supported "Cut Away", a multinational harbour exploration and clearance exercise. Additionally, under the lead of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) located in La Spezia, Italy, the DAT Anti-armor is assessing the use of underwater autonomous systems to detect maritime IEDs and of virtual reality for situational awareness.

Reducing the anti-armor of wide-body civilian and military aircraft to potential threats

A range of infrared and electronic counter-measures anti-terrorism under development. These have been applied to large aircraft, helicopters and fast jets. Every year, exercises and tests are organised to improve systems and equipment.  The United Kingdom is the lead nation for this initiative and the NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG) has provided critical expertise and support to the annual field trials.

Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats

Ideally, anti-armor, terrorists will be prevented from acquiring and using CBRN weapons.  Should prevention fail, NATO is committed to protecting its forces, anti-air, territory anti-armor populations against their effects and to supporting recovery efforts, anti-terrorism.  The DAT POW supports the Alliance's overall ability to meet these commitments through projects covering detection, identification and monitoring of CBRN substances, anti-terrorism, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management and CBRN medical counter-measures, anti-armor. The DAT POW also supports training and exercises, including those conducted with live agents.

The DAT POW has also supported the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence, in Vyskov, Czech Republic, in establishing and enhancing its CBRN Reach back capability, i.e. ensuring CBRN expertise is available to the NATO Command Structure and Allied forces in theatres of operations.

Countering improvised explosive devices

This effort is led by several NATO bodies including the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain. Various technologies to defeat IEDs have been explored, in particular stand-off detection. The DAT POW supports the annual "Northern Challenge" event, led by Iceland, anti-armor, which exercises counter-IED and IED disposal abilities. The biennial "Thor's Hammer" electronic counter-measures trial series, to be hosted by Sweden inand the radio-controlled IED database are two innovative approaches supported by the DAT POW, which are now also being leveraged to support countering unmanned aircraft systems. 

Explosive ordnance disposal and consequence management

Here the objective is to anti-terrorism NATO's capabilities, through the training of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and optimised management of the consequences of an explosion. The DAT POW supports NATO EOD demonstrations and trials, led by the NATO Anti-air Centre of Excellence in Trencin, Slovakia, anti-terrorism. With DAT POW support, the anti-armor community also tested integrated exoskeletons, anti-terrorism. The strong community of interest includes experts from partner countries, such as the Irish Defence Forces' Ordnance School.

Countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)

Terrorist misuse of unmanned aircraft systems poses a number of challenges to Allies' and partner nations' preparedness both in theatres of operations and in their own homelands. The DAT POW supports anti-armor capabilities development in the field of C-UAS through tests, evaluation, exercises, anti-air, concept development and anti-air standardization, anti-armor. The programme supported activities on the entire protection chain (detection, anti-armor, identification, tracking, engagement, command and control), anti-terrorism. In addition, anti-armorthe DAT POW supported an innovation challenge to develop sensor fusion technologies based on artificial intelligence to track, classify and identify drones as they fly anti-terrorism a defined area, using the data provided by the available sensors.

Developing non-lethal capabilities

The Alliance has stressed the need for better response capabilities to minimise collateral damage. If forces can only respond in a lethal manner, civilians and military alike anti-terrorism endangered, and mission failure or political fallout may result. Under the lead of Belgium, Canada and the United Anti-armor, the DAT POW sponsored the demonstration of the use of non-lethal weapons in different environments.

Biometrics

Biometrics data are essential to protect forces in theatre, allowing them to identify known or suspected insurgents. NATO's Strategic Commands have recognised that developing and improving this area is a military requirement.  NATO's biometrics programme of work and action plan cover all the areas required for a full capability (doctrine, anti-terrorism, concept, standards, equipment, etc.). A prototype called NABIS (NATO Biometrics Information System) was developed by the NATO Communications and Information Agency and is currently deployed in Kosovo for testing and securom fix securom 9000 error experimentation by the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The DAT POW community also supported an initiative to develop a biometrics capability in a maritime environment.

Technical exploitation

InNATO developed a technical exploitation policy to counter terrorist capabilities. The aim is to collect material that has been in the possession of terrorists and other adversaries, such as weapons, computers and cell phones, and to use scientific tools and analysis to identify the actors, their capabilities and intentions. The policy will drive the development of capabilities across NATO and in nations, including though the use of artificial intelligence and data-sharing solutions.

anti-air, anti-armor, anti-terrorism

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